On Five Levels of Security (Part 3)

said that in its gradual evolution, the European Union (EU) will evolve more and more into an amalgamated security community.
● Within the pluralistic security communities, the separate units preserve to a great extent the independence of their national security systems while at the same time they transfer a certain part of the functions of safeguarding their security to the Community security system and its planning, management and control institutions. In these institutions all states enjoy equal rights to participate in the decision making and taking process and can defend their interests (at least in theory). NATO could be pointed out as an example of such community.
  The inequality of the states exerts strong influence on the CSS. It is not always true that the votes are counted in the CSS; but even if this is the case, even if the decisions are taken with consensus and the most modern voting procedures for harmonizing the opinions and smoothing the differences are in effect, in the CSS, the votes de facto are assessed and small countries might turn out to participate on paper only into the decision making and taking process.
  In every CSS, the countries have different capabilities, according to their actual power and financial contribution to effective functioning of the CSS. Some countries, the big ones, are mostly producers of security and have much greater significance for the functioning of the CSS; while other countries, the small ones, are mostly consumers of security and this gives them a rear place into the votes’ weight scale. Due to the fact that they are mostly producers of security, the big countries are compensated by means of a leading role in the CSS, by the right to take decisions on behalf of the small ones and instead of them, etc. Due to the fact that the small countries are mostly consumers of security, they ought to pay dully by means of territory (with bases), raw materials, services, military detachments for missions.
  Within the CSSs there is no automatism and they don’t operate immediately if something happens to a weaker partner. It is possible for the Big, the Whole, to “miss” the problems of the Small, the Part. The Whole is always bigger and more important than its Component Parts.
  The CSS imposes to the NSS requirements and criteria, through which the NSS should first answer the CSS needs, and then it should take care of everything else. Every country in the CSS should make its contribution to the CSS’ aims and capabilities. One smaller state might invest resources that are huge for it in the fulfilment of the CSS’ requirements and criteria and thus it do without the resources to build its own adequate capacity. Relying on the CSS, this NSS might have security problems in the event of paralyzing or leading astray of the CSS. On the other hand, the strong emphasis on its own NSS might alienate the state from the CSS; it might incapacitate the state from working in harmony with the other member states, it might force the state to fall out of the CSS and render it incompatible with the CSS, so that the CSS can’t actually rely on it.
  Small countries’ people could hardly explain to big countries’ people that security of both the small and the big is measured not in kilograms, meters and hours, i.e. from the viewpoint of their population, security of both the small and the big countries is commensurable. But the big country, even in the CSS, is often tempted to say to the small one: “Just take a look at yourself how small you are and how less momentous (and more inconsiderable) your security is! “.
  For the small countries, membership in every CSS is a limitation of national sovereignty. It results that they run the risk of involvement into conflicts that is unwished because they don’t want to participate in those conflicts, they have no interests affected, or they have no interest.
  Security of every state in the CSS is just an element of security of the CSS itself. Security of the CSS takes priority over security of every member state. As a member of CSS, it would be harder for the small state to report to the CSS and the big countries within the CSS its fears and worries about the local issues, for instance border disputes, language, religious and ethnic tensions, internal or with its neighbours. The CSS will look on such issues as psychological complexes, arising from backwardness and pre-modernity. A paradoxical case, that is not to be excluded, is if a small country enters the security community to obtain more security, but in fact it gets insecurity or less security than expected.
  Owing to the discussed above, becomes evident the seriousness of the challenge for every small country related to the size of the community that sets the pattern for its integration in such community without exposing its identity and sovereignty to an unbearable risk. But it has become harder and harder for the small state to solve its security problems alone and this requires that he context should be broadened [17] in order to specify the nature of the bigger community wherein it should pursue realization of its priorities and protection of its security.
  This task could be solved from the viewpoint of the criteria for successful integration of a state into the collective security system. There are at least five basic criteria for such successful integration:
● Criterion 1: More security;
● Criterion 2: Better living standard;
● Criterion 3: More democracy;
● Criterion 4: Preserving the right to vote on vital for it and its security issues;
● Criterion 5: Preserving its national identity.
  The integration entailing the risk of dilution, loss of individuality, even vanishing of state’s identity has unpredictable consequences for this country.
  What could be said about the validity of these criteria for NATO and the EU?
● Doubtless, both NATO and the EU guarantee more security for their members, since there isn’t a state, for which entering these alliances brought more insecurity.
● The second (democracy) criterion and the third one (the living standard) are absolute and mandatory for the EU: no country has become poorer or less democratic after its acceptance into the EU. At the same time, the living standard and democracy are not NATO’s leading priority and they are much more by-products of the integration. Portugal under the dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar, Greece under rule of the Colonels, and Turkey under the rule of the Generals, were all members of NATO (down to the present day, in Anatolia, in Turkey, there are vast regions of poverty and backwardness, where the people still live in medieval conditions).
● As for the last two criteria (preserving the right to vote on vial for the State issues and preserving the national identity), they are both implemented in the EU and NATO.
  Bulgaria’s EU and NATO membership provides it with a perfect opportunity for equal participation into the policy-making process of various common and sector policies; it does not infringe upon the national identity at all and there is no collision between the Bulgarian and the European: pretending to be less Bulgarian, one will not grow more European.
  From the above analysis it results that the strategic priority of the EU membership meets largely all 5 criteria and there are strong reasons to specify it as a strategic aim, and Bulgaria should do everything in its power to make its membership in the EU of full value and efficaciousness. Whereas the priority of NATO membership meets largely 3 out of these 5 criteria, so there are much better reasons to specify it rather as a strategic means, that is to say, this membership should be assessed on the ground of its usefulness: if “it works”, it’s good; but if society does not “detect” it, such membership could be considered rather an admittance to an elite club: to be member of it is more prudent and more prestigious than not to be.
  The membership in the CSS exerts influence on strategic planning of security policy. Bulgaria’s strategic planning of security policy loses its independence to some extent. Bulgaria will be forced to comply with to a number of conditions and restrictions, as it obtains more security, but it does without the opportunity of manoeuvring and multi-variant behaviour, especially in crisis and/or tangled situation. However, in the event of a clear formulation of national interests and a proper choice of behaviour Bulgaria’s membership in the CSS could hundredfold compensate any subsequent drawback and inconvenience and thus it could convince all Bulgarians that it is worthwhile.

  The fifth level of security is Security of the World (Security of the Planet), i.e. universal security, global security, mutual security, cooperative security.
  During the 80s of the 20th century, the UN Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, developed the concept of common security, according to which sustainable security might not exist if it’s not shared by all, and common security might be achieved only through cooperation based on the principles of equality, justice and reciprocity [18].
  Oxford Research Group, in its analysis “Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century” [19], points out the most serious challenges to global security:
● Climate changes and global warming;
● Competition over the increasingly scarcer strategic resources;
● Increasing socio-economic divisions (the “North-South” gap) and marginalization of the Majority World: more and more people are becoming poorer;
● Global militarisation: intensified spread of weapons and military technologies, including weapons of mass destruction.
  Elsewhere, it would be much more worthwhile to contemplate on the Security Orthodoxy Agenda termed by Oxford Research Group. Security orthodoxy is faulty and does not enable the political elites to turn their efforts and resources to find sustainable, realistic and pragmatic solutions of unconventional risks, threatening the world. According to it, solutions to the global threats are given through force and struggling with the symptoms of the illness; but this policy is doomed in the long-term. A switch to the sustainable security paradigm is wanted. This is a preventive approach which assails the root causes (i.e. it heals illness). Such approach implicates moving from energy and resources directed against the war (anti-war) to energy and resources directed to more peace and security (pro-peace), as well to pass from unstable security for some people to sustainable security for all [20].
  It is a crucial period for the world development, when it is decided:
● Whether the world will follow a relatively stable path towards a sustainable development, in which despite the existence of some risks and challenges they are manageable and controllable, and our policy towards these challenges and risks will be pro-active and our activities planning will be fulfilled with a comparatively high degree of fulfilment probability (at least 60-70%); or
● Whether the world will pursue mush riskier scenarios and will move from one crisis to another, in which the management and the control are almost notional and our policy towards these challenges and risks will be re-active, and our activities planning will be fulfilled with a low degree of fulfilment probability (10-15% at the most), so that in fact we ride our luck. In this instance, we will be satisfied with slowing-down the negative processes, rather than reversing their course.

  In consequence of the description of the five levels of security the scope (the sphere) of the terms “National Security” and “International Security” may be clearly illustrated.
● The first three levels of security (Security of the Individual, Security of the Group of People and Security of the State) set National Security, or to be more specific, they include with a high degree of clarity the objects studied by National Security.
● The last three levels of security (Security of the State, Security of the Community of States, and Security of the World) set International Security, or to be more specific, they likewise include the objects studied by International Security.
  As it becomes clear, Security of the State is the intersection of National Security and International Security.
  The state is a pivotal, but not the only actor on the national stage any more. Therefore there isn’t any sign of equality between security of the state and national security. The Levels of Security Scheme takes into consideration the importance of security of the different communities of people for national security. It is in line with the strengthened human dimensions of security as a leading element of the national security.
  The Levels of Security Scheme reflects the idea that the states are the main but not the only actors on the international stage as well. It is rendered its due to the tangle of organizations and coalitions, i.e. the institutional security architecture. This Scheme takes also in consideration the global processes, which turned the world into a common boat and gave an above-national and trans-borders character to a lot of new and substantially different threats to security, in order that the preservation of common security should become an increasingly crucial and vital priority for all.
  It is obvious that the borders between the separate levels of security and between national and international security are becoming increasingly pervious and through them trickle, seep or overtake challenges and risks in both directions. The state experiences increasingly greater difficulties in carrying out adequate, effective security policy within the boundaries of its territory, because it is exposed to considerable outside influences; but the international security environment is also susceptible to influences descending from the individual countries and proving to be to be difficult to manage and control.
  The science of security, as it was described in this paper, continues to be based on the conception of the crucial and vital role of the state in safeguarding national security and in the most efficient corresponding to the national interests participating of the country in international security. This role of the state will indubitably evolve. But at least in the next one or two decades, the right planning of the Bulgarian security policy will entail the creation of conditions, under which the Bulgarian National Security System will continue to exist in order that the Bulgarian State should be the major factor in safeguarding security of society and the particular individual, as well the major factor in achieving not just in paper only, but as much as possible adequate and full rights membership in the EU and NATO, and in formulating Bulgaria’s conduct on the international stage, which should be of contributory nature in tackling of the world to the most momentous challenges before humankind.

1. Nisbet, Robert. The Quest For Community (Bulgarian edition) [Stremezhat kum obshtnost, Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia, 1992], p. 37.
2. Nye, Joseph S., Jr., The Case For Deep Engagement// Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, 1995, p. 91.
3. Slatinski, Nikolay. Security And International Relations (in Bulgarian) [Sigurnost i mezhdunarodni otnoshenia. // Mezhdunarodni otnosheniya, 1999, No. 2], pp. 15-36.
4. Slatinski, Nikolay. Security Dimentions (in Bulgarian) [Izmereniya na sigurnostta, Paradigma, Sofia, 2000], pp. 167-173.
5. Wall, James A., Jr., Michael Blum, Ronda R. Callister, Deng Jian Jin, Nam-Hyeon Kim, Dong-Won Sohn. Mediation in the USA, China, Japan, and Korea, PRIO, SAGE Publication, Vol. 29, No. 2, 1998, pp. 235-248, p. 237.
6. Fromm, Erich. Escape form Freedom (Bulgarian edition) [Da imash ili da badesh, Kibea, Sofia, 1996] p. 43.
7. Ibidem.
8. Cohen, Raymond. Negotiating Across Cultures. Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy, USIP Press, Washington, D.S., 1992, pp. 29-32.
9. Ibidem.
10. Cohen, R. Op. cit.
11. Cohen, R. Op. cit.
12. Fromm, E. Op. cit.
13. Nisbet, R. Op. cit.
14. Herzog, Roman. Staaten der Frühzeit (Bulgarian edition) [Darzhavata prez rannite vremena, Sofia, LiK, 1997], p. 87.
15. Deutsch, Karl W. The Analysis of International Relations, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey, 1968, p. 103.
16. Academy of Sciences of USSR. Modern Bourgeois Theories of International Relations (A Critical Analysis) (in Russian) [Sovremennye burzhuaznie teorii mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenii (kriticheskiy analiz), Nauka, Moskva, 1976], p. 273.
17. Cooper, Robert. The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. (Bulgarian edition) [Razpadaneto na natsiite, Obsidian, Sofia, 2004].
18. The Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighbourhood, Report, 1995, http://www.sovereignty.net/p/gov/ogn-front.html.
19. Abbott, Chris, Paul Rogers, John Sloboda. Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century, Oxford Research Group, June 2006, http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing_papers/pdf/g....
20. Ibidem.