These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
  The main characteristics and conclusions of two of the most important and we can say – leading schools of thought in the Science of Security – the School of Political Realism and the School of Political Idealism – are analyzed.
  The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed discussion of the School of Political Realism and the School of Political Idealism in the Science of Security:
  Николай Слатински. Сигурността – същност, смисъл и съдържание. София: Военно издателство, 2011.
  [Nikolay Slatinski. Sigurnostta – sushtnost, smisal i sadarzhanie. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2011].
  Nikolay Slatinski. Security – essence, meaning and content. Sofia: Military publishing house, 2011 (in Bulgarian)
  Security is an amazing, multi-layered, wonderful and stressful category in its comprehensiveness. Its research is associated not only with the approaches and models, phenomena and properties, criteria and quantities discussed in these Studies, but also with a number of other, no less intriguing and even exciting dimensions and aspects that have so far remained outside of our attention. Here we will continue our narrative of security by discussing the main principles and leading representatives of the School of Political Realism and the School of Political Idealism, highlighting and comparing their quests in studying and overcoming security problems. Not only are these two schools of thought essential to any university curriculum devoted to the substantive foundations of the Science of Security, but they, although opposed and in a certain sense antagonistic, represent two intellectual lenses, two conceptual prisms through which to reach the fundamental truths, ideas and concepts about the deep essence, broad content and high meaning of the scientific category „Security“.
  When we enter the deep thickets of these two leading schools, we must remember that these are not absolute dogmas, these are not universal axioms for decision-making and behavior in the complex and difficult interstate and interpersonal relations. These schools are associated „only“ with two tools, with two models of strategizing, of survival and development. One is more or less confrontational, the other is more or less cooperative. But we know that in the general case, rushing to extremes is, as a rule, not the best strategy. When you are in an extreme, critical position or close to it, your choices are limited, you can easily become a victim of your own radicalization according to the Winnie the Pooh principle: „The more – the merrier“. And you will begin to adhere to your maximum realism or to your maximum idealism because you do not want to betray your principles. In fact, any successful strategy is an effective mix of the two basic, ultimate strategies: the confrontational one and the cooperative one. We must understand that the general formula for choosing and combining these strategies has not yet been found, the golden ratio between the two models has not been found as well. In some situations, it is necessary to insist primarily on your own interests and security, at the expense of the interests and security of others; but in other situations, the best choice for you will be to work for common interests and security, within the framework of which you will strive to achieve a completely satisfactory degree of protection of your own interests and security. Moreover, such choices are made in a highly dynamic and unpredictable environment, the conditions of which must be constantly monitored.
  The Dilemma of (in)security discussed in Study 22 is a key concept for one of the two main schools of thought in the study of security – the School of Political Realism.
  DILEMMA OF (IN)SECURITY is a situation in which measures to improve the security of one state DO NOT LEAD to an increase in its security, because they provoke countermeasures from another state.
  DILEMMA OF (IN)SECURITY can also be formulated as follows: In general, IT IS NOT TRUE that when a system (state) invests in its security (increases resources, makes efforts for its protection), it NECESSARILY receives more security (i.e. investment security DOES NOT ALWAYS lead to more security).
  According to the School of Political Realism, at the forefront of the foreign, security and defense policy of a country is the protection of national interests and security with all its available power, and law and morality, along with such concepts as principles, duty, honesty, compliance with the commitments and keeping of the given word remain in the background and are observed as a direct function of the protection of national interests and security, taking into account the risks that international relations pose to the country.
  The main thesis of the ideologists of this school is that „insecurity is a universal and permanent feature of the international order“ [1], and international relations are a continuous and unchanging struggle for supremacy and power. For political realists, the system of international relations (indeed, much more than of interstate relations) is anarchistic. By „anarchistic“ we mean that this system, unlike the internal space of the state, lacks mandatory norms of behavior (laws), as well as institutions to ensure compliance with these norms and punish their violation. If the egoism of people is considered a bad and unattractive trait of their character, then in international relations political realists talk about the „sacred egoism of nations“, i.e. it is quite naturally implied that for nations, for states, it is justified and necessary for them to be egoistic, or at least have a healthy dose of egoism.
  Of course, realism does not mean selfishness. Political egoists, like individual egoists, always and in all cases put their own interests and security at the forefront. Political realists demand that security and interests be at the forefront only when the situation is „either – or“. In other words, as long as the pursuit of common interests and security does not conflict with national interests and security, the state can participate in collective efforts, but if there is a conflict between national interests and security and the interests and security of others, the statesman must always put the interests and security of his country at the forefront.
  This can be illustrated (see also Study 18) with a fable from as far back as 1755 by the great French philosopher and thinker Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 – 1778). In it, he tells how five primitive hunters try to kill a stug, enough to feed them and their families. While hunting the stag promises lunch for all of them, they pursue it with a concerted effort and surround it. But at that moment a rabbit runs past one of the hunters, who runs after him, kills him and secures food for himself and his relatives. Unfortunately, the stag escaped through the gap he opened and the other hunters were left empty-handed. The treacherous hunter did this because he knew that if he did not kill the rabbit, then running up to another of the hunters, the latter would not hesitate and chase him, leaving a gap through which the stag would escape and thus leave him empty-handed. This is how, as long as this is possible, everyone pursues the goal with a common effort, but if an „either – or“ situation arises (either the self-interest or the common interest), the hunter will always choose the self-interest. Not because he is egoist, but because it is the only way to satisfy his interests, and anyone in his place would do the same. Here we have „a classic illustration of the problem of securing a public good in the face of the individual temptation to give it up in favor of his selfish interest“ [2].
  Interstate relations are absolutely like that according to the views of the School of Political Realism. Being in an „either – or“ situation, the statesman is doomed to choose the national interest, because in such a situation, each of his opponents would act in the same way and protect his own interests at the expense of interests of others. Acting on trust can prove fatal. It is not possible to consider the interests of others because they would never consider your interests. According to political realists, „absence of trust dominates international relations. Therefore, every state strives to increase its power“ [3, 4].
  The viability of the theory of „realism“, writes Russian international relations scholar Vladimir Kulagin, „is explained by the fact that, with rare exceptions, it sufficiently adequately reflected the motives for the behavior of states during the three and a half centuries through which the classical mechanism of relations between sovereign nation-states functioned – the Westphalian system of international relations“ [5].
  The Westphalian system of international relations – a system of international relations based on the so-called Peace of Westphalia, which included two peace agreements signed in the German cities of Onabrück and Münster on May 15 and October 24, 1648. They put an end to the Thirty Years' War (1618 – 1648) – a pan-European military conflict that began as a religious clash between Protestants and Catholics in Germany (in the Holy Roman Empire) and affected almost all European countries (except Switzerland). The Peace of Westphalia marked the beginning of a new order in Europe. It was based on the concept of state sovereignty, i.e. international relations in Europe were no longer relations between monarchs, but between sovereign states, and relations within each individual state are the exclusive prerogative of the sovereign state itself.
  The Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation (German Heiliges Römisches Reich Deutscher Nation, lat. Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Germanicæ or Sacrum Imperium Romanum Nationis Teutonicæ) – the official name of the medieval German state that existed in the period 962 – 1806 and united many territories in Europe. At the time of its greatest prosperity, the empire included Germany (which was its core), northern and central Italy, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and some parts of France; from 1134 it formally consisted of three kingdoms: Germany, Italy and Burgundy. In 1135, the Czech Kingdom became part of the empire, whose official status within the empire was finally confirmed in 1212.
  Burgundy – a historical region in Western Europe; at different periods of history, this was the name given to various territories from what is now South-Eastern France to the Netherlands.
  Note. Clarifications for which no source is explicitly indicated are based on texts and definitions for them in Wikipedia.
  The ancient father of political realism is the outstanding ancient Greek historian Thucydides (c. 455 BC – c. 400 BC). To understand and appreciate its historical significance, it is necessary to draw a parallel with his no less outstanding predecessor, the father of history, Herodotus (c. 484 BC – c. 425 BC).
  According to Herodotus, what drives people, states and their rulers is the will of the gods. Human conflicts, joys, sufferings are an earthly projection of divine oppositions, clashes and passions. Of course, this is not a literal reflection of the turbulent life boiling on Olympus (deceptions, intrigues, seductions) on the relations within Ancient Hellas and between the Hellenes (i.e. the Greeks) and the barbarians, but the fact that we, people, are not sovereign masters of our own lives, and are subject to the whims of Fate; that there is some original design, some eternal plan, some unattainable idea that we follow blindly (and at least uninformed); the inexplicable forces us accept what happened as a gift or punishment from the Gods for listening to their will or ignoring their warnings. And if there is anything that still depends on us, it is not WHETHER SOMETHING WILL HAPPEN, but HOW IT WILL HAPPEN, how we participate in what is happening – by behaving courageously and with dignity, or showing our worst side and betraying traditions and understandings about bravery, honesty and justice.
  In his immortal „History“, describing the Greco-Persian wars, Herodotus tells how Cyrus II the Great (? – 530 BC), king of Persia, defeated the Lydian king Croesus (595 – 546 BC). After having captured Croesus, Cyrus ordered to build „a huge funeral pyre and made Croesus (who was tied up) … climb up to the top. Perhaps he intended them to be a victory-offering for some god or other, or perhaps he wanted to fulfil a vow he had made, or perhaps he had heard that Croesus was a god-fearing man and he made him get up on to the pyre because he wanted to see if any immortal being would rescue him from being burnt alive“. Croesus loudly called on Apollo: „If any gift of mine has pleased you, come now and rescue me from this danger“. Weeping, he called on the god, and suddenly the clear, calm weather was replaced by gathering clouds; a storm broke, rain lashed down, and the pyre was extinguished“. When Croesus was taken down from the pyre, Cyrus asked him who had persuaded him to invade his country and be his enemy rather than his friend. „My lord, Croesus replied, it was my doing. You have gained and I have lost from it. But responsibility lies with the god of the Greeks who encouraged me to make war on you. After all, no one is stupid enough to prefer war to peace; in peace sons bury their fathers and in war fathers bury their sons. However, I suppose the god must have wanted this to happen“ [6]. This is exactly how Herodotus understood the underlying causes of wars between peoples – the gods cloud their minds and encourage them to go to war.
  Croesus also had very serious problems with the son of Cyrus Cambyses (? – 522 BC) – a cruel and mediocre ruler, about whom it was said, probably with reason, that he „had a terrible sickness – the sacred disease [epilepsy] as it is sometimes called – ever since he was born“. And hence his madness: „So it is hardly surprising that lack of mental health should accompany such a terrible physical ailment“. Cambyses once asked his Persian advisers, and Croesus, „what sort of man they thought him to be, compared to his father Cyrus. The Persians replied that he was a better man than his father, because he had control over the whole of his father's possessions, while also adding dominion over Egypt and the sea. Croesus was there, however, and the Persians' reply did not satisfy him, so he said to Cambyses, „In my opinion, my lord, you do not bear comparison with your father, because you do not yet have a son of the calibre of the one he left behind“ [7].
  In the words of Croesus, there is a lesson on how to preserve dignity and honor. In our time, when showing respect for the individual is the exception rather than the rule, especially young people often find themselves in critical situations when they have to endure the will and power of an employer (or an all-powerful official, an arrogant boss), who treats them like slaves or personal property – just because they depend on him. When young people have to compromise their conscience and their dignity, it would be good if they did it in at least a way very similar to the way out that Croesus found – by telling the truth in the face („In my opinion, my lord, you do not bear comparison with your father!“), without allowing themselves to be severely punished for this („Because you do not yet have a son of the calibre of the one he left behind!“).
  And Thucydides, in his no less remarkable book „The Peloponnesian War“, describes the war within the Hellenic world – between Athens and Sparta. Each of the two city-states had united a number of other policies. As usually happens, when the external threat disappears (after the Hellenes, with a common and fearless effort, repulsed the Persian invaders), internal strife begins. The presence of an external enemy is the powerful means of strengthening an alliance, while the absence of an external enemy, in turn, is the powerful means of discord between its participants.
  If for Herodotus the war happened because „the god must have wanted this to happen“, then let us's see how Thucydides, as a true political realist, defines the causes for the war between Athens and Sparta: „The war was begun by the Athenians and Peloponnesians when they broke the Thirty Years Treaty which they had established after the capture of [the island of] Euboea. I have set out first the grievances and disputes which led to this breach, so that nobody in future will need to look for the immediate cause which brought such a great war on the Greeks. In my view the real reason, true but unacknowledged, which forced the war was the growth of Athenian power and Spartan fear of it: but the openly proclaimed grievances on either side causing the breach of the treaty and the outbreak of war were as follows“. In other words, Thucydides argued that the causes of war were not the result of any Divine will or Divine caprice, but because each of the two sides (the Athenians and the Spartans) sought to become stronger and to achieve the maximum in the pursuit of their interests and security, while at the same time preventing the other side from becoming stronger and taking actions that benefit its interests and security. Therefore, according to Thucydides, the causes of the war (that is, the wars, because there were three of them) between Athens and Sparta are as they are seen by the modern School of Political Realism.
  Thucydides tells how the inhabitants of the island of Melos tried in peace negotiations to convince the Athenians who decided to attack them that their intentions were cruel and unfair. The Athenian answer is a brilliant exposition of the philosophy of political realism (and, having thus recreated the answer, Thucydides becomes the „ancient father of political realism“). The Athenians replied: „So keep this discussion practical, within the limits of what we both really think. You know as well as we do that when we are talking on the human plane questions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can and the weak concede what they must... Well, we do not think that we shall be short of divine favour either. There is nothing in our claim or our conduct which goes beyond established human practice as shown in men’s beliefs about the divine or their policy among themselves. We believe it of the gods, and we know it for sure of men, that under some permanent compulsion of nature wherever they can rule, they will. We did not make this law; it was already laid down, and we are not the first to follow it; we inherited it as a fact, and we shall pass it on as a fact to remain true for ever; and we follow it in the knowledge that you and anyone else given the same power as us would do the same. So as for divine favour, we can see no reason to fear disadvantage“ [8].
  In the spirit of political realism also wrote the ancient Chinese historian Sima Qian (145 or c. 135 – c. 90 or 86 BC), from whose magnificent work „Shi Ji“ we learn about the brilliant Chinese thinker, general and strategist Sun Tzu, Sun Zi, Sunzi, Master Sun, who lived 25-26 centuries ago (end of the 6th century or 544 – beginning of the 5th century BC or 496), also known as Sun Wu, Worthy Sun of the Kingdoms of Wu [9].
  Sun Tzu is the author of the masterpiece „[Treatise on] The Art of War“ („Sunzi bingfa“, „The methods of war by Master Sun“). This treatise, written in ancient times, contains messages that need to be heard and understood precisely today. Sun Tzu's work was composed in the 5th – 4th centuries BC, probably in 453 – 403, in the era called „Five Hegemons“ Lords or „Wu ba“ (early 7th century – mid 6th century BC) – a period of cruel internecine and conquest wars that had to overcome the huge fragmentation in the space of Ancient China and reform the country. They stimulated the implementation of new forms of organization of the armed forces, and also encouraged the development of military art and the emergence of the doctrine of war [10].
   „Shi Ji“, „Shiji“ – „Records of the Grand Historian“, created between 109 and 91 BC.
   „The Art of War“ (Sunzi bingfa) is the oldest surviving such treatise. It is also the most influential of the seven fundamental collections on the art of war in ancient China, which are known as the „Seven Books“, called „Wujing qishu“, i.e. „Seven Military Classics“. The other collections are the following works: „Wuzi“, „Master Wu“ (IV century BC); „Simafa“, „Methods of the Minister of War“ (IV century BC); „Weiliaozi“, „Master Wei Liao“ (IV century BC); „Liutao“, „Six Secret [Teachings]“ (IV – III centuries BC); „Huangshigong sanlüe“, „Three Strategies of Master Yellow Stone“ (VI – VII centuries AD); „Tang Taizong Li Weigong wendui“, „Li Weigong answering the questions of Emperor Tang Taizong“, short „Li Weigong wendui“ (VII century AD)[11].
  The first European translation of Sun Tzu's treatise appeared in France around 1780, and the first Russian translation in 1860 [12]. The treatises of Sun Tzu – „The Art of War“ („Sunzi bingfa“, „Master Sun“, „Wu Sunzi bingfa“, „The art of war by Master Sun from the state of Wu“), and Wu Tzu (Wu Qi) – „Wuzi“ („Master Wu“) gained such esteem that for centuries it was accepted that the military art of ancient China was the „The art of war by Sun Wu“ („Sun Wu bingfa“). A long time ago, Sun Tzu's treatise was studied as a model of military science not only in China, but also in Korea and Japan [13], and in the twentieth century in the military academies of a number of European countries.
  Sun Tzu lived at the end of the Chunqiu period (770 – 403 BC) [14]; was born in the Kingdom of Qi and in his youth „lived in solitude, and people did not know about his talent“ [15]. Due to internal unrest, he fled to the Kingdom of Wu, handed over his works on the art of war to its ruler Helu (514 – 495 BC), was appointed a military commander, and became famous for his campaigns against the states of Chu, Qi and Jin. Thanks to them, the state of Wu strengthened its power and from being considered „barbarian“, it ranks among the officially recognized independent domains [16, 17]. There were many legends about Sun Tzu's famous battle victories. In the treatise „Weiliaozi“ it is written: „There was a man who had only 30,000 troops, and no one in the Celestial Empire could resist him. Who is this? I answer: Sun Tzu“ [18].
  For a long time, many researchers have identified Sun Tzu with his namesake and distant descendant Sun Bin, who lived 150 years later, was also born in the kingdom of Qi, is also mentioned under the name Sun Tzu and also wrote a military treatise with the same title „Treatise on the Art of War by Sun Bin“ („Sun Bin bingfa“), lost in the 7th century and discovered in 1972 in Li Ni in a Han burial from the second half of the 2nd century BC, together with other manuscripts of military works [19]. According to legend, this general and military theorist was tricked by his classmate Pang Juan, a general of the State of Wu, into Wu territory and was subjected to the punishment of „xin bin/bin-pi“ („cutting off the kneecaps“), and was branded on his face, as a result of which he was given the name Bin („Deprived of the kneecaps“. Later, he was secretly taken out by envoys of the ruler of Qi, was appointed commander of the army and twice managed to inflict heavy defeats on the troops of the state of Wei [20].
  Sun Bin considered military power („shi“ – „strength“) to be the main means of achieving the goals of the state. This doctrine of his was called „gui shi“ („value power“). He advocates the ideas of an offensive strategy; for serious preparation for military operations; rushing through a campaign so that the enemy can be taken by surprise. Sun Bin attached particular importance to the capture of cities, cavalry operations and the deployment (dislocation) of troops in the area [21].
  Sima Qian tells the following incident from the life of Sun Tzu. The ruler to whom Sun Tzu dedicated his treatise wanted to see for himself that the rules described in such detail in the work could be applied in practice. Sun Tzu readily agreed to conduct this experiment and accepted the prince's idea that it should be carried out with the participation of women, since, in his opinion, they were also capable of learning the intricacies of the art of war. 180 women who lived in the palace were summoned, Sun Tzu divided them into two groups and placed at the head of each of them one of the ruler’s favorite concubines. He then gave his instructions, repeatedly explaining everything in great detail. A signal sounded, after which the participants were obliged to follow his orders, but the women laughed loudly – everything seemed to them like a game, a harmless joke. Sun Tzu, however, remained calm, took full responsibility for the failure and attributed it to the lack of sufficient clarity in the instructions. He repeated everything slowly and thoroughly, but after a new signal to begin, the women laughed wildly again. This time, Sun Tzu declared that the troop commanders were to blame for disobedience, and ordered the beheading of two beauties – the „commanders“. The prince objected: „I already understood that you know how to wage war: without these two women, I won't enjoy eating. Don't kill them“. Sun Tzu reminded him that the commander, not the ruler, commands the battlefield. And the beauties were killed. In their place Sun Tzu appointed two other concubines as commanders. The orders were now carried out as best as possible, without any of the women laughing [22]. Left without his favorites, the ruler deprived Sun Tzu of the title of commander-in-chief. Then Sun Tzu boldly replied that his master „loves words, not deeds“. The ruler changed his mind, retreated, and even ordered him to lead a military campaign against the neighboring princedom of Yue, in which Sun Tzu won another quick victory [23].
  Sun Tzu's „The Art of War“ consists of 13 chapters and is known in ancient Chinese military literature as the „The Book of 13 Chapters“. In it, wisdom is combined with large-scale strategic thinking, the most accurate formulations are given about the importance of the army, about the role of the military leader, about the skill to fight, about the ability to guess the enemy's plan. Moreover, the author's advice can be followed not only on the battlefield, but also in public activities, diplomacy, and even as prescriptions for behavior in one's private life. More and more books and in a variety of fields are using the conclusions in this treatise. The following are Sun Tzu's reflections on war and how even the strongest, most insidious and well-prepared opponent can be defeated:
  ⁕ „The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected“.
  ⁕ „All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand“.
  ⁕ „To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting“.
  ⁕ „The highest form of generalship is to baulk the enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities“.
  ⁕ „The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more“.
  ⁕ „The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege“.
  ⁕ „Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field“ [24].
  At the basis of the ability to conduct a victorious war, Sun Tzu places five phenomena (factors, imperatives, elements) of strategy – The Moral Law [Path, Way], Heaven, Earth, The Commander, Method and Discipline [Law]:
   „The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness. By method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure“ [25].
  Interpreted in modern language, these five phenomena would mean the following:
  „The Moral Law [Path, Way], is the moral unity between the ruler and the people; The Heaven is a calculation of the time when a war is being waged, taking into consideration the influence of the seasons, of the natural conditions, i.e. weather and climatic factors; The Earth is the geographical conditions of the theater of war, the terrain, the relationship of the area to the conditions and tasks of the war; The commander is the necessary qualities of the commander-in-chief, of the high command, his military art and prerogatives; The Method and Discipline [Law] is the organization of the army, the set of rules relating to the military system, command of the army and supply, their compliance with the goals of the state, its military doctrine [26, 27, 28, 29].
  From here, Sun Tzu derives the „seven calculations“, i.e. the conditions under which any war is successfully waged [by comparing the qualities of two different types of leaders]:
  „(1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral Law? (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth? (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? (5) Which army is stronger? (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?
  Sun Tzu also points out five essentials for victory when „we may know that we will win“, i.e. when it is determined who will win the war:
  „(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to fight. (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and inferior forces. (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit throughout all its ranks. (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the enemy unprepared. (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not interfered with by the sovereign. Victory lies in the knowledge of these five points“.
  The following advice of the genius Chinese strategist and thinker is remarkable for its depth, wisdom and insight:
  ⁕ „Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general stagnation. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply out of pique. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if not, stay where you are. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be succeeded by content. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never come again into being; nor can the dead ever be brought back to life. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at peace and an army intact“.
  ⁕ „Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face death, there is nothing they may not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help for it, they will fight hard“ [30].
  Sun Tzu's final advice is a golden rule followed by great generals. The strength of an army was tripled when it was brought up against the wall, with no way of retreat. A position was often deliberately chosen for the decisive battle, in which a deep and raging river lay behind the rear of one's own army; or the bridges over which the frightened thought of personal salvation would have fled first have been burned. Before the last, unequal battle with the army of the praetor Marcus Licinius Crassus, the brave Thracian Spartacus „stabbed his horse: as in prosperity and adversity he had faithfully kept by his men, he now by that act showed them that the issue for him and for all was victory or death“ [31]. Fighting incredibly bravely in the gorge of Thermopylae, defending access to the Fatherland, in 480 BC the Spartan king Leonidas I and his 300 personal guards died to one, but did not give in to the countless hordes of Persia, led by King Xerxes I himself.
  When death is the only way to retreat, the fighter becomes completely different, he is ready for impossible, inexplicable, unimaginable feats, without even fearing death.
  Praetor – a public office in Ancient Rome. In the course of historical development, the content and functions of this position changed.
  Marcus Licinius Crassus (c. 114 – 52) – Roman politician and commander, consul (70 – 69, 55 – 54).
  Spartacus (c. 110 – 71) – leader of the largest slave uprising against Rome (73 – 71).
  Leonidas I (520 – 480) – king of Sparta (488 – 480).
  Xerxes I (519 – 465) – king of Persia (485–465).
  In the last, 13th chapter of his treatise, Sun Tzu gives perhaps the oldest, but still sounding even today quite acceptable classification of spies:
  „Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (1) local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called „divine manipulation of the threads“. It is the sovereign’s most precious faculty. Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy’s spies and using them for our own purposes. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our own spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy’s camp“ [32].
  The above classification requires some clarification. Local spies are information-bearing informants recruited from among the local population. Inward spies are agents recruited from among the administration of the enemy. Converted spies are agents of the enemy who have infiltrated the country from the outside, but are unmasked and recruited (mainly through bribery, special care and attention, or through threats) to work for the benefit of the country they originally came to spy on, possibly without even knowing they are being intercepted and having their actions carefully manipulated with false, misleading information. Doomed spies are their own spies sent to a foreign country on missions, the execution of which will inevitably lead to their death, i.e. these are saboteurs who spread false information, deceive, incite the enemy to actions to his detriment, and when their lies are revealed, they pay with their lives. Surviving spies are classic spies – their own agents who are sent to a foreign country to collect extremely important information and for this reason must return alive at any cost [33].
  Sun Tzu shares the following insightful, very modern-sounding thoughts on spies and espionage:
  „Hence it is that with none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. Be subtle! Be subtle! And use your spies for every kind of business... Spies are a most important element in war, because on them depends an army’s ability to move“ [34].
  Reading the instructions of Sun Tzu, one involuntarily draws the conclusion that it is difficult to add anything significant to them, because everything that mankind had to learn in its endless, nearly 15,000 wars – from from the deepest antiquity to the present, in a constant rhythm: „war – preparation for war – war“. The history of mankind is a tragic series of feuds and battles between peoples. If we leaf through its yellowed pages, if we dig up the deep layers of time, if we delve deeper into the memory of peoples, then we will see one and the same picture – millions of people covered with skins, breastplates, armor and shields, clutching stones, knives, clubs, axes, maces, swords, scimitars, halberds, sabers, pikes and spears; they draw slings, bowstrings and crossbows; press the triggers of muskets, arquebuses, pistols, machine guns and rocket launcher buttons. For thousands of years, the Earth has been a battlefield where the stronger takes away territories, raw materials, goods and rights from the weaker, and imposes his culture, religion or ideology on him.
  Unfortunately, researchers and politicians quote Sun Tzu only when they want to demonstrate intelligence or embellish their analyzes with something exotic or oriental. It is always useful to leaf through Sun Tzu’s short but rich in content Treatise „The Art of War“. There we shell find the following thought, suitable to complete this story about the great Chinese strategist:
  „If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle“ [35].
  As we have already said, knowledge about Sun Tzu can be gleaned from Sima Qian's famous work „Shi Ji [Shiji]“ (Records of the Grand Historian). But Sima Qian is compared not to the „father of history“ Herodotus, but to the „father of realism“ Thucydides – because of his objectivity, respect for evidence and influence on future generations of historians [36], because of his understanding of essential, deep processes in history. He is also compared to the ancient Greek historian (and military leader) Polybius (c. 201 – c. 120 BC) [37]. „Shi Ji“ is placed alongside such epic works as the ancient Greek „Iliad“ and „Odyssey” of Homer, as well as the ancient Indian „Mahabharata“ and „Ramayana“ [38], and it is not easy to judge who gains more from these exquisite comparisons.
  Sima Qian was a genius historian, writer, and thinker of the Han period. He was the son of Sima Tan (c. 165 – 110), the chief historiographer and astrologer at the court of Emperor Wu of Han. In 108 BC., shortly after the death of his father, Sima Qian took his position and gained access to the imperial archives [39]. He became a victim of his strong character and the dangerous for that time (only for that time?) tendency towards independent thinking and obvious oppositional sentiments dictated by his Taoist worldview [40]. In 99 (98) BC. he intercedes for the military leader Li Ling, who was defeated by the Huns and surrendered. By this he aroused the wrath of the emperor and was punished by imprisonment and castration [41]. Shocked and humiliated, Sima Qian debated whether to commit or not to commit suicide, but chose life to complete the historical work he had begun. He confessed his motives for making this difficult decision in a letter to a friend: „Man has only one death. This death may be as heavy as Mount Tai or as light as a goose feather. It all depends on how a person will use it. The reason why I continued to live in this filth is that I hide something in my heart that I have not yet been able to fully express“ [42]. There have always been people who have consciously chosen to continue dragging the weight of a heavy existence, because they felt in their souls thoughts and impulses that only they could bring into the world, only they could put into words in order to leave a trace, a mark behind – that they were, that it made sense to be born, to suffer, to walk along the dusty road of life.
  After being released from prison, Suma Qian took the post of chief secretary of the State Chancellery and through hard work completed his life's work, „Shi Ji [Shiji]“ (Records of the Grand Historian) in 92 (91) BC. „Records of the Grand Historian“ is the basic work for Chinese historiography [43], very unusual for such an early era and covering a huge period of the country’s history – two and a half thousand years – from ancient times to the end of the 2nd century BC. „Shi Ji“ is indeed a unique encyclopedia of war and peace, i.e. of the life of ancient China [44]. Sima Qian writes that when creating „Shi Ji“ he was guided by „the desire to explore everything that is between heaven and earth, to penetrate into the essence of the changes that took place both now and in the days of distant antiquity“ [45]. He was the first in China to create a literary portrait, a specific composition, and vivid prose storytelling techniques, which have since been a treasure trove of plots and ideas for a number of writers, playwrights, and poets. For example, one of the historical events narrated by Sima Qian served as the basis for the Chinese drama „The Orphan of the Zhao [Family]“, and much later for the work „The Orphan of China“ (L’Orphelin de la Chine, 1753) by the great French writer and philosopher Voltaire (this is the pseudonym of Francois-Marie Arouet, 1694 – 1778) [46].
  The Han Dynasty (206 BC – 220 AD) is the longest ruling dynasty in the history of China.
  Emperor Wu of Han – Emperor of the Western Han Dynasty (140 – 87 BC).
  Taoism (Daoism) – a system of Chinese philosophical and religious concepts. The word tao or dao literally translates as the path (way, road), although today it has taken on a more abstract meaning in Chinese folklore and religion. Taoism is a philosophy that preaches harmony in all things, represented by the union of disorder and law, negative and positive, earth and heaven through the symbols of Yin-Yang. Taoism considers a higher, much more global in scope, more spiritual level of existence. The relationship between man and nature is emphasized, which rejects the need for strictly defined rules and order. Taoism has no special deities, and most of its followers are polytheists, who believe in various spirits associated with nature or the spirits of their ancestors.
  The late Middle Ages and the cradle of the Renaissance Florence gave birth to the brilliant philosopher and thinker Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) – „the medieval father of political realism“. And this is undoubtedly true, because Machiavelli's small in volume, but large in content, book „The Prince“ (Il Principe) is a kind of manual for statesmen, based entirely on the spirit of the views and postulates of political realism, inherent even in our time.
  Renaissance - a historical period of rapid cultural development in ideas, means of expression and in general in creativity, which lasted approximately from the 14th to the 17th century. It originated in Florence in the 14th century, and in the following centuries spread to other parts of Europe. In a more general sense, the term Renaissance is also used to designate the historical period that is a transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age.
  In „The Prince“, Machiavelli wrote:
  „A prudent ruler cannot and should not respect his word, when such respect works to his disadvantage and when the reasons for which he made his promise no longer exist … A prince has never failed to have legitimate reasons for whitewashing his failure to respect his word. I could give countless modern examples, proving how many peace treaties and promises have been made null and void by the dishonesty of princes … Men are inexperienced, and are so bound to the needs of the moment that the deceiver will always find someone who will let himself be deceived … A prince, and particularly a new prince, must understand that he is unable to respect all those quali- 70 ties for which men are considered good. For to maintain his rule, he is frequently obliged to behave in opposition to good faith, to charity, to humanity, and to religion. Thus he needs a flexible mind, altering as the winds of Fortune and changes in affairs require. As I said before, he does not deviate from the good, when that is possible; but he knows how to do evil when necessary … Therefore let a prince be the conqueror and supporter of the state. His methods are always deemed honorable and praiseworthy by everyone because unintelligent people are always taken in by appearances and results. Nothing but the unintelligent populate the world. The few are elbowed out of the way when the many have a base for support“ [47].
  And we will present one more thought of Machiavelli here, because it is revealing in its frankness:
  „Therefore since a prince must perfect his knowledge of how to use animal attributes, those he must select are the fox and the lion. Since the lion is powerless against snares and the fox is powerless against wolves, one must be a fox to recognize snares and a lion to frighten away wolves. Those who depend merely on the lion are ignorant … He who has known best how to use the attributes of a fox has succeeded best. But a prince must know how to whitewash these attributes perfectly, to be a liar and a hypocrite“ [48].
  Among the medieval thinkers who worked in the spirit of political realism, we should mention as well the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679). His views on the essence of politics as a struggle for security in a hostile environment, Vladimir Kulagin calls „the bible for „realists“ [49]. Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679) described the natural condition in which people live in anarchy, without a common authority over them to respect them, i.e. without a supreme arbiter to bring order and enacting laws. This natural condition is a „war of every man against every man“ („bellum omnium contra omnes“), „and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short“. That is why „when establishing a state, people are guided by the desire to get rid of the disastrous state of war“ [50].
  The American scholar of international relations Hans Morgenthau (1904 – 1979) can be called „the modern father of political realism“. Mainly thanks to his developments, the School of Political Realism began to be understood as a „school of national interest“ [51] and became the most important instrument of US foreign policy. The opposite is also true – the new role of the United States after the end of World War II necessitated the development of a scientifically based political theory that would arm the United States with new principles for its policy as a world power.
  According to Morgenthau, the aspiration for dominance is universal across time and space [52]; „All politics, domestic and international, reveals three basic patterns; that is, all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political policy seeks either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.“ [53]; „international politics, like any other politics, is a struggle for power – whatever its ultimate goals, power is its immediate goal“ [54]; „the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of national interest and supported by appropriate power“ [55], and morality must be excluded from international politics, since „the concept of interest defined in terms of power ... saves us fr om both that moral excess and that political folly“ [56]. „The political realist … thinks in terms of interest defined as power, as the economist thinks in terms of interest defined as wealth; the lawyer of the conformity of action with legal rules; the moralist, of the conformity of action with moral principles. The economist asks: „How does this policy affect the wealth of society, or a segment of it?“ The lawyer asks: „Is this policy in accord with the rules of law?“ The moralist asks: „Is this policy in accords with moral principles?“ And the political realist asks: „How does this policy affect the power of the nation?” [57].
  Morgenthau believed that:
  „The individual may say for himself: „Fiat justitia, pereat mundis (Let justice be done, even if the world perish)“, but the state has no right to say so in the name of those who are in its care... The state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by the moral principle of national survival“ [58].
  The American political scientist and sociologist Francis Fukuyama (1952) wrote:
  „In its most extreme form, realism treats nation-states like billiard balls, whose internal contents, hidden by opaque shells, are irrelevant in predicting their behavior. The science of internatio nal politics does not require knowledge of those insides. One needs only to understand the mechanical laws of physics governing their interaction: how bouncing a ball off one cushion will leave it ricocheting at a complementary angle, or how the energy of one ball becomes differentially imparted to the two balls it strikes simultaneously. International politics, then, is not about the interaction of complex and historically developing human societies, nor are wars about clashes of values. Under the „billiard ball“ approach, the slender knowledge of whether an international system is bipolar or multipolar is sufficient to determine the likelihood of peace or war“ [59].
Based on the reasoning of Francis Fukuyama, the following three principles („familiar rules“) of political realism can be formulated [60]:
  ⁕ The first principle is related to the key concept of this scientific school – „balance of power“:
  „The ultimate solution to the problem of international security can be found by maintaining a balance of power against potential enemies“.
  This means that a strong state can benefit from its power in international relations if it does not allow other states to unite against it to compensate its power („divide and conquer“), and a weak state can hope to gain more than its weakness prescribes, if it finds other weak states to unite with, to compensate the strength of the strong state.
  ⁕ The second principle is related to the attitude towards partners (friends):
  „Friends should be chosen primarily on the basis of their strength and their ability to help protect the interests of the state, and only then on the basis of ideology or the internal character of the regime“.
  This means that the leading argument when choosing a partner in international relations is to what extent the state's interests can be protected with its help, and not how compatible its values are with the values of the state. For example, among regional powers (i.e. countries whose role in a given region is extremely important, even decisive, but outside the region their influence is weaker, regardless of what their ambitions are and whether they are used by the great powers to find a balance of power in the global scale) the United States has its own list of „pivot countries“ – those countries that are close partners of the US and are at the forefront of American strategic interests in the region (South Korea, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, etc.). For such countries, from the point of view of the functioning of democracy, the observance of human rights, and the respect for the rule of law, the norm „as much as it is“ applies.
  ⁕ The third principle is related to the attitude towards opponents (enemies):
  „When assessing possible enemies, it is necessary to analyze their military potential, and not exclusively or primarily the foreign policy goals they proclaim“.
  This is due to the fact that the goals of a state may change, but its military potential remains. In international relations, words very often serve as well-chosen packaging for intentions that are radically different from those words. And they, the words, can all too easily be replaced by other words. Therefore, what is important is not what a given state says, but what it has, what it is capable of and whether it can apply it to the detriment of our interests.
  We will conclude the story about the School of Political Realism with a thought of the German philosopher Oswald Spengler (1880 – 1936):
   „An abstract idea of justice pervades the minds and writings of all whose spirit is noble and strong and whose blood is weak, pervades all religions and all philosophies - but the fact-world of history knows only the success which turns the law of the stronger into the law of all. Over ideals it marches without pity, and if ever a man or a people renounces its power of the moment in order to remain righteous – then, certainly, his or its theoretical fame is assured in the second world of thought and truth, but assured also is the coming of a moment in which it will succumb to another life-power that has better understood realities“ [61].
  The School of political idealism is to a large extent antagonistic, the opposite of the School of political realism.
  According to the School of Political Idealism, at the forefront of the foreign, security and defense policy of a country are law and morality, along with such concepts as principles, duty, honesty, compliance with the commitments and keeping of the given word, and national interests and security remain in the background and are realized as their direct function in the collective (community) context, taking into account the risks that international relations pose to the country.
  „What kind of statesmen are they who will put national interests and security on the back burner!?“ – someone will object. But if for the individual person idealism characterizes him as living in a fictional space and time, cut off from harsh reality, then idealism for states contains ... a certain element of pragmatism! As a rule, idealists are aware that if each country pursues only its own interests and security, this will lead to endless conflicts and wars. World history has proven a thousand times over the validity of this seemingly unappealable sentence. Human civilization first allows realists to do what they want and create what they want, and then, humanity sits on a stone like Rodin's Thinker, surrounded by the destruction, anarchy and chaos generated by realist games, and begins to draw up idealistic projects based on the exclusion of the war from international relations.
  Idealism is primarily associated with the name of the prominent German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) and his great work „Toward Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch“ (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf, 1793) [62], which outlined the path of humanity to a world free from destructive conflicts, to a world of Perpetual Peace (Ewiger Frieden). Kant believes that the process of moral improvement of mankind can bring it closer to perpetual peace and develop in a man a sense of cosmopolitan morality, i.e. expressed in today's language, it will create a sense of moral and political unity of the world community [63]. Or, as Kant asserts:
  „The political maxims must not be based on the welfare and happiness that an individual state can expect to derive from following such maxims, which is to say that they should not be based on the end that each of them will set for themselves (on what one wants to pursue), as the supreme (but empirical) principle of political wisdom, but rather should be based on the pure concept of the duty of right (on what one ought to pursue, the principle of which is given a priori by pure reason), whatever the physical consequences may be. The world will certainly not come to an end by there being fewer evil people. An immutable feature of moral evil is that it is self-contradictory and self-destructive in its intentions (above all in the relationship to other like-minded persons), and it thereby makes room for the (moral) principle of the good, even if it does so in slow steps“ [64].
  According to some historians, the idea of Perpetual Peace was first formulated by Maximilien de Béthune, Duke of Sully (1560 – 1641) as a proposal to King Henri IV containing a plan for the creation of a „Christian Republic“ – a confederation of the Christian nations of Europe. This plan is set out in the last volume of the memoirs of the Duke de Sully (1634).
  The idea was developed by L'abate Charles de Saint-Pierre (1658 – 1743) in 1713 in the „Project for the Establishment of Perpetual Peace in Europe“ (Projet pour rendre la paix perpétuelle en Europe), which was presented at the Congress of Utrecht (1713) [65].
  In the same direction, great efforts were made by such individuals as the French philosopher and writer Emeric Cruce (1590 – 1648), the English preacher and founder of the province of Pennsylvania, an English North American colony, which later became the American state of Pennsylvania, William Penn (1644 – 1718), Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, English philosopher and sociologist Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832), one of the first American anti-war activists William Ladd (1778 – 1841). Theorists of „Perpetual peace“ aspire for some form of supranational unification that would harmonize the interests of different nations in order to avoid wars between them. For this, it is necessary for each state to partially give up its sovereignty, because only in this way can a space be found for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, otherwise, if everyone of them adheres to its full and unchangeable sovereignty, there will be no possibility of the different interests and needs of sure to be satisfied to an acceptable degree. In order to protect the community from external attacks and internal conflicts, each of the states must delegate to the supranational entity its armed forces or a significant part of them [66].
  Auguste Rodin (1840 – 1917) – French sculptor; „The Thinker“ (Le Penseur, 1888) is one of his most famous sculptures.
  A priori (lat.) – regardless of experience, of facts; previously; in advance; before the experience and independently of it.
  Henry IV (1553 – 1610) – King of France in the period 1589 – 1610.
  The Utrecht Congress – held in the period April – May 1713 in the Dutch city of Utrecht. It ended with the signing of the Peace Treaty of Utrecht, which ended the War of the Spanish Succession (1710 – 1714). It was signed, on the one hand, by France and Spain, and on the other, by Great Britain, the Dutch Republic, the Holy Roman Empire, Portugal and Savoy.
  Savoy – a historical region in the southeast of France, for some time it existed as an independent duchy, and since 1860 it has been part of France.
  By analogy with the School of Political Realism, three principles („empirical rules“) of political idealism can be formulated:
  ⁕ The first principle is related to the key concept of this scientific school – „institutional architecture“:
  „The ultimate solution to the problem of international insecurity can be found by building of a complex and interrelated institutional architecture that provides the conditions, principles, standards and culture for joint discussion of problems among potential adversaries“.
  The destructive power of conflicts can be reduced and controlled if opponents have the opportunity – through institutions that have developed their own principles and standards – to peacefully discuss difficult problems with each other, to talk, negotiate and agree on the issues that divide them and constantly generate tension and mistrust between them.
  If the realists believe (this will be also discussed below) that conflicts are an invariable feature of international and interpersonal relations and are therefore inevitable, while we can only reduce their destructive power, then the idealists believe that conflicts between states, societies and individuals are, first of all, evidence that these states, societies and individuals are sufficiently immature or insufficiently mature to resolve these conflicts peacefully, therefore conditions must be created for them for getting to know each other much better, for discussions, for seeking mutual concessions and for peaceful regulation.
  ⁕ The second principle is related to the attitude towards partners (friends):
  „Friends should be chosen first of all on the basis of their goals, vision, ideology, principles and values that they profess and with an assessment of the determination to translate them into the policy of the state, and only then on the basis of their strength and capabilities, from which we can benefit in the protection of our interests“.
  This means that the leading argument when choosing a partner in international relations is the extent to which he professes similar goals, visions, ideologies, principles and values to ours and what his determination is to uphold them, and not how much he has the power potential to which we may at some point seek assistance when our interests are put to the test. The idea is that even if our partner promises help in situations that are difficult for our interests and security, he may, with a certain development of the situation, withdraw from his commitments, but if we have common goals, vision, ideology, principles and values with him, it would be a much reliable bond between us and a stronger motive for him to help us in a difficult moment, because he would perceive the threat against our goals, vision, ideology, principles and values as a direct threat against his goals, vision, ideology, principles and values.
  ⁕ The third principle is related to the attitude towards opponents (enemies):
  „When assessing possible enemies, it is necessary to analyze their goals, vision, ideology, principles and values, and not exclusively or primarily their national power and military capabilities“.
  This, according to the idealists, is because too often the main motive for the use of military force arises from and is even inspired by what the state, society and citizens believe in and consider to be the pillars of their identity, faith, memory and culture, and it is these what can to unconditionally remove prohibitions and unleash aggression, while in relation to other inducements and reasons for resorting to force interventions there are many restraining factors – various alliances and unions, treaties and accepted obligations, balances of military potentials and (global, international, national) public opinion.
  Realists are Hobbesians (after Thomas Hobbes). They see „the world divided between good and evil, between friends and enemies“ [67]; as, as we have already said, a Hobbesian world („war of every man against every man“) in which power (force) is the main regulator of hierarchies and relationships.
  Idealists are Kantians (after Immanuel Kant). They are turning away from power (force), moving towards a community of treaties, laws and rules, towards transnational dialogue and cooperation, towards a post-historical paradise of „Eternal Peace“ and relative prosperity. They profess peaceful resolution of disputes, believe in and refer to international law [68].
  Realists believe that human nature is imperfect, there is a lot of aggression in it, there is selfishness, reliance on power (force), a desire for power over others. This also applies, of course, to states as well, which means that conflicts are inevitable, that they cannot be eliminated and have always been and will be an invariable feature of feature of international and interpersonal relations. Therefore, according to realists, the main task of foreign, security and defense policy is to humanize conflicts, to make them less bloody, less destructive, „to reduce senseless suffering, to mitigate atrocities not imposed by military necessity, to protect human rights in war, to restrain the striving of the belligerents by all possible means to crush the enemy's troops“ [69]. This is fully in the spirit of the thesis of the French philosopher and statesman Charles de Montesquieu (1689 – 1755): „The right of nations is by nature founded on the principle that the various nations should do to one another in times of peace the most good possible, and in times of war the least ill possible, without harming their true interests“ [70].
  Idealists, in turn, believe that the existence of conflicts is primarily a consequence of the immaturity of humanity, but with its development and humanization, it will gradually become possible to emerge and establish a universal morality, within the framework and according to the principles of which conflicts will be resolved in a peaceful way This idea of theirs (dream, hope, illusion?) was conveyed very well by the German and British sociologist of Jewish origin Norbert Elias (1897 – 1990): „Only when these tensions between and within states have been mastered can we expect to become more truly civilized… If the structure of human figurations, of people's interdependencies, has these characteristics, if the coexistence of people with each other, which after all is the condition of the individual existence of each of them, functions in such a way that it is possible for all those bonded to each other in this manner to attain this balance, then and only then can humans say of themselves with some justice that they are civilized. Until then they are at best in the process of becoming civilized. Until then they may at best say: the civilizing process is under way, or, with the old Holbach: „la civilisation ... n'est pas encore terminée [the civilization of peoples is not yet complete]“ [71].
  Paul-Henri Thiry, Baron d'Holbach (1723 – 1789) – French writer, scientist and philosopher of German origin.
  The approaches of realists and idealists are different both in theory and in practice [72]. According to realists, the consequences of the use of force should be limited, and according to idealists, the possibilities for the use of force should be limited.
  Before proceeding further, we will take a look at the Just War Theory. Its logical consequence is International Humanitarian Law, through the prism of which the differences between realists and idealists can be understood much more deeply. Of course, we are talking about political realists and political idealists.
  For us, the sage, theologian and philosopher Saint Aurelius Augustine (Augustine the Blessed, 354 – 430) is the First European. This is an extraordinary personality not only for Christianity – he passionately inspires Europe to believe in itself, in its mission, in its cause and calling.
  At the end of the 3rd and the beginning of the 4th centuries, Europe was defeated, disunited, violated and raped by pagan or hastily, superficially converted to Christianity tribes rushing through it. Left without the Roman Empire as a unifying and consolidating space, without leaders and unifiers, Europe has passively and submissively, dejectedly and alienatedly contemplated its fate. In part, this behavior of hers was doomed, tired, distrustful and resigned, because New Testament Christianity taught her not to resist violence and, when slapped on one cheek, to turn the other. It was Saint Augustine who dares – for the sake of the survival of Europe – to step beyond submission to violence and declare that yes, we should not resist violence in our private lives, but for us as communities, as peoples, there are wars that we are called to fight, that are holy and pleasing to God – these are the just wars. And just is that war whose cause is just.
  A few later, a phenomenon that was born in our Bulgarian lands, which is among the most centuries valuable Bulgarian contributions to human philosophy, religion and culture (just like the Slavic alphabet, and as a global influence perhaps even more significant than it), Bogomilism went further than St. Augustine. If for St. Augustine a just war is a war that has a just cause, for the Bogomils even in a just war one cannot fight in an unjust way! As the historian Emil Alexandrov (1934 – 2012) wrote: „On the one hand, the Bogomils allowed the conduct of military actions when they had to defend themselves from evil-doers or conquerors, on the other hand, they declared both unjust and just wars to be criminal in relation to murderers in them ... Those who protect the people from evil-doers and attackers were justified by the Bogomils, but those who, in a just war or military conflict, use murders and tortures not required by the situation, were rightfully condemned by the Bogomil teachings ... War is denied, defense in the event of an attack is allowed, but even in it, the struggle is waged to protect the lives of people and other living beings from various encroachments. The prohibition of killing and torture during defensive wars should be understood as the avoidance of killings not imposed by military necessity“ [73].
  The great insight of Bogomilism helps, in particular, to resolve the dilemma that divides Europe and the United States, known as „Freedom Fighters vs. Terrorists“. In the United States, it is believed that any [especially extreme] violence that pursues political goals can be characterized as terrorism, i.e. the emphasis is much more on the means – on „WHAT is being done?“. But according to this logic, even the genius Bulgarian poet and revolutionary Hristo Botev (1848 – 1876) would fall under the definition of „terrorist“. In Europe, the emphasis is much more on the cause – on „WHY is this being done?“. European thinking assumes that when violence is used to achieve Freedom (from slavery, tyranny, foreign rule, from the imposition of a foreign culture, foreign ideology, foreign religion, foreign identity), then we have FREEDOM FIGHTERS, and if, however, violence is used to create chaos, to destroy the normal course of things, to impose one's power, will, culture, ideology, religion, identity on others, then we have TERRORISTS. Sometimes the dividing line is very thin and can only be crossed with the help of the great insight of Bogomilism: The cause of the Fight for Freedom is just, but even in the Fight for Freedom one must fight in a just way and not (deliberately) destroy the life, health and property of the innocent of people.
  The Old Testament – the first of the two parts (along with the New Testament) of the Christian Bible; includes the ancient Hebrew Scriptures (Tanach); contains 50 books and is the common sacred text of Judaism and Christianity. The books of the Old Testament were written over a period of 1100 years – from the 13th century to the 1st century BC.
  The New Testament – the central written testimony of Christianity, in which the main person represented is Jesus Christ. This is the second part of the Bible (after the Old Testament) and contains 27 books, including the Gospels, the history and activity of the first Christians, letters (epistles) and the book of Revelation.
  According to the Holy Gospel of Matthew: „But I tell you, do not resist an evil person. If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other cheek also“. (Matt. 5:39)
  The Bogomils are religious and ideological followers of the teachings of the Bulgarian priest and spiritual teacher known as Pop Bogomil (10th century), who lived during the reign of Tsar Peter I (Saint Peter, 912 or ca. 900 – 969, Tsar of Bulgaria 927 – 969).
  Realists create legal norms and procedures, the purpose of which is to reduce the scale and consequences of conflicts, to bring conflicts under control, and to make their outcome more just. This is done through the adoption of treaties, conventions and laws, which, on the one hand, exclude certain types of weapons from the arsenal of war (the so-called Hague International Humanitarian Law); on the other hand, they exclude categories of people from the possible victims of war – the sick, the elderly, pregnant women and mothers with children, medical personnel, religious figures; as well as some vital facilities – hospitals, schools, religious temples; and also objects of the critical infrastructure – e.g. dams and nuclear power plants (the so-called Geneva International Humanitarian Law).
  Below are just a few examples of international documents illustrating the normative content of the HAGUE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW:
  • St. Petersburg Declaration renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight (1868);
  • Geneva Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (1925);
  • Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (1963);
  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1968);
  • Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (1972);
  • Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects – Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragments (Protocol I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices Devices (Protocol II); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III) [74];
  • Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (1993);
  • Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction (1997).
  The main content of the GENEVA INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW are the so-called Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Two Additional Protocols of 1977:
  • Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted in 1864, amended and supplemented in 1906, 1929 and 1949);
  • Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted in 1899, amended and supplemented in 1907 and 1949);
  • Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted in 1929, amended and supplemented in 1949);
  • Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted in 1949);
  • First Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts;
  • Second Additional Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts.
  Idealists build institutions as forums for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the exclusion of war from relations between states. These institutions could become the structural support of a collective world order, which through them will be self-sustaining and can gradually exclude power (force) from the instruments of international relations.
  Idealistic projects are the League of Nations, created in 1919, after the end of the First World War (1914 – 1918); and, of course, the United Nations, created in 1945, after the end of World War II (1939 – 1945). The European architecture of organizations, which is based on the European Communities, is also an idealistic project. Its beginning was laid by the founding fathers of a united Europe, Jean Monnet (1988 – 1979) and Robert Schumann (1886 – 1963). Monnet and Schumann realized that Europe, in which each nation selfishly pursues its own interests, would be constantly involved in military conflicts. In the 20th century, Europe became the cause and epicenter of two devastating world wars. It is therefore necessary to seek a different philosophical and practical framework in which the various European countries can best protect their interests and their security needs. Thus, the founding fathers found a magic formula, the basis of which is precisely idealistic – to create a European association in which each country will give up part of its interests and security in order to protect as many of them as possible and to the greatest extent!
  Sometimes they joke that the European architecture of institutions is too large, that it is overloaded with structures and bodies, that these are not interlocking institutions, but interblocking institutions, that there are even institutions for determining the length of a banana and the diameter of an orange. But we must remember that even the most expensive peace is cheaper than the cheapest war. If a problem arises, instead of solving it on the battlefield, it is better to create an institution (or use an already existing one) where the parties to the conflict can sit down and negotiate with each other, seek a peaceful resolution of this conflict. This creates a sense of community and belonging, and a model and culture of joint search for common, mutually beneficial, workable and sustainable solutions is formed.
  Putting security at the center of the analysis, we will introduce two pairs of concepts associated with its study: isolationism – interventionism and pacifism – militarism.
  ⁕ Isolationism is such a security policy in which the system (the state) is satisfied with its own security and seeks to further increase it by limiting its contacts with the outside world (minimum geopolitical presence) in order not to import (implant) for itself from its uncertainty. The system points to the norms, principles and values that guarantee it a high degree of security and prosperity, as a model and example to others, in oder to stimulate them by following these norms, principles and values, to increase their security and prosperity. This policy enhances influence at the expense of impact.
  More as a metaphor than as a concrete illustration of isolationism, we will cite the description that the eminent American expert in international relations Henry Kissinger (1923 – 2023) gives for one of the two opposit approaches of the US to foreign policy – AMERICA AS A BEACON OF DEMOCRACY: „America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind“ [75].
  ⁕ Interventionism is such a security policy in which the system (the state) is satisfied with its own security and seeks to further increase it by increasing the security of the outside world (maximum geopolitical presence) – by exporting (transplanting) security to it. The system imposes on others the norms, principles and values that guarantee it a high degree of security and prosperity, in order to stimulate them by professing these norms, principles and values to increase their security and prosperity. This policy enhances impact at the expense of influence.
  Quoting Henry Kissinger again, we will illustrate interventionism with the other of the two opposite approaches of the US to foreign policy – AMERICA AS A CRUSADER OF DEMOCRACY: „America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world“ [76].
  Isolationism and closed society, and interventionism and open society, should not be confused. Isolationism and interventionism are security policies, while closed society and open society are characteristics of political regime, legal order, and social organization. A closed society may pursue a policy of interventionism, while an open society may pursue a policy of isolationism. Just as one and the same country can simultaneously pursue a policy of isolationism towards one region of the world and a policy of interventionism towards another.
  ⁕ Pacifism is such a security policy in which the system (state) absolutizes peace at the expense of war. It puts the desire for reconciliation and the avoidance of violence at the forefront in conflict management, because it considers peace and non-violence as the most effective means for overcoming contradictions and protecting interests. The main criterion for the system is not the military potential, but the declared principles of the opponent. The main thing is the peaceful resolution of the dispute, and everything else – morality, principles, duty, honesty, honor – is of less importance, because there is nothing more important than the human life, and therefore even one killed is too high a price for victory.
  According to the doctrine of pacifism, war is completely morally unacceptable [77]. Pacifism has deep roots among the intelligentsia and clergy, but often also among cosmopolitan circles with a strong presence in the political elite.
  ⁕ Militarism is such a security policy in which the system (state) absolutizes war at the expense of peace. It puts military power and the use of force at the forefront in conflict management, because it considers war and violence as the most effective means for overcoming contradictions and protecting interests. The main criterion for the system is not the declared principles, but the military potential of the opponent. The main thing is the military resolution of the dispute, and everything else – morals, principles, duty, honesty, honor – is of less importance, because there is nothing more important than the national interests, and therefore even thousands killed are not too high a price for victory.
  According to the doctrine of militarism, war changes people and makes them what they were not before and could not be without it. War makes men Men, turns transforms a mass of members of different social groups into a single society, unites people, gives them a common goal and a common meaning in life [78]. Militarism has deep roots among the military and specialists from the military-industrial complex, but often also among nationalist circles with a strong presence in the political elite.
  It should not be assumed that a state professing pacifism has a symbolic army, nor that a state professing militarism is necessarily a militaristic state.
  Militarists differ from realists primarily in that for them conflict is the GOAL, while for realists it is the MEANS. This difference makes militarists much more likely to resort to war than realists. According to militarists, whenever society has to deal with serious problems or has a serious opponent (adversary, enemy), they are ready to resort to war as the universal solution to problems and the most dignified response to the opponent. On the other hand, militarists always talk about the war in terms of its virtues and patriotism, of its serving some higher purpose – i.e. they place the war in the realm of ethics, while realists consider the war as an instrument and therefore place it in the realm of pragmatics [79].
  Similarly, it can be said that pacifists differ from idealists mainly in that for them cooperation is the GOAL, while for idealists it is the MEANS. This difference makes pacifists much more likely to resort to peace negotiations than idealists. According to pacifists, whenever society has to deal with serious problems or has a serious opponent (adversary, enemy), they are ready to resort to peace negotiations as the universal solution to problems and the most dignified response to the opponent. On the other hand, pacifists always talk about the peaceful resolution of conflict in terms of the main principles of interpersonal and international relations and of the higher goals to which human civilization should strive – i.e. they place the peace, the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the realm of ethics, while idealists consider the peace, the peaceful resolution of conflicts as an instrument, and therefore place them in the realm of pragmatics [80].
  1. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan, Inc., p. 247.
  2. Rheingold, Howard. Smart Mobs. The Next Social Revoliution. Cambridge, MA.: Basuc Books, 2002, p. 42.
  3. Русо, Жан-Жак. Избрани съчинения. Т. 1. С.: Наука и изкуство, 1988, 624 – 625. (in Bulgarian)
  Ruso, Zhan-Zhak. Izbrani suchinenia. T. 1. Sofia: Nauka I izkustvo, 1988, 624 – 625.
   (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. Selected works)
  4. Кулагин, Владимир. Современные теории международных отношений. // Международная жизнь, 1998, №. 1, с. 82. (in Russian)
  Kulagin, Vladimir. Sovremennye teorii mezhdunarodnyh otnosheniy. // Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 1998, №. 1, s. 82.
   (Kulagin, Vladimir. Modern theories of international relations)
  5. Ibid., с. 83.
  6. Herodotus. The Histories. Ney York: Oxford University Press, 1998, 39 – 40.
  7. Ibid., с. 61.
  8. Thucydides. The Peloponnesian War. Ney York: Oxford University Press, 2009, с. 13, 302, 304.
  9. История войн в 3-х томах. Т. 1. Ростов-на-Дону: Феникс, 1997, с. 72. (in Russian)
  Istoria voin v 3-h tomah. T. 1. Rostov-na-Donu: Feniks, 1997, s. 72.
   (History of Vars in 3 volumes. Volume 1)
  10. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Pax Librorum Publishing House, 2009, с. 9, 252 – 255.
  12. История войн …, ibidem.
   (History of Vars in 3 volumes. Volume 1)
  13. Ibidem.
  14. Сундзъ, Удзъ. Трактати за военното изкуство. София: Шамбала, 1995, с. 13. (in Bulgarian)
  Sundzu, Udzu. Traktati za voennoto izkustvo. Sofia: Shambala, 1995, s. 13.
   (Sun Tzu, Wu Qi. Treatises on the Art of War)
  15. Дзъ, Сун. Изкуството на войната. Древни китайски трактати. София: Труд, 2009, с. 78. (in Bulgarian)
  Dzu, Sun. Izkustvoto na voinata. Drevni kitaiski traktati. Sofia: Trud, 2009, s. 78.
   (Tzu, Sun. The art of War. Ancient Chinese Treatises)
  16. Титаренко, М.Л. (гл. ред.). Китайская философия, Энциклопедический Словарь. Москва: РАН Институт Дальнего Востока, Мысль, 1994, с. 285. (in Russian)
  Titarenko, M. L. (gl. red.). Kitaiskaya filosofia, Enciklopedicheskiy Slovar. Moskva: RAN Institut Dalnego Vostoka, Mysl, 1994, s. 285.
  (Titarenko, M.L. (chief ed.). Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedic Dictionary)
  17. Сундзъ, Удзъ. Трактати..., ibidem.
   (Sun Tzu, Wu Qi. Treatises on the Art of War)
  18. Сундзъ, Удзъ. Трактати..., ibid., с. 14.
   (Sun Tzu, Wu Qi. Treatises on the Art of War, p. 14)
  19. История войн …, ibidem.
  20. Цянь, Сыма. Исторические Записки (Ши Цзи), Том VII. Москва: Издательская фирма „Восточная литература“ РАН, 1996, 49 – 50. (in Russian)
  Cian, Syma. Istoricheskie Zapiski (Shi Czi), Tom VII. Moskva: Izsdatelskaya firma „Vostochnaya literatura“, RAN, 1996, 49 – 50.
   (Qian, Sima. Historical Notes (Shi Ji), Volume VII)
  21. Титаренко, М.Л. (гл. ред.). Китайская философия..., ibidem.
   (Titarenko, M.L. (chief ed.). Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedic Dictionary)
  22. Сундзъ, Удзъ. Трактати..., ibid., с. 140.
   (Sun Tzu, Wu Qi. Treatises on the Art of War, p. 140)
  23. Дзъ, Сун. Изкуството на войната. Древни…, ibid., с. 79.
   (Tzu, Sun. The art of War. Ancient Chinese Treatises, p. 79)
  24. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War..., ibid., 1 – 12.
  25. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War..., ibid., 1 – 2.
  26. Титаренко, М.Л. (гл. ред.). Китайская философия..., ibid., с. 285.
   (Titarenko, M.L. (chief ed.). Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedic Dictionary, p. 285)
  27. Разин, Евгений. История военного искусства, XXXI до н.э. — VI н.э. Санкт-Петербург-Москва: Полигон, 1999, 113.
  Razin, Evgeniu. Istoria voennogo iskusstva, XXXI do n.e. – VI n.e. Sankt-Peterburg-Moskva: Poligon, 1999, s. 113.
   (Razin, Evgeniy. History of the art of war, vol. XXXI BC.)
  28. Дзъ, Сун. Изкуството да побеждаваш. София: Хомо Футурус, 1998, с. 16. (in Bulgarian)
  Dzu, Sun. Izkustvoto da pobezhdavash. Sofia: Homo Futurus, 1998, s. 16.
   (Tzu, Sun. The art of winning)
  29. Сундзъ, Удзъ. Трактати..., ibid., 43 – 50.
(Sun Tzu, Wu Qi. Treatises on the Art of War, 43 – 50)
  30. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War, ibid., 1 – 2, 4 – 5, 12 – 13, 43, 50 – 52.
  31. Mommsen, Theodor. The History of Rome, Volume 4, Part 1. Cambridge University Press, 2009, р. 83.
  32. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War, ibid., p. 41.
  33. Сундзъ, Удзъ. Трактати..., ibid., 209 – 217.
  34. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War, ibid., 54 – 55.
  35. Tzu, Sun. The Art of War, ibid., p. 21.
  36. Ралф, Филип Лий, Робърт Е. Ленър, Стендиш Мийчъм, Алън Т. Ууд, Ричард У. Хъл, Едуард Макнал Бърнс. Световните цивилизации. История и култура. Т. 1, София: Абагар, 1982, с. 349. (in Bulgarian)
  Ralf, Filip Liy, Roburt E. Lenar, Stendish Miychum, Alun T. Uud, Richard U. Hul, Eduard Maknal Burns. Svetovnite civilizacii. Istoria i kultura. T. 1, Sofia: Abagar, 1982, s. 349.
   (Ralph, Philip Lee, Robert E. Lehner, Standish Meacham, Alan T. Wood, Richard W. Hull, Edward McNall Burns. World civilizations. History and culture. Volume 1)
  37. Конрад, Н. И. Полибий и Сыма Цянь. Във: Запад и Восток. Статьи. Москва: Главная редакция Восточной литературы Мысль, 1972, 47 – 76. (in Russian)
  Konrad, N. I. Polibiy i Suma Cian. Vuv: Zapad i Vostok. Stati. Moskva: Glavnaia redakcia Vostochnoi literaury Mysl, 1972, 47 – 76.
   (Conrad, N. I. Polybius, and Sima Qian)
  38. Никитина, В. Б., Е. В. Паевская, Л. Д. Позднеева, Д. Т. Редер. Литература древнего Востока. Москва: Издательство Московского Университета, 1962, с. 433. (in Russian)
  Nikitina, V. B., E. V. Paevskaya, L. D. Pozdneeva, D. T. Reder. Literatura drevnego Vostoka. Moskva: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Univesriteta, 1962, s. 433.
   (Nikitina, V. B., E. V. Paevskaya, L. D. Pozdneva, D. T. Reder. Literature of the Ancient East)
  39. Титаренко, М.Л. (гл. ред.). Китайская философия..., ibid., с. 293.
   (Titarenko, M.L. (chief ed.). Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedic Dictionary, p. 293)
  40. Никитина, В. Б., Е. В. Паевская, … Литература..., ibid., с. 434.
   (Nikitina, V. B., E. V. Paevskaya, L. D. Pozdneva, D. T. Reder. Literature of the Ancient East, p. 434)
  41. Титаренко, М.Л. (гл. ред.). Китайская философия..., ibidem.
   (Titarenko, M.L. (chief ed.). Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedic Dictionary)
  42. Ралф, Филип Лий. Робърт Е. Ленър, Световните цивилизации, ibidem.
   (Ralph, Philip Lee, Robert E. Lehner, Standish Meacham, Alan T. Wood, Richard W. Hull, Edward McNall Burns. World civilizations. History and culture. Volume 1)
  43. Титаренко, М.Л. (гл. ред.). Китайская философия..., ibidem.
   (Titarenko, M.L. (chief ed.). Chinese Philosophy, Encyclopedic Dictionary)
  44. Никитина, В. Б., Е. В. Паевская, … Литература..., ibidem.
  (Nikitina, V. B., E. V. Paevskaya, L. D. Pozdneva, D. T. Reder. Literature of the Ancient East)
  45. Никитина, В. Б., Е. В. Паевская, … Литература..., ibidem.
   (Nikitina, V. B., E. V. Paevskaya, L. D. Pozdneva, D. T. Reder. Literature of the Ancient East)
  46. Никитина, В. Б., Е. В. Паевская, … Литература..., ibid., с. 436, 438.
   (Nikitina, V. B., E. V. Paevskaya, L. D. Pozdneva, D. T. Reder. Literature of the Ancient East, p. 436, 438)
  47. Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1976, 281 – 285.
  48. Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince, ibid., p. 281.
  49. Кулагин, Владимир. Современные теории..., ibid., с. 81.
  50. Hobbes, Thomas, William Molesworth (ed.). THE LEVIATHAN., p. 88.
  51. Прохоренко, Ирина. Национальный интерес во внешней политике: проблемы концепции. // Международная жизнь, Nо. 12, 1991, с. 127. (in Russian)
  Prohorenko, Irina. Nacionalniy interes vo vneshnei politike: problem koncepcii. // Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, Nо. 12, 1991, s. 127.
   (Prokhorenko, Irina. National interest in foreign policy: problems concepts)
  52. Караиванова, Пенка. Аналитичната парализа в дисциплината международни отношения. // Международни отношения, 1997, № 3, с. 85. (in Bulgarian)
  Karaivanova, Penka. Anslitichnata paraliza v disciplinata
Mezhdunarodni otnoshenia. // Mezhdunarodni otnoshenia, 1997, № 3, s. 85.
  (Karaivanova, Penka. Analytical paralysis in the discipline of international relations)
  53. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. Fourth Edition. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954, р. 36.
  54. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics…, ibid., р. 25
  55. Прохоренко, Ирина. Национальный интерес..., ibid., 126 – 127.
  56. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History..., ibid., 249 – 250.
  57. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics…, ibid., р. 11.
  58. Ibid., р. 10.
  59. Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History..., ibid., 248.
  60. Ibid., 248 – 250.
  61. Spengler, Oswald. The Decline of the West. Form and Actuality. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927, p. 364.
  62. Kant, Immanuel. Toward Perpetual Peace and Other Writings on Politics, Peace, and History. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006.
  63. Кулагин, Владимир. Современные теории..., ibid., 85 – 86.
(Kulagin, Vladimir. Modern theories of international relations)
  64. Kant, Immanuel. Toward Perpetual Peace…, ibid., 102 – 103.
  65. Вечен мир – Уикипедия ( (in Bulgarian)
  Vechen mir – Yikipedia (
   (Perpetual Peace –
  66. Johnson, James Turner. International Law and the Peaceful Resolution of Interstate Conflicts. In: Vasquez, John A., James Turner Johnson, Sanford Jaffe, Linda Stamato (ed.). Beyond Confrontation. Learning Conflict Resolution in the Post-Cold War Era. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1995, 161 – 162.
  67. Kagan, Robert. Of Paradise and Power. America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Vintage Books, 2003, p. 4.
  68. Ibid., p. 5.
  69. Котляров, И. И. Международное гуманитарное право и его применение в Вооруженных Силах России. // Военная мысль, 1998, № 5, с. 39. (in Russian)
  Kotliarov, I. I. Mezhdunarodnoe gumanitarnoe pravo i ego primenenie v Vooruzhennyh Silah Rossii. // Voennaya mysl, 1998, № 5, s. 39.
   (Kotlyarov, I. I. International humanitarian law and its application in the Russian Armed Forces)
  70. Montesquieu, Charles de, Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, Harold Samuel Stone. The Spirit of the Laws. Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 7.
  71. Elias, Norbert. The Civilizing Process. Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000, 446 – 447.
  72. See also: Johnson, James Turner. International Law..., ibid., 156 – 157.
  73. Александров, Емил. Богомилските схващания за мира и войната. // Международни отношения, 1992, № 7, 47 – 50, 49 – 50. (in Bulgarian)
  Aleksandrov, Emil. Bogomilskite shvashtania za mira i voinata. // Mezhdunarodni otnoshenia, 1992, № 7, 47 – 50, 49 – 50.
   (Alexandrov, Emil. Bogomil's concepts of peace and war)
  74. Тункин, Г. И. (ред.). Международно право. София: Наука и изкуство, 1986, с. 419. (in Bulgarian)
  Tunkin, G. I. (red.). Mezhdunarodno pravo. Sofia: Nauka i izkustvo, 1986, s. 419.
(Tunkin, G. I. (ed.). International law)
  75. Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p. 18.
  76. Ibidem.
  77. Коппитерс, Бруно, Ник Фоушин, Рубен Апресян. Нравственные ограничения войны: проблемы и примеры. Москва: Гардарики, 2002, с. 26. (in Russian)
  Koppiters, Bruno, Nik Foushin, Ryben Apresian. Nraavstvennye ogranichenia voiny: problemu i primery. Moskva: Gardariki, 2002, s. 26.
  (Coppieters, Bruno, Nick Fouchin, Ruben Apresyan. Moral Limits of War: Problems and Examples)
  78. Ibid., s. 23.
  79. Ibid., s. 25.
  80. Iibidem.
  Brief explanation:
  The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.


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