These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
STUDY 11. STRATEGIC PILLARS OF THE SECURITY STATE
The five strategic institutional pillars of the contemporary Security State are systematized, i.e. of the State as an effective producer of security.
The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of the five strategic pillars of the Security State:
Николай Слатински. Сигурността – животът на Мрежата. София: Военно издателство, 2014.
[Nikolay Slatinski. Sigurnostta – zhivotut na Mrezhata. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2014].
Nikolay Slatinski. Security – the Life of the Network. Sofia: Military publishing house, 2014 (in Bulgarian)
We will recall that in Study 2 different classifications of types of security were considered. It was then pointed out that one of these classifications reflects the relationship of security to the institutional pillars of the Security State.
According to this classification, we have the following types of security:
• military (provided by the Army as the First pillar of the Security State);
• internal (provided by the Police as the Second pillar of the Security State);
• intelligence (provided by the Special Services as the Third pillar of the Security State);
• defense-industrial (provided by the defense industry as the Fourth pillar of the Security State);
• civil (provided by the Complex of institutions and structures responsible for actions in case of natural disasters, accidents, catastrophes, pandemics and other emergency situations as the Fifth pillar of the Security State).
The Security State is the State as a producer of security.
In other words:
The Security State is that system of state institutions that is directly involved in the production of security.
In the first approximation, the Security State can be viewed as the National Security System.
Explanation:
Civil security should not be confused with the security of citizens. Civil security is security related to emergency situations.
Thus, as mentioned above, the above classification „reflects the relationship of security to the institutional pillars of the Security State“. This Study will be dedicated to the strategic institutional pillars of the Security State.
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Personal and lyrical explanation:
One of my first insights (the word „insight“ could be put in quotation marks) in the distant time of my involvement in politics and entering the very complex and difficult for me to pass through the thickets of national security, was the following:
The state is nothing but a complex mechanism for the production of security.
I have repeatedly said this in the media and written in my publications. I was often quoted and I was overwhelmed with pride that I, too, had given something to the world; and if not to the world, then at least to the science!
Until one day I read that the eminent Spanish philosopher José Ortega y Gasset (1883 – 1955) wrote that:
„First of all, the state is a producer of security“ [1].
And since then, instead of repeating my „insight“, when I talk about the key role of the state in security, I have to quote this eminent Spanish philosopher.
....
There is no doubt that it is the state that still has the main powers and main functions when it comes to responding to serious challenges, managing serious risks, controlling serious dangers and neutralizing serious threats facing the state, the society and the citizens. We are talking about such key problems, tasks, impacts and obligations in the field of security, which have been and remain the leading priority and most significant concern of the state.
That is why it is both unreasonable and irresponsible in a radical way to „unload“ the state, or for it to „unload“ itself from these basic obligations. It is necessary to seek what is this minimum of responsibilities from which the state cannot be relieved without risking ceasing to be a state, or at least – to be effective as a state. These are precisely the essential functions of the state in security, and optimal conditions must always be created very carefully so that it can fully implement them.
Arnold Wolfers (1892 – 1968) distinguished between subjective and objective security. According to him, objective security is associated with the absence of a threat [to the values of the system], and subjective security is associated with the absence of fear of a threat [that these values will be attacked] [2].
Following the logic of Wolfers, we will also assume that the security of an individual (a group of individuals, a state, a community of states) has two constituents – objective and subjective.
Objective security is when there is no destructive impacts on an individual (a group of individuals, a state, a community of states).
Subjective security is when an individual (a group of individuals, a state, a community of states) believes that there are no such impacts.
In this sense, the preservation of the minimum complex of responsibilities of the state, which would allow the state to fulfill its responsibilities in the field of security, refers above all to objective security.
However, in order to create conditions in which, regardless of the minimization (shrinking of the role) of the state, the necessary level of subjective security will be ensured, the achieved minimum of the state in security must preserve both the effective functioning of the state as a complex mechanism for the production of security, as well as the conviction of society and citizens that the state functions effectively as a producer of security. Only when the state guarantees for society and individual citizens (or at least for as many of them as possible) acceptable levels of both objective and subjective security at the same time, society as a whole and citizens (or, again, as many of them as possible) will be internally convinced and calm that the state is able to satisfactorily maintain a certain COMPLEX level of security (both objective security and subjective security). Otherwise, even if the objective security is at a sufficient level, when the subjective security is below the minimum necessary level, society and individual citizens will tell themselves, and more importantly – they will think that „there is no state“, that „statehood is collapsing“.
When the situation is unstable, society tends to OVERESTIMATE its security needs and UNDERESTIMATE the capabilities of the state to provide it.
And when the situation is unstable, society tends to UNDERESTIMATE its security needs and OVERESTIMATE the capabilities of the state to provide it.
As a rule, overestimated needs and underestimated capabilities lead to excessive psychological discomfort and a huge overexpenditure of material resources before the threat has even arisen.
Accordingly, overestimated capabilities and underestimated needs lead to excessive psychological comfort and a huge overspending of financial resources after the threat has materialized.
Security management is an extremely complex process of ADJUSTING the SUBJECTIVE SECURITY NEEDS of society and citizens (which, as a rule, are high) with the OBJECTIVE CAPABILITIES of the state (which, as a rule, are limited) to ensure this security and to guarantee its needs for this security.
The management is effective when more security is achieved with fewer resources.
The management is inefficient when less security is achieved with more resources.
Because security resources are almost always limited, the fundamental issue is about priorities, goals, and resources in security. There are two ultimate approaches to linking goals and resources in security provision.
• The „Maximum Goal“ approach – this approach seeks to achieve the highest possible goal regarding security with the available resources of the state. The emphasis is on achieving as high a level of security as possible without sparing resources for the sake of this goal, i.e. the goal is MAXIMIZED, no matter how many resources it takes to achieve it.
• The „Minimum Resources“ Approach – this approach seeks to achieve some acceptable, realistic goal in terms of security with the least possible expenditure of the available resources of the state. The emphasis is on spending as few resources as possible to achieve a given acceptable level of security, i.e. the expenditure of available resources is MINIMIZED, of course, while and to the extent that security is still guaranteed.
Somewhat tentatively, it can be said that the „Maximum Goal“ approach is more inherent in the United States, and the „Minimum Resources“ approach is more inherent in the European way of thinking and strategizing.
Under normal conditions, the state is inclined to minimize security costs and ensure its security at some acceptable level. But in emergency conditions, the state optimizes its security goals and, as far as possible, it does not spare security costs.
Security policy planning and security management are extremely complex. If not done in the optimal way, there can be overspending of resources and falling below the critical minimum of security. If done optimally well, it will pay high dividends by finding the „golden ratio“ between capabilities and needs, between goals and resources.
Financing security is not just an accounting process and a matter of budgeting techniques. This is primarily state policy. It is also a philosophical and conceptual problem. Before planning resources for security, the security policy must be formulated. If resources are allowed to be overspent in the name of security, other areas and sectors of economic and social life will inevitably begin to suffer.
But besides philosophy, there is also real and often difficult to implement practice in this process.
We are talking about a complex adjustment of the subjective security needs of society and citizens with the objective capabilities of the state to meet these needs. Usually the needs are defined by the professionals, by the experts, i.e. from bottom to top. And the capabilities are determined by the politicians, by the rulers, and here the direction is opposite – from top to bottom. Adjustment is quite difficult – with compromises, through mutual concessions (even sacrifices) and responsibility, in the spirit of debates and discussions in search of common goals. Everyone has to decide how much to give in so that security, respect for authority, and respect for professionalism do not suffer. It is going slowly, step by step – a long way is covered, directly related to technologies and procedures that combine well-known modern methods of budgeting and financing, but also taking into account the state of the country, the preparedness of its personnel.
The state is indeed a very complex and subtle mechanism for the production of security. Today, the management of the state, security and the Security State is more difficult than both higher mathematics and aerobatics. This management is both a science and an art.
A mistake in the management of a personal life strategy is a failure for the person who made it.
A mistake in the management of a state can lead to tragedy for millions of people.
In the general case, as a public product produced by the state, Security S has two components [for more details, see 3]:
Sg – security as a good that is produced for everyone to some extent and at some acceptable minimum;
Ss – security as a service, for which the market principle applies that everyone gets exactly as he can buy (for as much as he can pay).
Therefore, in the general case for security, it can be written: S = Sg + Ss.
⁕ Security in the premodern society is primarily security as a good with a minimal component of security as a service. In this society, the state is the main, almost monopoly producer of security, which means that the component Sg reaches the maximum value of Sgmax, and the component Ss reaches the minimum value of Ssmin.
Therefore, for the premodern society it can be written: S = Sgmax+ Ssmin.
⁕ Security in the modern society is both security as a good and as a service.
Therefore, for the modern society it can be written: S = Sg + Ss.
⁕ Security in the postmodern society is increasingly becoming security as a service with a diminishing component of security as a good. Therefore in this society the component Sg will gradually tend to some acceptable, but still minimal value Sgmin, and the component Ss will increase to some maximum, but possibly acceptable value Ssmax.
Therefore, for the postmodern society it can be written: S = Sgmin+ Ssmax.
There are two extreme views on the prospects for the „State-Security“ relationship.
According to the first view, the state must preserve its monopoly on the protection of security and on the resource, regulatory and personnel provision of the national security system for as long as possible.
According to the second view, the state should withdraw as much as possible, and as soon as possible, from many of its security functions.
The truth, as usual, probably lies somewhere in the middle between these two extreme views. It is in balance, taking into account the best practices in security and the specifics of society.
And yet the last rights, responsibilities and obligations that the state can waive, from which the state can „free“ itself, must be those related to security. Only when we recognize this invariable, unchanging and inevitable role of the state can we look for an answer to the question: „How much state (do we need)?“. But this answer is largely political, and that could easily make it politicized.
Those who are in favor of a maximum and comprehensive role of the state cannot imagine otherwise a well-organized and orderly state in which there are strict rules. For them, it is the state that sets the rules, enforces them and controls their observance, and people are free as to the extent and long as they do not violate the rules established by the state and as long as they do not violate the interests of the state.
At the other extreme are those who, like Adam Smith (1723 – 1790), believe that „the power of government should be limited [and that] it has such essential functions as the maintenance of defense power and internal order, building infrastructure, and developing of education. It must ensure a free and open market economy and not take actions that hinder its natural course“ [4]; who are convinced that the role of the state in ensuring security should be limited to the state as a „Night Watchman“, i.e. „limited to the functions of protecting all its citizens against violence, theft, and fraud, and to the enforcement of contracts, and so on“, and this role „appears to be redistributive“ redistributive“ [5]. Therefore, according to them, the state is reduced to a minimum and its main task should be to ensure that everyone can pursue his goals as long as he does not break the law. And the role of the state in such a society will become counterproductive from the moment the state begins to prevent citizens from pursuing their interests within the law.
In any case, however, a complete withdrawal from security-related tasks will mean the collapse of the state.
Yes, for us this is undoubtedly indisputable, but we should not turn a blind eye to the objectivity of some trends – the process of withdrawing the state from security, as much as possible decentralization and privatization of its functions is gaining momentum. The state will inevitably continue to retreat from its previous maximum obligations and comprehensive responsibilities in the field of security. In this process of withdrawal, however, it is possible – in actions that are mainly subject to the logic of the market and above all the pursuit of profit – that the private structures that have come to replace it will do only what is profitable, what justifies and compensates them for the costs associated with it, in order to they will not be at a loss and will be „in profit“.
The state does not have any capabilities inherent only to it, which would allow it to ensure security. The state implements this through structures, people and equipment (machines, technique). But any structure, regardless of the form of ownership, can, through people and equipment do the same. And since every function in security is performed by structures, people and equipment, it can be divided into separate activities, for the implementation of which private business can be involved. That is why there is a serious logic in the accelerating processes of „security privatization“. But if the national goals and values are removed from the provision and protection of national security, if we remove strategic planning, management, control and coordination, if feedback with society is „missed“, if no one (anymore) cares about community interests and priorities, nor about the legitimacy of decisions and public support for them, i.e. for what is the essence of the political process in a democracy, then wouldn't this create ideal conditions for the irreversible reduction, weakening and dismantling of the state?
Naomi Klein (1970) analyzed the privatization of security as a real threat to the privatization of the state. She talks about the Disaster Capitalism Complex (DCC), i.e. about the capitalist complex associated with disasters [6]. The more accurate name is the „Disaster Industrial Complex“ (DIC) to indicate that it is some kind of modern analogue of the Military Industrial Complex (MIC).
The Disaster Industrial Complex (DIC) is closely tied, according to Klein, to the power in the US and thus „feeds“ either on public resources that the state allocates for security-related purposes and operations, or on related activities and tasks that, through „outsourcing“, the state very often assigns without any public debate to companies from the DIC. The spectrum of ambitions and appetites covers all the different spheres from which the state withdraws and gives them to private business – war on terrorism; homeland security, including liquidation of damages in natural and man-made disasters, accidents and catastrophes; peacekeeping, rescue and search operations; building infrastructure, hospitals, schools, bridges, oil wells; guarding, patrolling, demining, supplies for the armed forces („maintaining the U.S. military is now one of the fastest-growing service economies in the world“); military, police and civil service training; cleaning of rivers and storages; providing medical assistance; supervision and interrogation of prisoners; care for refugees and asylum seekers; collection and processing of information, including personal data. Thus, it is a powerful security-related complex that expands its influence and involvement both outside the state through the „privatization“ of war and within the state, through the „privatization“ of internal activities to ensure internal security [7].
It is a trend in which the government divests itself of key security-related functions and transfers them to private corporations. The state becomes „hollow“, freed from the content and capacity to respond to security challenges. Power grows numerically, but becomes a de facto distributive mechanism of finance, attracting lobbyist and corporate interests like a magnet. This creates a new system of blurred boundaries between Big Government and Big Business that can be called „corporatist“, i.e. operating on the principle of corporatism. Its main feature is huge transfers of public good into private hands, making it a most profitable business to take over large sectors of security from private companies [8]. And as Russia's war against Ukraine shows, private military companies with the support and funding of the state are becoming a sinister instrument of Russian imperial policy of conquest, not only participating in hostilities, but also „specializing“ in terror, murders, robberies and violence against the civilian population.
The Military Industrial Complex (MIC) (or at least its most aggressive sector) has always pushed for new wars. In order to purchase new weapons and equipment, the arsenals must be cleared of old weapons and equipment. And war is the cheapest utilization of weapons and equipment. In addition, in order to introduce new weapon systems and equipment, they must be tested on military training grounds in conditions close to combat. And the best military training grounds are the real battlefields where real combat takes place.
So the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) is historically burdened with the original sin of the need for new wars.
It is not for nothing that the 34th President of the United States (1953 – 1961) and Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces during World War II with the rank of Army General with five general stars Dwight Eisenhower (Dwight David „Ike“ Eisenhower, 1890 – 1969) used the term „military industrial complex“ in his farewell address to the nation on January 17, 1961: „In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together” [9].
Following what Naomi Klein said, we will emphasize that now, to a large extent analogous to the the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC), the complex of multiple companies associated with emergency situations, i.e. DIC – The Disaster-Industrial Complex, who profit from the occurrence and resolution of crises, expect more and more orders from the state, want to restore (after destruction), guard (civilian or military objects), build or repair, treat, train (police and military), clear mines, patrol, develop deposits, expend (state reserve or mobilization resources). This complex „feeds“ during crises, disasters and accidents, during operations abroad and in the fight against terrorism, it, as has been said, profits from the occurrence of emergency situations. And from here, willingly or unwillingly, we find ourselves close to the thought that when it is „hungry“ for such situations, the Disaster-Industrial Complex (DIC) will demand from the authorities to „help“ it in this desire, by „providing“, by „organizing“ some emergency situations. All these companies that profit from and through the state's security and defense projects and missions can, analogously to the Military-Industrial Complex (MIC), demand for more and more crises and emergencies because they benefit from them and from working on the ground of the given disaster.
What was written above about the Military-Industrial Cmplex (MIC) and the Disaster-Industrial Complex (DIC) directly affects a really very serious problem:
If certain private corporations, firms, enterprises make a living, figuratively speaking, with activities related to security, then why not imagine how they – because they cannot afford their structural units, especially those involved in emergency situations, to stand idle in anticipation of such situations (e.g. fires) and in order to ensure employment and profits – may be tempted to cause („organize“) such kinds of emergencies…
The model situation is as follows: these corporations, firms, enterprises deal with the following – they intervene (begin to act) when a certain insecurity arises and they profit from the transformation of this insecurity into security. Their business is to profit from turning insecurity into security. The more efficiently they do this, the greater their profit, the more often they are used to solve the problems of converting the existing great insecurity into a satisfactory level of security.
This is why the suspicion inevitably arises – Would any of them be tempted to first cause („organize“) some greater insecurity in order to be hired to turn that insecurity into security and thus improve their finances, image and reputation?
• This is how the Military-Industrial Complex, MIC can require the state to wage war, because war is both the cheapest means for utilization of old weapons and the most effective way to test new weapons.
• This is how the Disaster-Industrial Complex, DIC can also require the state to provide it with emergency situations – disasters, accidents, catastrophes, etc. of this kind or even it can cause them itself.
The French sociologist Loïc Wacquant (1960) writes about a kind of Carceral-Industrial Complex, CIC, or, in his words, „carceral-auxiliary complex“ [10]. This CIC is the result of a growing tendency in a modern democratic state (in the US, but also in Europe) to relieve the state of responsibilities for the social and economic causes of insecurity, for a „new punishing mind that criminalizes the poor“, for a policy of criminalizing poverty, for carceral hypertrophy, for the punitive management of social insecurity, for using the repressive power of the state to systemically and structurally violence on crime-producing poverty and on poverty-born crime. From the fact that there are poor people who commit crimes, they move to accepting that poverty is the direct cause of crime. It leads to the understanding that the poor are not capable of being responsible for themselves and that the fault for being poor lies with the poor themselves, with their attitude towards themselves and the law, with their behavior. In relation to the poor, there is only one step left – to repress them with all the might of the state. This is how the „neutralization of the population disobedient to the new economic order“ is achieved. Reduced investment in social policy, i.e. social de-investment turns into increased investment in prisons - into carceral over-investment. This approach becomes very profitable – through it we are present at the birth of the „commercial carcero-auxiliary complex“ - on the one hand, the cheap labor of prisoners is used, and on the other hand, a whole network of companies is developing that profits from the government business with prisons – construction of buildings, production of facilities and means of observation, supply, security, etc.
• This is how the Carceral-Industrial Complex, CIC can require the state to increase the number of prisons.
And since there must be prisoners in prisons, they can be sought for among the poor and poorest strata of the population, considering poverty as a prerequisite for deviant, criminal behavior and inevitably coming to the criminalization (and hence to carcerization) of poverty. This will be the most severe punishment for the poor FOR BEING POOR. Other punishments for the poor for being poor include severely limited or no access to quality education, quality health care, quality (fair) justice, and quality fulfillment in life. Otherwise, it is well known that the poor are also punished BY BEING POOR – they eat worse food and dress in poorer quality clothes, live in messier neighborhoods and with higher crime rates.
The growing personal (individual) insecurity in society after the beginning of the Transition to Democracy in Bulgaria gave rise to a phenomenon unknown to the times of socialism – private companies engaged in the protection of persons and property (of course, this phenomenon is by no means typical only for Bulgaria) – a kind of Protection-Industrial Complex, PIC. There is no guarantee that some of these companies will not be tempted to create a higher level of threat for businessmen, politicians, other solvent persons (through individual violent attacks on some of them), so that these threatened persons resort to bigger and more expensive protection, as well as insisting on the allocation by the state of additional resources for the individual security of people, in the distribution of which, of course, these private security companies will also be directly involved.
• This is how the Protection-Industrial Complex, PIC can require the state to spend much more public resources in close cooperation with the companies from this complex and to introduce the most stringent measures (including legal ones) to guarantee the personal and corporate security.
We constantly refer to the already mentioned problem – about the „shrinking“ of the role of the state. This is, in fact, a global trend, or at least a trend that is most characteristic of democratic countries.
This trend in the contemporary security environment at the global, continental, regional and national level can be formulated as follows:
■ Serious weakening of the positions and role of the State [11].
Pushed from without and squeezed from within, the State is already beginning to become „too small for the big problems, and too big for the small problems“ [12], its shagreen skin shrinking painfully before the eyes of a generation. Such sacral concepts as independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, state secrets are losing their content. The state is no longer the main, and even more so the sole owner of the information. The active advancement of regional (or group) interests often leads to (not at all innocuous) combinations of interests, where regions (or groups) in one country come close to each other and even cooperate with regions (or groups) in other countries to put pressure on their own governments.. The influence of external interests on internal processes is growing. It is increasingly rare when society perceives itself as a single organism with common goals and priorities.
By seeking answers to challenges, managing risks, controlling dangers and neutralizing threats, and realizing that its role is shrinking, the mature State seeks to manage this natural and inevitable process with reasonable and deliberate actions.
‣ On the one hand, the State transfers part of its powers and functions upwards vertically – to supranational structures of integration and security (for example, the EU, NATO, UN, OSCE).
‣ On the other hand, the State transfers part of its powers and functions downwards vertically – to regional structures and local government bodies (local authorities).
‣ Finally, the State transfers part of its powers and functions horizontally – to private entrepreneurship (business), to various religious communities, to non-governmental organizations and non-profit associations, to individual periodic, temporary or one-time initiatives of self-organizing citizens.
While the immature, eroding its statehood or collapsing state allows its powers to be spontaneously torn away or to be deprived of them under the pressure of private and corporate interests, the mature, responsible state gives up its powers and functions according to the scheme given above after a reflective and reflexive analysis and targeted strategizing.
The process of giving up powers and functions cannot be endless, it has its limits. It can be considered that the national goals in this process have been achieved when two conditions are present – objective and subjective. To characterize these conditions, it is necessary to recall what was said above – that security is objective and subjective.
The one condition for the minimum (the level below which the State should not „fall“) of the powers and functions that the State must retain is precisely the OBJECTIVE CONDITION, i.e. for the state to continue to fulfill its tasks and roles as a complex producer of security – for itself, for society and citizens.
But although objectively with this minimum of powers and functions, the State can fulfill its fundamental role in terms of security, this is not enough precisely because security, in addition to an objective component, also has a subjective component.
Because of this subjective component of security, it is not only necessary for the State to objectively be able to produce the necessary security, but also for society and citizens to believe that it, the State, is capable to fulfill its tasks and roles, i.e. this is the SUBJECTIVE CONDITION of the „shrinking“ shagreen skin of the state.
The state has carried out an effective and manageable process of „unloading“ powers and functions vertically (up and down) and horizontally, if both OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE CONDITIONS are met, namely, that the State is able to be a producer of security, and that society and citizens believed that the State is capable of being such a producer. If one of the two conditions is not present, then the State has failed in this process of minimizing its powers and functions. Then it will either objectively not be able to produce security, even if society and citizens are inclined to subjectively believe the opposite; or society and citizens will not subjectively believe that the state is capable of producing the necessary security, even if it is objectively capable of doing so.
The most essential problem is, as already mentioned, is that the security needs of society and citizens are mainly SUBJECTIVE in nature, i.e. they are primarily subjective. While the capabilities of the state to produce security are mainly of an OBJECTIVE CHARACTER, i.e. they are primarily objective.
For the purposes of this Study, we will cite another global trend in the modern security environment on the global, continental, regional and national level [13]:
■ The growing role of natural, anthropogenic (caused by human activity), technogenic (caused by industrial technologies) and pathogenic (caused by mass epidemics and even pandemics) disasters, accidents and catastrophes and the need for more and more resources for their early warning, prevention, timely reaction, counteraction and liquidation of the consequences.
The high technological and constructive achievements; the escalating consumerism towards nature; the concentration of large-scale energy or complex nuclear, chemical and biological production; the gene experiments; the pandemics; the growing recklessness of terrorism and the imperial maniacal ambitions of various dictators, completely change our ideas of crises and crisis situations and impose on us a qualitatively new structure of the entire crisis management system. The accident at the Japanese nuclear power plant in Fukushima (11/03/2011) was an alarming warning that we are entering an era of crises and catastrophes, the immediate consequences of which, even if contained, can be irreversible in their long-term effects. The Covid-19 virus pandemic has caused devastating human and economic losses.
Many of these destructive phenomena and processes are global or at least supra-regional in nature, i.e. they quickly and easily cross borders from one country to another. This requires cooperative efforts and the establishment of sophisticated supranational ground-based and (increasingly) space-based early warning and surveillance systems, with the aim of pre-emptive or timely prevention and reliable control.
Globally critical, destructive and catastrophic problems and factors require a global response with global mobilization, global coordination, global cooperation and global mutual assistance.
Efforts are needed to prepare and educate the population for actions in crisis situations, not only in emergency situations of this kind, but in the hypothesis of their increasingly frequent presence in our everyday life. The skill of crisis behavior and self-control during a crisis will become the most significant prerequisite for our overcoming such extreme trials, for minimizing human and material damage, for maintaining the normal course of life, for reliable functioning of the political system.
We must draw logic and logical conclusions that the actions of palliative measures, to one degree or another, the first-signal reactions are already in the past. The causes, critical factors and symptoms are much deeper and warn us that the time to find answers is indeed very limited. It becomes even more limited due to the exceptional dynamics of everything that happens to us and directly affects security. Let's face the new reality and realize that in the Risk Society, in the society of risks and serially produced uncertainties [14], any underestimated, poorly managed and realized risk will most likely lead to crisis and increase insecurity, and this will mean an emergency and, perhaps, even a catastrophe.
It has become mercilessly clear that in the last two decades, humanity is moving into a new phase of development, when extraordinary events, crises and risks, insecurity, uncertainty, indeterminacy, the unknown and high dynamics settle permanently into everyday life, and somehow nostalgia for the bygone days of stability, safety, definiteness and predictability of events to which we were accustomed and thought they were guaranteed to us, which could not be otherwise at all. But such a return to the golden cage of security is now impossible. We must cold-bloodedly and reasonably accept the new reality and the fact that the emergency will become more frequent in it, it will become the norm, the rule. Crises will become a daily occurrence. The process in which normality and a-normality (non-normality) begin to change their places is gaining more and more strength. Normality becomes rare, exceptional, almost impossible; while the a-normality (non-normality, extraordinarity) begins to be realized as a new normality, becoming more and more frequent, more and more predictable and more and more expected. We are moving from one a-normality to another a-normality and so we actually live in a constant stream of a-normalities. This is why a-normality is the new normality.
The question inevitably arises – what happens to the state, its hierarchical institutions, its structures, laws and resources during this transformation? Previously, these institutions, structures, laws and resources were quite logically built to serve normality. And a-normality (non-normality) was seen as an exception, as an emergency situation: almost impossible, very rare, in fact extreme, tacitly considered as something related to a military or political encroachment on the order established in the state and by the state. Then it was regulated that if something like this happens, then the Army and other power institutions would intervene, and the state would go into an emergency (an extraordinarity), which is difficult to imagine, very vaguely described in meaningful legal norms regime of governance.
This is why we are called and urged, even rather compelled and pressed to ask ourselves again and again: „What actually happens to the state in the new normality of a-normality (non-normality), in the emergency (the extraordinarity) becoming the new normality (the ordinarity)?“.
This question urgently requires an answer for countries with limited resources like Bulgaria, but it applies with no less force to NATO and the EU. It affects the very foundation of NATO and the EU, their fundamental essence, as both Unions were created and built to serve and protect normality and have not developed, at least to an acceptable degree, the capabilities, procedures and resources to operate in and manage various non-military emergencies and extreme situations with approaches other than the direct use of military force.
However, this leading role is already carried out in radically different situations, in situations „on the verge“, „on the edge“, in situations of strong non-linearity (small impacts lead to big consequences – mainly in the manifestations of crises; and conversely, big impacts lead to small consequences – mainly in human efforts to manage these crises). Thus, gradually (and in fact, how gradually?) out-of-order situations become the new in-order, the new order, the new routine (new normality). That is why public anxieties, fears and reactions are changing radically, the feeling of insecurity is increasing. The French sociologist Gastón Bouthoul (1896 – 1980) called this feeling the „Damocles complex“ and defined it as a cause of aggressiveness [15].
Emergency situations are among the so-called SECURITIZED PROBLEMS (see Study 10).
Let's remind:
A problem related to security (SECURITY PROBLEM) becomes a problem essential to security, i.e. it is securitized (SECURITIZED PROBLEM) when it cannot be overcome without mobilization and structural transformations in the system (in the state and the national security system, in society and public relations).
An emergency situation, and in the political optics of debates, a state of emergency, can occur in one of the following cases:
⁕ Firstly, when the political (constitutional, legal, public, social) order is violated by forces outside or inside the state.
We will call this an EMERGENCY OF THE FIRST TYPE – outside the established constitutional (legal, legally guaranteed) order. As a rule (at least – but not only – in Bulgaria), the current legislation focuses (even fixes) precisely on this situation and it describes, first of all, how to react if this situation occurs. And rather, it only mentions it, without building either an adequate regulatory framework or the necessary institutional infrastructure.
⁕ Secondly, when the normal course of processes is disrupted as a result of an emergency situation – disaster, accident, catastrophe, crisis, civil contingency, emergency, pandemic.
We will call this an EMERGENCY OF THE SECOND TYPE – outside the normal (natural) course of processes. Here (as legislation, as an institutional network of networks [16], as resources) there is a lot of work, a lot of effort, a lot of changes and even a lot of thinking ahead...
In both types of emergencies (of the First type and of the Second type), but this sounds especially strongly for the Emergency of the Second type, two questions of extremely increased complexity arise:
• Can the normal (ordinary, routine) measures be applied in an emergency situation?
• If emergency measures are needed, how to control them so that they do not become new ordinary (routine) measures, i.e. did not become the new „normal“ legislation?
The answers to these two questions are to be given by Time, Power and Democracy, by Rethinking Security, the Evolution of Societies and Global Order. Undoubtedly, the scientists have to say their heavy and reasoned word as well...
We will first consider the strategic institutional supports of the CLASSIC Security State.
Let us clarify that when we talk about the „pillar“ of the Security State, one should not think of some kind of single institution, something like a chimney – vertical and pointing upwards to the top of power. It is a complex of institutions and structures (a „network of networks“) that are integrated mainly horizontally and increasingly combine coordination and decentralization at the expense of command and centralization.
The CLASSIC Security State has four strategic institutional pillars: The Army, The Police, The Special Services, The Defense Industry.
▪ The Army (with a capital “A”) – it was created to protect the external security of the State, i.e. it is an armed institution for protection against external threats, born simultaneously with the emergence of the State or even becoming a sign of the birth of the State.
▪ The Police (with a capital “P”) – it was created to protect the internal security of the State, i.e. it is an armed institution for protection against internal threats, „grown“ out of the Army. The Police is separated from the Army, because if the Army were introduced into society to protect it from internal challenges, risks, dangers and threats, several problems would immediately arise, among which the so-called „Juvenal dilemma“ is especially important (Decimus Junius Juvenal, c. 60 – about 131): „Who who is to guard us from the guardians guardians themselves?“ (Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?).
▪ The Special [intelligence] services – they provide information, i.e. the software of the national security system.
▪ The Defense industry – it produces the weapons and equipment, i.e. the hardware of the national security system.
Let us now consider the CONTEMPORARY Security State – the Security State in the Globalized, Postmodern, Networked and Risk Society, i.e. in Society, which is increasingly globalized, increasingly postmodern, increasingly networked and increasingly risky [17].
The CONTEMPORARY Security State has five strategic institutional pillars: The Army, The Police, The Special Services, The Defense Industry, and The Civil Security.
Speaking about the Security of the State and the State in Security, it is necessary to take into account one of the most topical topics in the discussion about the role and place of the State in guaranteeing security – about the evolution of the CLASSIC Security State and its strategic institutional pillars.
As various emergencies come to the fore, when a-normality (non-normality) becomes the new normality (the ordinarity), the four CLASSIC PILLARS of the Security State come face to face with a very strong, powerful competitor for material, financial, cognitive (knowledge-related) and human resources – the Civil Security.
When it comes to CIVIL SECURITY as a COMPETITOR to the classical pillars of the Security State, scientists are divided into two large groups (schools, camps).
→ Scientists from one group believe that the MODERN Security State should remain with four pillars, but each of them should gradually develop and strive to increase and improve the capabilities that will allow it to take on responsibilities and functions in the field of Civil Security.
If any of these pillars fail to do so, it risks losing some of its meaning, funding and public support.
→ Scholars of another group argue that the four classic pillars of the Security State should remain and continue to be mainly the way they were created (some of them even in ancient times), and not be overstrained financially and in personnel in order to learn now the activities inherent in the Civil security. However, it is necessary to build a new Fifth Pillar of the CONTEMPORARY Security State – Civil Security. Something like this is done in the USA and Russia, creating, respectively:
• The Homeland Security Department in the USA, which first emerged as a hierarchical structure and gradually became networked;
• The Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency Situations and Liquidation of the Consequences of Natural Disasters, which first emerged as a network structure and gradually gradually became hierarchized.
In this spirit they act, for example, in Sweden. A powerful intellectual and practical force is the the research of the eminent expert and university professor Bengt Sundelius (1950). He and his team are working to build a network of governmental, non-governmental and private organizations to respond to and manage crises from natural, man-made and mixed threats that can be very critical structural hazards and threaten critical functions of society.
The way ahead, in our opinion, is definitely in the second direction – building a network of networks as a strategic institutional Fifth pillar of the MODERN Security State. If such a support is built, it will lead to a synergistic effect of using the limited (they are, in principle, always limited) resources of the state in countering any kind and type of emergency and critical situations.
In conclusion, let us say again:
THE CONTEMPORARY Security State has five strategic institutional pillars: The Army, The Police, The Special Services, The Defense Industry and The Civil Security:
▪ The ARMY – an armed institution for protection against external threats; it protects the external security of the State.
▪ The POLICE – an armed institution for protection against internal threats; it protects the internal security of the State.
▪ The SPECIAL SERVICES – they provide the information, i.e. the software of the national security system.
▪ The DEFENSE INDUSTRY – it produces weapons and equipment, i.e. the hardware of the national security system.
▪ The CIVIL SECURITY – it is a complex of institutions and structures („network of networks“) directly involved in disasters, accidents, catastrophes, pandemics and other emergency situations.
References:
1. Ortega y Gasset, Jose. The Revolt of the Masses, 1930, https://libgen.rocks/ads.php?md5=40B59567FF838168390B0E6E41026E49, p. 96.
2. Wolfers, Arnold. National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol.//Political Science Quarterly, December, 1952, Vol. 67, No. 4, 481 – 502, p. 485.
3. Слатински. Николай. Сигурността – животът на Мрежата. София: Военно издателство, 2014, стр. 143 и следв.
Slatinski, Nikolay. Sigurnostta – zhivotat na Mrezhata. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2011, p. 143 et seq. (in Bulgarian)
(Slatinski, Nikolay. Security – the life of the Network).
4. Бътлър. Имън. Адам Смит: Въведение. София: Институт за радикален капитализъм Атлас, 2010, стр. 31.
Butlur, Imun. Adam Smit: Vavedenie. Sofia: Institut za radikalen kapitalizm Atlas, 2010, p. 31. (in Bulgarian)
(Butler. Eamon. Adam Smith: An Introduction).
5. Нозик, Робърт. Анархия, държава и утопия. София: Класика и хуманизъм, 2005, stр. 26.
Nozik, Roburt. Anarhia, durzhava I utopia. Sofia: Klasika i humanism, 2005, р. 31. (in Bulgarian)
(Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State and Utopia).
6. Клайн, Нейоми. Шоковата доктрина. Възходът на капитализма на бедствията. Сдось: Изток-Запад, 2011, стр. 20.
Klain, Neiomi. Shokovata doktrina. Vuzhodut na kapitalizma na bedstviata. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2011, р. 20.(in Bulgarian)
(Klein, Naomi. The shock doctrine).
7. Ibidem, р. 13 et seq.
8. Ibidem.
9. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's Farewell Address (1961), https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhow...
10. Вакан, Лоик. Затворите на нищетата. София: ЛИК, 2004 , с. 10 и следв.
Vakan, Loik. Zatvorite na nishtetata. Sofia: LIK, 2004, р. 10 et seq. (in Bulgarian)
( Wacquant, Loïc. The prisons of poverty)
11. Слатински, Николай. Рискът – новото име на Сигурността. С.: Изток-Запад, 2019, стр. 45 и следв.
Slatinski, Nikolay. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019, р. 45 et seq. (in Bulgarian)
(Slatinski, Nikolay. Risk – the new name of Security)
12. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. Has Democracy a Future? // Foreign Affairs, September/October 1997, Vol. 76, № 5, 2 – 12, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-09-01/has-democracy-future, p. 12.
13. Slatinski, Nikolay. Risk…, ibidem.
14. Бек, Улрих. Световното рисково общество. София: Обсидиан, 2001, стр. 13 и следв.
Bek, Ulrih. Svetovnoto riskovo obshtestvo. Sofia: Obsidian, 2001, р. 13 et seq. (in Bulgarian)
(Beck, Ulrich. The World Risk Society)
15. Делюмо, Жан. Страхът в Западния свят (XIV – XVIII век). Един обсаден град. София: Рива, 2002, стр. 28.
Deliumo, Zhan. Strahut v Zapadnia sviat (XIV – XVIII vek). Edin obsaden grad. Sofia: Riva, 2002, р. 28. (in Bulgarian)
(Delumeau, Jean. Horrors of the West in the Western World (14th – 18th centuries).
16. Йончев, Димитър. Равнища на сигурност. София: НБУ, 2008, стр. 222.
Ionchev, Dimitar. Ravnishta na sigurnost. Sofia: NBU, 2008, р. 222. (in Bulgarian)
(Yonchev, Dimitar. Security levels)
17. Слатински, Николай. Рискът…, Ibid., стр. 43 и следв.
Slatinski, Nikolay. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019, р. 43 et seq. (in Bulgarian)
(Slatinski, Nikolay. Risk – the new name of Security)
02/19/2023
Brief explanation:
The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.
