On Five Levels of Security (Part 2)

compensates part of the spilled energy, and gives a hand to the fallen one, the weak and the loser. Every individualistic culture needs these correctives, solidarity and mutual aid, for prevent loosing its landmarks, mainstays and values, so that it doesn’t turn out to be without moral restrictions and degenerates into permanent contest for material wealth. Because the man of the West, in Europe and the United States, feels sometimes the intrinsic need to Escape from Freedom [12], from the egoism of the market, from this pursuit of success at all costs and to find shelters and sanctuaries of compassion, care and consolation where to satisfy his Quest for Community [13]. For the Western individualistic cultures, threatened by atomization (at the people level) and fragmentation (at the strata level), the networks of intermediate communities (intermediate in the sense between the separate Individual and the whole Society) are extremely necessary because they provide the societies with a collectivistic corrective, they motivate them to resist actively against the destructive influences of today’s individualism: increasingly restrained and not rarely devoid of values.
  Here comes the sacred question: Who and Where are the Bulgarians? Probably, they are originated from in-between societies, inter-societies, between these two polar types of cultures: the individualistic culture and the collectivistic one. Namely, the Bulgarians are not on the left side, nor on the right side of the hyphen, but they are the hyphen itself or at least part of it.
  In the psychology of Bulgarian people (and in its perception of security) there are traits, inherent to the individualistic societies (mutability, pragmatism, rationality, preponderance of the dynamics over the customs), but there are also in no lesser extent traits inherent to the collectivistic societies (preponderance of the staunch forms, of the conservatism, of the customs and the irrational motives). Bulgaria lived for 4-5 decades under a totalitarian type of society having collectivistic nature. In that sense, Bulgaria has lost the habit of individualistic society and it have lost its immunity against some extreme, reaching aggressiveness and destruction, manifestations of individualism. In Bulgaria in extremely acute form and very quickly some metastases of illness by which are threatened the Western individualistic societies: atomization, apathy and anomy: a lack of common ideas and initiatives. The discussion about the values and about the humane dimensions of that, what is happening in Bulgaria, lies ahead; and it will produce a completely new leaders, since at stake is the future of Bulgaria as a State with a Bulgarian national identity.

  The third level of security is Security of the State or State Security.
  Security of the State is old, traditional, more and more undervalued security, that remains, as mentioned already, related to the defence of pivotal values: territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence, freedom, constitutional and internal order, etc. The necessity to guarantee security of society (security of family, of the tribe, of the clan, and of the polis) is one of the main reasons for the origination of the state. The state is a result from the society’s and the individual’s aspiration towards more security, or as Roman Herzog wrote: “Security in terms of the enemies has always been an excellent reason for the formation and consolidation of the States” [14].
  The “State-Security” relation is complex, non-linear, with the presence of the so called feedback, and between the two exists a constant process of interaction, of mutual penetration, of mutual consolidation, or respectively a constant process of mutual weakening. For a long time, More State meant More Security; but gradually, More State ceased to always mean More Security, and sometimes it turned out to lead to Less Security. This is because numerous other values and benefits started to compete with Security and, above all, this was Democracy. Democracy removes Security from the pedestal of an absolute value and takes down its halo of an utter benefit; so it makes security a relative benefit. Society is not content anymore to stay obediently and passively inside the golden cage of security.
  In the non-democratic state, there is a complete fusion between security of the Regime and security of the State, whilst security of the individual and security of the different communities are sacrificed in their favour. Through violence, manipulation, finding an external or internal enemy, society is coerced to merge and identify its security with security of the regime or at least to live thinking that they hold one and the same priority. Thus, the state “consumes” security of its society.
  Security in democratic society costs less to achieve in the same conditions as in the non-democratic regime, because the non-democratic regime allocates additional resources to foothold its security: political police, secret services, and other repressive bodies. Democracy is a complex form of government from the point of view of reaching optimal security for society; it means a division of the powers, a discussion and a controversy, a balance of personal, group, party, corporative, national interests.
  Under democracy, there are frequent mutual contradictions between competence and electivity, between liberalism and the sheer need of order, between common goals and personal egoism, between interests of the ruling majority and those of society.
  Under difficult problems, society easily turns ready to trade more Democracy for more Security. But even though it is not a panacea, democracy is a medicine for security, as the problems of security are cured only with more Democracy, not formal but real one, working one. As with every remedy, however, the dose is crucial so that it won’t turn into a poison, so the key question is how much security is necessary to society so that it would preserve itself as democratic, and how much democracy is needed so that its security wouldn’t fall apart.
  Security and Democracy are sometimes Siamese twins (the separation of whom is risky, and can impose one to be sacrificed in favour of the other), and they are sometimes quite the contrary, some times they are interconnected parts; their relations are sometimes symbiotic, they are sometimes indifferent, and they are sometimes incompatible; they are competing and cooperating, they are in a conflict and in a concord. Accordingly, the political leadership must find the balance between security and democracy, which would depend on the particular circumstances, the customs, the mentality, the historical memory.
  The State has different mechanisms and tools for safeguarding Security. It is the only legitimate agency which can exert force (according to Max Weber). There exist two extreme views on the perspectives for the “State-Security” relation:
● According to the first one, the state should preserve its exclusive rights to protect security and to provide the national security system with resources, legislation of norms and standards, and staff as long as possible;
● According to the second one, the state should withdraw from its functions in security maximally and as soon as possible.
The truth again is somewhere in the middle. But yet, the last rights and duties which the state could give up should be those related with security. However, strengthening of the trends of the withdrawal of the state from security, of the decentralization and privatization of its various functions is a fait accompli, because there are private fire companies, private detectives and private security agencies. There are private information agencies, and intelligence agencies in general, owned by private corporations. Hence, it stands to reason the idea that the state should delegate intelligence work to non-state institutions and think thanks (especially as 90% of the information is gathered from so-called open sources). Thus one arrives at the idea of private police and private armies! Why shouldn’t one image that the state decides to participate in a mission in a risky region and that it announces a tender to private organizations for the provision of the maximum fulfillment of the assigned tasks in exchange for minimum government expenses?!
  The state will inevitably continue to withdraw from security, however, in the presence of actions subject to market’s logic it is likely that the private structures would undertake only profitable measures that would not drive them on a less; and the private fire company might refuse to extinguish the fire in a squalid house (because this is unprofitable), and this is in fact a normal practice in the health care in Bulgaria. If in safeguarding national security, the strategic planning, management, control and coordination are excluded; if the feedback with society is “missed”; if nobody takes care of the common interest and priorities yet, aren’t then created the perfect conditions for irreversible cutting off, weakening and dismantling of the state created?
  The government of the country is a complex mechanism for producing security. One of the main tasks of the power is to have an active and decisive role in the complex process of balancing the State’s necessities of security with its abilities to provide such security. The manner, by which it copes with this balancing, is the judgement criterion of government’s effectiveness. The government is effective if it achieves more security with fewer resources and respectively it is ineffective if it achieves less security with more resources. The state’s monopoly of safeguarding security and of providing the national security system with resources, legislation of norms and standards and staff is not the same as irresponsible depletion of resources. And in the resources for security, every country should “cut its coat according to its cloth”!
  Financing security is not just a simple accounting process, but it is, above all, State Policy, it is a conceptual and philosophical problem. Before planning of the resources for Security, Security Policy should be formulated. The resources are always limited and everything is a matter of priorities and goals. If planning and management of security policy are fulfilled in the best way possible, they could found the Golden Section between the capacities and the needs, and they could pay give great dividends and turn themselves into an efficient generator of security.

  The fourth level of security is Security of the Community of Nations, i.e. collective security or coalition security.
  The term “Community” comprises different forms of bilateral and/or multilateral treaties, alliances, pacts, coalitions, communities for security and even temporary coalitions, such as the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq.
  Security of every system is a state or a process, in which the normal existence of the system is guarantied and its vital interests are preserved. If a threat exists to these interests, the system might begin to experience a security deficit, i.e. to be in a state of insecurity. A constant requirement to the National Security System is to preserve in all cases its capability to act in an autonomous way as well, in case of necessity. To put it in another way, the National Security System must be really “national” (by character), really “system” (with a high level of integrity) and really “security” (i.e. to represent a complex mechanism for production of security), in the true sense of the word, in order to be efficient and to carry out its designation.
  The national security system cannot exist out of its concrete time and space; it is a function not only of enduring trends, but of every change in the strategic situation as well. It accounts the historical experience, the traditions and the mentality of society. It is a fallacy that every construction, the mechanically imported one inclusive, could be suitable for each country. The engrafted into the National Security System could be ineffective, and it could even cause internal friction and pressure concentration.
  The national security system should be national in essence, but it should be also integrated into a Collective security system, because of the trans-national character of the risks and threats. Under its membership into a Collective Security System (CSS), every National Security System (NSS) obtains not only benefits and advantages, but experiences difficulties and problems. With joining the CSS, the key task of the NSS, is to achieve adequate sovereignty and capacity to function autonomously.
  However, before the consideration of the “NSS-CSS” relation, the basic concept of “security community“, introduced by Karl Deutsch [15, 16], will be taken into consideration. The characteristic features of every security community are: integrity; shared security; a feeling of unity and readiness for joint defence of the interests; an agreement that all the disputes among the participants would be resolved only by peaceful means and through negotiations; an existence of mechanisms, institutions and traditions for surmounting the threats, disputes and conflicts.
  Following Karl Deutsch’s pattern, two types of security communities are distinguished (amalgamated and pluralistic).
● Within the amalgamated security communities, although keeping some elements of their own security systems, the separate units build a joint security system within the borders of the community and its planning, management and control institutions cover all of the participating states and assume the guarantees of particular security of each of them. It could be said that in its gradual evolution, the European Union (EU) will evolve more and more into an amalgamated security community.
● Within the pluralistic security communities, the separate units preserve to a great extent the independence of their national security systems while at the same time they transfer a certain part of the functions of safeguarding their security to the Community security system and its planning, management and control institutions. In these institutions all states enjoy equal rights to participate in the decision making and taking process and can defend their interests (at least in theory). NATO could be pointed out as an example of such community.
  The inequality of the states exerts strong influence on the CSS. It is not always true that the votes are counted in the CSS; but even if this is the case, even if the decisions are taken with consensus and the most modern voting procedures for harmonizing the opinions and smoothing the differences are in effect, in the CSS, the votes de facto are assessed and small countries might turn out to participate on paper only into the decision making and taking process.
  In every CSS, the countries have different capabilities, according to their actual power and financial contribution to effective functioning of the CSS. Some countries, the big ones, are mostly producers of security and have much greater significance for the functioning of the CSS; while other countries, the small ones, are mostly consumers of security and this gives them a rear place into the votes’ weight scale. Due to the fact that they are mostly producers of security, the big countries are compensated by means of a leading role in the CSS, by the right to take decisions on behalf of the small ones and instead of them, etc. Due to the fact that the small countries are mostly consumers of security, they ought to pay dully by means of territory (with bases), raw materials, services, military detachments for missions.
  Within the CSSs there is no automatism and they don’t operate immediately if something happens to a weaker partner. It is possible for the Big, the Whole, to “miss” the problems of the Small, the Part. The Whole is always bigger and more important than its Component Parts.
  The CSS imposes to the NSS requirements and criteria, through which the NSS should first answer the CSS needs, and then it should take care of everything else. Every country in the CSS should make its contribution to the CSS’ aims and capabilities. One smaller state might invest resources that are huge for it in the fulfilment of the CSS’ requirements and criteria and thus it do without the resources to build its own adequate capacity. Relying on the CSS, this NSS might have security problems in the event of paralyzing or leading astray of the CSS. On the other hand, the strong emphasis on its own NSS might alienate the state from the CSS; it might incapacitate the state from working in harmony with the other member states, it might force the state to fall out of the CSS and render it incompatible with the CSS, so that the CSS can’t actually rely on it.
  Small countries’ people could hardly explain to big countries’ people that security of both the small and the big is measured not in kilograms, meters and hours, i.e. from the viewpoint of their population, security of both the small and the big countries is commensurable. But the big country, even in the CSS, is often tempted to say to the small one: “Just take a look at