These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
  The meaning and content of uncertainty as an extremely important systemic, structural, value, resource and security and risk related phenomenon are analyzed.
  The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of the role and meaning of uncertainty as a basic scientific category in riskology:
  Николай Слатински. Рискът – новото име на Сигурността. София: Изток-Запад, 2019.
   [Nikolay Slatinski. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019].
  Nikolay Slatinski. Risk – the new Name of Security. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019 (in Bulgarian)
  Uncertainty is an extremely important concept as it and risk are closely related; they are, metaphorically speaking, in a continuous and increasingly dynamic dance that takes our breath away.
  At the core of our world, of our lives, of our existence, and of our striving to be active and creative beings, is precisely uncertainty. Uncertainty infuses freedom into our endeavors, it makes us free, or at least free to seek freedom. Without uncertainty, life would be predetermined, obvious, predictable, devoid of the thrill of discovery – in short, life would be boring.
  The Science of Security in prominent Western universities and think tanks, where serious funds are invested in its development, is experiencing its renaissance. As different as their societies are, there is an understanding among their elites of the importance of supporting this science; there, the leading universities and institutes are led by leaders, scientists and managers for whom this is a mission, not a career step; for them, people engaged in scientific research and teaching are valuable and valued as a source of intelligence and creativity, they are not simply officials to be kept in submission, stress and fear and they are not an appendage, they are the main thing and the administration works for them, not the other way around.
  When the Science of Security enjoys priority attention, it rewards the country and feeds the country's elite with the most up-to-date, in-depth and meaningful analyzes and forecasts, provides alternative scenarios and solutions so that the rulers can, based on them, make their strategically true and adequate, correct and accurate choice.
  Why did the Science of Security become from a social science the Social Science? The answer lies in the epochal and comprehensive transformation that the world has experienced in the last 3-4 decades. It, as we have already seen in these Studies, is expressed in our entry into a new type of society, which is simultaneously globalized, postmodern, networked and risky.
  And when the world changes, when the structures and functions, as well as the goals and priorities of social relations inevitably change; and when this change, like any radical change, is accompanied by the generation of considerable uncertainty, unknownness, obscurity, ambiguity and insecurity, then the essence, meaning and content of the scientific category „Security“ also change, and hence the instrumentation (analytical, symbolic, conceptual and operational), with which security is studied, realized and managed.
  In the conditions of this change, the Science of Security in the USA and Europe is constantly modernizing and developing, upgrading and updating its language. At the same time, the Bulgarian Science of Security did not manage to modernize the language in which it interprets the problems, as it mechanically, in the spirit of political correctness, translated the Soviet Oldspeak into the Atlantic Newspeak. Simultaneously, it fell into a crisis and thus deepened its lagging behind the current searches in the leading centers, which, enriching themselves with new knowledge, methods and approaches, turned to a number of natural and social sciences. We will mention among the first the theory of chaos, the theory of catastrophes, the theory of games, the theory of fractals, etc., and among the second – cultural anthropology, social psychology, sociology, political science, etc.
  Newspeak – a neologism from the novel „1984“ (1948) by the English writer George Orwell (1903 – 1950). Analogously, we also form the neologism Oldspeak.
  Fractal – a mathematical object possessing the property of self-similarity, i.e. each part is similar to the set as a whole.
  Note. Clarifications for which no source is explicitly indicated are based on texts and definitions for them in Wikipedia.
  Even when it borrows, correctly or not, new concepts already introduced in the West, Bulgarian Science of Security as a rule resorts to the literal translation, relying on their most obvious, closest to the mind and traditional content. In this way, it moves away from the true meaning invested in them, distorting and damaging both these concepts and itself.
  For example, in Bulgaria, in the translation of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1944 – 2015), as a characteristic of the Risk Society the expression „manufactured insecurities“ is used [1]. The same in the same context applies to the translation of the English sociologist Anthony Giddens (1938) [2]. But they use uncertainty, not insecurity.
  In Bulgarian, „insecure“ („несигурен“) has two meanings:
  1. I am not sure (i.e. uncertainty): „I am not sure that I will succeed in this endeavor“; and
  2. I am not in a state of security (i.e. insecurity): „I am in insecurity because of this threat“.
  The literal translation of uncertainty as insecurity, even to some extent correct, still distorts the understanding, because in Bulgarian, insecurity (несигурност) is thought of as the opposite of security (сигурност), but in the real context it is the opposite of certainty.
  In fact, what Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens wanted to say is not that the Risk Society is risky just because there is a lot of insecurities in it, but because it has – and this is first of all, mostly and mainly – many uncertainties and precisely because of them, because of this excessively high degree of uncertainty, unknownness, obscurity, ambiguity, additional, even more insecurity arises.
  This is about the very understanding of the deep and complex nature of the Risk Society.
  Apparently, our significant sociologist Georgi Fotev (1941) was somewhat misled by the translation. Starting from „serially manufactured insecurities“, he reasoned about risk in terms of insecurity and therefore argued that: „Risk is related to insecurity and its magnitude/size is determined by the magnitude of insecurity... It is necessary to turn again to their systematic definition with a view to clarifying the problem of serially manufactured insecurities in society, which is characterized as risky“ [3].
  We will add the changed meaning in the book „Cultures and Organizations: Software for the Mind“ [4] by the Dutch culturologist Geert Hofstede (1928 – 2020). In the Bulgarian translation, the reader encounters the term „insecurity avoidance“ in different cultures – some that try to avoid insecurity as much as possible, and others that are not afraid of it and more easily accept it. But Hofstede himself writes not about avoiding insecurity, but about avoiding uncertainty (uncertainty avoidance) – i.e. to avoid uncertainty, unknownness, obscurity, ambiguity. And this is something completely different, radically different, and it characterizes individual cultures far more deeply and comprehensively.
  And in the theory of the Israeli psychologists Daniel Kahneman (1934) and Amos Tversky (1937 – 1996) for making decisions in complex situations (the title of the book in which they present this theory of theirs is indicative: „Judgement under Uncertainty“ [5], not Judgment under Insecurity), the term „Security Effect“ was used in the translation into Bulgarian. The problem is that the authors are not talking about the security effect, but about the certainty effect – about the effect of certainty, clarity, awareness, lucidity, i.e. of security in the sense of confidence. According to this „psychological effect of decreasing probability from certain to probable" [6], people prefer not to take risk when they expect to win or the probability of losing is small; on the contrary – they tend to take risks when they expect to lose or the probability of winning is small [7].
  In 2002, Daniel Kahneman received the Nobel Prize in Economics for scientific results achieved together with Amos Tversky (the Nobel Prize is not awarded to scientists who have died).
  Apparently, some Bulgarian translators are aware of this problem. Some of them think that the context makes it abundantly clear what kind of security/insecurity is involved, and they are satisfied with that. Others are looking for some solution to the problem. For example, in the translation of the book „The Black Swan“ by the Lebanese-American economist and essayist Nasim Taleb (1960), for „certainty“ is sometimes used „security and certainty“, and for „uncertainty“ is used „insecurity and uncertainty“. See for example, the translations of the sentences from the original „We are suckers for those who help us navigate uncertainty“ and „Demand some certainties“ [8, 9].
  We will use for uncertainty the parable of the genius ancient Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427 – 347 BC) about the cave and the shadows! In Book Seven of Plato's Republic, Socrates converses with Glaucon, Plato's brother:
   „Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern with a long entrance open to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built... See also, then, men carrying past the wall implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent... tell me do you think that these men would have seen anything of themselves or of one another except the shadows cast from the fire on the wall of the cave that fronted them? ... In every way such prisoners would deem reality to be nothing else than the shadows of the artificial objects“ [10].
  Socrates (469 – 399 BC) – a great ancient Greek philosopher, whose teachings marked a turning point in philosophy – from the study of nature to the study of man.
  The prisoners see only the shadows on the wall and consider them to be the real images. For them, they are not a reflection of reality, but reality itself. And we in our human life think that reality is what we see. In fact, we see a particle of reality, the shadow of reality, our vision is clouded by the presence of something that makes the visible images incomplete, vague and ... uncertain. Uncertainty is that of reality that we do not see through the senses. And we can „paint“ it to a certain completeness, „write“ it to a certain completion – on the basis of our experience or on the basis of our intuition, i.e. either on the basis of what we have experienced and imprinted in our consciousness up to that moment, or through the help of the imagination, of the fantasy that anticipates the future and builds on reality – fantasy as a flight of thought above and beyond reality.
  Socrates from the parable lays out the way before us towards the attainment of reality in a fuller measure – that is the liberation from the fetter of concrete time and concrete space, i.e. from the specific slice of time and the specific piece of space. Only in this way will we understand that what we see and consider to be real images are projections on the wall of life and therefore to a large extent they are nothing more than illusions. And it could not be otherwise, because these are only shadows, flat and colorless projections of the three-dimensional and multi-colored images in and of reality.
  But there are two very complicated issues here:
  ‣ Whether and to what extent we will be able to realize – when our senses are freed from their fetter – that what they see are the true essences of things and phenomena?
  ‣ To what extent and whether we will prove stronger than the inertia and the routine, the habit and the comfort of continuing to think that the shadows are the real images and their prototypes are our delusions and false ideas, our fear of the unknown and of recognizing of our own, delusions tempting us?
  Turning uncertainty into certainty is very much a painful process – because it can blind us, because it requires us to outgrow ourselves, to upgrade ourselves, to accept that the lack of knowledge has distorted our ideas, and hence it is deformed our minds and therefore ourselves.
  Unraveling uncertainty, or at least lowering its level and scope, requires efforts – intellectual, thought, value.
  A very important problem in Plato's allegory is what will happen when the one who is freed from the fetter and has seen the true nature of things, returns to his fettered comrades? How will he be met and what will be the attitude today to the one who, at least partially, but still managed to unravel the uncertainty?
  According to Plato, the one who returned and was freed from the fetter of illusion would be regarded as ridiculous and foolish by his fellows, until he himself again reverted to the old perceptions of shadows as true images. At the same time, the other prisoners may even consider him sick, damaged, and they may even kill him.
  In the real world, they don't kill for revealing uncertainty, but the fate of those scientists and specialists who see further and deeper than the mainstream is not easy at all; and to see farther and deeper, that is the result of the effort to unravel the uncertainty, to reduce it in quantity and to change it in quality.
  What human life is – constant efforts to unravel the uncertainty, accompanied by the realization that this unraveling is possible only partially, only up to a point, and therefore our efforts are to a discouraging degree doomed to failure, and they will bring us the consolation of success only up to a point, and as much as a single grain.
  The effort to unravel the uncertainty is Sisyphean. But if there was no point in Sisyphus' efforts, the myth of him would not have such meaning. This myth convinces that the effort is worth it, as long as the alternative is to despair, to stop our efforts, to give up. Therefore, a successful person is a person who does not give up.
  Sisyphean labor – hard, unbearable, useless work; from the myth of Sisyphus, who is condemned by Zeus after his death to climb a huge stone up a steep slope, and when he reaches the top, the stone falls down again and it starts all over again.
  We already know (see Etude 7) that for the American economist Frank Knight (1885 – 1972), risk is measurable uncertainty. If uncertainty is unmeasurable, it remains uncertainty [11].
  Or as Nassim Taleb writes, when probability can be calculated, then it is risk; when it cannot be calculated, it is uncertainty [12].
  So the practical difference between risk and uncertainty is that in risk the distribution of the possible outcome in a group of cases is known (by a priori calculation or from statistics from past experience), whereas in uncertainty this is not true, but in principle the cause is that it is then impossible to form a group of cases as a result, since the situation we are in is largely unique [13].
  Consider Frank Knight's now classic division between risk as measurable uncertainty and uncertainty as unmeasurable uncertainty, but also his profound, somewhat unexpected, highly original insight into uncertainty itself.

  It has already been said that when translating uncertainty into Bulgarian, insecurity (несигурност) is used as a rule. But this is insecurity in the sense of uncertainty, unknownness, obscurity, ambiguity, i.e. as the opposite of certainty, not security.
  Analogously, certainty is most often translated into Bulgarian as security, but security in the sense of certainty, clarity, awareness, lucidity, and not the basic category security.
  According to the logic of Frank Knight, UNCERTAINTY is divided into:
  And what about CERTAINTY?
  It is also divided into:
  And if:
  Our answer is that it is INSECURITY.
  In other words, CERTAINTY is divided into:
  To summarize once again our addition to Frank Knight's classic understanding of uncertainty and risk:
  So let's draw the line.
  • If uncertainty cannot be measured quantitatively, it should be considered as uncertainty.
  • If uncertainty can be measured quantitatively, it should be considered as risk.
  • If certainty cannot be measured quantitatively, it should be considered as insecurity.
  • If certainty can be measured quantitatively, it should be considered as certainty.
  We can now classify the concepts of certainty and uncertainty in terms of whether they are measurable or unmeasurable:
  • measurable certainty – certainty.
  • unmeasurable certainty – insecurity.
  • measurable uncertainty – risk.
  • unmeasurable uncertainty – uncertainty.

  Table 1. Supplement to the definitions of risk and uncertainty according to Frank Knight
  Note 1: This supplement was made by us.
  Note 2. In this table, the bottom row corresponds to the Frank Knight's definitions.
  Let us recall Donald Rumsfeld's four types of cognitive quantities (discussed in Study 7) – known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns, and unknown unknowns.
  US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (1932 – 2021) is the youngest US Secretary of Defense (1975 – 1977) and the oldest one (2001 – 2006).
  In Study 7, we showed the following binding of the four types of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld in accordance with the concepts of certainty and uncertainty and measurable and unmeasurable:
  • measurable certainty – known knowns.
  • unmeasurable certainty – unknown knowns.
  • measurable uncertainty – known unknowns.
  • unmeasurable uncertainty – unknown unknowns.

  Table 2. Relationship of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld with the concepts of certainty / uncertainty; measurable / unmeasurable
  Let's think about what Table 1 and Table 2 give us:
  • Measurable certainty is on the one hand certainty, and on the other hand it is known knowns.
  • Unmeasurable certainty is on the one hand insecurity, and on the other hand it is unknown knowns.
  • Measurable uncertainty is on the one hand risk, and on the other hand it is known unknowns.
  • Unmeasurable uncertainty is on the one hand uncertainty, and on the other hand it is unknown unknowns.
  What does this mean, how should we understand it, what is the point of these reasonings?
  Table 1 is a reflection of and at the same time it itself reflects the degree of uncertainty of the world and, rather, of the specific situation in which we find ourselves. We are immersed in this objectively existing world, it in any particular situation it is outside of us, it exists independently of our knowledge and perceptions about it.
  This is about ONTOLOGY, about the ontological dimension of our existence and how we perceive the realities of the world and their influence and impact on us.
  In this sense, Table 1 reveals to us a very essential part of the objectivity of the existing, it gives us the four objective phenomena from the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight – certainty, insecurity, risk, uncertainty, which have an ontological status, which exist independently from our perceptions, from our claims for knowledge, from our subjective judgments of what they are and how likely they are to be realized.
  Ontology – a philosophical discipline that examines the general foundations and principles of existence and reality, existing and being, their structure, basic categories and regularities, how they relate to each other.
  At the same time, Table 2 is a reflection of and at the same time it itself reflects the extent of our knowledge about the world and rather, about the specific situation in which we find ourselves. Yes, we are immersed in the objectively existing world, but in any particular situation we strive through our perceptions and analytical capabilities to gain as much knowledge about it as possible.
  This is about EPISTEMOLOGY, about the epistemological dimension of our existence and how we perceive the realities of the world and their influence and impact on us.
  In this sense, Table 2 reveals to us a very essential part of the subjectivity of our attitude to the existing, it gives us the four subjective phenomena of the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld – known knowns, unknown knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns, which have an epistemological status, which reflect our, to one degree or another, incomplete knowledge about the existing, about the world in general and about the specific situation in particular.
  Epistemology – a section of philosophy, a general theory of knowledge, determining the foundations, the validity criteria of scientific knowledge in relation to both the exact sciences (mathematics and logic) and the natural and experimental sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc.).
  Supplementing Frank Knight's definitions and linking them to Donald Rumsfeld's cognitive quantities allows another terminological, rather categorical breakthrough!
  Let us first recall that in Study 4 it was shown that the basic categories of challenge, risk, danger, threat can be systematized into a relation for which in English it is convenient to use the acronym „CreDiT“, with an addition of „e“ and „i“ for euphony – respectively Challenge-Risk-Danger-Threat.
  It turns out that reasoning analogous to the above applies as well to these four basic categories – challenge, risk, danger, threat – thus also binding them in a general classification with the concepts of certainty and uncertainty and measurable and unmeasurable.
  As for the binding of the four basic categories of the relationship „CreDiT“ with certainty and uncertainty and measurable and unmeasurable, we have (see also Study 7):
  • measurable certainty – threat.
  • unmeasurable certainty – danger.
  • measurable uncertainty – risk.
  • unmeasurable uncertainty – challenge.

  Table 3. Binding of the categories from the relationship „CreDiT“ (challenge, risk, danger, threat) with the concepts of certainty / uncertainty; measurable / unmeasurable
  As for the connection of the four basic categories of the relationship „CreDiT“ (challenge, risk, danger, threat) with the four types of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld – known knowns, known unknowns, unknowns knowns and unknown unknowns, we have the following:
  • threat – known knowns.
  • danger – unknown knowns.
  • risk – known unknowns.
  • challenge – unknown unknowns).

  Table 4. Relationship between the categories of the relationship „CreDiT“ (challenge, risk, danger, threat) and the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld
  Again, it is necessary to introduce clarifications to help the reader emerge unscathed from the abundance of different concepts and connections between them. This is required at least because, if we compare Table 1 and Table 3, it turns out that according to them:
  • Measurable certainty is on the one hand certainty, and on the other hand it is threat.
  • Unmeasurable certainty is on the one hand insecurity, and on the other hand it is danger.
  • Measurable uncertainty is on the one hand risk, and on the other hand it is also risk.
  • Unmeasurable uncertainty is on the one hand uncertainty, and on the other hand it is challenge.
  We cannot help but ask ourselves: How are we to understand all this?
  Well here's how.
  Table 1, as we said, is a reflection of and at the same time it reflects the degree of uncertainty of the world and, rather, of the specific situation in which we find ourselves. It, by its ontological essence and, therefore, from an ontological point of view, it gives us what the world as a whole and, above all, the specific situation brings us.
  In other words, it brings us one of the four possible objective phenomena of supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight – certainty, insecurity, risk, uncertainty – that have an ontological status.
  But we – and this clearly and irrefutably tells us Table 3 – as a function of the objectively existing world outside us, and above all as a function of the specific situation, based on our incomplete knowledge about the objective reality – subjectify, i.e. we try, we strive, we tend to perceive subjectively what this reality brings us – through the prism of, with the help of, by means of, through the categories of the relationship „CReDiT“– challenge, risk, danger, threat.
  This is where the explanation of the ontological uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“! Here is the key to the Risk Society as one of the dimensions of the epochal, radical transformation that our world is experiencing!
  In fact, we are talking about a coincidence here, about both a stunning and a natural coincidence.
  The ontological, that which is outside of us, i.e. what the world brings us, coincides with what is in us, with our attitude to what is happening, with our attitude to what the world brings us. And they enter into resonance, cause our whole being to vibrate strongly, insist on proactive behavior, on action, which will not allow potential trouble to arise, because if it does arise even as a seed, as a tiny foreshadowing of trouble, as a vague outline of trouble, it can very quickly lead to a disaster.
  Let's point out again the uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“ – this is a coincidence between what the world brings to us and our perception of what the world brings to us!
  One more thing – it turns out that according to Table 2 and Table 4:
  • Known knowns are, on the one hand, certainty, and on the other hand, they are threat.
  • Unknown knowns are, on the one hand, insecurity, and on the other hand, they are danger.
  • Known unknowns are, on the one hand, risk, and on the other hand, they are also risk.
  • Unknown unknowns are, on the one hand, uncertainty and on the other hand, they are challenge.
  And again the question arises: How are we to understand all this?
  Well here's how.
  Table 2, as already mentioned, is a reflection of and at the same time it reflects the degree of our knowledge about the world and, rather, about the specific situation in which we find ourselves. It, by its epistemological essence and, therefore, from an epistemological point of view, gives how we, with our always to some extent incomplete knowledge about the existing, about the world in general and about the specific situation in particular, perceive these realities of the world and their influence and impact on us.
  In other words, we cognize the world in terms of one of four possible subjective phenomena of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld – known knowns, unknown knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns – that have epistemological status.
  But we – relying on our subjective incomplete knowledge about the world and, above all, about the specific situation, based on the awareness of our subjective attitude to the independent and existing reality outside us – objectify, i.e. we try, we strive, we tend to perceive objectively, what we know about the reality, through the prism of, with the help of, by means of, through the categories of the relationship „CReDiT“– challenge, risk, danger, threat.
  Here again is the unraveling of the epistemological uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“! Here again is the key to the Risk Society as one of the dimensions of the epochal, radical transformation that our world is experiencing!
  In fact, we are talking again about a coincidence here, about both a stunning and a natural coincidence.
  The epistemological, that which is outside us, i.e. what we know about the world coincides with what is in us, with our attitude to what is happening, with our attitude to what we know about the world. And they enter into resonance, cause our whole being to vibrate strongly, demand proactive behavior, action, which will not allow potential trouble to arise, because if it does arise even as a seed, as a tiny foreshadowing of trouble, as a vague outline of trouble, it can very quickly lead to a disaster.
  Let's point out again the uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“ – this is a coincidence between what we know about the world and our perception of what we know about the world!
  Two great economists with a significant contribution to the understanding of the concept of „risk“ and its relationship with the concept of „uncertainty“ are the several times mentioned Frank Knight and also the genius of economic science John Maynard Keynes (1883 – 1946).
  We already know that for Frank Knight, risk is measurable uncertainty; and uncertainty is immeasurable uncertainty.
  John Maynard Keynes, for his part, did not distinguish risk from uncertainty. According to him, life is dominated by uncertainty, not probability. If life obeyed the laws of probability, then people would have no choice and no influence on the course of events [16]. As early as 1937, Keynes wrote:
   „By ‘uncertain’ knowledge … I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty... Or, again, the expectation of life is only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is only moderately uncertain. The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position of private wealthowners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know“.
  An amazing admission, rather an insight of the great scientist: there are cases when „there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever“, and therefore „we simply do not know“! There are cases, and they are the rule rather than the exception, when we simply do not know. Not knowing is an awareness that there is uncertainty. Uncertainty means not only lack of knowledge or unreliability of knowledge about reality [18]. It means or can also mean basic ignorance of reality.
  Uncertainty means both unknownness, obscurity (ignorance); unreliability (incompleteness, insufficiency, inadequacy, vagueness); ambiguity [19]; as well insecurity. We don't know, that's why we feel ambiguity, vagueness, we are placed in the obscurity, we feel uncertainty, and therefore we are in insecurity! Uncertainty leads to insecurity.
  In this context and with such a formulation of the question, Keynes is really right! Our decisions are not evidence of helplessness. They matter. It is within our power to change the world – large parts or at least small parts of it; long stories, or at least short sentences of it – precisely because, as Keynes believed, as we make decisions, we change the world! Another question is whether this change is for the better or for the worse – and to what it will be is precisely what depends on us. And it has nothing to do with it (in our opinion, „almost“ - i.e. almost nothing to do with it) spinning the roulette wheel [20]. An economic entity can motivate its pro-risk, risk-seeking behavior with the goal of either maximizing expected results or minimizing input resources – this depends on the chosen strategy, but it is important to understand that if this entity is an active and strategic player, then before him is not the question WHETHER TO TAKE RISKS?; the question is, as is clear from what has just been said, only HOW TO TAKE RISKS?, seeking an optimal ratio between goals and resources.
  Emotionally, psychologically, and mentally, it is much easier to live in terms of uncertainty, being Knight than Keynes.
  Frank Knight „cuts off“ a large and appetizing piece of uncertainty – that is measurable uncertainty – and calls it „risk“. Researchers emphasize „measurable“ and forget, or at least underestimate, neglect the presence of a second word – „uncertainty“. It turns out that we have an uncertainty that is not an uncertainty just because it is measurable. In other words, uncertainty, uncertainty, but measurable. And why do we fail to say – measurable, measurable, but uncertainty!? Indeed, Knight reserves „uncertainty“ for immeasurable uncertainty, and „reserves“ „risk“ for measurable uncertainty. But it does not follow that measurable uncertainty is less uncertainty than unmeasurable uncertainty! It would have been more fair to measurable uncertainty if for „uncertainty“ Knight had used „unmeasurable uncertainty“. The very term „risk“ is unjustified here! Because its merits are not given full credit – risk is actually a measure of victory over uncertainty. Risk is that part of the uncertainty that it himself has won from uncertainty, that it has revealed.
  Risk really is a victory over uncertainty! True – over measurable uncertainty. But the better we learn to measure uncertainty, the more of it we can measure, the more space and freedom risk gets. Of course, the uncertainty is not only objectively existing, it is through no small part of it also subjectively existing – because of the specifics of the person who knows and takes risks. But with efforts to know (to measure) the uncertainty, i.e. to make it measurable, the subjective uncertainty attracts to itself the objective uncertainty, „eats“ it, reduces it, and the epistemological in the uncertainty grows at the expense of the ontological. This is the famous phrase: „I know that I know nothing“ Rather, the more I know, the more I know that I do not know. The longer the radius of the circle of our knowledge, the greater the reach with our ignorance. Anyone who is seriously engaged in science knows that the deeper he goes into the matter, the more new knowledge appears that he did not suspect. Thus, one book draws behind it another to read, it – a third, and so on.
   „I know that I know nothing“ – a catchphrase attributed to Socrates (according to Plato).
  The reverse to a certain extent, although with an inverted logic, is also true – objective uncertainty attracts to itself subjective uncertainty and thus increases it, grows it – objective uncertainty gives itself, gives a part of itself because of it and in its name. Yes, part of the world is unknowable – the ontological content of uncertainty, when striving to be known and learned, inevitably turns from our general and inherent ignorance of the world (ontology) – into our personal ignorance, into the incompleteness of our knowledge, of the knowledge of the individual or the community of individuals (epistemology).
  Therefore, in our opinion, it is much easier to be Knight than Keynes!
For Knight, risk seems to have „bitten“ uncertainty and is slowly and inexorably devouring it.   Knight, of course, is keenly aware that risk can never absorb all uncertainty. Not only because there will always be uncertainty and risk efforts are limited – both by time and space, but also by the epistemological and ontological nature of uncertainty. Neither our knowledge can become absolute, but will remain only relative, nor can the world be absolutely knowable, but will remain only relatively knowable. The more we turn unmeasurable uncertainty into measurable uncertainty, i.e. we are bitten it at one end and swallowed it, the more uncertainty is produced from the other end. It has been and will be – the transformation of unmeasurable uncertainty into measurable uncertainty is accompanied by the emergence of new unmeasurable uncertainty.
  Uncertainty is like a many-headed Hydra. In this non-appealable judgment also lies the beauty, the uncertainty and ... the riskiness of our world.
  The Hydra, the Lernaean Hydra – a monster from ancient Greek mythology, with the body of a snake and the nine heads of a dragon, with poisonous breath. She inhabited the swamps around the city of Lerna, where the entrance to the underground kingdom was also located. Fighting her was difficult, as two new ones grew in place of each severed head, and one of her heads was immortal.
  Being Keynes rather than Knight is much more difficult. If for Knight uncertainty is actually uncertainty that has not yet been measured (assuming that as we conquer territory from it at one end, at its „other“ end it continues to grow), then for Keynes uncertainty in a significant part of itself is once and forever immeasurable, unfathomable, irreversible and insurmountable! This part of it cannot be entered, we must say that we simply do not know about it. Or as Keynes might have reasoned: the uncertainty of risk cannot be tamed by means of uncertainty risk [21].
  When we talk about uncertainty, especially through the understanding of a person like Keynes, we can skim the surface and perceive uncertainty as a completely objective phenomenon that exists outside of us. Not only would this be a wildly inaccurate interpretation, it would also be grossly unfair to Keynes. He indeed disputes the subjective approach to epistemological probabilities – according to him, the subjectivity of probabilities is not such a problem – it is actually an objective relationship between knowledge and probabilities, insofar as knowledge is disembodied, not individual [22]. But Keynes always accounts for the subjective dimension of uncertainty – and not only as a degree of our ignorance of objective reality (an ignorance that can be reduced but not completely overcome), but also as a reflection of the inescapable fact that any assessment of the situation and the actions we will take, including the risk we will take, always have an element of subjectivity, and it imports subjective uncertainty to objective uncertainty. Often „imports“ is inaccurate – the subjective uncertainty we „import“ not only adds itself to the objective uncertainty, but increases it. Just as objective uncertainty reduces subjective uncertainty.
  Here is the second feature of Keynes's understanding of uncertainty!
  ‣ The first feature is, to recall again, that there is a significant portion of uncertainty that remains forever undefined, unknown, unfathomable and unknowable.
  ‣ The second feature is that subjective uncertainty increases objective uncertainty and vice versa – objective uncertainty decreases subjective uncertainty.
  This, if a person thinks about it, will seem both natural and relatively easy to explain.
  Since some of the uncertainty is unknowable (we simply do not know!), it is logical to assume that the objective uncertainty will „feel“ damaged, unfairly aggrieved, and in its efforts to expand its scope, to compensate for the part of itself that is a priori unknowable, it will „tempt“, attract subjective indeterminacy to itself, „eat“ it, reduce it, and the ontological in the uncertainty will increase at the expense of the epistemological.
  We don't know if such a phrase exists, but it has every reason to claim famous: „About the world is known that nothing is known!“.
  Rather, the more we get to know the world, the more we realize that we haven't gotten to know it. Imagine a circle enclosing how much we have known the world, and outside that circle is how much we have not known the world. Then the larger the radius of the circle, i.e. the more we have known the world, the greater the reach of the circle with how much we have not known the world. Again, anyone who is serious about science knows that the more he gets to know the object of the world he is studying, the more he realizes that he knows little about it, new knowledge about the world arises that he did not even suspect. And so one book draws another to be read, it – a third, and so on.
  The reverse is partly also true – subjective uncertainty attracts objective uncertainty to itself and thus increases it, grows it – gives itself to it, gives of itself for it, gives itself away for its sake. Our knowledge, the epistemological content of uncertainty, in an effort to be acquired, expanded, assimilated, turns from our common and inherent knowledge, knowledge of the individual or the community of individuals (epistemology) into knowledge of the world, into the incompleteness of knowledge of the world (ontology). What we lack as knowledge, which is actually our ignorance, inevitably turns into a deficit of knowledge about the world, into our falling into the arms of not knowing the world in particular and the unknowability of the world – in general.
  If we sum up:
  ■ According to Frank Knight:
  › the risk „eats“, „swallows“ from one end the uncertainty, while at the same time uncertainty grows from the other end (all this – to put it completely conditionally).
  › subjective uncertainty reduces objective uncertainty and objective uncertainty increases subjective uncertainty.
  ■ According to John Maynard Keynes:
  › there is a part of uncertainty that always remains uncertainty and risk „can't“ do anything about it, there „we simply do not know“, and when uncertainty increases, it happens simultaneously – with an increase in uncertainty that can be overcome and to turn into certainty, and with the increase of uncertainty, which will remain uncertainty.
  › subjective uncertainty increases objective uncertainty and objective uncertainty decreases subjective uncertainty.
  In this sense, it will not be an exaggeration if we conclude that Frank Knight's views on uncertainty and risk are ontological in nature, and in their main content they gravitate towards and predominantly turn out to be in the direction of the objective approach to reality and its processes or phenomena; while the views of John Maynard Keynes on uncertainty and risk are epistemological in nature, and in their main content they gravitate towards and predominantly find themselves in the direction of the subjective approach to reality and its processes or phenomena.
  And this is what another remarkable person, the Austrian and later American economist Ludwig von Mises (1881 – 1973) says:
   „We may assume that the outcome of all events and changes is uniquely determined by eternal unchangeable laws governing becoming and development in the whole universe. We may consider the necessary connection and interdependence of all phenomena, i.e., their causal concatenation, as the fundamental and ultimate fact. We may entirely discard the notion of undetermined chance. But however that may be, or appear to the mind of a perfect intelligence, the fact remains that to acting man the future is hidden. If man knew the future, he would not have to choose and would not act. He would be like an automaton, reacting to stimuli without any will of his own“ [23].
  Despite different, often antagonistic economic views, especially with Keynes – with his understanding that uncertainty, although related to the limitations of our knowledge, is an immutable and key condition for the existence of freedom of choice [24] – Mises is not only 'in-between' Knight's and Keynes' understandings of uncertainty and risk, and even reconciles them.
  ‣ On the „ontological-epistemological“ axis, Mises is closer to Knight;
  ‣ On the „objective-subjective“ axis, as paradoxical as it may sound, Mises is closer to Keynes.
  Actually, this seems both logical and correct:
  › On the one hand, risk will always „eat“, „swallow“ some part of the uncertainty, while at the same time uncertainty continues to grow. But there is always and always will be uncertainty, which will always remain uncertainty, where „we simply do not know“. And whenever and however uncertainty grows, it will naturally happen at the same time – both with an increase in the part of it that can be overcome, and with an increase in the part of it that is doomed to remain uncertainty.
  › On the other hand, two mutually accelerating or mutually „extinguishing“ processes are taking place – as subjective uncertainty reduces objective uncertainty, and objective uncertainty increases subjective uncertainty; so also subjective uncertainty increases objective uncertainty, and objective uncertainty decreases subjective uncertainty. This is the other name of life or is it even life itself!
  So indeed uncertainty according to Keynes, Mises and Knight is an inalienable feature of social reality. Therefore, the consequences of our actions, especially in the more distant future, cannot be (at least partially) more accurately assessed [25].
  We are faced with an undeniable fact – we cannot clarify what risk is before we understand (and not just define) – what uncertainty is.
  Let's repeat:
  In fact, it is not strange that in Bulgarian uncertainty is translated as insecurity. Such a translation should be accepted as normal and natural, as long as we do not constantly think of insecurity only as the opposite of security!
  As it was said, security (respectively insecurity) in Bulgarian has two meanings:
  ‣ the first is related to the category of „security“, which is central to the science of society.
  With this meaning we can say:
  I am not / Community is not / Society is not in a state of security.
  ‣ the second is related to ignorance, obscurity, ambiguity, uncertainty.
  With this meaning we can say:
  I am not sure / Community is not sure / Society is not sure whether the economy of the country will have better results next year.
  If it can be agreed that:
  ♦ when in Bulgarian, security (respectively, insecurity) is understood primarily as a CONDITION, it is more accurate to think of it as a PROCESS, but let's not complicate the interpretation now), i.e. as a NOUN, it then refers to the fundamental scientific category „security“ (and its opposite is „insecurity“);
  ♦ when in Bulgarian, security (respectively, insecurity) is understood primarily as a CHARACTERISTIC OF A GIVEN CONDITION (more precisely – a CHARACTERISTIC OF A GIVEN PROCESS), i.e. as an ADJECTIVE, it then refers to that „security“ which in English is „certainty“ (and its opposite is „uncertainty“).
  Uncertainty is an essential characteristic of the environment. This allows us to trace the causes of uncertainty, what it is due to, what it is caused by, and it will lead us to the two main types of uncertainty – (1) the one encoded in the environment, in the world as a whole, i.e. ONTOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY; and (2) the other encoded in our knowledge of the environment, of the world as a whole, i.e. EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNCERTAINTY.
  Webster's Dictionary explains „uncertain“ as: not definitely established or fixed; is not confident; not clearly or precisely defined; unclear, cloudy; subject to change, changeable; lack of predictability [26]. And these definitions can address both the epistemological and the ontological sides of indeterminacy.
  For the completeness of the analysis of uncertainty, we will cite the following point of view – the very detailed approach of the German researchers and doctors Christoph Tannert (1946 – 2019), Horst-Dietrich Elvers and Burkhard Jandrig.
  According to them, uncertainty is of two types – objective and subjective.
  Objective uncertainty is also divided into two types – ontological and epistemological.
  Ontological uncertainty is the uncertainty inherent in the world around us, it is „is caused by the stochastic features of a situation, which will usually involve complex technical, biological and/or social systems. Such complex systems are often characterized by nonlinear behaviour, which makes it impossible to resolve uncertainties by deterministic reasoning and/or research“. In such situations, it is practically impossible to make rational decisions, therefore the decision-makers are also faced with the dilemma of resorting to the so-called „quasi-rational“ decisions. An example is the behavior of the rational player in financial markets or in relation to ecosystems – both are highly unpredictable as developments, yet past experience and probabilistic reasoning can provide some relatively robust guidelines for analyzing – how such complex systems could react and act.
  Stochastic – random; in the stochastic or random process there is an uncertainty about its future development (evolution), described by probability distributions. This means that even if the initial condition (or starting point) is known, there are many possibilities for how the process can unfold, and some realizations may be more likely than others.
  Epistemological uncertainty arises from gaps in knowledge that can be filled through scientific research. In this uncertainty, decision-makers should strive to increase their level of knowledge, their scientific and expert awareness – both regarding the specific situation and analogous risks, and also about modern trends in the management of crisis situations and the management of complex systems.
  On the other hand, subjective uncertainty is also divided into two types – rule-related and value-related.
  The uncertainty associated with rules can also be called normative uncertainty. In such situations, decision makers must be primarily intuitive. This means that one acts on the basis of previously formed fundamental value principles and experiences based on moral motivational impulses. Such decisions are defined as „intuitive“, relying on intuition.
  The uncertainty associated with values can also be called moral uncertainty. In such situations, decision makers must follow more general rules based on values and morality. Similar rules are Kant's categorical moral imperative and the Hippocratic Oath [27].

  Table 5. Systematization of uncertainties and solutions [28]
  Categorical imperative – a basic concept in the ethics of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), formulating a moral prescription with the power of an unconditional principle of human behavior. Morality, according to Kant, must be absolute, universal, generally significant, i.e. to have the form of law. For Kant, there is only one such law: „Act in such a way that the maxim of your behavior can always be valid as a principle of a universal law“.
  Hippocratic Oath – an oath traditionally taken by doctors to practice medicine ethically. It is believed to have been written by Hippocrates (460 BC – c. 365, called the father of medicine) in the 4th century BC or by one of his disciples.
  Uncertainty is therefore uncertainty because it is … uncertain. The question is whether it is in principle uncertain or it can be reduced in quantity and quality. Uncovering uncertainty is about assessing its scope and depth. And the assessment of something as fundamental as uncertainty is invariably connected with our faith, not only and not even primarily with our religious faith, but with faith and trust in the world, i.e. with the supports and imperatives of our worldview, that is, with our belief in how things are around us and in us, how they are connected and prioritized; from which it follows that it is about our understanding of the processes and phenomena that surround us or occur in our inner world. We bring to our evaluations our values (value and values are highly intertwined and interdependent), our views, complexes and fears. Mathematical equations are solved independently of the solver's personality, but life's equations are not. We strive to describe the world, the event, with mathematical equations to protect ourselves from any subjectivity, but the resulting solution is only a first approximation of reality. This has a particularly strong impact on processes related to risk management – as much as we suggest that defining, assessing a risk is not that complicated – you simply multiply the probability of what could happen by the possible damage if happened and … done! A x B = C. But the problem is that in determining both the probability of something happening and the possible damage if it happens, the subjective factor, everything that we are, has a very strong impact.
  And if the Talmud says:
  We see things not as they are, but as we are.
  We can paraphrase it with full right and say:
  We assess risks not as they are, but as we are.
  The Talmud („instructions“) – considered an authoritative record of religious discussions of Jewish law, ethics, legends, and stories; primary source for Judaism's law, customs, and moral values.
  It is clear that such subjectivization of the approach to risks is not a rational prerequisite for correct, but rather for objective assessment. But whatever we think and say about risk assessment, the relationship between uncertainty (it is too vague, too general, too abstract, too ... uncertain) and risk assessment (it must be as precise, as accurate, as specific as possible, as clear) – this is the probability.
  Probability is the path that takes us from the abstractness of uncertainty to the concreteness of risk assessment.
  Uncertainty cannot be but uncertainty, but risk cannot be left in the bosom of uncertainty. That is why risk management is studied – because it is overcoming the abyss of uncertainty and reducing it to some understandable and conceptual assessment. And it can happen – if it happens at all and even if only partially – through probability!
  With its birth, the concept of „probability“ and thinking about probability take two paths, long not intersecting, gaining length with difficulty, through the swamps of doubt, the thorns of ignorance, the gorges of illusions, the sands of delusion.
  From today's point of view, it is unbelievable that such different approaches and understandings have not discredited and maligned the most important thing – that it is actually about one concept, one scientific category – probability.
  Today it seems easy: we take this category and say – it is such and such, we call its first manifestation this, the other – otherwise. But once upon a time, in the age of mathematical exploration of the world –
  when philosophers and mathematicians, philosopher-mathematicians were guided above all by intuition, by the guess that the world of reality and the world of mathematics are the same world and therefore mathematics can not only hypothetically but absolutely necessarily describe this world, to offer at least a model for understanding the main processes and phenomena in it –
  it was a truly intellectual miracle that even sometimes speaking in different languages and using their understandings for different cognitive purposes, the wise minds of that time clearly realized that both the one concept, and the other concept, are nothing more than two extremely inherent features, sides of the same scientific category – probability!
  This realization of theirs is on the scale of the most remarkable insights!
  • THE FIRST UNDERSTANDING (interpretation) of probability is the OBJECTIVE one, the so-called frequency – probability is the relative frequency of an action (an experiment) that can be repeated many times.
  If we assume, hypothetically, that the repetition can take place an infinite number of times, then the result obtained is equal to the probability of the event. For example, the probability of rolling a dice to get a 1 is 1/6, i.e. if we imagine that we can roll this dice an infinite number of times, then the number of times 1 is rolled will be 1/6 of all times. It follows that the more times we roll the dice, the closer we will be to the 1/6 ratio.
  Of course, with dice (and coin) flips it is easy to determine the probability in advance. If we talk about a huge number of attempts, it is in a game situation – for the player to determine what to bet on. But even with the dice, things get complicated if the dice are 2 or 3, let alone if there are more... And what remains for the cases when the probability cannot be calculated easily. In such cases it is precisely assumed that it is what would result if the experiment could be done an infinite number of times.
  So on the first conception of probability, it is much more technology than deep, philosophical content, because it is much more an external phenomenon – the result of repeated and reproducible experiments. Here, of course, we can talk about probability, but the word FREQUENCY – the frequency (of repetition), a quantity that can be established experimentally, even if the experiments are not actually carried out, but are mental, is better suited to the understanding of it.
  • THE SECOND UNDERSTANDING (interpretation) of probability is SUBJECTIVE, i.e. it is perceived as a measure of uncertainty about future events and consequences, seen through the eyes of the evaluator and based on previously held information and permanently established, reliably verified in different circumstances, knowledge.
  Here, probability is a knowledge-based (subjective) measure of uncertainty conditioned by already existing fundamental knowledge (baseline knowledge). But we must immediately say that the acquisition of new knowledge could affect the already made assessment of the probability – this perspective can be called Bayesian (from the English priest and mathematician Thomas Bayes (1702 – 1761) – see Etude 23).
  In scientific, research terms, it is precisely this understanding of probability that is the true, full-fledged as knowledge and as use of knowledge – it imbues probability with a fundamental, deep meaning. That is why the keyword PROBABILITY [29, 30] is more suitable for this concept.
  The Americans, businessman Stanley Kaplan (1919 – 2009) and risk scientist B. John Garrick (1930 – 2020) wrote: „Frequency … is the science of handling data … Probability … is the science of handling the lack of data“. They also cite the following, fundamentally important quote by the Scottish mathematician Augustus De Morgan (1806 – 1871):
   „It may seem a strange thing to treat knowledge as a magnitude, in the same manner as length, or weight, or surface. This is what all writers do who treat of probability, and what all their readers have done, long before they ever saw a book on the subject….By degree of probability we really mean, or ought to mean, degree of belief….Probability then, refers to and implies belief, more or less, and belief is but another name for imperfect knowledge, or it may be, expresses the mind in a state of imperfect knowledge“ [31].
  And according to the American economist Peter Bernstein (1919 – 2009), probability hides a double meaning, two meanings [32]:
  › One meaning has to do with our assumptions. It is epistemological and refers to the limitations of human knowledge that is not fully analyzable.
  › The other meaning is interpretative of the past. It is probabilistic and related to what we actually know, which is based on experience and the checks that have been done.
  Let us summarize the two approaches to probability – the objective and the subjective:
  • Probability as an OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTIC of the object or phenomenon.
Here it is all a matter of an adequate model and properly performed calculations to establish the probability exactly or with an approximate but sufficient accuracy that does the job for us.
  In this way we shall add to our knowledge of the object or phenomenon, and may even obtain such knowledge that in satisfactorily complete degree is in fact the whole knowledge of that object or phenomenon. This is the basis of the objective approach to reality and its objects or phenomena.
  • Probability as a SUBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTIC of our ideas and beliefs about the object or phenomenon.
  Here we are talking about both ideas and beliefs, because invariably, trying to form knowledge about the object or phenomenon, we also put into this experience our essence, our values, our attitude to the world. Again we will quote the Talmud: We see things as we are; i.e. we refract them through the prism of our principles and values, beliefs and complexes. This is the basis of the subjective approach to reality and its objects or phenomena. With him, „there is no immediate connection between the truth of a statement and the degree of rational conviction, because in this interpretation, probability is a characteristic not of the statement itself, but only of the validity of the belief that it is true“ [33].
  This is how the understanding of probability develops: on one path goes the past as an interpretation of experience and relying on knowledge; on the other path is the future, as an assessment of what lies ahead and assumptions about what lies ahead.
  Horse racing is an example of subjective and objective probability.
  ‣ Let's take the subjective probability. At these races, most spectators have a fairly uniform lack of knowledge about the horses, the course and the jockeys. But regardless, they make different bets. These bets reflect individual beliefs, the so-called inner feelings (intuition), reasoning by analogy, the observations of viewers. When betting, everyone focuses on the most likely outcome, i.e. to the maximum probability of who will win, but since the bettor always assumes that he may not win, although he hopes for luck, the evaluation approach in this case is probabilistic, based mainly on the subjective attitudes and evaluations of the individual viewer [34, 35].
  ‣ And what happens if we take the objective probability? These races can be said to have a certain amount of information accumulated about the horses, jockeys and track, and it exists objectively, independent of the attitudes and preferences of the spectators. A ranking of the favorites can be drawn up, so that assuming an infinite number of races are run, their result (the final ranking of all races) will reflect the class of each competitor. When betting, every spectator (if he is at least a little knowledgeable and „into“ things, i.e. if he is at least somewhat professional) orients himself to this hypothetical ranking, he cannot escape from it in any way – it is entirely in the field of the objective probability, – and he works out his approach, follows his strategy, but a strategy based on this objective probability, moving actually into the field of risk in relation to his money and the management of that risk.
  If in SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY the variety of assessments is the result of the existence of different interpretations of the specific situation (i.e. the subjective probabilities that individual participants assign to the specific situation are different), then in OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY the certain similarity between the assessments is the result of the same interpretation of the specific situation (that is, individual participants consider a relatively narrow set of probabilities estimated by them on the basis of the objective probability common to all regarding this specific situation).
  The above reasoning about probability serves only as a basis in our reasoning about risk and is not intended to explore in depth the nature of the scientific category „probability“. Therefore, here we will limit ourselves to only a few quotations that partially convey the views on probability of important scientists and represent guiding and important markers in the long and unceasing effort to realize and make sense of probability [36].
  The English mathematician Frank Ramsay (1903 – 1930):
  Probability reflects the subjective degree of confidence, having operational significance, in the sense of willingness to act or avoid risk.
  The Italian mathematician Bruno de Finetti (1906 – 1985):
  An individual's degree of confidence, or his subjective probability estimates, must satisfy the laws of probability.
  John Maynard Keynes:
  Probability reflects the rational degree of confidence that establishes the logical connection between the set of judgments (taken as starting hypotheses) and some statement (taken as a conclusion).
  The American mathematician Leonard Savage (1917 – 1971):
  Probability is the degree of confidence of the ideal, i.e. the rational individual who, when making a decision, acts according to the axioms of probability theory.
  When uncertainty is used, we are not talking about insecurity, i.e. for a state opposite to security, but namely about uncertainty, i.e. for a state opposite to certainty, i.e. for a state of obscurity, of fuzzy or missing cognitive clarity about the possible options for behavior and their consequences.
  That is why one of the famous definitions of „risk“ is:
  Risk is the impact of uncertainty (not insecurity) on the objectives of the system.
  In other words, risk is an impact on the objectives of the system
  not of INSECURITY,
  but of UNCERTAINTY, of unknownness, of vagueness, of cognitive deficit, of cognitive on the objectives of the system, of information incompleteness.
  The transformation of uncertainty and insecurity into characteristics of the globalizing, postmodern, networked and risky society does not necessarily mean that fear and stress, pessimism and panic must arise. It is about a QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTIC of the environment that we must get used to and that we must be able to influence/impact.
  In the Risk Society, uncertainty (unknownness, ambiguity, insecurity) seriously affects the anxiety of people, their communities and society as a whole, and at the same time makes it difficult for politicians, strategic managers of the state. Both in earlier stages of development and now, every society faces uncertainty (unknownness, ambiguity, insecurity).
  Earlier, however, uncertainty, a major characteristic of all knowledge, including man's and society's knowledge of themselves, could be minimized to a level close to certainty, to clarity, to security already through religion, ideology, astrology, esotericism, fiction, science fiction and partly through science [37].
  Astrology – describing or predicting practices, traditions and beliefs based on the influence of the celestialbodies on the earthly world and man, on human temperament, character, actions and destiny, and in particular, the ability to predict the future by the movement and position of the celestialbodies on the celestial sphere and between them.
  Esoterics – a set of knowledge, information, inaccessible to people ignorant of mystical sciences, as well as ways of perceiving reality, having a secret.
  Today, only science has such an explanatory and predictive role, but it too experiences a deficit of knowledge, which may turn out to be ignorance. This ignorance is not nescience, it is much more insufficient knowledge, but when it comes to risks with serious consequences, partial, incomplete knowledge could prove misleading and therefore even worse than a self-critical and wholehearted admission of ignorance.
  In the globalized, postmodern, networked and risky society, risk comes to the fore – it is the main concept (the key word, the main discourse in thinking) regarding trials for people. This is a radical change in the language (in the study of risk) – from risk as probability to risk as uncertainty, from calculable externally generated risks to incalculable internally generated risks [38].
  As we indicated at the beginning, in the Bulgarian translation by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens, the expression is „serially manufactured insecurities“". It is not in vain that we emphasized several times explicitly and clearly that Beck and Giddens do not actually use insecurity, but rather uncertainty.
  The Risk society - let's make it clear again and again – is not risky just because there are many insecurities in it, but because there are too many uncertainties in it! And because of these too many uncertainties, because of this too high degree of uncertainty, many insecurities are born, our insecurity also increases to a significant extent.
  For us, it is much more logical to include as a translation into Bulgarian the expression „serially manufactured uncertainties“ used by Beck and Giddens, both concepts – uncertainties and insecurities: „serially manufactured uncertainties and insecurities“. Because it is clear that the Risk Society produces many uncertainties, from which an even greater set of insecurities arise, but it also produces a huge amount of insecurities that are not directly related to the uncertainties it produces.
  The problem is that (at least FOR NOW) in the Bulgarian language there is no such direct – in terms of meaning and content! – connection between „uncertainty“ and „insecurity“ as in the English language, which is why „insecurity“ is often (and sometimes incorrectly) used in Bulgarian translations for „uncertainty“.
  1. Бек, Улрих. Световното рисково общество. София: Обсидиан, 2001, с. 13.
  Bek, Ulrih. Svetovnoto riskovo obshtestvo. Sofia: Obsidian, 2001, s. 13. (in Bulgarian)
   (Beck, Ulrich. The World Venture Society)
  2. Гидънс, Антъни. Социология. София: Прозорец, 2003, с. 541.
  Giduns, Antuni. Sociologia. Sofia: Prozorec, 2003, 2003, s. 541. (in Bulgarian)
   (Giddens, Anthony. Sociology)
  3. Фотев, Георги. Човешката несигурност. София: Изток-Запад, 2016, 145 – 146.
  Fotev, Georgi. Choveshkata nesigurnost. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2016, 145 – 146. (in Bulgarian)
   (Fotev, Georgi. Human uncertainty)
  4. Хофстеде, Хеерт. Култури и организации: Софтуер на ума. София: Класика и Стил, 2001.
  Hofstede, Heert. Kulturi i organizacii: Softuer na uma. Sofia: Klasika i Stil, 2001. (in Bulgarian)
   (Hofstede, Heert. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. Sofia)
  5. Tversky, Amos, Daniel Kahneman. Belief in the Law of Small Numbers. – In: Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, Amos Tversky (eds.). Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1982, 23 – 31.
  7. Карева, Румяна. Илюзии в полет. София: Изток-Запад, 2013, 46 – 50.
  Kareva, Rumyana. Iliuzii v polet. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2003, 46 – 50. ()
   (Kareva, Rumyana. Illusions in flight)
  8. Taleb, Nassim. The Black Swan. The Impact of the Highly Improbable. Random House, 2007, p. 153, 181.
  9. Талеб, Насим Никълъс. Черният лебед. Въздействието на слабо възможното в живота и на пазара. София: Инфодар, 2009, с. 204, 246.
  Taleb, Nasim Nikulus. Chrniat lebed. Vuzdeistvieto na slabo vuzmozhnoto v zhivota i na pazara. Sofia: Infodar, 2009, s. 204, 246. (in Bulgaria)
   (Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. Black swan. The impact of the faintly possible in life and in the marketplace.)
  10. Plato. Republic. Book 7:
  11. Knight, Frank H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York, NY: Sentry Press, 1921, Reprint New York, NY: Augustus M. Kelley, Bookseller, 1964, р. 233.
  12. Талеб, Насим Никълъс, ibid., с. 193.
   (Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. Black swan)
  13. Knight, Frank H., ibidem.
  16. Hermans, Marijke A., Tessa Fox, Marjolein B. A. van Asselt. Risk Governance. – In: Roeser, Sabine, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Per Sandin, Martin Peterson. (eds.). Handbook of Risk. Theory, Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics, and Social Implications of Risk. New York, NY: Springer Science&Business Media B.V., 2012, 1093 – 1118, p. 1096.
  17. Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment. – In: The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Feb., 1937, Vol. 51, No. 2, 209 – 223, 213 – 214.
  18. Соколов, Александр. Политический риск от теории к практике. Москва: Поколение, 2009, c. 23.
  Sokolov, Aleksandr. Politicheski risk ot treorii k praktike. Moskva: Pokolenie, 2009, s. 23. (in Russian)
   (Sokolov, Alexander. Political risk from theory to practice)
  19. Панфилова, Эльвира. Понятие риска: многообразие подходов и определений. – В: Теория и практика общественного развития, № 4, 2010, 30 – 34,, с. 31.
  Panfilova, Elvira. Poniatie riska: mnogoobrazie podhodov i opredeleniy. – V: Teoria i praktika obshtestvennogo razvitia, , № 4, 2010, 30 – 34,, s. 31. (in Russian)
   (Panfilova, Elvira. The concept of risk: variety of approaches and definitions)
  20. Bernstein, Peter L. Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk. New York, NY; Chichester, UK; etc.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996, 1998, р. 230.
  21. Beck, Ulrich. World at Risk. Cambridge, UK; Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2009, p. 18.
  23. Von Mises, Ludwig. Human Action. A Treatise on Economics. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press; San Francisco, CA: Fox & Wilkes, 1996], 1949, 1963, p. 105.
  24. Макашева, Наталия. Неопределенность, вероятность, этика: Дж. М. Кейнс, Л. Мизес, Ф. Найт. – В: Вопросы Экономики, 2013, № 10,, 47 – 65.
  Makasheva, Natalia. Neopredelenost, veroiatnsot, etika: Dzh. M. Keins, L. Mizes, F. Nait. – V: Voprosy Ekonomiki, 2013, № 10,, 47 – 65. (in Russian)
   (Makasheva, Natalia. Uncertainty, probability, ethics: J. M. Keynes, L. Mises, F. Knight)
  25. Макашева, Наталия, ibidem.
   (Makasheva, Natalia. Neopredelenost, veroiatnsot, etika)
  26. Aven, Terje. Foundations of Risk Analysis. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2012, 4 – 5.
  27. Tannert, Christof, Horst-Dietrich Elvers, Burkhard Jandrig. The Ethics of Uncertainty. In the Light of Possible Dangers, Research Becomes a Moral Duty. – In: EMBO Reports, 2007, Vol. 8, No. 10,, 893 – 894.
  28. Tannert, Christof, Horst-Dietrich Elvers, Burkhard Jandrig, ibidem.
  29. Aven, Terje. Misconceptions of Risk. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, Ltd., 2010, 31 – 32.
  30. Kaplan, Stanley, B. John Garrick. On the Quantitative Definition of Risk. – In: Risk Analysis, 1981, Vol. 1, No. 1,, p. 10.
  31. Kaplan, Stanley, B. John Garrick, ibid., p. 11.
  32. Bernstein, Peter L., ibid., 48 – 49.
  33. Макашева, Наталия. Методология. Еще раз о революции Дж. М. Кейнса (опыт построения макроэкономической теории для экономики с неопределенностью). – В: Общественные науки и современность, 2006, № 2, 143 – 154, с. 150.
  Makasheva, Natalia. Metodologia. Eshcho raz o revoliucii Ozh. M. Keinsa (opyt postroenia makroekonomicheskoi teorii dlia ekonomiki s neopredelennostiu). – V: Obchestvennye nauki i sovremennost, 2006, № 2, 143 – 154, s. 150. (in Russian)
   (Makasheva, Natalia. Methodology. Once again about the revolution of J.M. Keynes (experience of building a macroeconomic theory for an economy with uncertainty)
  34. Bouleau, Nicolas. Risk and Meaning. Adversaries in Art, Science and Philosophy. Berlin, Germany: Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2011, р. 120.
  35. Концепция субъективной вероятности,
  Koncepcia subektivnoi veroiatnsoti, (in Russian)
   (The concept of subjective probability)
  36. Диев, Владимир. Риск и неопределенность в философии, науке, управлении. – В: Вестник Томского государственного университета. Философия. Социология. Политология, 2012, № 2 (14), 79 – 89,, с. 86.
  Diev, Vladimir. Risk i neopredelennost v filosofii, nauke, upravlenii. – V: Vestnik Tomskoogo gossudarstvennogo universiteta. Filosofia. Sociologia. Politologia, 2012, № 2 (14), 79 – 89,, s. 86. (in Russian)
   (Diev, Vladimir. Risk and uncertainty in philosophy, science, management)
  37. Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties. – In: Iris, 2 October 2009, Vol. 1, No. 2, 291 – 299, p. 292.
  38. Kemshall, Hazel. Risk, Social Policy and Welfare. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 2006, 4 – 10.
  Brief explanation:
  The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.