STUDIES ON SECURITY: STUDY 19. PHENOMENA, DEPENDENCES, REGULARITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS INHERENT IN THE EMERGED RISK SOCIETY

  These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
  
  STUDY 19. PHENOMENA, DEPENDENCES, REGULARITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS INHERENT IN THE EMERGED RISK SOCIETY
  
  Basic processes and specific features of risk, risks, riskization, risk-taker man are examined, and the analytical efforts are aimed at understanding the Risk Society, in front of which and among which stands – insufficiently prepared and in no small measure disoriented – all mankind.
  
  The following monograph of mine is devoted to the discussion of various dimensions and manifestations directly related to the Risk Society:
  Николай Слатински. Рискът – новото име на Сигурността. София: Изток-Запад, 2019.
   [Nikolay Slatinski. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019].
  Nikolay Slatinski. Risk – the new Name of Security. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019 (in Bulgarian)
  
  As discussed in Study 12, the world today is experiencing a multidirectional transformation, having four leading dimensions, each of which can be spoken of as our entry into a qualitatively new type of society: the Globalized Society, the Postmodern Society, the Network Society, and the Risk Society. In this Study, we will dwell in more detail on the fourth dimension of this epochal change – the Risk Society.
  The complex transformation of our world requires fundamentally different or very differing cognitive models and practical tools for studying security. We are witnessing a SECURITY PARADIGM SHIFT related to the transition from the increasingly outdated and inadequate monodisciplinary approach to the far more promising and adequate multidisciplinary approach [1].
  
  THE MONODISCIPLINARY APPROACH is associated with traditional cognitive schemes inherited from the bipolar age of block confrontation:
  • oriented towards statics and balance;
  • based on the „hard“ aspects of power;
  • relying primarily on the power institutions of the state (army, police, special services and other repressive bodies);
  • founded on quantitative criteria;
  • following the thinking of the state as a static and closed system (ie „besieged fortress“ type);
  • professing the understanding of the security of the state, which must be achieved at „the cost of everything and at any cost“;
  • focused on protection and safety;
  • defining the state as the leading priority;
  • seeking solutions mainly in the political-military sphere;
  • inherent to the last phase of modern society.
  
  THE MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH uses a qualitatively new type of cognitive schemes:
  • oriented towards dynamics and development;
  • based more on the „soft“ aspects of power;
  • relying not only on the power institutions of the state, but also on institutions ensuring the quality of life and the quality of human potential (health care, education, social policy, demography, ecology);
  • founded on qualitative criteria;
  • following the thinking of the state as a dynamic and open system (i.e. as an element of regional, continental and global networks);
  • professing the understanding of state security, which should be achieved not only effectively, but also efficiently (i.e. by finding a working and sparing other social systems ratio between goals and resources);
  • focused on the timely identification, analysis, assessment and management of risks;
  • defining as the leading priority not only the state, but also the society and the individual;
  • seeking solutions mainly in the political-social sphere;
  • inherent to the initial phase of postmodern society.
  
  Nowadays, it is impossible to study security without the application of knowledge and ideas from other sciences – both natural (mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, etc.) and social (political science, sociology, psychology, anthropology, etc.). Not only do new cognitive models require a new research instruments, but the new research instruments will discover new cognitive models and thus Science of Security will keep up with the time. We could not give adequate knowledge and create modern security cognition without the use of applicable schemes and approaches from the „mathematical“ scientific field – synergy, catastrophe theory, chaos theory, fractal theory, game theory, theory of probabilities, Gödel's incompleteness theorems and especially studies of network structures.
  
  Explanation:
  Synergetics is a science of self-organizing, evolving (or devolving) systems, i.e. systems in which self-organization processes take place, as a result of which the system acquires qualitatively new positive (or negative) properties and characteristics.
  Synergy – joint action of two or more organs, i.e. joint activity, work done together.
  Kurt Gödel (1906 – 1978) – prominent Austrian and American mathematician. The idea of Gödel's First Theorem (on incompleteness) is that if we have a sufficiently complex system, then no group of axioms and theorems can describe the inherent properties and processes of this system completely, if it remains within the framework of its conceptual and logical apparatus. The idea of Gödel's Second Theorem (on consistency) is that if a group of axioms and theorems describing the system is consistent, then its consistency cannot be proven by remaining within that group of axioms and theorems.
  
  We do not mean that all security scientists should become fractal experts and start proving Gödel's theorems. It is not about becoming experts in cultural anthropology, psychology, sociology, mathematics, chemistry, physics. The point is to master a new, modern instruments. After all, the specialist in imaging diagnostics is not obliged to know how the X-ray and mammogram, scanner and nuclear magnetic resonance are constructed and on what theoretical principles they are based. But he should be able to use them as a qualitative new generation of diagnostic tools – radically different from the hammer, the earpiece, say „Ahhhh!“ and palpation with fingers.
  
  In Study 4 we have examined the integrative relationship of four basic categories in Science of Security – Threat, Danger, Risk, Challenge. It was clarified that each of these concepts is directly related to the creation and development of relevant skills (capabilities):
  
  ♦ THE THREAT – with the creation and development of skills (capabilities) for REACTING;
  ♦ THE DANGER – with the creation and development of skills (capabilities) for PREVENTION;
  ♦ THE RISK – with the creation and development of skills (capabilities) for EARLY WARNING;
  ♦ THE CHALLENGE – with the creation and development of skills (capabilities) for FORECASTING.
  
  We will dwell on these connections and needs in a little more detail.
  
  ♦ THREAT – REACTING:
  → In reacting, our behavior and our approach to the problem are reactive.
  We act when there is a problem.
  It could be said that we are reacting and being reactive to what happened yesterday.
  
  ♦ DANGER – PREVENTION:
  → In prevention, our behavior and our approach to the problem are active.
  We act when the problem is small in order to prevent it from becoming a big problem.
  It could be said that we act preemptively and we are active to what is happening today.
  
  ♦ RISK – EARLY WARNING:
  → In early warning, our behavior and our approach to the problem are pro-active.
  We act before the problem appears, because if it appears even as a small problem, it will very quickly become a big problem.
  It could be said that we have to increasingly build skills (capabilities) for early warning and we are proactive to what will happen tomorrow.
  
  ♦ CHALLENGE – FORECASTING:
  → In forecasting, our behavior and approach to the problem is aimed at foresight.
  We act even before the occurrence of conditions that contribute to the appearance of the problem and so that there is not even the slightest possibility this problem to appear.
  It could be said that we have to increasingly build skills (capabilities) for forecasting and we should foresight and take measures to what may happen the day after tomorrow.
  
  Let's clarify the difference between forecasting and foresight.
  Forecasting is more of a process, and foresight is more of a result of a process.
  Forecasting is more of a means and foresight is more of an end.
  A relatively correct forecasting of a process would lead to a relatively correct foresight of what will happen as a result of that process.
  It is for this reason that in Study 4 it has been argued that the social system should seek to „build skills (capabilities) for forecasting [that will enable it] to effectively perform comprehensive and reliable foresight… based on strategic design, scenario planning and long-term behavior”.
  Analyzing the differences between forecasting and foresight gives us the opportunity to clarify which of the two concepts is more of a process and which is more of an end state; which is more of a means and which is more of an end; which is more primary and which is more secondary; which is more the things that do and which is more the thing that is done; which more answers the question How? and which more answers the question What?
  
  Early warning is a term borrowed from medicine and electrical engineering. The objectives of early warning are diverse, among them we will indicate the following as the main ones:
  › informational [2] – to provide information about the status and changes of the observed object (or process) and about the environment in which it is located;
  › predictive [3] – to help make a prediction for the possible future development of the observed object (or process) and about the environment in which it is located;
  › prescriptive [4] – to suggest to decision-makers possible approaches to prevent the problem that may arise;
  › motivational [5] – to motivate decision makers to plan and take proactive actions to prevent the problem that may occur.
  
  Early warning information is collected by scanning (undirected, non-targeted search) or by monitoring (directed, targeted search) [6]. Among the approaches to conduct early warning as the main ones we can point out the following:
  › Early warning as object observation – this is early warning by scanning; it monitors (scans) the characteristics of the specific observed and studied object (or process), and on the basis of its background and data from the observation, relevant proactive actions are developed and taken to prevent the occurrence of the predicted problem;
  › Early warning as field observation [7] – this is also early warning by scanning; it observes not only the studied object (or process), but also the environment in which it is located. Although it seems at first glance that this is an extended version of the previous approach, in fact, in terms of specificity and content, committed resources and supported database, this approach is significantly different from the previous, because it takes to a much greater extent into account the dynamics of the object (or the process) and the environment, their interactions, the influence of the environment on the object (or process) and the influence of external factors on the environment itself.
  In the first two early warning approaches by scanning, what they have in common is that observation is made that is largely unfocused, unsystematic, scattered in nature, addressing the full range of putative key parameters, demanding a lot of effort, accumulating a large amount of information, one part of which it may turn out to be unnecessary, another – to remain unprocessed precisely because of its large volume; expectations with such approaches – these are attempts, to some extent, to „blindly“ catch something, to „feel“ something, without a very clear idea of what it might be and without having sufficient reliable grounds to believe that what is expected to be obtained will be obtained. The massive efforts and the multitude of data that are observed and received give reasons to assume that among them will be the most important ones that will suggest the possible occurrence of a problem, for the prevention of which a number of proactive actions must be taken.
  › Early warning as monitoring of indicators [8] – this is early warning through monitoring; it monitors certain indicators, i.e. object (or process) and environment parameters. The determination of these indicators is related to the professionalism, experience and knowledge of those performing the monitoring; professionalism allows to „capture“ and monitor above all those parameters that play the role of the so-called accelerators (triggers), i.e. causes of sharp exacerbation (sharp escalation) of the situation. It is purposeful monitoring based on the observers' understanding of the likely development of phenomena and processes and of those critical factors that may cause a problem. Unlike scanning, which operates on the principle of „Watch everything at all times“, monitoring is carried out on the principle of „Watch certain things at certain time intervals“. This allows to save significant resources, efforts and time, and to collect much more necessary, qualitative and specific information.
  › Early warning based on models [9] – this is early warning through monitoring; with it, the development of the object (or process) is observed on the basis of several and, in principle, a limited number of certain possible models (scenarios) of development. This approach is aerobatics in early warning, because it goes beyond the collection of huge volumes of information and thinking in quantitative parameters, and requires a deep and systematic knowledge of the object (or process) and the environment in which it is located, skills to outline the most possible eventual developments – one or rather several, but no more than 2, 3, maximum 4 alternative developments, and to „set“ as basic precisely these scenarios, which can also be considered as a kind of accelerators (triggers), because precisely it is possible for them to have an aggravation (sharp escalation) of the situation. Monitoring is performed not so much of the parameters of the object (or process) and the environment, but whether the development fits into any of the set scenarios. If the development follows one of these scenarios, it becomes possible at a very early stage to achieve the goal of monitoring and to anticipate (forecast) the problem that will inevitably arise, and as a result of this anticipation (forecasting) appropriate management decisions are made and the necessary proactive actions are taken.
  
  We said above: „We have to increasingly build skills (capabilities) for early warning“. But we as human beings have no or almost no natural (innate) senses on which to develop such skills (capabilities). Due to reasons related to the long evolution of man, of all our senses and capabilities stored in it, about 90% are oriented to reacting, to reactive action, and another 10% (and this exhausts human senses and abilities) is oriented to prevention, i.e. to active action. We have not actually developed natural (innate) senses for early warning on which to form instincts and reflexes for proactive action. As the Lebanese and American economist and essayist Nasim Taleb (1960) wrote, „Clearly, the environment for which we have built our endowment is not the one that prevails today“ [10]. And since we do not have them today, when we will increasingly have to act proactively if we want our strategies to be successful, we must develop new, artificial (acquired) senses of skills and capabilities oriented towards early warning, i.e. to proactive action.
  Basic in the analyzes of the Israeli psychologists Daniel Kahneman (1934) and Amos Tversky (1937 – 1996) is the examination of the two thinking systems in the human mind – SYSTEM 1 (for fast thinking) and SYSTEM 2 (for slow thinking). These systems were proposed by American psychologists Keith Stanovich (1950) and Richard West (1945).
  • SYSTEM 1 is „the secret author of many of the choices and judgments“, is intuitive and impulsive, „operates automatically and quickly, with little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control“. It makes decisions quickly, with the help of associations and experience from lived or imagined situations „maintains and updates a model of our personal world“ and „determines our interpretation of the present as well as our expectations of the future“. It is a system of reactive, almost instinctive action, developed in the process of evolution so that the individual can assess immediate dangers almost instantly and make decisions in an extremely short time. Thanks to it, the individual survived to the greatest extent. If it wasn't for it quick reaction in shaking the leaves of the tree to judge that it was the saber-toothed tiger, then the matter of this tiger's food at the given time would have been successfully resolved.
  • SYSTEM 2 is analytical, reasoning and rational, it „allocates attention to the effortful mental activities that demand it, including complex computations“, it tests and compares different hypotheses and is related „often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice, and concentration“ . This is the system whose sphere of action is uncertainty and doubt [11].
  
  Explanation:
  Saber-toothed tiger or smilodon – an extinct genus of saber-toothed cats that lived from 2.5 million years ago to 10 000 years ago.
  
  If the environment imposes the development of certain qualities and patterns of behavior, then they, from conscious choice as a result of coercion, could become genetically determined properties of individuals, communities and societies. Evolution can take place at a faster pace.
  
  In this sense, together with the already mentioned above:
  
  • SYSTEM 1 – unconscious, reactive, „effortless, automatic, associative, rapid, parallel process, opaque (i.e., we are not aware of using it), emotional, concrete, specific, social, and personalized“; and
  • SYSTEM 2 – conscious, active, „effortful, controlled, deductive, slow, serial, self-aware, neutral, abstract, sets, asocial, and depersonalized“ [12];
  
  people, through the need for new, artificial (acquired) skills and capabilities for early warning, i.e. to proactive action, can acquire (or re-develop, thereby „resurrecting“ once-existing but extinct in our evolution as human beings, skills and instincts) yet another SYSTEM.
  
  This SYSTEM, which we are the first to introduce, we shall call thus:
  • SYSTEM 0 – subconscious, proactive, anticipatory, instinctive, sensing, premonition (telepathic?), perceiving various, propagating (and) immaterial media, signals, i.e. abilities that to normal logic seem paranormal, psychic, absurd and inexplicable by rational arguments.
  • SYSTEM 0 – subconscious, proactive, anticipatory, instinctive, sensing, preemptive (telepathic?), perceiving various signals propagating (as well) through immaterial media (as well), i.e. these are capabilities that to normal logic seem paranormal, psychic, absurd and inexplicable by rational arguments.
  
  We assume that along with proven human capabilities, there are also remnants, relics of previous capabilities that have not been used in the process of evolution and are therefore stunted. Entering a world in which the occurrence of the risk (for example, a crack of the dam wall) must be very timely anticipated, because if it occurs (in this case – if the dam wall cracks) it will already be too late (the dam wall can burst very quickly), could once again call to life those stunted, abandoned on the path of evolution, preserved here and there, in an extremely insufficient quantity, capabilities.
  
  We see these capabilities only as an option for the development of SYSTEM 0. It can also be based on new capabilities completely different from the relic capabilities. The compulsion of our environment, of the qualitatively different society, will make us develop and produce new, artificial (acquired) skills and capabilities, oriented to early warning, to proactive action. Along the path of rapid evolution, they can, why not assume, gradually pass into our genes and become part of our, if not biological, then social DNA.
  Whether only artificial, or gradually becoming a natural, material-spiritual part of us, but we will have our SYSTEM 0. Without it, it would be very difficult for us to manage the risks in the Risk Society.
  
  We need to add more reasoning to our description of the relevant types of behavioral approaches in the search for more security and manageability of risks.
  ∙ When REACTING, i.e. in re-active behavior, there is a critical factor (irritant, problem, event, situation) that threatens us, and we promptly neutralize it in some way, we deal with it to some extent, and most importantly, we react. In other words, there is a real or perceived danger, which we judge by the twitching of the leaves of the tree – this can be caused by the wind, it can also be caused by the saber-toothed tiger. The twitching of the tree's leaves makes us react. In this case, our response is called reacting.
  ∙ In PREVENTION, i.e. in active behavior, we try to preemptively control in some way, to intercept to some extent, and most importantly to act preventively, while the threatening critical factor (irritant, problem, event, situation) is still small, in order to prevent it from becoming big. In other words, we don't wait for the leaves of the tree to to tremble in order to release the string and send the arrow in their direction, so as to kill the possibly lurking sabre-toothed tiger, but we act differently. In the place where the tiger can pass and where it can hide, we set a trap or dig a „wolf pit“ (which for a tiger should be called a „tiger pit“). Having a saber-toothed tiger roaming around makes us take preventive action. In this case, our response is called prevention.
  ∙ In EARLY WARNING, our behavior is radically different, pro-active, as we strive at a very early stage to manage in some way, to reduce to some extent, and most importantly to use early warning skills to prevent the occurrence of the threatening critical factor (irritant, problem, event, situation), because with this dynamics of processes and events, the time from the appearance of the threatening critical factor to its realization can be extremely short. Our action does not wait for the threatening critical factor to appear, but precedes it. In other words, since it could be a matter of seconds from the trembling of the leaves or from the approach of the saber-toothed tiger to its pouncing on us, we must guess where the tiger might pass and not go into that vicinity or prevent it from has entered our zone of habitation, and it is also possible, while it is still far from us, to organize a hunt for its elimination. In this case, our response is called early warning.
  
  The role of early warning is growing rapidly, because from the situation in which a risk may appear to its realization, the time can turn out to be extremely short.
  
  Here we run into Collingridge's Dilemma (of control) – while we are able to control a new technology, our technological knowledge is far greater than our knowledge of the social factors and consequences of that technology, i.e. the social effects of a given technology at the time of decision are not yet visible and cannot be easily predicted until the technology is significantly developed and widely applied; and when they do occur, the technology is already so embedded in social practice that it is usually impossible to control and/or change it [13]. This means that we can either regulate a technology while it is in its initial stage and not yet widely used, but then its unexpected and unwanted consequences have not manifested, or we can wait to see those consequences, but then there is a risk of losing the opportunity to control this technology. The dilemma of control can be rephrased more clearly: „When we make a decision, we do not have the necessary knowledge of its consequences, and when these consequences occur, we can no longer control them“.
  
  Explanation:
  The dilemma [of control] (Collingridge Dilemma) was formulated by the British scientist David Collingridge (1945 – 2005). This is a methodological case in which efforts to control technology development face a dual problem: (1) an information problem: impacts cannot be easily predicted until the technology is significantly developed and widely used; and (2) management problem: control or change is difficult to achieve when the technology is permanently established [14].
  
  The expectation from society to make a decision and the lack of the necessary knowledge to make a decision are related to the Paradox of signaling (warning) (The warning paradox) of the German sociologists Wolf Dombrowski (1948) and Lars Clausen (1935 – 2010), according to which the signaling of possible dangers does not help to resolve risky situations, in the sense that we can learn whether the signaling was justified only if we failed to take it into account; if we have taken it into account, we will never know whether it was justified or not [15].
  
  Science is responsible for the emergence of a number of new risks, but it is also one of the main arguments when making informed political decisions – this is called scientification of politics.
  The role and duties of the experts are also changing. Previously, they were oriented towards the more short-term, immediate consequences. Now, their recommendations may have long-term consequences. This is undoubtedly a qualitatively new challenge for them, because they have to combine their until recently narrower expert thinking with the strategic vision, which was inherent to a much higher level than their previous level and required a different thinking – much more political than theirs. In this way, the role of experts is obviously not decreasing and their responsibility is certainly increasing.
  We will point out another paradox – to analyze and counteract the risks, for their more effective management, we rely more and more – out of necessity and for our rationality – on the scientific approach, on the involvement of science (of sciences). At the same time, a contradiction arises between scientificity in approaches and expert knowledge. Science becomes part of our efforts, and expert knowledge remains (extremely) insufficient to anticipate and manage risks and to predict and overcome their consequences. The involvement of science has as its basic motivation the justification of the acceptability of risks and leads us to direct efforts for their timely prediction and effective management. And the insufficient expert knowledge prompts us to determine the inadmissibility of the risks and pushes us to direct our efforts to avoid the risks and what's more – to prevent them from being created. Science accepts that risks arise and exist anyway and we must strive to anticipate and manage them, and expert knowledge, realizing its insufficiency, tries to reorient our thinking towards avoiding risks as much as possible and striving to provoke them as little as possible. Real paradox!
  
  Since one of the established understandings is that risks are related to decision-making, let's outline the differentiation of the four levels related to decision-making – see Table 1:
  1. Political level – politicians (rulers);
  2. Expert level – expert professionals (technocrats);
  3. Expert level – expert specialists (narrow specialists);
  4. Executive level – officials (bureaucrats), this is the level with executive, technical and servicing functions.
  
  Differentiation will be based on two criteria:
   (a) whether risks can be tolerated or not; and
  b) whether risks can be managed or not:
  





  
  Table 1. Differentiation of decision-making levels
  
  1. Politicians (rulers) tend to believe that risks could be efficiently managed and therefore should, as a rule, be tolerated;
  2. Experts – professionals (technocrats) tend to think that risks could be somewhat managed, but nevertheless should not be particularly tolerated;
  3. Experts – specialists (narrow specialists) tend to think that risks could not be acceptably managed, but should nevertheless be tolerated sometimes;
  4. Officials (bureaucrats) tend to think that risks generally cannot be managed and therefore should not be tolerated most of the time.
  
  From what has been said, it can be seen that in the Risk Society a powerful asymmetry between „risk ownership“ (those who are responsible for the occurrence of a given risk) and „risk responsibility“ (those who have responsibilities for managing a given risk) opens like a wound [16].
  
  The Risk Society, although it sounds like a tautology, is a society of risks, a society that lives with risks. This causes psychological problems and imposes psychological requirements – to get used to the risks, to develop models of behavior that make society resistant to risks – that it does not panic, that it does not break up into small groups or atomized individuals, that it unites in the face of extreme difficulties and to strengthen its internal solidarity.
  In the Risk Society, risks are a daily feeling, premonition, apprehension, it seems to us that risks are everywhere and everything is a risk. This can be used by politicians – both ruling and opposition, for their own selfish ends – to feed both individual and public minds with both premonitions of risks and fears of inevitable catastrophes due to the mismanagement of these risks. Risk, like emergency, is also a speech act. But this can also be used for mobilization to become part of risk management – as a pro-active action.
  In the Risk Society, uncertainty (unknownness, uncertainty) seriously affects the anxiety of people, their communities and society as a whole, and at the same time makes it difficult for politicians, strategic managers of the state. Both in earlier stages of development and now, every society faces uncertainty (unknownness, uncertainty). Earlier, however, uncertainty, a major characteristic of all knowledge, including man's and society's knowledge of themselves, could be minimized to a level close to certainty, to clarity, to security most of all through religion, ideology, astrology, esotericism, fiction, fiction and partly through science [17].
  Today, only science has such an explanatory and predictive role, but it too experiences a deficit of knowledge, which may turn out to be unawareness. This unawareness is not ignorance, it is much more insufficient knowledge, but when it comes to risks with serious consequences, partial, incomplete knowledge could prove misleading and therefore even worse than a self-critical and wholehearted admission of unawareness.
  According to French sociologist Francois Ewald (1946), risk is a way of controlling or, one could say, colonizing the future [18]. And for the English sociologist Anthony Giddens (1938): „Thinking in terms of risk ... is a mode of colonizing the future“ [19]. As for the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1944 – 2015): „It is an (institutionalized) attempt, a cognitive map, to colonize the future“ [20].
  By a number of authors, risk is seen as optics (binoculars), allowing us to peer into the future and even influence it. Through risk, the future – at least to some extent – becomes the possession of the present. But such a view of things is one-sided. The opposite statement is also valid – through risk the present becomes the property of the future; today we behave, act, think as if tomorrow manipulates, prescribes, orders us what to do. Risk is also optics (binoculars) through which the future peers into the present and even influences it; through risk, the present becomes a shrinked future; through risk the present becomes the possession of the future; through risk the future colonizes the present.
  
  We therefore agree that:
   „The emergence of the risk society has profound consequences for how Western societies measure how secure they are… In risk society there is no such thing as perfect security. Thinking in terms of risk means measuring the present in terms of the future – and from the perspective of the first years of the twenty-first century, there is plenty to fear from the future“ [21].
  
  As it was already said in Study 10, with the entry into the Risk Society, it is logical, and even inevitable, that a qualitatively new, non-traditional type of problems will be of increasing scientific and practical interest:
  ‣ On the one hand, such problems, which – from related to risks, or, to put it more clearly, from representing risks, that is to say, from problems that generate risks, RISK PROBLEMS, as they have been until now, are able (have the potential) to escalate extremely quickly and undergo a qualitative (and not just quantitative) transformation, thus becoming problems capable of generating very serious, complex, destructive and difficult to manage risks and, thus are riskized, that is to say, they become RISKIZED PROBLEMS;
  ‣ On the other hand, in parallel with them and even more often – independently of them in the Risk Society new, radically different, non-traditional problems with extremely high potential and also capable of generating very serious, complex, destructive and difficult to manage risks are emerging and thus also are riskized, that is to say, they also become RISKIZED PROBLEMS.
  
  So, in the Risk Society we have mainly the following two types (types, classes) of problems:
  
  ▪ RISK PROBLEMS, i.e. problems that are related to risks or, as it was more clearly stated, that are risks, that are generating risks – these are THE TRADITIONAL RISKS, the previous generation of risks.
  TRADITIONAL RISKS, risk problems – these are risks that existed before and what they were until recently, i.e. risks that still manifest themselves even today in the old, well-known (although always carrying certain, or rather uncertain; and known, or rather unknown surprises) way and for the management of which there is developed expertise, there is accumulated experience, there is a decision-supporting routine, there are models, approaches, procedures, standards, best practices and culture of of behavior.
  
  ▪ RISKIZED PROBLEMS, i.e. problems that are capable of giving rise to very serious, complex, destructive and difficult to manage risks, i.e. which are capable of being riskized, of becoming precisely riskized problems – these are THE NON-TRADITIONAL RISKS, the new generation of risks.
  NON-TRADITIONAL RISKS, the new generation of risks, riskized problems are such risks that either existed earlier, but now manifest in a new, radically different way, or did not exist earlier.
  
  When we talk about non-traditional risks, the new generation of risks, riskized problems, we should know that very often such a risk is actually a whole family of similar (related) risks – of its mutations. In other words, when a risk, i.e. a risk problem is transformed into a riskized problem, this is most often (but not always) associated with its successive – several or multiple – mutations, creating a whole family of similar and related risks. So then, when we talk about a riskized problem, as a rule, we mean precisely the general, generic name of the sum of the individual mutations of this new generation risk, of this non-traditional risk.
  
  Riskized problems, new generation risks, non-traditional risks are a very serious test for any complex, self-organizing, dynamic and non-equilibrium systems. When such a system is unable to effectively manage a riskized problem, it faces significant difficulties and stresses, and even the hypothetical possibility of the beginning of the collapse of its main systemic functions, and thus the system loses unrecoverable parts of its systemicity and falls into a state of unmanageable insecurity. The resulting rapidly developing process of destabilization threatens the very existence of the system. Moreover, a riskized problem is capable of extremely destructively exploiting not only the vulnerability that is directly related to it, but also ANY OTHER system vulnerability! This is why the system can no longer treat a riskized problem by itself, on its own, in isolation, or at least independently of other risk problems (traditional risks) or other riskized problems (non-traditional risks), but it must approach a given riskized problem and accordingly − the problems of its security – in a complex way - systemic, holistic, unified. A riskized problem has the potential to destroy and bring down the entire system. A riskized problem is like a cancer that can and does seek to destroy the entire organism, even though it strikes a specific organ.
  
  In the case of a riskized problem, the SPECIFIC VULNERABILITY through which this new generation risk, this non-traditional risk, „slips through“, can become a vulnerability through which ANY OTHER RISK will already „slip through“.
  At the same time, the opposite is also true – a riskized problem, a new generation risk, a non-traditional risk can „slip through“ not only through the vulnerability directly related to it, but also through ANY OTHER vulnerability of the system.
  
  If a traditional risk, a risk problem can be attacked and managed by itself, on its own, individually, then the non-traditional risk, a risk of the new generation, a riskized problem must be „attacked“ in a complex manner, AT THE LEVEL OF THE ENTIRE SYSTEM.
  
  Since there have always been risks, what then is new, non-traditional about risks in the Risk Society? The new thing is, let's say it one more time, that:
  ‣ either in the Risk Society the previous generation of risks, traditional risks manifest themselves in a new, radically different, non-traditional way, because they acquire an escalating and highly destructive potential;
  ‣ or in the Risk Society new, radically different generation of risks emerges and manifests themselves – the non-traditional risks, the riskized problems – also with escalating and highly destructive potential.
  
  In other words (because of the importance of all this we will say it once more):
along with
  ‣ TRADITIONAL RISKS, i.e. the old generation of risks; problems generating risks; problems related to risks, problems representing risks – RISK PROBLEMS;
we will increasingly face the urgent need to manage
  ‣ NON-TRADITIONAL RISKS, i.e. the new generation of risks, very serious, complex risks with escalating and highly destructive potential; problems that are riskized – RISKIZED PROBLEMS.
  
  • Traditional risk, RISK PROBLEM is related to a SPECIFIC vulnerability of the system. It can „slip through“ into the system through this („its“, specific, related) vulnerability. At the same time, the presence of this SPECIFIC vulnerability is an „invitation“ for the risk associated with it to materialize.
  Counteraction to such a risk is carried out by minimizing (or eliminating) its inherent vulnerability.
  
  Unlike a traditional risk (a RISK PROBLEM)
  a non-traditional risk, a risk of the new generation of risks (a RISKIZED PROBLEM) can exploit ANY vulnerability of the system. And, accordingly, ANY vulnerability of the system can turn out to be a „hole“, through which a riskized problem can see an opportunity for its realization and, accordingly (and immediately) take advantage of this „hole“, of this vulnerability.
  Counteraction to a riskized problem is carried out only at the systemic, general, complex, whole (holistic) level!
  
  In Study 2, we looked at the Classification of the individual aspects of security, i.e. of the types of security, according to which we distinguish the following types of security:
  • Absolute safety;
  • Protected safety;
  • Relative security;
  • Transformational security.
  
  Let us now explore the evolution of security problems.
  
  • In the case of ABSOLUTE SAFETY, there are no impacts or there are very weak, practically negligible impacts on the system and its security. We are talking about a hypothetical, ideal situation where the system is not exposed to any impacts or is exposed to virtually negligible as potential impacts. We already know that this security is a theoretical construct, to the extent that in real life it is impossible to realize it, because there are always tangible, perceptible impacts on the systems (objects).
  •• Let there be no (or practically negligible potential) impacts on the system, but over time impacts begin to occur (or be perceived) and grow in potential. I.e. from zero or negligibly close to zero, they materialize and gain potential. Thus, from the complete absence of problems for the system or the presence of practically negligible as potential impacts, we have a perceptible materialization of some problems, i.e. there is a process of their emergence and/or growth, of their materialization, and of the emergence of:
  Materialized problems.
  
  Near the border, where protected safety begins (Illustration 1), a zone of Materialized problems occurs.
  This process prepares the ground, creates the conditions for the transition from absolute safety to protected safety, for moving to the „kingdom“ of safety, to the Wave of Safety.
  For waves of security, see Study 3.
  In other words, the Materialized problems create the conditions to move on to the Safety problems:
  Materialized problems → Safety issues





  
  Illustration 1. Areas of different types of security and zones of transition
  
  • In the case of PROTECTED SAFETY, there are impacts on the system which, although real and having an impact on it, are not able (both as specific values and as a trend for their development over time) to significantly affect its security. So, with protected safety, there are impacts on the system, but it can neutralize them effectively and they do not significantly affect its security.
  •• Let there be impacts on the system that it can neutralize effectively and therefore they do not affect its security, but over time these impacts start to grow. From not being able to have any impact on the security of the system, the impacts are gaining potential. With this from the insignificant impact on the security of the system, we have impacts that begin to reach the potential to impact the security of that system, i.e. there is a process of their growth from not significantly influencing the protected safety to affecting protected safety, in other words – to influencing the safety of the system, or simply put, it is a process of the safetization of problems, and of the emergence of:
  Safetized problems.
  
  Near the border, where relative security begins (Illustration 1), a zone of Safetized problems occurs.
  This process prepares the ground, creates the conditions for the transition from protected safety to relative safety, i.e. for moving to the „kingdom“ of security, to the Wave of Security.
  In other words, the Safetized problems create the conditions to move on to the Security problems:
  Safetized problems → Security problems
  
  • In the case of RELATIVE SECURITY, there are impacts on the system that carry the potential for significant growth, but the system is able to block this development or keep it under control so that the critical point beyond which it falls into insecurity is not reached. Thus, with relative security, there are impacts on the system that can have a destructive impact on its security, but the system can effectively control them so as to preserve its security.
  •• Let there be impacts on the system that can have a destructive impact on its security, but the system has the necessary resources to effectively control these impacts so as to preserve its security, however, over time they begin to grow. From impacts that can have a destructive impact on its security, but the system has the necessary resources to effectively control these impacts, they gain potential. With this from an impact on the security of the system that can be controlled, we have impacts that are beginning to reach the potential to cause extremely serious consequences on the security of that system, i.e. there is a process of their growth from partially influencing to seriously influencing the relative security, in other words – to influencing the security of the system, or simply put, it is a process of the securitization of problems, and of the emergence of:
  Securitized problems.
  
  Near the border, where transformational security begins (Illustration 1), a zone of Securitized problems occurs.
  This process prepares the ground, creates the conditions for the transition from relative security to transformational security, i.e. for moving to the „kingdom“ of risk, to the Wave of Risk.
  In other words, the Securitized Problems create the conditions to move on to the Risk Problems:
  Securitized problems  Risk problems
  
  • In the case of TRANSFORMATIONAL SECURITY, there are impacts on the system which, with their enormous (escalating) power, are able to cause extremely serious consequences for its security, but the system has built the necessary resources and is able, through their extraordinary mobilization, to carry out such structural transformations, thanks to which it can effectively manage these impacts so as to preserve its security. Thus, in transformational security, there are impacts on the system that in scale are above the critical point for the system, after which it falls into insecurity, but the system can, through certain mobilization efforts of its resources and structural transformations, effectively manage these impacts, so that to maintain its security.
  •• Let there be impacts on the system that can cause extremely serious consequences for its security, but the system, through the mobilization of its resources and structural transformations, can effectively manage these impacts so as to preserve its security, however, over time they begin gradually increase. From impacts that can have a very destructive impact on its security, pushing it beyond the critical point beyond which it falls into insecurity, but the system has built the necessary resources and is able, through their mobilization and structural transformations, to effectively manage these impacts, they rapidly gain potential. With this from influencing the security of the system that can be managed, we have impacts that can irreversibly push the system into insecurity, i.e. there is a process of their growth from very seriously affecting the transformational security to the potential to completely destroy the security of the system, in other words – to affecting the overall picture of the risk to the system, or simply put, it is already a process of the riskization of problems, and of the emergence of:
  Riskized problems.
  
  Near the border from which one goes beyond transformational security and, as we will see later, moves to „absolute safety“ (Illustration 1), a zone of Riskized problems occurs.
  This process prepares the ground, creates the conditions for the transition for the transition from transformational security to „absolute safety“, i.e. for moving to the „kingdom“ of the challenge, to the Wave of Challenge.
  In other words, the Riskized problems create the conditions to move on to the Challenge Problems:
  Riskized problems → Challenge problems
  
  In Study 5, we pointed out that in the still hypothetical but entirely possible in the more distant (or even nearer) future Fourth wave of Security, the Wave of Challenge, security will be indicated as „absolute safety“ (i.e., in quotation marks) and this will most likely be the ultimate goal in the search for security, the limit of our efforts.
  And so the circle of security evolution will finally close:
  
  Absolute safety → Protected safety → Relative security → Transformational security → „Absolute safety“
  
  →In the Challenge society, the aspiration will be at the cost of everything and at any cost to ensure „ABSOLUTE SAFETY“.
  
  So if:
  The First type of Security is ABSOLUTE SAFETY, in which there are no impacts and there is no conditions for the occurrence of any impacts on the system and its security (that is why it is an ideal situation, a theoretical construct);
  Then:
  The Fifth type of Security is „ABSOLUTE SAFETY“, when the system has made maximum and extraordinary efforts to prevent, even before they appear, the first signs of any hypothetical and potential impacts that may develop rapidly in time and threaten its security with (all possible) destructive consequences.
  In other words:
  The First type of Security, ABSOLUTE SAFETY reflects the fact, i.e. the conditional theoretical assumption (at the INPUT) that there are no impacts on the system and its security;
  While:
  The Fifth type of Security, „ABSOLUTE SAFETY“ reflects the end result (at the OUTPUT) that they are removed even before they appear, the first signs of any hypothetical and potential destructive impacts on the system, through its maximum and extraordinary mobilization and transformational efforts.
  
  Later it will become clear that „absolute safety“ can be characterized as ontological security, and Challenge problems are, in their essence, Ontological problems.
  
  And so:
  
  • Within the framework of ABSOLUTE SECURITY, a process can take place where from the absence of any security problems or from the existence of negligibly small problems, i.e. from Zero [Non-existent] problems, problems could arise that materialize and grow as potential, and escalate to Materialized problems, i.e. to such problems that create conditions for the system to be translated from absolute safety to protected safety and, accordingly, to move to Safety problems.
  
  Zero [Non-existent] problems  Materializеd problems  Safety problems
  
  • Within the framework of PROTECTED SAFETY, a process can take place where from Safety problems, problems could arise that grow as a potential, and escalate to Safetized problems, i.e. to such problems that create conditions for the system to be translated from protected safety to relative safety and, accordingly, to move to Security problems:
  
  Safety problems  Safetized problems  Security problems
  
  • Within the framework of RELATIVE SECURITY, a process can take place in which from Security problems, problems could arise that grow as a potential, and escalate to Securitized problems, i.e. to such problems that create conditions for the system to be translated from relative security to transformational security and, accordingly, to move to Risk problems:
  
  Security problems  Securitized problems  Risk problems
  
  • Within the framework of TRANSFORMATION SECURITY, a process can take place in which from Risk problems, problems could arise, that grow as potential, and escalate to Riskized problems, i.e. to such problems that create conditions for the system to be translated from transformational security to „absolute safety“ or ontological security and, accordingly, to move to Challenge problems or Ontological problems.
  
  Risk problems → Riskized problems → Challenge problems или Ontological problems





  
  Table 2. Relationship Type of security – Type of security problem
  
  In other words, just like (for more see Study 3):
  → in the case of relative security, i.e. in the Wave of Security, in the Danger society, there are two types of problems – problems, that are related to security, Security problems, and problems, that are essential to security, Securitized problems;
  and:
  → in the case of protected safety, i.e. in the Wave of Safety, in the Threat society, there are two types of problems – problems, that are related to safety, Safety problems, and problems, that are essential to safety – Safetized problems;
but more importantly and:
  → in the case of transformational security, i.e. in the Wave of Risk, in the Risk Society, there are two types of problems – problems, that are related to risk, Risk problems, and problems, that are essential to risk – Riskized problems.
  
  We have already talked about this, and it needs to be thought through as much as possible – a problem related to risk, Risk problem can at some point grow in potential, escalate and become essential to risk, Riskized problem, i.e. to become riskized. It largely becomes a problem „on the edge“, near the limit after which transformational security passes into „absolute safety“, into ontological security, and this is a qualitatively different state.
  
  We now know that transformational security is the Security of the Wave of Risk. In this wave, the base category of critical destructive factors is Risk. Therefore, it can be said that the Risk Society is afraid (should be afraid) of challenges, and probably because of this it tends to perceive security even literally as the absence (lack) of challenges.
  
  In the conditions of transformational security, as explained, in case of ineffective management or others, including and objective causes, the Risk problem, the Problem of Risk, could not only be risked, become a Riskized problem, but its destructive potential could grow to new critical dimensions, thus gradually transforming into a Problem of challenge, Challenge problem.
  
  What can happen even further are only hypotheses, only speculations, for that, as they say in our country, we are simply short of imagination! If, however, we assume that this Challenge problem continues to escalate uncontrollably as a potential, it can, in turn, to become challengized, i.e. to become a Challengized problem, to acquire not just the scale, scope and characteristics of a challenge to the very existence of the whole system, such is the Challenge problem itself, but to turn out to have the scale, scope and characteristics of a disruptive phenomenon for the whole system.
  
  As we enter the Risk Society, security becomes more and more „risky“. Efforts are directed to risk management, because if the risk materializes, the consequences will be extremely serious. It is no longer enough to protect safety, even to guarantee security, but risks must be managed, a different sensibility of the state and society must be developed. If the efforts to manage the risk fail, it will be riskized (and thus the conditions are created for it to turn from a Riskized problem into a Challenge problem from a moment on). This will put the security of the entire system under severe test, and the answer to this problem must be at the system level – complex, comprehensive, holistic.





  
  Table 3. Relationship between security types, security waves, main categories and types of problems
  
  The Danish scientist Olaf Corry (1971) has a somewhat different view of riskization. He writes: „Whereas securitization tends to personalize, risk-thinking objectifies“ [22]. This synthesized thought captures an important element related to riskization and securitization, so to speak – risk factors vs. security actors. In securitization, the transition from normality to the extraordinarity, i.e. from security to securitization is related to and reflects the role of actors in the field of security – security actors, in other words it is actors-oriented, while in riskization the transition from normality to extraordinary, i.e. from risk to riskization, is related to and reflects the role of factors in the field of risk, risk factors, in other words it is factors-oriented.
  Olaf Corry also cites the following reasoning of his compatriot Mikkel Rasmussen (1973): „Where the metaphor of the Cold War was the wall – (…) – the metaphor of the post-Cold War security environment is the filter. Governments now try to set up a „risk filter‟ that screens their jurisdiction against the most dangerous elements coming from the flows of globalisation”, and adds „Re-engineering society against flows of risks therefore presents a different mentality of governing that is more permanent, holistic and long-term in its nature than temporarily mobilising to thwart or defeat a threat“ [23].
  According to Olaf Corry, Securitization and Riskization are different and have different logics and consequences. Rather than relegating an issue to the category of extraordinary politics, riskization expands the powers of governance, creates new objects of risk management, and prescribes the reengineering of society to increase its resilience and protect it against growing risks. This is a different management mentality to security, one that focuses on risks rather than security, and thus on resilience, and is more permanent and long-term in nature than seeking to thwart or overcome a threat. While securitization seeks primarily to identify a threat that is external to the „valued referent object“, Riskization focuses on governance capacity and resilience as an internal property of the referent object. Thus, in essence, security is subordinated to and included in risk. That is why Securitization and Riskization obey different logics. The logic of risk is related to the politics and rationality of security actors, not to zero tolerance and the politics of rapid reactions and exclusion directed against some adversary (i.e. towards actual securitization); it implements a strategy of containing and preventing dangers, of long-term management and of building management potential. And this has and will have very serious consequences, regardless of whether something is securitized or riskized [24].
  So, Olaf Corry considers 3 types of strategies towards a certain destructive problem, as 3 different phases of counteraction to this problem – politicization (politics of normality and therefore perhaps it is more accurate to call it normalization), securitization (politics of security), riskization (politics of risk).





  
  Table 4. Relation politicization – securitization – riskization [25]
  
  First, the problem is seen as a normal problem, placed on the same level as other problems, it is considered manageable and its management is proceeded with the traditional, normal approaches, means and resources. But gradually the problem acquires a higher priority and is not only balanced and tied to other problems, but the politics is optimized in relation to it in search of maximum utility for the system in finding an adequate solution to this problem.
If at some point, regardless of the efforts made, the problem continues to grow in potential, it is securitized and then it moves to the politics of security called securitization. The external threat to the system (or, as Olaf Corry says – to the valued reference object) is „attacked“; the aspiration is to eliminate it, and for this purpose extraordinary measures are applied, not allowing a compromise with security. Here we are fully in the studies of the Copenhagen School (see Study 10), because this problem from related to security has become essential to security, i.e. the problem has become securitized.
  And again, if from a certain point, regardless of the efforts made, the problem continues to grow as a potential, it is riskized and already moves to the politics of risk, called riskization. In the center is placed the system (or, as Olaf Corry says – the valued reference object), i.e. a leading priority of analysis and effort becomes the resilience of the system (of the valued reference object) as its intrinsic property, a plan to increase resilience is put into action, and a precautionary politics is implemented, together with risk insurance and a safety margin. For Corry, riskization is turning a securitized problem into a risk. This necessitates a shift from a security politics to a risk politics.
  
  In our logic, the riskization of the problem, Riskized problem vs. the problem related to risk, Risk problem, is analogous to the securitization of the problem, Securitized problem vs. the problem related to security, Security problem.
  
  Exactly as:
  a Security problem grows as a potential and becomes a Securitized problem, i.e. it can no longer be solved by the normal, ordinary security control measures, but must be solved by extraordinary measures, so we are in the realm of the extraordinarity, and that is the essence and content of securitization,
  as well
  a Risk problem grows as a potential and becomes a Riskized problem, i.e. it can no longer be solved by the normal, ordinary risk management measures, but must be solved by extraordinary measures, so we are in the realm of the extraordinarity and that is the essence and content of riskisation. Risk must be „attacked“ already at the systemic level, at the level of the whole system, at the holistic level. If this is not done in a timely and efficient manner, the Risk problem will transform into a Challenge problem, which we characterize as an ontological problem, as a problem of a much different and more complex order, directly related to the existence of the system, with the possibility that it fall into escalating insecurity, and from here the devastating Challengized problem is just an arm's length away.
  
  According to François Ewald:
   „Risk has acquired a kind of ontological status. Life is henceforth marked by an essential precariousness… Risk does not represent only a virtual threat or something that is merely possible, but is entirely real“ [26].
  And the British scientist of Hungarian origin Frank Furedi (1947) seems to continue his thought:
   „Living with risk becomes our fate, encouraging a disposition towards a fatalistic perspective towards uncertainty. This sense of fatalism continually counsels us to avoid risks, to take measures that can promote safety“ [27].
  
  In the long, dramatic and controversial, full of many ups and downs, catastrophes and triumphs, human history, we can metaphorically distinguish six periods of the relationship between the Life of people (of society) and the Risks:
  
  PERIOD 1. The Risks do not exist at all in the Life of people.
  PERIOD 2. The Risks are on the periphery of the Life of people.
  PERIOD 3. The Risks are dispersed (dissolved) among the Life of people.
  PERIOD 4. The Life of people is dispersed (dissolved) among the Risks.
  PERIOD 5. The Life of people is on the periphery of the Risks.
  PERIOD 6. The Life of people is completely subject to the Risks.
  
  Let us now trace the essentials of each of these six periods:
  
  PERIOD 1. The Risks do not exist at all in the Life of people (Illustration 2)
  This is the Paradise (we could also put quotation marks – „Paradise“). In the Paradise, life is blissful and there are no risks of any kind. People, however, taste the fruits of the Tree of Knowledge – the knowledge of good and evil. As punishment, God banishes them from the Paradise.
  Let us recall here the words of the German sociologist Niklas Luhmann (1927 – 1998): „The gate to paradise remains sealed – by the term risk“ [28].
  
  PERIOD 2. The Risks are on the periphery of the Life of people (Illustration 2).
  It is a life that is limited to the boundary separating it from the risks. People are banished from the Paradise and their difficult earthly existence begins. The normality of this existence reaches a certain boundary beyond which the risks are. This boundary is drawn by the various taboos. Or as the British anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921 – 2007) said: „Taboo preserves local consensus about how the world is organized. It reinforces shaky security. It reduces intellectual and social disorder“ [29]. And we would supplement it in terms of today's time, rather we would paraphrase it like this: „Taboos preserve the global consensus about how the world is organized. They reinforce shaky security. They reduce intellectual and social disorder“.
  There is a boundary. On the inside of this boundary is the normal, risk-free living of people. The boundary – these are the various taboos that people do not break, but if they break them, they take risks – to invite the wrath of the gods. Accordingly, beyond this boundary, on its outside, are the risks, the risky existence, the existence at risk. People can cross this line, but they don't because it is guarded by key behavior-regulating mechanisms against harmful, immoral, and abnormal behavior (already discussed in Study 13).
  The first and most powerful of these protective (deterrent) mechanisms is Fear. One could cross this line, but as a rule one does not do it out of FEAR – fear of God's punishment, fear of angering the gods (I can do something bad, but I do not because I'm afraid of being punished by God).
  Then, the second protective (deterrent) mechanism is activated with its protective (deterrent) power – the name of which is SHAME (I can do something bad, but I do not because I'm ashamed to do it).
  Finally, in this chronological sequence, the third protective (deterrent) mechanism appears, whose name is CONSCIENCE (I do not do something bad because I cannot [allow myself to] even think about doing it).
  If in the first two protective (deterrent) mechanisms, FEAR AND SHAME, the person mentally calculates the pros and cons, the damages and the benefits of a certain harmful, immoral or abnormal action, in order to assess whether to commit it and to decide not to commit it, then with the third protective (deterrent) mechanism CONSCIENCE, such a calculation, a dilemma of this kind does not confront a Man – he cannot even [afford himself to] think that he is capable of performing such a harmful, immoral or abnormal act, because it is not at all compatible with his value system and professed faith, with the ideals and principles of conduct in life which he professes and follows.
  
  PERIOD 3. The Risks are dispersed (dissolved) among the Life of people (Illustration 2).
  This is the period during which existing risks are an integrative, invariable part of human life. It is as if risks are interspersed among the life of society. People generally live normally, but in their various actions they often face risks and have to decide whether to take them or not. Risks are not something that is on the horizon or a stone's throw away from it – they are in reality, but above all it depends on the people which risks are given what importance. People have a choice – they constantly make one or another choice and see making a choice as their right, they see themselves more as a subject who sifts risks, and see risks as an object of their judgment.
  





  
  Illustration 2. Periods of the relationship between Live of people and Risks
  
  PERIOD 4. The Life of people is dispersed (dissolved) among the Risks (Illustration 2).
  This period is an image as a negative of the previous one. Human life is now an immutable, integrative part of existing risks. The Life of people is interspersed with the risks. Normality in life is fragmented, short time intervals between different risks. People are less and less able to decide whether or not to take the risks that cross their path. What people basically have to do is decide what they're going to do with those risks, how they're going to manage them. This is their choice now – to accept the risks as objectively existing and more and more frequent, more and more usual and to look for ways to counteract them. The places are changing in their own way – risks are a subject that shapes the agenda of society, and people must increasingly think of themselves as the object of the impact of these risks.
  
  PERIOD 5. The Life of people is on the periphery of the Risks (Illustration 2).
  This is the Risk Society that has gained momentum (and power!). Unlike the previous period, when life was scattered like pieces of a puzzle among risks, now it, its normality has been reduced to a critical threshold, the rest is risks – in other words, except for fewerand smaller spheres of life, people are constantly at risk. Normality everywhere borders on risks, it is constantly on the test – every attempt to multiply it exposes it to one, several or many risks. The space of normality can only be expanded if people enter into „dialogue“ with the risks, if the risks are „convinced“ that people can co-exist „peacefully“ in and with them – not through „either-or“ – either normality, or risks, and through „and – and“, both normality and risks. As with the second period, we can say – „It is a life that is limited to the boundary separating it from the risks“. But the space (and time) of this life is much more contracted. If in the second period we had pressure from the inside–outside along the boundary separating normality from risks, i.e. pressure from normality to risks and normality could be extended at the cost of courage against fear, of compromise to shame and constant internal dialogue with oneself regarding conscience, here we have the opposite – pressure from outside–inside along this boundary, i.e. pressure from risks to normality, and if people do not manage well enough the risks they encounter, the normality of their lives will shrink further, shrink further both spatially and temporally.
  
  PERIOD 6. The Life of people is completely subject to the Risks (Illustration 2).
  This is the Hell (one could put quotation marks – „Hell“). People are banished out of life where everything is there – both normality and risks – and are expulsed to the Hell. They are punished because, with their activities and their values, they generate more and more dangerous risks, and they also treat these risks and their management more and more poorly and irresponsibly. In the Hell everything is now risks, there is no normality; all life is risk and there is no activity without risk. If upon his banishment from the Paradise for committing the Original Sin, i.e. tasting of the fruits of the Tree of knowledge, of the knowledge of good and evil, men have the excuse that they were still inexperienced, then for the sins for which they were expulsed to the Hell, their guilt is not due to inexperience and ignorance, but to irresponsibility; of a frivolous attitude towards the consequences of their activity for nature and their social life; of reluctance and inability to learn from their experience and apply their knowledge; of self-perception almost as super-humans. The Hell is not a Risk Society, a Society of Risks, it is a Society-Risk, a Society at Risk, a Society in which everything is a risk and there is nothing but risks.
  
  Different types of security are inherent to the periods thus indicated, in accordance with the already indicated classification of types of security, according to which, we distinguish the following types of security: Absolute safety; Protected safety; Relative security; Transformational security.
  
  ♦ The first PERIOD is a hypothetical, biblical period – a theoretical construct, by comparison with which we can make sense of real, earthly, human periods and their inherent security. We can say that Absolute Safety is inherent to this period. Such a hypothetical society of maximum security could be characterized as a Society of Absolute Safety, the „Absolute-Safety“ Society, the „Super-Safety“ Society.
  
  ♦ The second PERIOD is the period of the Protected Safety. As stated in Study 3, this is the Threat society, the Wave of Safety.
  
  ♦ The Third PERIOD and the Fourth PERIOD are two sides of the same coin. They are related to each other, flow into each other, the differences between them are not absolute, but relative, not so much qualitative, but much more quantitative – depending on how much the Risks are subordinate to (derived from) the Life of people and how much the Life of people is subject to (derived from) the Risks. These are the two periods of the Relative Security. This is also the Danger society, the Wave of Security.
  
  ♦ The fifth PERIOD is the period of the Transformational Security, it is precisely the Risk Society, Society of risks, the Wave of Risk. The Transformational security is the security of the Risk Society.
  In the Risk Society, the very logic of human existence is changing. Let's take the attitude towards uncertainty. It was something initially bad, capable of confusing our plans in life and even upsetting or destroying it. Uncertainty brought a sense of disorder and a premonition of trouble, and we sought to avoid it and free ourselves from it. Or at least to reduce it. Today, uncertainty becomes a part of us, of our existence, and as the American economist Peter Bernstein (1919 – 2009) says, it makes us free [30]. We increasingly boldly, frantically strive from negative freedom, freedom from – in this case freedom from uncertainty, to positive freedom (freedom to) – in this case freedom to uncertainty [31]. This freedom gives us the right to choose and the obligation to make that choice carefully and responsibly.
  
  ♦ The Sixth PERIOD, like the First, is a hypothetical (really?) period with biblical dimensions. It is the end of security, in it we have zero security, no security. This is the period when all challenges to humans have been given a highly ineffective, poor response, and every challenge has become a risk. If mankind does not come to its senses, such a society could be not only the end of security, the end of society, but also the end of humanity. A possible alternative to the described „Hell“ is the society discussed in Study 5 – the Society of challenges, Challenge Society. This could be a society in which we will give adequate answers to most of, to a large part of challenges, or at least to the more and most serious of them. But such a society can easily be brought to the end, to its absurdity, to its negation – when we will want to give timely answers to ABSOLUTELY ALL CHALLENGES.
  
  It was in Study 5 that we already discussed how far such an absolutization of our ambitions and aspirations, complexes and fears can lead us.
  
  In the Wave of Challenge, in the Challenge Society, the main priorities and efforts regarding Security will be related to the challenges, in providing answers to which the system should seek to avert, even before they appear, the first signs of potential destructive consequences of still distant in time possible alternative developments of processes and to build skills (capabilities) for FORECASTING. These skills (capabilities) will enable the system to effectively perform comprehensive and reliable foresight, with the goal of achieving „Absolute Safety“.
   „Absolute Safety“ will be the Security of the Society of challenges, of the Challenge Society.
  The Challenge society will be afraid (should be afraid) of any potential sources of negative impacts, and probably because of this it will tend to perceive security even literally as the absence (lack) of potential sources of negative impacts.
  
  It will be perhaps (we will use the conditional form as we are trying to look into the future) a return to the primal security – to the ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY, which Anthony Giddens describes as predictability and reliability in life; as clear ideas about the reasons for what happens and about the essence of what happens. Ontological security is a form of a perception of security (in the broadest possible sense and with the fullest content of the word) when a person (community, society) feels a sense of maximum confidence regarding both the integrity of his identity and the permanence of the social world and the environment, so that everyday life is and will be as predictable as possible [see 32].
  At the same time, what Anthony Giddens defines as ontological security can also be defined as EPISTEMOLOGICAL SECURITY, since epistemological security is „closely bound with the limits of knowing, with asking questions about the nature of being, of self and others and the impossibility to provide answers“; and if society does not find its anchorage in it, if it does not find its refuge in it, it will indeed experience a „double fear“ – the ontological „fear of death“ and the epistemological „fear of not knowing“ [33].
  The pursuit of ontological certainty is also a pursuit of epistemological certainty!
  We can talk about both ontological security and epistemological security at the same time – because this means talking about the bright, all-consuming the individual, the communities, and beyond doubt and above all, the society, need to ensure to the maximum extent their survival, existence and behavior, their being and life, and as well as to have an optimally satisfactory degree of knowledge – about what has happened in the past, what is happening in the present and what will happen in the near and in the more distant future.
  
  A few more considerations related to ontological security, which, as we have already said, is at the same time epistemological security.
  Again and again we will ask [ourselves] all these questions:
  How far can it go, how far will take us our quest to prevent everything, to protect ourselves from everything, to safeguard ourselves from everything?
  What are the limits and what is the meaning of our life passing into a constant effort of maximum and extraordinary, of titanic and Sisyphean efforts – to make it absolutely impossible, to make it so that there is not even the slightest probability, to make it so that it is not allowed in any way and at any cost to create conditions for the possible emergence of any potential source of negative impact that can quickly develop over time and lead to destructive consequences?
  What is Life without challenges, risks, dangers, threats and all kinds of potential sources of any impacts; what is Life in which we can think of nothing but removing every cause and occasion of fear, apprehension, worry, chagrin?
  
  That is why now and in the near future, even in the not-so-distant future, while we are still in the Risk Society, we can strive to manage risks so that we remain as long in this society. It is by no means the most difficult society to live in, even if one thinks about it, there are many positive aspects in it that motivate us as humanity to live in it without putting our fate at stake. A Bulgarian novel, and later a film, was called „There's nothing better than bad weather“. We can paraphrase it like this – „There is nothing better than the Risk Society“.
  
  Explanation:
   „There is nothing better than bad weather“ (1968) – a novel by the famous Bulgarian writer Bogomil Raynov (1919 – 2007). The Bulgarian theater and film director Metodi Andonov (1932 – 1974) created the film of the same name (1971) based on the novel – the screenplay was by Bogomil Raynov.
  
  When we claim that „There is nothing better than Risk Society“, we contradict the apocalyptic warning of Risk Society guru Ulrich Beck himself:
  „Believed risks are the whip used to keep present day moving along at a gallop. The more threatening the shadows that fall on the present day from a terrible future looming in the distance, the more compelling the shock that can be provoked by dramatizing risk today“ [34].
But we are convinced that our statement is not far from the truth – as long as it is understood in the sense in which we understand it, namely that in front of us people, in our common human future (and it turns out to be very different – immediately forthcoming future, near future, foreseeable future, distant future), happily or unfortunately, there really is nothing better than the Risk Society. All other options and scenarios are… worse.
  
  
  References:
  1. Слатински, Николай. Сигурността – същност, смисъл и съдържание. София: Военно издателство, 2011, 11 – 35.
  Slatinski, Nikolay. Sigurnostta – sushtnost, slisul i sadarzhanie. Sofia: Voenno izdatelstvo, 2011, 11 – 35. (in Bulgarian)
   (Slatinski, Nikolay. Security – essence, meaning and content)
  2. Гочев, Атанас, Николай Младенов. Подходи, системи и организация на ранното сигнализиране. – В: Гочев, Атанас, Георги Генов, Николай Младенов, Петър Христов. Ранно сигнализиране и предотвратяване на конфликти. София: Албатрос, 1997, 78 – 89, с. 82.
  Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Podhodi, sistemi i organizacii na rannoto signalizirane. – V: Gozhev, Atanas, Georgi Genov, Nikolay Mladenov, Petar Hristov. Ranno signalizirane i predotvratiavane na konflikti. Sofia: Albatros, 1997, 78 – 89, s. 82. (in Bulgarian)
   (Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Approaches, systems and organization of early warning)
  3. Гочев, Атанас, Николай Младенов. Ранното сигнализиране за предотвратяване на конфликти след края на Студената война. – В: Гочев, Атанас (ред.). Новата архитектура на сигурността в Европа и ранното сигнализиране и предотвратяване на конфликти. София: Албатрос, София, 1997, 119 – 128, с. 123.
  Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Rannoto signalizirane za predotvratiavane na konflikti sled krai na Studenata voina. V: Gochev, Atanas (red.). Novata arhitektura na sigurnostta v Evropa i rannoto signalizirane i predotvratiavane na konflikti. Sofia: Albatros, Sofia, 1997, 119 – 128, s. 123.
   (Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Early warning to prevent conflict after the end of the Cold War)
  4. Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Early warning to prevent conflict…, ibid., p. 123.
  5. Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Approaches, systems and organization…, ibidem.
  6. Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Early warning to prevent conflict…, ibid., p. 122.
  7. Gochev, Atanas, Nikolay Mladenov. Approaches, systems and organization…, ibid., с. 84.
  8. Гочев Атанас. Конфликтът – ранно сигнализиране и превантивна дипломация. София: Албатрос, 2012, 126 – 127.
  Gochev, Atanas. Konfliktut – ranno signalizirane I prevantivna diplomacia. Sofia: Albatros, 2012, 126 – 127.

   (Gochev Atanas. The conflict – early warning and preventive diplomacy)
  9. Gochev Atanas. The conflict – early warning and preventive diplomacy, ibid., 127 – 128.
  10. Taleb, Nassim. Fooled by Randomness. The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. New York: Random House, 2004, p. 198.
  11. Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking, Fast and Slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011, р. 11, 22, 72, and next.
  12. Taleb, Nassim. Fooled by Randomness…, ibid., с. 257.
  13. Bora, Alfons. Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behaviour, and Social Problems. – In: Ritzer G. (ed.). The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology, vol. VIII, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, 3926 – 3932, p. 3936.
  14. Tannert, Christof, Horst-Dietrich Elvers, Burkhard Jandrig. The Ethics of Uncertainty. In the Light of Possible Dangers, Research Becomes a Moral Duty. – In: EMBO Reports, 2007, Vol. 8, No. 10, p. 895.
  15. Bora, Alfons. Risk, Risk Society, Risk Behaviour, and Social Problems, ibidem.
  16. Тремонти, Джулио. Страхът и надеждата. Европа: глобалната криза, която се задава и начинът да я избегнем. София: Сиела, 2010, с. 21.
  Tremonti, Dzhulio. Strahut i nadezhdata. Evropa: globalnata kriza, koiato se zadava i nachimut da ia izbegnem. Sofia: Siela, 2010, s. 21. (in Bulgarian)
   (Tremonti, Giulio. Fear and hope. Europe: the looming global crisis and how to avoid it)
  17. Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society and Manufactured Uncertainties. – In: Iris, 2 October 2009, Vol. 1, No. 2, 291 – 299, p. 292.
  18. Beck, Ulrich. Politics of Risk Society. – In: Franklin, Jane (ed.). The Politics of Risk Society. Polity Press, Published in association with the Institute for Public Policy Research, 1998, 9 – 22, р. 72.
  19. Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press in association with Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 1991, р. 133.
  20. Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society, https://pdfcoffee.com/ulrich-beck-world-risk-society-pdf-free.html, p. 3.
  21. Rasmussen, Mikkel Vedby. The Risk Society at War. Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 2 – 3.
  22. Corry, Olaf. Securitzation and 'Riskization': Two Grammars of Security. Working paper prepared for Standing Group on I nternational Relations, 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm 9th - 11th September, 2010, р. 12.
  23. Corry, Olaf. Securitzation and 'Riskization', ibidem.
  24. Corry, Olaf. Securitzation and 'Riskization', ibid., 26 – 29.
  25. Corry, Olaf. Securitzation and 'Riskization', ibid., р. 20.
  26. Свенсен, Ларш. Философия на страха. С.: Персей, 2014, p. 72.
  27. Furedi, Frank. Culture of Fear Revisited. Risk-taking and the Morality of Low Expectation. London, UK; New York, NY: Continuum, 1997, 2006, p. 5.
  28. Luhmann, Niklas. Risk: A Sociological Theory. Berlin, Germany; New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 1993, р. 17.
  29. Дъглас, Мери. Чистота и опасност. Анализ на понятията за омърсяване и табу. София: ЛИК, 2005, с. 8.
  Duglas, Meri. Chistota i opasnost. Analiz na poniatiata za omursiavane i tabu. Sofia: LIK, 2005, s. 8. (in Bulgarian)
   (Douglas, Mary. Purity and danger. An analysis of the concepts of pollution and taboo)
  30. Bernstein, Peter L. Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk. New York, NY; Chichester, UK; etc.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996, 1998, p. 229.
  31. O’Malley, Pat. Risk, Uncertainty and Government. London, UK: The Glass House, 2004, р. 33.
  32. Giddens, Anthony. Modernity and Self-Identity, ibid., 184.
  33. Aradau, Claudia. Rethinking Trafficking in Women. Politics out of Security. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, р. 52.
  34. Beck, Ulrich. World Risk Society, ibid., p. 137.
  
  
  08.12.2023
  
  
  Brief explanation:
  The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.