STUDIES ON SECURITY: STUDY 3. „THE THREE WAVES OF SECURITY“ MODEL

  These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
  
  STUDY 3. „THE THREE WAVES OF SECURITY“ MODEL
  
   „THE THREE WAVES OF SECURITY“ MODEL is a temporal model of security.

  
  The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of this Model:
  Николай Слатински. Сигурността – същност, смисъл и съдържание. София: Военно издателство, 2011.
  [Nikolay Slatinski. Sigurnostta – sushtnost, smisal i sadarzhanie. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2011].
  Nikolay Slatinski. Security - essence, meaning and content. Sofia: Military publishing house, 2011 (in Bulgarian)
  
   „The Three Waves of Security“ Model examines the evolution of the relationship „safety – security – risk“.
  
  In the contemporary Science of Security the key analytical category is „risk“. In this important and growing Science, more and more special attention must be paid to the main directions and leading approaches in the study of risk. A significant place needs to be devoted not only to the theoretical but also to the practical problems related to the risk management – in the conditions of shocks and upheavals, uncertainty and instability, but as well of enormous new opportunities and chances brought by the Third wave of Security (the Wave of risk), which is coming to replace the First wave of Security (the Wave of safety) and the Second wave of Security (the Wave of security).
  According to „The Three Waves of Security“ Model, which reflects the wave theory of evolution
  safety  security  risk,
  the Science of Security goes through an evolution in the understanding of Security, where
  first there was the First wave of Security – the Wave of safety,
  after it was the Second wave of Security – the Wave of wecurity,
  and now we enter the Third wave of Security – the Wave of risk.
  The transition from one Wave to another has not only security-related dimensions, but also large-scale political, economic, social, cultural and other dimensions. We are talking about a multidirectional and multifaceted evolution of society.
  
  Security in the Wave of safety was understood as safety and then it was primarily and mainly about statics, i.e. it was about state;
  Security in the Wave of security was understood as security and then it was primarily and mainly about a hybrid between statics and dynamics, i.e. was about a combination of state and of process;
  Security in the Wave of risk is understood as risk and already it is primarily and mainly about dynamics, i.e. it is about process.
  
  Moreover, although we are talking about evolution, in fact these are revolutionary processes characterized as a paradigm shift, i.e. they can be placed in the conceptual system of the theory of scientific revolutions, which is the result of the research of the American scientist in the field of history and philosophy of science Thomas Kuhn.
  Thomas Kuhn opposes the idea of a linear, sequential accumulation of scientific knowledge and considers the development of science not as a smooth, but as an uneven, leap-like process which can be schematically described as follows:
  
  Old paradigm (dominance of normal, traditional science)  Crisis of the old paradigm (clash of approaches, norms and categories of the old and new paradigms)  Paradigm shift (the scientific revolution according to Thomas Kuhn)  New paradigm (dominance of extraordinary, revolutionary science)
  
  According to Thomas Kuhn, the scientific revolution is expressed by a paradigm shift. By paradigms he means „some accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together – [which] provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research“. For a certain period, science develops within the framework of the old paradigm. At one stage, however, the old research methods and old concepts are not able to satisfactorily describe the ongoing processes. Anomalies have arisen that cannot be explained within the framework of the previous paradigm and „normal goes astray“. „When… the profession can no longer evade anomalies that subvert the existing tradition of scientific practice – then begin the extraordinary investigations that lead the profession at last to a new set of commitments, a new basis for the practice of science.“ In this leap-like, qualitative transition (revolution) from one scientific paradigm (the „normal“, intra-paradigm science) to another (the revolutionary, inter-paradigm science), it is logical that during a certain period the approaches, norms and categories of the old and new paradigms enter into conflict. This is a stage of crisis, of a clash between the supporters of the old and the new paradigm, of changing perceptions. The conflict is even more complex because it is not (only) about establishing a set of new rules and a new symbolic language, i.e. norms and concepts affecting the reflection of what is happening, but about changes affecting the worldview, values, ethical optics, responses to challenges, the logic of our reactions and the motives of our behavior [1].
  
  Let us now discuss „The Three Waves of Security“ Model, which was proposed by us.
  
  With regard to the security and protection of the state (similar to the corporation) and the upholding of its interests, stability, normal and effective functioning, one can also speak of three Waves, without making analogies with the well-known theory of Alvin Toffler about three civilizational waves [2].
  
  THE FIRST WAVE OF SECURITY
  The First wave of Security was the Wave of Safety.
  In this wave Security was understood as safety. This was not just a matter of linguistics, but also a way of thinking, a way of acting and reacting, a way of building the security system and a way of setting the priorities of that system.
  It was about STATICS, i.e. about a STATE, about an unchanging aspiration to maintain a maximum level of safety, i.e. to maintain the protected (optimal) safety. Any threat, any danger, required the mobilization of forces and resources and was considered something extremely undesirable, capable of throwing the system out of its equilibrium position, so it was approached with all available force – to maintain the static equilibrium of the system. This meant that all the efforts of the system (the state, the corporation, etc.) were aimed at upholding safety. Therefore, to emphasize it again, in the First wave of Security - the Wave of safety:
  ♦ Safety is a state.
  ♦ Safety is upheld.
  ♦ The objective is to achieve protected (optimal) safety.
  ♦ The strategy is resource oriented, i.e. it is based on the available resources and therefore seeks to multiply them as much as possible.
  
  The Wave of safety was directly related to statics, to staticity. It can be concluded that in the comparatively static and relatively little change-filled time of bipolar confrontation during the Cold War (compared by the American political scientist Michael Mandelbaum to a fight between two heavyweight sumo wrestlers: „Two big fat guys in a ring, with all sorts of posturing and rituals and stomping of feet, but actually very little contact, until the end of the match, when there is a brief moment of shoving and the loser gets pushed out of the ring, but nobody gets killed.” [3]) it was natural to assume, that a function of this time and of the absolutization of safety would be precisely the Wave of safety.
  But at the same time it is logical to think as well vice versa: that the Wave of safety, the perception of security as safety and the orientation towards statics, towards staticity, maximally favored the maintenance and even self-maintenance of such a static geopolitical model as the bipolar one.
  It has been said somewhere that bipolar geopolitical models are very stable – but until the very moment when the balance of power between the two poles is not disturbed at least a little. Then these models quickly disintegrate or self-detonate. We would add that this rapid disintegration or self-detonation occurs not only when the absolute balance of power is disturbed, but also (and perhaps mainly) when there is a sharp change in the external and (why not?) internal environment, in the external and (why no?) the internal conditions, as a result of which one of the poles can become absolutely untenable if it is not adapted to react adequately to changes in the environment and in the conditions. It's like a school of fish accustomed to a river (freshwater) environment, suddenly enters into a marine (saltwater) environment – then these fish (or at least most of them) quickly turn their bellies up, they die.
  We have to be careful with these analogies. They refer more to the system in which Bulgaria was – the Socialist system.
  The socialist system was to a much greater extent oriented towards statics, towards thinking about safety, even absolutizing them. It sought to maintain a balance with the West – starting with the number of nuclear warheads and ending with the number of medals at the Olympics, when if the USSR won one gold medal more than the USA, it was proof of the advantages of the world of Socialism and its inevitable historic victory; and if they lost a football match, the Soviet players were accused of almost betraying the great Communist ideals.
  The same thing happened in Bulgaria – a lost match at the world championship caused radical decisions by the top of the Communist party and State leadership, including devastating articles, later attributed to the first Party and State leader Todor Zhivkov, about the infirmities and vices of Bulgarian football, with serious accusations for unacceptable violations of socialist norms and morals.
  But for a very long period of history, American strategic culture, or perhaps more precisely American political strategy, has also been oriented toward statics and safety. For this until September 11, 2001 significantly helped the protection of the United States by two oceans, which allowed the Americans to think that the hands of anyone who wants to strike them were short. This is how public attitudes were created, transforming into foreign policy, that true security is actually maximum security, in other words, protected safety. It is for this reason that, figuratively speaking, if there is a bear in the forest (like Saddam Hussein), the US prefers to burn the forest and thus permanently and irrevocably solve the problem of their fear of the bear: There is a forest – there is a bear, there is no forest - there is no bear.
  
  THE SECOND WAVE OF SECURITY
  The Second wave of Security was the Wave of security.
  A number of students (and not only them) experience certain difficulties, how to comprehend and understand the phrase „The Second wave of Security is the Wave of security“. Let's make it clear:
  √ In the first meaning of this phrase, „Security“ (with a capital „S“) – this is the basic category in the Science of Security. Therefore, in these Studies, whenever the basic, fundamental scientific category „Security“ is mentioned and it is required to indicate and designate it directly and explicitly, we will use a capital letter „S“ and write „Security“.
  Here „Security“ is a general and abstract concept.
  √ In the second meaning of this phrase, „security“ (with a small letter „s“) is one of the types (dimensions), one of the manifestations (contents) of the basic scientific, fundamental category „Security“ – Security as security (relative security), along with Security as safety (protected safety) and Security as risk (transformational security). Therefore, in these Studies, whenever one of the types, one of the manifestations of the basic, fundamental scientific category „Security“ is mentioned and it is required to indicate and designate it directly and explicitly, we will use a small letter „s“ and write „security“.
  Here „security“is a particular and concrete concept.
  In this wave, Security was understood as security, as something much more than safety. And even more so, this was not just a matter of linguistics, but also a way of thinking, a way of acting and reacting, a way of building the security system and a way of setting the priorities of that system.
  It was about a hybrid combination of STATICS, i.e. of STATE, and of DYNAMICS, i.e. of PROCESS; for striving to guarantee a certain level of security, i.e. of relative (acceptable) security. Threats and dangers have been analyzed and assessed, some of them have been accepted as inevitable existing, and measures have been taken and efforts have been made in relation to others; strategies have been developed, resources have been mobilized aimed at bringing these threats and dangers under the maximum possible control, in order to guarantee an acceptable level of security and to maintain the dynamic equilibrium of the system. This meant that all the efforts of the system (the state, the corporation, etc.) were aimed at guaranteeing security. Therefore, to emphasize it again, in the Second wave of Security – the Wave of security:
  ♦ Security is a hybrid combination of state and process.
  ♦ Security is guaranteed.
  ♦ The objective is to achieve relative (acceptable) security.
  ♦ The strategy is resource oriented, i.e. it is based on the available resources and therefore seeks to build them on the principle of reasonable sufficiency.
  The hybridity of state-process (statics-dynamics) is a transition (an element of processivity) through different states (elements of state). The system guarantees itself a level of relative (acceptable) security until the moment when it needs to prioritize again its objectives and resources, and if the system develops in a positive direction, it can afford itself a higher level of relative (acceptable) security, and if the system develops in a negative direction, it must move to a lower level of relative (acceptable) security. Thus, a hybrid pseudo-process can be understood as passing through certain (finite, discrete, limited set) pseudo-static states.
  In this Wave, as was said, Security was no longer thought of as safety, but as security, in other words, Security was then conceived not as something absolute or at least maximally guaranteed, but as something relative, achieved to some acceptable level and at some acceptable cost. As something that is guaranteed and therefore the guaranteed actor, player, factor, agent comes to the fore.
  Due to the existence of the need for a guarantor actor, as well as due to passing through a finite number of states, i.e. through a hybrid combination of statics and dynamics, staticity and process, it could be said that the orientation of the international security system after the fall of the Berlin Wall towards a unipolar model with a single superpower, the United States, naturally calls to the agenda a qualitative new understanding for security as Security as security, i.e. the Wave of security. Thus, the transition to the Second wave of Security, the Wave of security, was gradually realized.
  The content of Security during the Wave of security, the approaches and ways to ensure security at a relative (acceptable) level, as well as the presence of the only superpower, the USA, as the guaranteeing actor, a relatively successful arrangement of the new security puzzle.
  But again, it is logical to think the opposite: that the Security Wave, the perception of Security as security (relative security) and the orientation towards the hybridity of statics and dynamics, of state and process, maximally contribute to the maintenance and even self-maintenance of a hybrid static-process geopolitical model such as the unipolar one.
  The main problem is that the unipolar geopolitical model is unstable and has many structural defects, it is undemocratic, „exclusive“ and easily generates disagreements with it and attempts to destabilize it and even destroy it as „from above“ by systemic factors (actors), for example (mainly) Russia, as well as „from below“ by non-systemic factors (agents), for example (mainly) ISIS. There are a number of critical vulnerabilities in such a model, and regardless of whether the unipolar geopolitical model produced the Wave of security or it was a consequence of it, this in both cases reduced the prospects for its longevity and irreversibly shortened the time horizon for the propagation of the Second wave of Security - the Wave of security.
  The US, until September 11, 2001, tended to seek „perfect“ security, i.e. protected (optimal) safety. But the Europeans, living in a much narrower space and with a much larger population, know only „imperfect“, i.e. relative (acceptable) security, because they „know what it is like to live with danger, to exist side by side with evil, since they've done it for centuries“ [4]. Therefore, if there is a bear in the forest, they only take measures to ensure that the bear does not enter their village. They tell themselves that the bear is also a living creature and has the right to live in the forest, and whoever is afraid of bears, he does not go into this forest or he determines how far he can enter it; it is important that the village is not threatened by the bear. And when this is guaranteed, life goes on, regardless of whether there is a bear in the forest.
  
  THE THIRD WAVE OF SECURITY
  The Third wave of Security is the Wave of risk.
  We will be under its influence for a long time and probably we will get used to it; it will become another name of our new „natural state“ and will become our Being and Consciousness interacting through the feedback loop (when Being affects, i.e. determines Consciousness, but also Consciousness affects, i.e. determines Being), and the other two Waves will seem to us like preludes that have remained far in the past.
  In the Wave of risk, the term „risk“ is understood as a process or action that can have an effect on the system (state, corporation, etc.) with probability and consequences that are subject to determination. Therefore, „risk“ means a realized under conditions of uncertainty effect on the objectives of the system. In the risk standards and in a number of scientific publications, it is relatively simplistically said – let me recall this – that „risk“ is the effect of uncertainty on the objectives of the system.
  So, risk in the Wave of risk – it is a possible process or event that has a high degree of uncertainty and that can affect the vision, mission, strategy and resources of the system. Obviously, and to the greatest extent, this is not just a matter of linguistics, but a qualitatively different way of thinking, a qualitatively different way of acting and reacting, a qualitatively different way of building the security system, and a qualitatively different way of setting the priorities of that system.
  In this Wave one is talking about a process in which the system is involved. And for a process with complex dynamics that is subject to a certain logic and that can be understood through a high degree of abstraction. A process that must be managed and, in accordance with the system's objectives pools of resources, capabilities and people must be formed through which to achieve an acceptable level of risks, i.e. of minimized (tolerable) risks. Depending on the nature, frequency of occurrence and damage that a given risk can cause, four main approaches are followed in terms of risk management: the risk is accepted, avoided, shared (partially or completely transferred, i.e. transferred to other entities through outsourcing, insurance or hedging) or limited (i.e. acted upon). This means that all the efforts of the system (the state, the corporation, etc.) are now directed towards risk management. Therefore, to emphasize it again, in the Third wave of Security – the Wave of risk:
  ♦ Dealing with risks is a process.
  ♦ Risks are managed (accepted, avoided, shared, limited).
  ♦ The objective is to achieve minimized (tolerable) risks.
  ♦ The strategy is objective oriented, i.e. it is based on the objectives that the system seeks to achieve.
  As the focus shifts from safety through security to risk, more and more in the governance (management) of the state (and the corporation) it is talking about risk management rather than about upholding safety and about guaranteeing security.
  
  TRANSFORMATIONAL SECURITY is the security of the Society of the Third wave of Security - the Society of the Wave of risk, i.e. it is the security of Risk society, of the Society of risks.
  The basic category in the Risk Society, the Society of risks is „Risk“.
  The Society of the Wave of risk, the Risk society is afraid (should be afraid) of challenges, and probably because of this it tends to perceive security even literally as the absence (lack) of challenges.
  
  Arguing similarly (see also Etude 2 on this site), we could say that:
  PROTECTED SECURITY is the security of the Society of the First wave of Security – the Society of the Wave of safety, i.e. it is the security of the Threat society, of the Society of threats.
  The basic category in the Threat Society, the Society of threats was „Threat“.
  The Society of the Wave of safety, the Threat society was afraid (should be afraid) of dangers, and probably because of this it tended to perceive safety even literally as the absence (lack) of dangers.
  
  And arguing similarly still similarly (see Etude 2 again), we could say that:
  RELATIVE SECURITY is the security of the Society of the Second wave of Security – the Society of the Wave of security, i.e. it is the security of the Danger society, the Society of dangers.
  The basic category in the Danger Society, the Society of dangers was „Danger“.
  The Society of the Wave of security, the Danger society was afraid (should be afraid) of risks, and probably because of this it tended to perceive security even literally as the absence (lack) of risks.
  
  We can imagine what the Fourth wave of Security will be like.
  Further in these Studies, we will analyze the Fourth wave of Security – the Wave of challenge, and also the society corresponding to it, the Society of the Fourth wave of Security – the Society of the Wave of callenge, i.e. the Challenge society, the Society of challenges.
  The basic category in the Challenge Society, the Society of challenges will be „Challenge“.
  
  Transformational security, as was mentioned above, is the security of the Risk Society, i.e. it is the security of the first decades of a new century filled with so many risks and challenges.
  As we enter the Risk Society, the Society of risks, humanity is rapidly approaching the critical moment of truth – will it exercise collective wisdom to embark on a new path with a new attitude towards our small and beautiful planet Earth, or will it continue to live in a way that it, our humanity, simply cannot afford.
  
  At the end of this Study, we will summarize the three Waves of Security:
   (1) The Wave of safety;
   (2) The Wave of security;
   (3) The Wave of risk.
  
  
  References:
  1. Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Third edition. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996, рp. 6, 10.
  2. Toffler, Alvin. The Third Wave. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1980.
  3. Friedman, Thomas L. The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999, p. 33.
  4. Kagan, Robert. America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Vintage Books, 2003, 2004, p. 30.
  
  
  
  Brief explanation:
  The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.
  
  
  18.11.2022 г.