These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
STUDY 7. INTEGRATION OF BASIC CONCEPTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY, UNCERTAINTY AND RISK
The integration of the scientific categories of the „Challenge-Risk-Danger-Threat“ Relationship („CReDiT“), the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight, the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld and the supplemented „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb is shown.
The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of the integration of these basic concepts:
Николай Слатински. Рискът – новото име на Сигурността. София: Изток-Запад, 2019.
[Nikolay Slatinski. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019].
Nikolay Slatinski. Risk – the new Name of Security. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019 (in Bulgarian)
I.
Nassim Taleb (1960) introduced the term „Black Swan“ – an event which, as he wrote, has the following three attributes:
(1) it is an outlier, as it lies outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can convincingly point to its possibility;
(2) it carries an extreme impact.
(3) in spite of its outlier status, human nature makes us concoct explanations for its occurrence after the fact, making it explainable and predictable [1].
Briefly and for further clarity, we can say that a „black swan“ is an event that:
(1) occurs extremely rarely;
(2) its occurrence does not follow from the normal logic of the process; and
(3) if it happens, its effect is enormous.
Let us also add the following reasoning of Nassim Taleb:
„Some events can be rare and consequential, but somewhat predictable… They are near-Black Swans… These events are rare but expected. I call this special case of „gray“ swans Mandelbrotian [i.e. of the French and American mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot (1924 – 2010)] randomness… Mandelbrotian Gray Swan: Black Swans that we can somewhat take into account – earthquakes, blockbuster books, stock market crashes – but for which it is not possible to completely figure out the properties and produce precise calculations“ [2].
According to Nassim Taleb, therefore, there are following types (categories) of „swans“:
› Frequent and predictable, expected events – „white swans“.
› Rare and (somewhat) predictable, expected events – „grey swans“;
› Rare and unpredictable, unexpected events – „black swans“.
If
we classify the „swans“ according to two pairs of parameters:
(1) frequent occurrences or rare occurrences;
(2) (somewhat) predictable events or unpredictable events;
and if
we construct a 2 x 2 table with these two parameter pairs,
then
there can be four types of „swans“ – frequent and (somewhat) predictable events; rare and (somewhat) predictable events; frequent and unpredictable events; rare and unpredictable events.
If we put the „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb in this table, we will find that one of the „cells“ in the table remains empty, unfilled!
Table 1. „Swans“ according to Nassim Taleb.
Strangely, it turns out that Nassim Taleb somehow misses, simply does not notice one of these types of „swans“ – frequent and unpredictable events!
But in nature – we are firmly convinced of this – there are not and cannot be empty „cells“. If a „cell“ is empty, then this is either because it has not yet been studied, or because it has so far been considered insignificant.
The question naturally arises:
What kind of „swans“ are events of the fourth type – i.e. frequent and (somewhat) unpredictable, unexpected events?
We will characterize such events as „silvery swans“ (Table 2):
› Frequent and (somewhat) unpredictable, unexpected events – „silvery swans“.
Table 2. The supplemented „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb
II.
Some time ago, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (1932 – 2021, the youngest in this position, 1975 – 1977, and the oldest in this position, 2001 – 2006) warned that in today's highly dynamic time, we must consider and account for four types of cognitive (knowledge-related) quantities [3]:
› known knowns – [about] which we know [that] we know;
› known unknowns – [about] which we know [that] we do not know;
› unknown knowns – [about] which we do not know [that] we know;
› unknown unknowns – [about] which we do not know [that] we do not know.
None of these four types of quantities should be underestimated, but especially difficult to predict are the fourth type of quantities – unknown unknowns.
Managing security (personal, community, corporate, national, international) in the spirit of the aforementioned thesis of Donald Rumsfeld is increasingly reminiscent of blindfold shooting at a moving target (i.e. unknown unknowns). At first we need to stop the target (i.e. unknown knowns) or remove the blindfold (i.e. known unknowns). But long gone are the days when we could, as a rule, shoot at a stationary target and without a blindfold (i.e. known knowns).
It could be summarized that one of the main questions about (in) the Risk Society, the Society of risks is what kind of critical situations we will find ourselves in:
• whether of unknown unknowns – these are situations where „our representation of reality ceases to apply – but we do not know it“ and this type of situations Nassim Taleb calls „Platonic [from Plato] fold“ [4];
• whether of known unknowns – these are situations where our representation of reality ceases to apply – and we know it.
• whether of unknown known – these are situations where our representation of reality does not cease to apply – but we do not know it.
• whether of known knowns – these are situations when our representation of reality does not cease to apply – and we know it.
In fact, situations of the latter type, as has been said, will occur less and less.
Undoubtedly, in order to cope with the qualitatively new quantities (tasks and problems) that we will increasingly face, we must also develop qualitatively new skills and capabilities.
The fact is that, although in the Risk Society, traditional risks will continue to accompany us, non-traditional, sometimes even unknown risks, which are not only unknown, but also unknowable [5], will increasingly come to the fore.
In this sense, the Risk Society is a society (as well) of unknown unknowns risks.
It is probably much more correct to say that unknown unknowns risks are not even risks, but challenges (or at least bordering whit them) to which we must give at least partially correct answers and thereby „limit“ them, turning them to known unknowns risks or unknown knowns risks.
Our world is interconnected and interdependent. In this sense, the concepts (scientific categories) are as well interconnected and interdependent. That is why it is so important to draw lines of demarcation that, up to a certain point, unite them, and beyond that point, separate them.
Let us now think – Is there something in common between „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb and cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld?
Although these „swans“ and quantities do not completely overlap (and this is generally not possible at all), to a considerable extent there is something in common between them, which could be formulated as follows (Table 3):
• „white swans“ (frequent and predictable/expected events) coincide in no small degree with known knowns.
• „silvery swans“ (frequent and unpredictable/unexpected events) coincide in no small degree with unknown knowns.
• „grey swans“ (rare and predictable/expected events) coincide in no small degree with known unknowns.
• „black swans“ (rare and unpredictable/unexpected events) coincide in no small degree with unknown unknowns.
Table 3. Relationship between the supplemented „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb and the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld
III.
The prominent American economist Frank Knight (1885 – 1972) published the book „Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit“, which left a significant mark on economics and risk management.
According to Knight, when the uncertainty is measurable, it is risk, and when the uncertainty is unmeasurable, it remains uncertainty [6]. This understanding has become entrenched in the economic literature with the status of a classical understanding.
Or, as Nassim Taleb writes, when a probability can be calculated, then it is risk; when it cannot be calculated, it is uncertainty [7].
So, following Frank Knight, „the practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique“ [8].
As English sociologist Anthony Giddens (1938) believes however, Frank Knight's distinction between risk and uncertainty as future probabilities which can be calculated and those that cannot be calculated „doesn't hold water“ because there are „too many fuzzy areas in the middle“, between them, so „there isn't a tight distinction between risk and uncertainty“ [9].
Let's reflect a little more on Frank Knight's classic division between risk as measurable uncertainty and uncertainty as unmeasurable uncertainty, and on his profound, somewhat unexpected, original insight into uncertainty itself.
We repeat once again – according to the logic of Frank Knight, uncertainty is divided into measurable uncertainty (risk) and unmeasurable uncertainty (uncertainty).
And what about certainty?
Well, it can also be divided into measurable uncertainty and unmeasurable uncertainty.
And just as unmeasurable uncertainty according to Frank Knight is precisely uncertainty, just so measurable certainty is precisely certainty.
The question immediately arises:
And what exactly is unmeasurable certainty?
Our answer is that it is insecurity.
In other words, according to our logic, certainty is divided into measurable certainty (certainty) and immeasurable certainty (insecurity).
Let's summarize once again:
● According to the logic of Frank Knight:
› If uncertainty is unmeasurable, it should be treated as uncertainty.
› If uncertainty is measurable, it should be treated as risk.
● According to our logic:
› If a certainty is unmeasurable, it should be treated as insecurity.
› If certainty is measurable, it should be treated as certainty.
Let's explain with an example:
Suppose there is a closed opaque urn with 100 balls – red and black.
• In one case, let there be 1 black ball for every 3 red balls, i.e. there are 75 red balls and 25 black balls in the urn.
Two players are told that there are red and black balls in the urn, and each of them must draw one red ball.
Let the first player knows the number of balls of each color. The situation in which this player finds himself is risk (i.e. measurable uncertainty) – the probability of drawing a red ball is 3/4.
Let the second player does not know the number of balls of each color. The situation in which this player finds himself is uncertainty (i.e. unmeasurable uncertainty).
• Now consider another case where all the balls are red.
Again two players are told that there are red and black balls in the urn and they must each draw one red ball.
Let the first player knows that all balls are red. The situation in which this player finds himself is certainty (i.e. measurable certainty) – the probability of drawing a red ball is 1.
Let the second player does not know that all the balls are red, but he only knows that all the balls are of the same color. The situation in which this player finds himself is insecurity (i.e. unmeasurable certainty).
Consider the general case when there are N balls in the urn, then there are two options:
1) Some combination of red and black balls, for example L red balls such that 0 < L < N and, correspondingly, M black balls, M = N – L such that 0 < M < N and L + M = N.
Then the probability p of drawing a red ball is p = L/N, and the probability q of drawing a black ball is q = M/N = 1 – p, with 0 < p < 1 and 0 < q < 1, and p + q = 1.
If the player does not know what the content of the urn is, he is in uncertainty (i.e. unmeasurable uncertainty) – he cannot calculate the probability of drawing a red ball (or a black ball).
If the player knows what the contents of the urn are, he is in risk (i.e. measurable uncertainty) – he knows that the probability of drawing a red ball is p and the probability of drawing a black ball is q.
Thus, uncertainty and risk exist at probabilities p and q greater than 0 and less than 1.
2) All balls are of the same color – either red or black; here the probability p of drawing a red ball is either 1 (if all balls are red) or 0 (if all balls are black), respectively the probability q of drawing a black ball is either 0 (if all balls are red) or 1 (if all balls are black).
If the player does not know what balls are in the urn, but knows that they are all of the same color, he is in insecurity (i.e. unmeasurable certainty) – he will draw a red ball (if all the balls are red) or a black ball (if all the balls are black).
If the player knows what color the balls are in the urn, then he is in certainty (i.e. measurable certainty) – he knows that the probability of drawing a red ball is 1, and the probability of drawing a black ball is 0 (if all balls are red), or, accordingly, the probability of drawing a red ball is 0, and the probability of drawing a black ball is 1 (if all balls are black).
Thus, insecurity and certainty exist with probabilities p equal to 1 and q equal to 0, or p equal to 0 and q equal to 1.
In this example, we can establish the following relationships (Table 4):
› measurability – the player knows what the ratio of the balls is;
› unmeasurability – the player does not know what the ratio of the balls is;
› certainty – the observer knows what ball will be drawn;
› uncertainty – the observer does not know what ball will be drawn.
Table 4. Relationships between the basic conditions and concepts in the example of the urn and the balls in it
Now we can classify the concepts of certainty and uncertainty in terms of their measurability and unmeasurability (Table 5):
• measurable certainty – certainty.
• unmeasurable certainty – insecurity.
• measurable uncertainty – risk.
• unmeasurable uncertainty – uncertainty.
Table 5. Supplement to the definitions of risk and uncertainty according to Frank Knight
Note: In this table, the bottom row corresponds to the Frank Knight's definitions
With this set of definitions of the most important concepts, let's return to the four types of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld: known knowns, known unknowns, unknown knowns, and unknown unknowns.
Table 6. Cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld
German scientists Christopher Daase (1962) and Oliver Kessler (1973) give the following explanation about these quantities (Table 7):
“There is knowledge (or non-knowledge) about things, and knowledge (or non-knowledge) about ways to identify things.
The first refers to the phenomena of reality as such, which we might or might not know, thus having phenomenological or factual knowledge or not [knowledge of things].
The second refers to the epistemological status of such knowledge. We might or might not know methods of gaining knowledge [methodological knowledge, knowledge of ways/methods to identify things]…
→ We might have reliable methods of identifying observable facts, thus producing known knowns.
→ We might … have some methods of dealing with phenomena that we are not 100% sure of, thus creating known unknowns…
→ [We must accept that] there are also situations in which factual knowledge is available in principle, but not used because it is ignored or repressed; this is the category of the unknown knowns…
→ We must accept that there might be things we do not even dream of and have no method of anticipating; these are unknown unknowns“ [12].
And so, the methods are the first word (known/unknown), and the facts are the second word (knowns/unknowns):
→ When we have reliable methods for identifying the observable facts, these are known knowns.
→ When we have reliable methods of identifying the unobservable facts, these are the known unknowns.
→ When we don't have reliable methods for identifying the observable facts, these are unknown knowns.
→ When we don't have reliable methods identifying the unobservable facts, these are unknown unknowns.
With an acceptable degree of convention and with an acceptable level of approximation, the conclusions from Daase and Kessler's analysis can be summarized as follows (Table 7):
→ Threat – these are known knowns.
→ Risk – these are known unknowns.
→ Ignorance – these are unknown knowns.
→ Disaster – these are unknown unknowns.
Table 7. Knowledge (empirical and methodological) and basic concepts [11]
The breakthrough with the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight allows us to link the four types of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld in a common classification in accordance with the concepts of certainty and uncertainty and measurable and unmeasurable (Table 8):
• measurable certainty – known knowns.
• unmeasurable certainty – unknown knowns.
• measurable uncertainty – known unknowns.
• unmeasurable uncertainty – unknown unknowns.
Using the example with which we illustrated the four types of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld – about shooting blindfolded/without a blindfold at a fixed/moving target, it can be said the following (Table 9):
• Shooting without a blindfold, at a fixed target – known known.
• Shooting without a blindfold, at a moving target – known unknowns.
• Shooting with a blindfold on a fixed target – unknown known.
• Shooting with a blindfold on a moving target – unknown knowns.
In other words, methods or modes of action are the first part (more precisely, the first word) for the four types of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld (shooting without a blindfold or with a blindfold), and situations or facts are the second part (more precisely, the second word) for these quantities (the target is fixed or moving).
This means that the first word is associated with a blindfold, and its variants are: „it is not“, that is, „known“ and „it is“, that is, „unknown“; and the second word is associated with the target, and its variants are: „fixed“, that is, „knowns“, and „moving“, that is, „unknowns“.
Table 8. Relationship between supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight and supplemented cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld
Table 9. Relationship between supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight, illustrated by the example of target shooting
Let's think about what Table 5 and Table 8 give us:
• Measurable certainty is, on the one hand, certainty, and on the other hand, known knowns.
• Unmeasurable certainty is, on the one hand, insecurity, and on the other hand, unknown knowns.
• Measurable uncertainty is, on the one hand, risk, and on the other hand, known unknowns.
• Unmeasurable uncertainty is, on the one hand, uncertainty and, on the other hand, unknown unknowns.
What does this mean, how do we understand it, how do we realize it, what is the point of these reasonings, are they not juggling words or abracadabra?
No, they are not juggling words, they are not abracadabra.
Table 5 is a reflection of and at the same time it itself reflects the degree of uncertainty of the world and, rather, of the specific situation in which we find ourselves. We are immersed in this objectively existing world, it in any particular situation it is outside of us, it exists independently of our knowledge and perceptions about it. This is about ontology, about the ontological dimension of our existence and how we perceive the realities of the world and their influence and impact on us.
In this sense, Table 5 reveals to us a very essential part of the objectivity of the existing, it gives us the four objective phenomena from the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight – certainty, insecurity, risk, uncertainty, which have an ontological status, which exist independently from our perceptions, from our claims for knowledge, from our subjective judgments of what they are and how likely they are to be realized.
At the same time, Table 8 is a reflection of and at the same time it itself reflects the extent of our knowledge about the world and rather, about the specific situation in which we find ourselves. Yes, we are immersed in the objectively existing world, but in any particular situation we strive through our perceptions and analytical capabilities to gain as much knowledge about it as possible. This is about epistemology, about the epistemological dimension of our existence and how we perceive the realities of the world and their influence and impact on us.
In this sense, Table 8 reveals to us a very essential part of the subjectivity of our attitude to the existing, it gives us the four subjective phenomena of the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld – known knowns, unknown knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns, which have an epistemological status, which reflect our, to one degree or another, incomplete knowledge about the existing, about the world in general and about the specific situation in particular.
Supplementing the definitions according to Frank Knight and linking them with supplemented cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld allows us to make another terminological, or rather even categorical, breakthrough.
We dare to say that this is an extremely important categorical breakthrough!
But before that, let us recall that in Study 4 it was shown that the four basic categories of challenge, risk, danger, threat can be arranged in one relationship, which is expressed by the acronym „CReDit“.
And here, it turns out that reasonings analogous to those given above also apply to these four basic categories, thereby also connecting them in a general classification both with the concepts of certainty and uncertainty, and with the concepts of measurable and unmeasurable (Table 10 and Table 11).
Regarding the binding of these four basic categories with certainty and uncertainty, we have (Table 10):
• measurable certainty – threat.
• unmeasurable certainty – danger.
• measurable uncertainty – risk.
• unmeasurable uncertainty – challenge.
Table 10. Binding of the categories of the „CReDiT“ Relationship and the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight
And as for the binding of the four basic concepts with measurable and unmeasurable, we have the following relationships (Table 11):
• threat – known knowns.
• danger – unknown knowns.
• risk – known unknowns.
• challenge – unknown unknowns.
Table 11. Binding of the categories of the „CReDiT“ Relationship and the supplemented cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld
Again, it is necessary to make clarifications to help the reader emerge unscathed from the abundance of different concepts and connections between them.
This is required at least because, if we compare Table 5 and Table 10, it turns out that according to them:
• Measurable certainty is, on the one hand, certainty, and on the other hand, threat.
• Unmeasurable certainty is, on the one hand, insecurity, and on the other hand, danger.
• Measurable uncertainty is, on the one hand, risk, and on the other hand, it is also risk.
• Unmeasurable uncertainty is, on the one hand, uncertainty, and on the other hand, challenge.
We cannot help but ask ourselves: How are we to understand all this?
Well here's how.
Table 5, as we said, is a reflection of and at the same time it reflects the degree of uncertainty of the world and, rather, of the specific situation in which we find ourselves. It, by its ontological essence and, therefore, from an ontological point of view, it gives us what the world as a whole and, above all, the specific situation brings us. In other words, it brings us one of the four possible objective phenomena of supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight – certainty, insecurity, risk, uncertainty - that have an ontological status.
But we – as a function of the objectively existing world outside us, and above all as a function of the specific situation, based on our incomplete knowledge about the objective reality – subjectify, i.e. we try, we strive, we tend to perceive subjectively what this reality brings us – through the prism of, with the help of, by means of, through the categories of the „CReDiT“ Relationship – challenge, risk, danger, threat.
This is where the explanation of the ontological uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“! Here is the key to the Risk Society as one of the dimensions of the epochal, radical transformation that our world is experiencing!
Risk is an intersection point of what the world brings us (and especially what the specific situation brings us) and how we perceive it.
In fact, we are talking about a coincidence here, about both a stunning and a natural coincidence.
What the world brings us is risk perceived as measurable uncertainty, and at the same time we perceive measurable uncertainty precisely as risk!
Risk symbolizes and represents a unity of what the world brings us and how we perceive what the world brings us!
The ontological, that which is outside of us, i.e. what the world brings us, coincides with what is in us, with our attitude to what is happening, with our attitude to what the world brings us. And they enter into resonance, cause our whole being to vibrate strongly, insist on proactive behavior, on action, which will not allow potential trouble to arise, because if it does arise even as a seed, as a tiny foreshadowing of trouble, as a vague outline of trouble, it can very quickly lead to a disaster.
Let's point out again the uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“ – this is a coincidence between what the world brings to us and our perception of what the world brings to us!
One more thing – it turns out that according to Table 8 and Table 11:
• Known knowns are, on the one hand, certainty, and on the other hand, threat.
• Unknown knowns are, on the one hand, insecurity, and on the other hand, danger.
• Known unknowns are, on the one hand, risk, and on the other hand, also risk.
• Unknown unknowns are, on the one hand, uncertainty and on the other hand, challenge.
And again the question arises: How are we to understand all this?
Well here's how.
Table 8, as already mentioned, is a reflection of and at the same time it reflects the degree of our knowledge about the world and, rather, about the specific situation in which we find ourselves. It, by its epistemological essence and, therefore, from an epistemological point of view, gives how we, with our always to some extent incomplete knowledge about the existing, about the world in general and about the specific situation in particular, perceive these realities of the world and their influence and impact on us.
In other words, we cognize the world in terms of one of four possible subjective phenomena of cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld – known knowns, unknown knowns, known unknowns, unknown unknowns – that have epistemological status.
But we – relying on our subjective incomplete knowledge about the world and, above all, about the specific situation, based on the awareness of our subjective attitude to the independent and existing reality outside us – objectify, i.e. we try, we strive, we tend to perceive objectively, what we know about the reality, through the prism of, with the help of, by means of, through the categories of the „CReDiT“ Relationship – challenge, risk, danger, threat.
Here again is the unraveling of the epistemological uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“! Here again is the key to the Risk Society as one of the dimensions of the epochal, radical transformation that our world is experiencing!
Risk is an intersection point of what we know about the world (and especially about the specific situation) and how we perceive it.
In fact, we are talking again about a coincidence here, about a simultaneously stunning and natural coincidence.
What we know about the world is risk perceived as measurable uncertainty, and at the same time we perceive measurable uncertainty precisely as risk!
Risk symbolizes and represents a unity of what we know about the world and how we perceive what we know about the world!
The epistemological, that which is outside us, i.e. what we know about the world coincides with what is in us, with our attitude to what is happening, with our attitude to what we know about the world. And they enter into resonance, cause our whole being to vibrate strongly, demand proactive behavior, action, which will not allow potential trouble to arise, because if it does arise even as a seed, as a tiny foreshadowing of trouble, as a vague outline of trouble, it can very quickly lead to a disaster.
Let's point out again the uniqueness of the scientific category „risk“ – this is a coincidence between what we know about the world and our perception of what we know about the world!
IV.
All that remained was the binding of the scientific categories of the „CReDiT“ Relationship, the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight, the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld and the supplemented „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb.
We can, with a high degree of confidence, conduct a systematization of fundamental concepts, based on the following belonging to the same class (i.e. relative similarities):
Table 12. Binding of the scientific categories from the „CReDiT“ Relationship, the supplemented definitions according to Frank Knight, the cognitive quantities according to Donald Rumsfeld and the supplemented „swans“ according to Nassim Taleb
References:
1. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan. The Impact of the highly improbable. New York: Random House, 2007, p. XVII – XVIII.
2. Ibidem, p. 37, 309.
3. Ikenberry, John G. America's Imperial Ambition. – In: Foreign Affairs, 2002, Vol. 81, No. 5, pp. 44 – 60, p. 50.
4. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, ibid., p. 19.
5. Bracken, Paul, Ian Bremmer, David Gordon. Introduction. – In: Bracken, Paul, Ian Bremmer, David Gordon (eds.). Managing Strategic Surprise. Lessons from Risk Management and Risk Assessment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 2008, pp. 1 – 15, p. 8.
6. Knight, Frank H. Risk, Uncertainty and Profit. New York, NY: Sentry Press, 1921, Reprint New York, NY: Augustus M. Kelley, Bookseller, 1964, р. 233.
7. Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, ibid., p. 128.
8. Knight, Frank H. ibid., р. 233.
9. Pierson, Christopher. Conversation with Anthony Giddens. Making Sense of Modernity. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998, р. 105.
10. Daase, Christopher, Oliver Kessler. Knowns and Unknowns in the `War on Terror': Uncertainty and the Political Construction of Danger. – In: Security Dialogue, December 2007, No. 38, pp. 411 – 434, p. 413 – 414.
11. Daase, Christopher, Oliver Kessler., ibid., p. 413 – 415.
12/31/2022
Brief explanation:
The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.
