These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
STUDY 27. ON THE FOUR MAIN APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF RISKS AND ON A HYBRID APPROACH APPLICABLE TO BULGARIA
Four main approaches (models) for studying risk (risks) are considered and the possibility of developing and using a hybrid model applicable to Bulgaria and its security is discussed.
The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of four main approaches (models) in the study of risks and the possibility to create and use in science and practice – as a hybrid of these four main approaches (models) – a relevant approach (model) that would be applicable to Bulgaria and its national security:
Николай Слатински. Рискът – новото име на Сигурността. София: Изток-Запад, 2019.
[Nikolay Slatinski. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019].
Nikolay Slatinski. Risk – the new Name of Security. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019 (in Bulgarian)
In the previous Studies, we have repeatedly talked about entering the Risk Society. It is characterized by:
• generation of new and increasingly difficult to manage risks;
• processes of turbulence and chaos;
• strong dynamics;
• accelerated rates of change;
• increasing unpredictability;
• raising level of complexity;
• shortening the time for making decisions;
• serial manufactoring of uncertainties and insecurities.
Explanation:
New risks – these are
(1) risks that existed earlier, but now manifest themselves in a qualitatively new way;
(2) risks that did not exist previously.
Note. Clarifications for which no source is explicitly indicated are based on texts and definitions for them in Wikipedia.
The term „Risk Society“ was coined by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1944 – 2015). When translating his works into Bulgarian, the expression „serially manufactured insecurities“ is used as a characteristic of the Risk Society [1]. The same applies to the translation by the English sociologist Anthony Giddens (1938) [2]. But Beck and Giddens use uncertainty, not insecurity.
‣ Uncertainty means (as well) indeterminacy, vagueness, ambivalence, inaccuracy, diffidence.
‣ Insecurity means (as well) defencelessness, unreliability, instability, dangerous situation.
In our opinion, it is logical to talk [in Bulgarian] about „serially manufactured uncertainties and insecurities“. Because the Risk Society produces (manufactures) a multitude of uncertainties, from which arise an even greater multitude of insecurities, but it also produces a huge amount of insecurities that are not directly related to the uncertainties it produces. The problem is that in the Bulgarian language there is no such direct – strong and meaningful – connection between uncertainty and insecurity as it is in the English language and because of this in the translations into the Bulgarian language „insecurity“ is used for „uncertainty“.
When we talk about the Risk Society, a serious conceptual dilemma immediately arises.
We have consistently pointed out in our Studies that the world is experiencing a dramatic and epic Change that has four leading dimensions, each of which we can speak of as our entry into a new type of society:
• Globalized Society;
• Postmodern Society;
• Network Society;
• Risk Society.
So, on the one hand, Risk Society in Science of Security is one of the four dimensions of the transformation that the world is experiencing, but on the other hand, Ulrich Beck has „reserved“ the concept of „Risk Society“ for the society he analyzed. How to „reconcile“ this conflict, how to overcome this conceptual ambiguity? In fact, a way out of this situation can be found (we will comment on this again later).
• The GENERAL and ABSTRACT concept is RISK SOCIETY, which is one of THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF TRANSFORMATION experienced by our world.
• The PARTICULAR and CONCRETE concept is Ulrich Beck's RISK SOCIETY, which is one of the FOUR APPROACHES (models, analytical tools) FOR STUDYING RISK (as a collection of the huge variety of risks) OR RISKS (as separate concretizations of risk) [3, 4].
Let's move on to the systematization of approaches (models) to the study of risk (risks). They can be grouped into TWO MAIN DIRECTIONS, each consisting of TWO [COMPARATIVELY] AUTONOMOUS APPROACHES (MODELS).
Australian sociologist Deborah Lupton (1963) analyzed three of these four approaches (models) as theoretical perspectives [5]. The British sociologist Gabe Mythen calls them paradigms [6].
♦ THE FIRST MAIN DIRECTION for studying risk is called SUBJECTIVE. In its scientific framework, there are two autonomous approaches (models):
• THE FIRST AUTONOMOUS APPROACH (MODEL) is the CULTURAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL (according to the British anthropologist Mary Douglas (1921 – 2007) and the American political scientist Aaron Wildavsky (1930 – 1993).
Deborah Lupton calls this approach (model) the „Cultural/symbolic“ perspective. We will use the name „CULTURAL/SYMBOLIC“ APPROACH or CS APPROACH.
• THE SECOND AUTONOMOUS APPROACH (MODEL) is the SOCIOLOGICAL (according to Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens).
Deborah Lupton calls this approach (model) the „Risk society“ perspective. We will use the name „RISK SOCIETY“ APPROACH or RS APPROACH.
The first main direction accepts risks and the attitude towards them as internally inherent to society, embedded in its cultural specifics and resulting from its worldview and its activities. Risks in a certain sense are subjectively generated. Society produces its own risks and it is valid that:
AS THE SOCIETY IS, SO ARE THE RISKS.
♦ THE SECOND MAIN DIRECTION for studying risk is called OBJECTIVE. There are also two independent approaches (models) in its scientific framework:
• THE THIRD AUTONOMOUS APPROACH (MODEL) is the MANAGERIAL (in the spirit of the great French philosopher Michel Foucault (1926 – 1984).
Deborah Lupton calls this approach (model) the „Governmentality“ perspective. We will use the name „GOVERNMENTALITY“ APPROACH or GM APPROACH.
Explanation:
Governmentality (from govern, government, governmental; and mentality, mental; in the original French – gouvernementalité [7]) – a neologism coined by Michel Foucault [8].
We are especially indebted to Antoinette Koleva for helping us to delve deeper into the creative pursuits of Michel Foucault and Ulrich Beck (if we have failed in this endeavour, it is our own fault), and also for the invaluable content of a number of translated books published in our country by her publishing house „Kritika i humanizum“ („Criticism and Humanism“, „Критика и хуманизъм“).
Here is what Foucault's translator Antoinette Koleva writes:
„Governability (Upravliaemost, Управляемост) – this is how I translate the neologism gouvernementalité, at first sight a simple combination of gouverner (governing) and mentalité (mentality), which, however, cannot be conveyed through the mechanical compound „governing mentality“, which would be a mistake, including falling into the trap of history of mentalities; openly avoided by Foucault. Since the term, and thus the concept, are central, I bring to the aid of understanding Foucault's description of it, first given in a famous lecture of February 1978:
„By this word „governmentality“ I mean three things. First, by „governmentality“ I understand the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument [the security dispositifs]. Second, by „governmentality“ I understand the tendency, the line of force, that for a long time, and throughout the West, has constantly led towards the pre-eminence over all other types of power – sovereignty, discipline, and so on – of the type of power that we can call „government“ and which has led to the development of a series of specific governmental apparatuses (appareils) on the one hand, [and, on the other]‡ to the development of a series of knowledges (savoirs). Finally, by „governmentality“ I think we should understand the process, or rather, the result of the process by which the state of justice of the Middle Ages became the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and was gradually „governmentalized“ [9, 10].
Explanation:
Dispositif – (legally) the dispositive part of a judgment reflecting what the court orders; apparatus, device, utensil, appliance. Foucault's English translations for „dispositifs [of security]“ use apparatuses.
In the Science of Security, governmentality refers to the nature and style of governance, the strategies and policies, the ways and means by which the state and its institutions manage both the society facing risks and the risks themselves. Here, the appropriate translation of the concept is not literal, but explanatory – „governmental rationality“, and even „management rationality“ [11], although we are not satisfied with such a translation. Perhaps, at least, the concepts of managerial rationality and rational management should be combined to reflect the rational essence of management and the management content of rationality. Not only in essence, but also for brevity, we will use the term governability, taken from Antoineta Koleva, but we will also use the English governmentality (after all, this approach is „named“ after it).
• THE FOURTH AUTONOMOUS APPROACH (MODEL) is the TRANSFORMATIONAL.
This is an approach (model) introduced by us [12]. It can be called the „Adaptive/absorptive“ perspective. We will use the name „ADAPTATIVE-ABSORPTIVE“ APPROACH or AA APPROACH.
In this approach (model), it is about the need for transformations (serious changes) – value and structural – in society, so that it can cope with the risks it faces.
The second main direction accepts risks and the attitude towards them as existing externally to society, located outside it and having a direct and indirect impact on it. Risks in a certain sense are objectively generated. Therefore, the emerging risks affect society and it is valid that:
AS THE RISKS ARE, SO IS THE SOCIETY.
⁕ The first and second autonomous approaches (models) are within the subjective direction. According to them, the production and escalation of risks is a direct or indirect result of the functioning of society, and therefore, in order to be effective, management of risks must take into account its specificities.
> In the first approach (model), the basis of this process are the CULTURAL-ANTHROPOLOGICAL SPECIFICITIES OF THE SOCIETY;
> In the second approach (model), the basis of this process are the STRUCTURAL-SOCIOLOGICAL SPECIFICITIES OF SOCIETY.
⁕ The third and fourth autonomous approaches (models) are within the objective direction. According to them, the functioning of society is a direct or indirect result of occurring risks, and society must adapt to risks, change its management structures, normative and value characteristics, material and human resources, in order to ensure effective management of risks. Management of risks should reflect capabilities of the society.
> In the third approach (model), the basis of this process are the MANAGERIAL-ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE SOCIETY;
> In the fourth approach (model), the basis of this process are the SYSTEMIC-FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES OF THE SOCIETY.
These two main directions and four autonomous approaches (models, perspectives according to Deborah Lupton, paradigms according to Gabe Mythen) can be systematized as follows:
♦ FIRST MAIN DIRECTION – SUBJECTIVE.
• „CULTURAL-SYMBOLIC“ APPROACH or CS APPROACH.
• „RISK SOCIETY“APPROACH or RS APPROACH.
♦ SECOND MAIN DIRECTION – OBJECTIVE.
• „GOVERNMENTALITY“ APPROACH or GM APPROACH.
• „ADAPTATIVE-ABSORPTIVE“ APPROACH or AA APPROACH.
Table 1. Main directions and autonomous approaches (models) in the study of risks
Before examining each of these approaches in detail, we will clarify that the study of the two main directions (subjective and objective) is based on two alternative branches of societal (political, social) knowledge. These are respectively:
● POLITICAL BEHAVIORISM
● POLITICAL INSTITUTIONALISM.
■ The study of the first main direction, the subjective, is based on the scientific research and the thought-logical apparatus of political behaviorism (which for brevity we will call simply behaviorism, not forgetting, of course, that it is a projection and application of behaviorism in the field of political knowledge and political processes in society – its functioning and management).
Here, the complex and probably rather contradictory theory of political behaviorism as a scientific tool will not be developed in its entirety, but only those of its cognitive constructs that are related to Security and Risk will be used.
Explanation:
Behaviorism – a direction in psychology, according to which the object of research is not social consciousness, but social behavior, i.e. the behavior of the individual or society is formed under the influence of external impacts.
Behaviorism (let‘s remind – political behaviorism) is based mainly on SOCIOLOGY and PSYCHOLOGY and is reductionist, value-based and empirical. It studies what is directly observed – the interaction of individuals, communities (groups of individuals, strata, classes, etc.) and society is analyzed. It is not so much the state and its organization as such that is studied, but above all power and the process of construction, use and self-optimization of power. From the interaction of individuals, communities and society, the interaction of organizations (e.g. parties, trade unions, non-governmental structures), institutions (e.g. from executive, legislative and judicial system) and institutes (e.g. morality, law, identity) is derived and described. The main weakness of behaviorism is that with it the interaction of organizations, institutions and institutes is a function mainly and even almost exclusively of the interaction of individuals, communities and society, i.e. organizations, institutions and institutes in their interaction are secondary, and individuals, communities and society are primary. Therefore, it is sometimes said that for behaviorism:
AS THE SOCIETY IS, SO ARE THE INSTITUTIONS.
Explanation:
Reductionism – a methodological principle according to which complex phenomena can be fully explained with the help of laws inherent in their simpler components, absolutizing the principle of reducing the complex to the simple and the higher to the lower (reduction).
Empiricism – obtained through experience, experiment, with direct observation; a direction in knowledge recognizing sensory experience as the source of knowledge. The validity of a theory is based on the evidence obtained through experience (the facts).
That is why we logically arrive at the basic contradiction arising from the theory of behaviorism – since as the society is, so are the institutions, it would follow that as many different societies there are (after all, every society has its own specificity and therefore societies are different), so many institutional frameworks and architectures, so many patterns of institutional interaction will exist. And in fact, life and practice show us that this is not the case – there are so many different Western European societies, but there are so few different institutional arrangements (the choice in main lines is too limited – for example, a monarchy or a republic, a strong president or a strong parliament). And the differences in these slightly different institutional arrangements are increasingly formal and becoming increasingly formal. It could not be said that in terms of deep democratic principles and mechanisms there are fundamental and significant differences (although there are some specifics in functioning) between Sweden (monarchy) and Finland (republic) or between France (presidential republic) and Italy (parliamentary republic).
The place where behaviorism is studied and applied in universities is usually in a faculty or department of political science. It uses methods such as statistical research (e.g. before and during elections), surveys, laboratory experiments, game theory, role-playing, etc.
Behaviorism first describes reality and then constructs it, not first constructs reality and only then describs it. This is an approach of reasoning not from the top down, in order to understand the essence of the processes, but from the BOTTOM UP – based on the empirical data, on the study of the actors and groups. Behaviorism measures what can (relatively easily) be measured (elections, public opinion, public attitudes). But this its ability, in addition to its strength (as is assumed), is also its weakness, because it is important to measure not only what can be (relatively easily) measured, but also (above all) what must be managed, because what cannot be measured it cannot be managed.
A strong influence in behaviorism have the subjective factor, subjectivization which manifest itself in the observation and measurement of processes, of their „sociality“, i.e. their derivation, their placement IN – „in society“. The growing importance of subjectivism is instrumentalized and through the feedback given political attitudes and social preferences are set, „programmed“ and society is „led“ to them through manipulation, PR, propaganda, various social technologies of influence.
In summary, behaviorism is a reductionist, particularist, bottom-up approach in which the main thrust of scientific inquiry is primarily how to govern, and for whom and in whose name it is to be governed. Behaviorism describes and studies reality, and then constructs and explains it.
Explanation:
Particularism – striving for private details, solutions; fragmentation, separation of distinct and separable parts.
■ The study of the second main direction, the objective, is based on scientific research and the thought-logical apparatus of political institutionalism (which for brevity we will call simply institutionalism, without forgetting again, of course, that it is a projection and application of institutionalism in the field of political knowledge and political processes in society – its functioning and management).
Explanation:
Institutionalism – a direction studying the systemic organization of society, the construction, functioning, role of institutions, interaction of actors and groups within and through the existing institutional framework.
And here, the complex and probably rather contradictory theory of political institutionalism as a scientific tool will not be developed in its entirety, but only those of its cognitive constructs, which is related to Security and Risk, will be used.
Institutionalism (we remind again – political institutionalism) is based mainly on PHILOSOPHY and LAW and is holistic, normative and abstract in nature. It studies the conceptually constructed – analyzing the interaction of organizations (e.g. parties, trade unions, non-governmental structures), institutions (e.g. from executive, legislative and judicial system) and institutes (e.g. morality, law, identity). First of all, the state and its organization as such are studied, not so much power and the process of construction, use and self-optimization of power. From the interaction of organizations, institutions and institutes, the interaction of individuals, communities and society is derived and described. The main weakness of institutionalism is that with it the interaction of individuals, communities and society is a function mainly and even almost exclusively of the interaction of organizations, institutions and institutes, i.e. individuals, communities and society in their interaction are secondary, and organizations, institutions and institutes are primary. Therefore, it is sometimes said that for institutionalism:
AS THE INSTITUTIONS ARE, SO IS THE SOCIETY.
Explanation:
Holism – the organism is an organic whole that cannot be reduced to the simple sum of its constituent parts; priority of the whole over its individual parts; a comprehensive approach to objects and phenomena. Holistic – whole, comprehensive.
That is why we logically arrive at the basic contradiction arising from the theory of institutionalism – since as the institutions are, so is the society, it would follow that with the same institutional framework and architecture, with the same model of institutional interaction (for example similarly constructed political systems and similarly enacted political procedures) societies would be the same (similarly organized and functioning). And in fact, life and practice show us that this is not the case – there are so many similar institutional arrangements, but there are so few similar Eastern European societies (the variety is too great – from fairly successful to extremely failed democracies, from very effective to extremely ineffective management). Moreover, the similarities in these somewhat similar Eastern European societies are increasingly formal and becoming more formal. It could not be said that in terms of deep democratic principles and mechanisms, there are fundamental and significant similarities (although there are certain commonalities) between Bulgaria and the Czech Republic (two parliamentary republics, Slavic states; close both in terms of territory – approximately 111,000 km² and 79,000 km² respectively, and in population – 6,878,000 people and 10,510,000 people respectively; they were previously in the same totalitarian socialist and command-administrative system with one-party power exercised by a communist party vassal of the CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union); or between Macedonia and Slovenia (two parliamentary republics, Slavic states; close both in territory – approximately 25,700 km² and 20,300 km² respectively; and in population – 2,065,000 and 2,108,000 people respectively; they were previously located in one and the same country – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; they had a mix of socialist government and a market economy with one-party rule exercised by a communist party that sought to keep the country equally distant from and equally close to the two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union).
The place where institutionalism is studied and applied in universities is usually in a faculty or department of law. It uses explanatory models from the toolbox of the general theory of the state, cultural anthropology, culturology, social psychology, political science, etc.
Institutionalism first constructs reality and then describes it, not first describs reality and only then constructs it. In other words, it is a TOP DOWN reasoning approach to get at the essence of processes, rather than a bottom up approach based on empirical data, on the study of actors and groups. Institutionalism models what can (relatively easily) be modeled (institutions, relations between institutions, procedures by which institutions interact). But this ability of it, in addition to its strength (as is assumed) is also its weakness, inasmuch as it is important to model not only what can (relatively easily) be modeled, but also (above all) that must create an effective mechanism for management, because one cannot create an effective mechanism for management for what cannot be modeled.
The objective factor, objectification, has a strong influence in institutionalism, manifesting itself especially in the study and research of institutions, of their „naturalness“, i.e. their predestination, their placing ABOVE – „above society“. The growing importance of objectivism is universalized and, through the feedback, certain institutional structured and power relationships are set, „programmed“ (import of democracy, for example, on the „Europe requires“ principle) and society is „led“ to them through manipulation, PR, propaganda, various social technologies of influence.
In summary, institutionalism is a holistic, universalist, top-down approach in which the main thrust of scientific inquiry is primarily who should govern and by what and to what ends he should govern. Institutionalism constructs and explains reality, and then describes and studies it.
Explanation:
Universalism – an approach that considers processes and events, objects and subjects comprehensively, holistically, multifaceted.
If we compare BEHAVIORISM (a trend in political thought passing in some dimensions through notable figures such as the ancient Greek philosophers Heraclitus (c. 544 – 483 BC) and Aristotle (c. 384 – 322 BC), the ancient Greek historian Thucydides (c. 455 – c. 397), the Italian political philosopher and thinker Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1527), without them knowing that they were behaviorists) and INSTITUTIONALISM (a trend of political thought passing in some dimensions through notable personalities such as the ancient Greek philosophers Parmenides (c. 540 or 520 BC – c. 450 BC) and Plato (c. 427 – 347 BC), the ancient Greek historian Herodotus (c. 484 – c. 425 BC), the English political philosopher and thinker Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), also without them knowing that they were institutionalists), we can say that from these two initial branches depart the two main trends in political sciences which form radically different approaches, differentiating in their attitude to conflicts between people, communities of people, societies and states.
‣ In behaviorism, the leading solution of the conflict is POLITICAL, i.e. some degree of agreement or perhaps above all compromise between the parties is sought. Such a decision is acceptable, but could have difficulties with how legitimate it is. The best way is to find a political solution and then to „clothe“ it in legal norms. The very fact that, although both parties are looking for a compromise (political solution), they are thinking – in advance and in the process of searching for a political solution – about its possible legitimacy (the legal solution), suggests at least some easing of finding such a solution, which in addition to being political (politically acceptable) is also legal (legally legitimate)
‣ In institutionalism, the leading solution of the conflict is LEGAL, according to the existing norms, and therefore it practically does not take into account whether both parties are satisfied with the solution – yes, it is legitimate, but it could have difficulties with how acceptable it is (for both parties or for one of them).
‣ In its politological evolution, BEHAVIORISM (political behaviorism) developed through STRUCTURAL FUNCTIONALISM to modern POLITICAL SYSTEMOLOGY (SYSTEM POLITOLOGY).
‣ In its politological evolution, INSTITUTIONALISM (political institutionalism) developed through THEORY OF RATIONAL CHOICE to modern (POLITICAL) NEO-INSTITUTIONALISM.
Explanation:
Structural functionalism – an approach in sociology, considering society as a system dynamically striving for social order with its structure and mechanisms of interaction of its structural elements, each of which has its own function.
Systemology - a field of science studying the systematicity, organization and self-organization of objects, processes and phenomena; science of systems. Also used are „general systems theory“, „systems approach“, „systems analysis“.
The theory of rational choice – according to this theory, subjects (individuals, communities, corporations, societies) make rational decisions, consistent with their available resources, based on available information, corresponding to their optimal strategy and to the maximum extent to the goals they have set for themselves.
Neo-institutionalism (or New Institutional Theory) – it considers the new role of institutions, taking into account the dynamics of societies, the role of social, psychological and cultural factors in the behavior of individuals and groups of individuals.
Table 2. Characteristic features of political behaviorism and political institutionalism in the study of risks
Let us now begin the examination of the four autonomous approaches (models).
◙ The study of the two autonomous approaches belonging to the first main direction, the subjective one, is based, as we have already emphasized, on scientific research and the thought-logical apparatus of political behaviorism.
♦ The first two approaches (models) are within the subjective direction and it can be said about them (Table 1):
AS THE SOCIETY IS, SO ARE THE RISKS.
„CULTURAL-SYMBOLIC“ OR CS APPROACH
In this approach (model), in the basis of risk management are the cultural-anthropological specificities of society.
In the logic of the tradition laid down by the studies of Mary Douglas [13], risks and the attitude towards them serve as another condition for the construction of cultural boundaries between individuals, between social groups in a community, as well as between different communities. Risk (of contagion, of contamination) is dangerous above all through the threat it poses to social order, and because it is perceived mainly culturally, it serves to further differentiate between Me and the Other, between Us and the Others. Risk triggers culturally conditioned responses based on culturally conditioned perceptions, and therefore its assessment is accompanied by concepts such as „shame“, „guilt“, „belief“, as well as (especially to a large extent) „sin“ and „taboo“.
Mary Douglas emphasizes, however, that risk is radically opposed in its cultural meaning to sin and taboo. Being „at risk“ means to be a being against whom society is wrong. The individual feels weak because others do him harm, i.e. he is vulnerable because of the „bad behavior“ of society. And being „in sin“ or being „under taboo“ means that you are a real or potential cause of harm to society, i.e. society is vulnerable to the „bad behavior“ of the individual. „The discourse in the concepts of sin and taboo is aimed at the conservation of traditional solidarity, while the discourse around risk implies its decentralization and the disappearance of social divisions“ [14].
At the same time, the Other or the Others, his or their behaviors, norms and institutions are perceived through the lens of risk. They are dangerous mainly with the possibility of endangering the physical or symbolic body to which we belong. Whether something is a risk depends not so much on its factual nature as a risk, but on how we formulate and understand it in terms of its impact on our values and the established social order. The way we will react when a risk occurs is also determined not so much by the objective content of the risk, but above all by our subjective assessment of it. That there is a risk is the result of our behavior going against the generally accepted norms and going beyond the limitations imposed on us by our identity.
Risk is first of all a manifestation of disturbed societality, and only then – of external influence. That is why it is important not only to respond to the risk through our legal and technological resources, but also to give a moral and ethical assessment of the actions (to condemn them morally) that led to the materialization of the risk. We will not reduce the risk level of our society by acting ad hoc, treating each risk situation by itself, one by one or all at once, but by first changing ourselves and the way we live, bringing ourselves and this way of life to the cultural imperatives embedded in our community and representing our social „Self“. In other words, the risks and the answers we will give them are determined first culturally, and only then scientifically, technologically, organizationally and resourcefully.
In sum, for Mary Douglas, danger in pre-modern societies is seen in the context of taboo and as an accusation against and retribution for the offending individual – this is what makes individuals comply with the norms and restrictions imposed on them by the community, and thus the community reinsures itself and protects against the „badly behaved“ individual. And in modern societies danger is seen in the context of risk, but already as an accusation against and retribution for the wrongdoing community – this is precisely what makes the community to value the rights and interests of the individual, and thus he protects himself from the „badly behaving“ community [15].
Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky examine culturally conditioned responses to risk in societies and organizations through a specific „grid-group“ model. This model is represented by
two coordinate system with TWO AXES:
‣ the horizontal axis is „Group“ – the boundary in which the community is – shows the cohesion in the group; and
‣ the vertical axis is „Grid“ – the regulation of relations within the group, i.e. the coercion;
and accordingly with FOUR FIELDS, each of which symbolizes a specific type of social organization [16, 17].
■ The horizontal axis „Group“ differentiates by the relationship
„COLLECTIVISM – INDIVIDUALISM“
the degree of cohesion (interdependence, coherence of behavior) of individuals.
In other words, in this model the group is related to the degree of group ethos. The individual is included in the group by obeying regulations, rules and requirements, i.e. with pressure, coercion, lack of choice, accepting the demands of the group.
▪ Moving RIGHT along the horizontal axis (i.e. increasing group cohesion) means:
› increasing the individual's sense of belonging to the group (collectivism);
› increasing his dependence on the influence and impact on him of other members of the group; and
› increasing the difference, the distinction between Us in the group and They outside it.
▪ Moving LEFT on the horizontal axis (i.e., decreasing group cohesion) means:
› decreasing of the individual's sense of belonging to the group (individualism);
› decreasing his dependence on the influence and impact on him of other members of the group; and
› decreasing the difference, the distinction between Us in the group and They outside it.
For the horizontal dimension „Group“ it is important to have a clear boundary between the group and other groups, between the group and society, between the group and the outside world. The group needs identification markers (they can be memory, culture, faith, language, myths, complexes, fears) that at any moment help it recognize itself and (self)convince itself that in its actions and activities, in its interactions with other groups and with the outside world, it does not change itself, it remains true to itself.
Explanation:
Ethos – the disposition, character, or fundamental values that are specific to a particular person, community, people, culture, or movement.
■ The vertical axis „Grid“ differentiates by the ratio
„POWERNESS – POWERLESSNESS“
the degree of structuring (normativity, subordination to general rules) of social relations.
In other words, the grid (raster) takes into account the presence of other constraints and expectations that shape community relations. The idea is that in every sustainable group (community) there is some arrangement and regulation of the positions of the individuals entering the group, and this is exactly what social classification is.
▪ At the highest values along the vertical axis, i.e. moving UP it (increasing subordination in the group), corresponds to an increasingly strong coherence and a more complete system of social classification that predetermines, prescribes individual choice, and strictly controls the interaction between individuals in the group (powerness).
▪ At the lowest values along the vertical axis, i.e. moving DOWN it (decreasing subordination in the group) corresponds to ever more complete confusion, indeterminacy, ever greater lack of social classification, and this introduces too much autonomy, makes individual choice extremely unpredictable, and does not exert even minimal control over interaction between individuals in the group (powerlessness).
For the vertical dimension „Grid“, the individual's position changes from maximum regulation of and strongest constraints on their behavior (the highest value on the axis) to maximum freedom of and most significant choices of behavior (the lowest value on the axis). The maximum meaning can be illustrated by the army order, and the minimum – by the complete freedom of life without obligations and regulation.
The distribution along the axes „GRID – GROUP“ allows to clearly show and to understand in depth the relationship of the cultural specifics and norms of the group with the perception and analysis of risk, its causes, consequences and forms of control.
Patterns of relations between group members depending on the degree of expressiveness of the „grid-group“ properties (rigid vs. indeterminate structure of positions – full vs. partial subordination to group regulation) represent four types of lifestyle and social relations, called by Mary Douglas „cultures“:
▬ INDIVIDUALISTIC CULTURE (Illustration 1. MARKET – low group, low grid); SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „A“.
▬ FATALIST CULTURE (Illustration 1. ISOLATION – low group, high grid); SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „B“.
▬ HIERARCHICAL CULTURE (Illustration 1. HIERARCHY – high group, high grid); SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „C“.
▬ EGALITARIAN (or SECTARIAN) CULTURE (Illustration 1. VOLUNTARY GROUP – high group, low grid); SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „D“.
These cultures are characterized by a well-defined worldview, including a well-defined perception of and attitude to risk. The more given communities (organizations) are „high-group“ (strong cohesion) and „high-grid“ (strong subordination), the more and stronger they trust institutions in finding answers to risk. And the more given communities (organizations) are „low-group“ (weak cohesion) and „low-grid“ (weak subordination), the more and stronger they prefer approaches of self-regulation and self-management of risk [18, 19, 20, 21, 22].
Illustration 1. Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's Grid-Group model [23]
Let's see the attitudes and approaches to risk of each of these four cultures:
▬ SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „A“ (low-group, low-grid), individualistic culture, highly oriented towards individualism and powerlessness. Includes active individualists, enterprising people. With it, we have weak structuring and weak cohesion (weak structural coercion, weak group commitment), which are typical „market“ type relations. For representatives of this culture, risk is primarily related to individual decisions, opportunities and responsibilities, and therefore they perceive risk-taking as an opportunity to succeed in a competitive market and pursue their personal goals. They believe in market forces and that the market will eventually put everything in its place, so they are in favor of self-regulating of risks. They are convinced that taking risks brings not only dangers but also benefits, so they are against external constraints on behavior, trusting individuals more than organizations. They are less concerned with issues of fairness and would like the government to refrain from extensive regulatory or risk management efforts. Characteristic here is the fear of losing one's own positions and resources, which can lead to the impossibility of leading an independent game in the market. Threats to the system of interactions of relatively autonomous individuals are seen by it as extremely significant.
▬ SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „B“ (low-group, high-grid), fatalistic culture (atomized obedience), highly oriented towards individualism and powerness. It includes isolated (restricted in their behavior, even marginalized) individuals. With it, we have strong structuring and weak cohesion (strong structural coercion, weak group commitment), which are characteristic of „isolation“ type relationships. Inherent in this culture is the perception of short-term risks, the belief in luck and fate in relation to risk, and that one has little control over processes and events leading to risks. These people believe in hierarchy in principle, but do not identify with the hierarchy to which they belong; they trust only themselves, are often confused about rick problems, and are likely to take high risks for themselves, but are averse to any risk they feel is imposed upon them. What happens to us in the future is not the result of our choices. Life is a lottery – some will succeed more and others – less, and therefore they often cannot connect the harm to a specific cause.
▬ SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „C“ (high-group, high-grid), a hierarchical culture oriented to the highest degree towards collectivism and powerness. It includes individuals who are vertically hierarchically managed and horizontally cohesive in their group relations, who believe in the effectiveness of organizational skills and practices in relation to the problems being solved when there is a strict procedure for the functioning of its management. In this culture, we have a strong structuring and a strong cohesion (strong structural coercion, strong group commitment) that are characteristic of „hierarchy“ type relationships. Inherent to this culture is respect for and obedience to authority, compliance with group norms, excessive stress from risks and exaggerated fear of processes and phenomena that are a threat to the existing social order – they can be both internal (violation of the law) and and external (war). The perception of risk is heavily influenced by tradition and by the bodies and organizations that are relied upon to solve emerging problems, and the correctness of decisions is determined by the position of power held. The main tool for risk management are rules and instructions. Rules and procedures are relied upon to deal with uncertainty and there is no cause for concern as long as the risks are managed by a competent institution and coping strategies are provided for each critical case.
▬ SOCIAL ORGANIZATION „D“ (high-group, low-grid), egalitarian culture (or sectarian culture), highly oriented towards collectivism and powerlessness. It includes minimally differentiated internally and voluntarily created communities with a strong identification with the group (for example, a religious association), in other words it is characterized by a low hierarchy, but with a highly developed sense of group cohesion and solidarity. With it, we have weak structuring and strong cohesion (weak structural coercion, strong group commitment), which are characteristic of „voluntary group“ type relationships. This (egalitarian) culture emphasizes cooperation and equality rather than competition and freedom. For it, the following are common: blaming external forces and external people for the risks; distrust of externally imposed norms; support for social equality and the active participation of all in countering risks; the notion of an unpreventable global threat that will materialize in the future. Such a belief is functional as maintaining a sectarian social context, as it is an external evil that causes people to interact and participate in the work of the community; but it is also a motive for demarcating the boundary between the community and the outside world. People are concerned about fairness. When faced with risks, they focus on the long-term effects of human activity and are more likely to forgo an activity (even if they perceive it as beneficial) than to take a risk and rely on chance. The emphasis is on the negative consequences of modern technologies, which symbolize social differences, the division of labor and the distribution of wealth. For example, pollution of nature and ecological risks to the environment are among the main concerns of representatives of this culture [24, 25, 26, 27].
Mary Douglas attributes to each of the four cultures an inherent cosmology, e.g. a set of categories limiting individual consciousness, „ultimate justifying ideas that are commonly referred to as part of the natural order, but which are not natural but are products of social interaction“ [28]. In Table 3, the corresponding cosmologies characteristic of individual cultures are briefly systematized.
Table 3. Cosmologies inherent in the four cultures according to the classification of Mary Douglas [29]
Along with these four groups (cultures) – individualistic („entrepreneurs“), fatalistic („atomized or stratified individuals“), hierarchical („bureaucrats“) and egalitarian („egalitarians“), some authors separate a fifth group (culture) of „autonomous individuals“ – a hybrid group that is located at the center of the „grid-group“ scheme and consists of „self-centred hermits and short-term risk evaluators“ who can be seen as „potential mediators in risk conflicts, since they build multiple alliances to the four other groups and believe in hierarchy only if they can relate the authority to superior performance or knowledge“ [30, 31].
Illustration 2. The attitude to risk in the context of cultural categories (models) [32]
For the „CULTURAL-SYMBOLIC“ APPROACH (model) the thesis applies:
AS THE SOCIETY IS, SO ARE THE RISKS.
For this approach (model), the cultural-anthropological specificities of the society are important and, as we have seen here, it is the cultural, identity, value characteristics of each society that have a key, determining influence both on the risks that this society generates, and on the ways in which it confronts risks, manages them and minimizes their consequences.
„RISK SOCIETY“ ИЛИ RS APPROACH
In this approach (model), the basis of risk management are the structural-sociological specificities of society.
Researchers working within this model believe that:
→ as in the 19th century, when modernization dissolved the ossified agrarian society [33], the pre-industrial society gradually gave way to the industrial society;
→ thus, at the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the industrial society (which reached its peak in the first two thirds of the 20th century) gradually gave way to the risk society.
Pre-industrial society is defined as a traditional society (a society of tradition); the industrial society is called FIRST MODERNITY, and the risk society – SECOND MODERNITY.
Ulrich Beck argues that this is not a question of postmodernity but of a second modernity, and that the reflexive modernization inherent in this second modernity means not less but more modernity – „a modernity radicalized against the paths and categories of the classical industrial setting“ [34].
The following clarification is extremely necessary here.
Until now, we have repeatedly pointed out that when talking about the transformation that our world is experiencing, one of its dimensions is the advent of the Postmodern Society, coming in place of the Modern Society.
An alternative concept is precisely that of distinguishing two phases of modernity, between which there are no completely antagonistic qualitative differences:
• the first – early, low, reflective modernity;
• the second – late, high, reflexive modernity.
Explanation:
Reflective – prone to reflection, to self-analysis; reflexive – unconscious, involuntary, instinctive, automatic [35].
Reflexivity – a reaction, an action carried out by the nervous system in response to an external influence. Reflectivity follows from reflective. If reflectivity has a direction from outside to inside, then reflexivity – from inside to outside [36].
Late modernity is seen as the result of the development of modernity, of the accumulation of changes that greatly reinforce the typical, normal features of modernity [37]. Representatives of this view are Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, the American sociologist Scott Lash (1945), the British sociologist John Urry (1946 – 2016) and others. They believe that nowadays the era of the first modernity, i.e. reflective modernity, is ending and the era of the second modernity, i.e. reflexive modernity begins. For Scott Lash, „the new type of reflexivity is more related to reflex (reflexion) than to reasoning (reflection) – i.e. it may be unconscious“. And according to the American sociologist Harold Garfinkle (1917 – 2011), thought or knowledge (theory, method) is not „reflective“ but „reflexive“. Thus, it does not have the distance of reasoning, but is „embodied“ in actions and expressions“ [38]. John Urry, for his part, describes the change „as the shift from social role in the first modernity to social network in the second“ [39].
• Reflective modernity begins with the New Age.
Explanation:
New Age (Modern Times, Modern History) – a period in the history of mankind between the Middle Ages (5th century – beginning of the 16th century) and the Newest Age (from the beginning of the 20th century).
Reflective modernity is characterized by the predominance of industrialism, by complex and static social structures, by the beginning of the transformation of man into an individual, i.e. with the emerging and manifesting human individuality – „individuality first in the enlightened sense (of the autonomous and responsible individual), and then also in the mass sense (of the individual as a man from the mass)“ [40]. Society is seen as a simple, static, closed linear system, steadily functioning (trying to function) around certain equilibrium points, striving to maintain order and having as its main goal its own reproduction; above all, external processes and external forces for the system can take it out of its equilibrium and cause changes in it – in its structure or functions. Social reflectivity is understood as „involuntary and imperceptible confrontation of society with the results of its development, with the risks and dangers generated by the process of modernization“ [41]. In this modernity, the individual is reflective, oriented to his relation to the object, to objective knowledge [42]. The choice that the individual makes is linear, limited by the traditions, structures, norms and values of the society and communities to which he belongs and which he interprets almost literally, i.e. perceives them primarily and mainly in their sense of being predetermined and eternal, not subject to rejection and change, in other words this interpretation [43] – and there is undoubtedly an interpretation after all – is very close to the reflection, because the individual looks in their mirror and sees himself precisely in and through the image that this mirror „returns“ to him. The individual is what traditions, structures, norms and values prescribe him to be; his ideas and understandings are sustainable, principled, rational. Reflectivity imposes a duality of subject and object, the subjection of the known object to the knowing subject, and the idea of certain and objective knowledge.
• Reflexive modernity began in the West in the last third of the 20th century. It coincides with the post-industrial era and globalization and is characterized not by static structures but by dynamic processes, „flows“. Society is seen as a complex, dynamic, open non-linear system in which non-equilibrium states are invariably inherent and which strives out of chaos to give birth to another, more efficient order of its own. The disequilibrium and change of the system structure and functions are the result not so much of external, but, as a rule, of internal processes and internal forces in the system and through various manifestations of feedback, which undoubtedly affects separate individuals, therefore individualization here is at the same time a systemic destabilization. Such a system cannot simply reproduce itself, remaining unchanged – it changes continuously, in it the processes of reproduction and change are inextricably linked [44]. This type of non-linearity is at the heart of individualization in the second modernity. It breaks with the linear individualism of the first modernity.
In reflexive modernity, society thinks about itself, it analyzes itself and criticizes itself [45]. As Deborah Lupton explains: „Reflexive modernization contains two phases. The first (the reflex stage) is part of the automatic transition from industrial to risk society, where risks are produced as part of the processes of modernization but are not yet the subject of sustained public or personal debate or political conflict. The second (the reflection stage) involves industrial society coming to see itself as a risk society, with the growing realization of the dangers involved in modernity which then calls into question the structures of society. Reflexive modernization, therefore, is: the combination of reflex and reflections which, as long as the catastrophe itself fails to materialise, can set industrial modernity on the path to self-criticism and selftransformation. Reflexive modernisation contains both elements: the reflex-like threat to industrial society’s own foundations through a successful further modernisation which is blind to dangers, and the growth of awareness, the reflection on this situation“ [46].
For Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, reflexive modernization is essentially connected – and so it is in accordance with the literal meaning of this word – with knowledge (knowledge in the sense of reflection) about the foundations, consequences and problems of modernization processes, and it is precisely in this way that one speaks for reflection in the narrow sense of the word.
For Ulrich Beck – although at first glance it contradicts the literal meaning of the word – reflexive modernization is primarily the result of the unintended consequences of modernization, and in this case we are talking about reflexivity of modernization in the broad sense of the word, because reflexivity, in addition to reflection, knowledge, also includes the idea of reflex – in the sense of effect or of a preventive effect of ignorance [47].
In reflexive modernity, the role and functions of institutions (e.g. the state) and institutes (e.g. the family) classical for the preceding modernity are weakened, religion is confined to the personal, intimate sphere, and ideologies from powerful tools for mass social mobilization and self-identification are transformed into inter-party distinctions and internal party specifics. The individual in this modernity is reflexive. Social reflexivity is understood as knowledge and awareness of the processes taking place in society, it is continuous (self)learning, in which doubt and a critical attitude to what is happening are of primary importance [48]. Of course, reflexion, although it preserves some features of traditionalism, takes more and more the character of reproduction of the social system itself and is based on scientific knowledge and on everyday, practical knowledge, as well as on the awareness of the incompleteness of knowledge (it is increasingly indefinite, fuzzy, contradictory and probabilistic) and of ignorance. In this modernity, the Cartesian and Kantian dualism of the subject and the object, in which the known object is subordinate to the knowing subject and the idea of certain and objective knowledge is fundamental, is replaced by what Beck calls „the intentionality of knowledge in the second modernity“.
Because the individual is forced to make many choices at high speed without existing patterns, he acts by reflex and as an endless producer of indefinite and immediate reflexes: various deals, networks, alliances are constantly constructed, combined, recombined. As a result, we have individualization of self-definitions, self-conscious fictitious boundaries, conflicts between these boundaries, as well as institutional and individual difficulties in coordinating the multiplicity of networks and boundaries of the subject. The subject becomes a quasi-subject that determines its own limits and is the result of them. Self and society develop in tandem through self-organizing, self-selected activities. Ambivalence, contradiction and the internalization of uncertainty are therefore the hallmarks of reflexive modernization [49, 50, 51].
Explanation:
Cartesianism – teaching of the French philosopher, mathematician and physicist René Descartes (1596 – 1650), according to which philosophy must derive its propositions from abstract reliable truths, which are reached by questioning all knowledge because it is received through the senses, who deceive us.
Kantianism – a system of critical philosophy developed by the prominent German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), as well as other philosophical systems that arose under the influence of his ideas; a collection of studies with Kant's works as a starting point. It is not a unified school and is characterized by its polemic regarding Kant's theories.
Ambivalence – a state of the subject who, in a given situation and at the same time, experiences contradictory feelings.
It is not for nothing that Ulrich Beck talks about the complex and contradictory paradox: how to secure certainty and security through knowledge of the future in the face of uncertainty as the basic state of human knowledge [52].
In reflexive modernity, the autonomous and mass individual begins to transform into an individual whose connection with the past is thinning and whose behavior is less and less influenced by traditions; he does not feel the support and stability of the structures of the industrial age; he begins to lose touch with and feel alienated from the norms of society, as a result of which his isolation deepens and he falls into a state of anomie. That is why the individual is reflexive, i.e. his consciousness is oriented towards making a choice (but also a choice to make or not to make a choice) corresponding to his inclinations and preferences. The choice that the individual makes is non-linear, loosely limited by the traditions and structures, norms and values of the society and communities to which he belongs. His ideas and understandings are mobile, situational, irrational [53].
If in reflectivity we had a reflection of the impact of traditions and structures, norms and values on the life and choices of the individual, here we have their continuous interpretation and re-interpretation by the individual, i.e. reflexivity is seen as a systematic reflexive application of knowledge to the conditions of reproduction of the social system, leading to changes in the conditions to which it is applied. Reflectivity is a one-way connection system → individuals and is a condition for the immutability of the social system, and reflexivity is a two-way connection system ↔ individuals and is a condition for the reproduction of the social system [54].
Explanation:
Anomie – a social condition defined by the eradication or destruction of any moral values, standards or guidelines that people should follow. It is believed that anomie likely develops as a result of conflicting belief systems and causes a breakdown in social ties between the individual and the community.
The German sociologist Ortwin Rren (1951) thus summarizes the following developments characteristic of the transition from reflective to reflexive modernity:
„• Individualization of lifestyles and public careers. Individuals have more options available to them than ever before; but they lack social orientation and ontological certainty when faced with behavioral or moral dilemmas.
• Pluralization of knowledge camps and values orientations. Contemporary societies are characterized by parallel systems of competing knowledge claims, moral judgement codes and behavioural orientations.
• Pluralization of fields of knowledge and value orientations. Modern societies are characterized by parallel systems of competing knowledge claims, codes of moral judgment, and behavioral orientations.
• Lack of overarching objectives and goals. All collective actions are challenged as being interest-driven or incongruent with somebody’s beliefs, values or convictions. This leads to the need for more legitimization; but there is hardly any reservoir for gaining legitimacy.
• Dominance of negative side effects. Most collective (and well-intended) actions lead to unintended negative consequences that often surpass the intended [p. 27] benefits. Most citizens are, therefore, sceptical about the promises of collective actions as they expect negative side effects“ [55].
Explanation:
Ontology – study of the general foundations and principles of existence and reality, existing and being, their structure, basic categories and regularities, how they relate to each other.
„His“ Risk Society, Ulrich Beck sees (and defines) precisely as a society of reflexive modernity and, accordingly, as a set of:
• certain architecture of institutions and organizations;
• certain relations: power – society, public sector – private sector, between different classes and layers;
• certain emerging or manifesting in a new way phenomena – individualization (at the personal level) and fragmentation (at the societal level), qualitative at the expense of quantitative impacts and consequences, replacement of the non-democratic (non-egalitarian) distribution of goods with a democratic (universal) distribution of damages from poorly managed risks, etc.
• certain conditions – political, economic, ecological, social, cultural, etc., but mostly technological, which – all, in their complex and integrative totality – change to a great extent, but not radically or with a minimum of radicality, the already existing for long years, if not more than for two centuries of society – the industrial one.
In the transition from the first (early) modernity to the second (late) modernity, and more precisely in the transition from the late industrial society to the risk society [56], due to the growing consumption (consumer society [57]) and the growing arsenal of technologies, society produces risks of ever greater impact and ever greater scope. Their impact is taking on the catastrophic potential, and their scope is increasingly globalized. In the ongoing transition to catastrophic and globalizing risks, society's abilities to identify, analyze, assess and manage these risks lag behind the scale of their manifestations.
The theory of reflexive modernity is based on the understanding that the processes of modernization no longer produce only „goods“ (employment, income, health care, education, living standards, prosperity) from which we feel benefited, which are „closed“ within borders of the nation-state and whose fair distribution we strive for, but also „bads“, (environmental pollution, climate change, unemployment, nuclear radiation, financial crises, family breakdown) by which we feel threatened, and in addition most of them can neither be „closed“ within the borders of the state, nor limited in time, and whose impact we seek to avoid.
While until recently the key structures of early modernity (government, industry, corporations, science, medicine, etc.) were producers of goods and benefits, creating a sense of stability and security, today, in late modernity, they are the main producers of risks, insecurities and uncertainties. In other words, logic is based not on the possession (of goods) but on the avoidance (of bads) [58]. Not only for this reason, but in direct relation to it, risks are no longer seen as malevolent effects of fate or higher forces, but as a consequence of ineffective management and out-of-control complex technologies with which it is increasingly closely associated the life of the state and society. At the same time, the trend of individualization is increasing, that is, people's self-awareness as active citizens, as rational individuals who can be responsible for their life strategies and make choices, make decisions related to the implementation of these strategies [59].
And if the first modernity was centered around the nation-state, then the second modernity could not be based on the nation-state alone. In it, the until recently considered inseparable connection between society and the (national) state has been torn almost irreparably, and a change in meaning is inevitable, a rethinking is necessary, even a reformulation and – why not – a renegotiation of the content of such key constituents of the relationship and the place of the individual in society and the state – such as genealogy, family, biography, career, role [60].
The new risks of the transition from the first to the second modernity pass through (and beyond!) national borders and thus begin to undermine them. The national, as the foundation of the first modernity, begins to compete with and even be displaced by the inter-, trans-, supra-national. It calls into question everything about traditional affiliations and loyalties to state and society. Until recently condemned as a negative phenomenon and even as treason to the fatherland, cosmopolitanism became a competitor, sometimes, if not more often, a more adequate competitor to nationalism. Undoubtedly, such a development is not accepted unequivocally, even very often it is accepted extremely negatively and is met with aggressive denial; nationalism fights hard in its retreat, and this, as we see, in many cases makes it much more populist, more demagogic, more radical and even more chauvinistic.
The first modernity can be called „knowledge society“. In this sense, the second modernity is a non-knowledge society. The second modernity „cannot be overcome by more and better knowledge, more and better science; rather precisely the opposite holds: it is the product of more and better science. Non-knowledge rules in the world risk society. Hence, living in the milieu of manufactured nonknowing means seeking unknown answers to questions that nobody can clearly formulate“ [61].
The concept of risk is directly related to the theory of reflexive modernization. According to Ulrich Beck, risk can be defined „as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself“. According to Beck, „risks, as opposed to older dangers, are consequences which relate to the threatening force of modernization and to its globalization of doubt. They are politically reflexive“ [62].
Let's explain in more detail the concept of „manufactured uncertainties“ used by Beck and Giddens, key to the Risk Society, which to one degree or another oppose the modern concept of risk and calculability – the calculability of the frequency and consequences of various events.
According to Ulrich Beck, in the Risk Society we have three different types of „future insecurity“ – threats, risks and manufactured uncertainties.
• THREATS are the pre-industrial „blind accidents, no matter how large-scale and destructive“, which continue to be perceived as strokes of fate, are mainly associated with natural and other disasters (e.g. epidemics, plague, drought, famine, fires, wars) and other phenomena or processes that are external to society and are attributed to „another“ – to gods, demons or nature, i.e. „they are directed against gods or against God, they have, simply put, a „religious motivation“ and are not – like industrial risks – politically charged“ [63].
• RISKS imply human choices, human actions and technologies, decisions of individuals, companies, state institutions, corporate leaders – man-made hazards (e.g. smoking, drinking and occupational accidents) with political responsibility and accountability; they are engaged with and directed to the future as an „extended present“, are associated with calculable uncertainties and can be defined with statistical precision in terms of probabilistic calculus and reimbursable with the instruments of insurance and money compensations.
• MANUFACTURED UNCERTAINTIES are coming to the fore, today is their hour. They cannot be limited in time and space, they are dependent on human decisions, they are created by society itself, they are inherent (immanent) to it, they arose from it and affect it, thereby externalizing themselves). They are impossible for external application, „collectively imposed and thus individually unavoidable; their perceptions break with the past, break with experienced risks and institutionalized routines; they are incalculable, uncontrollable and in the final analysis no longer (privately) insurable (climate change, for example)“. The manufactured uncertainties strongly affect the innovative branches of science – human genetics, reproductive medicine, nanotechnologies, etc., because there the rates of development, unpredictable consequences and entry into unknown areas hide the impossibility of predicting all the consequences [64, 65].
Explanation:
Externalization – a process in which an object from the internal world, i.e. an object internal to the system is projected onto an object from the outside world, i.e. on an object external to the system. The opposite process is called internalization, roughly – internalization.
We are entering a world, writes Ulrich Beck anxiously, which „has to make decisions under the conditions of manufactured uncertainty and in which the institutionalized mechanisms for coping with uncertainty can no longer meet these challenges... The victory of science once again places upon us the burden of making fateful decisions that may affect our very survival , but which have no relevant grounds in knowledge. That is why it is not about risk, but about uncertainty... Mass-produced uncertainty means a mixture of risk, more knowledge, more unawareness and reflexivity, and therefore a new type of risk“ [67, 68].
Anthony Giddens, for his part, talks about manufactured risks:
„Manufactured risk is risk created by the very progression of human development, especially by the progression of science and technology. Manufactured risk refers to new risk environments for which history provides us with very little previous experience. We often don't really know what the risks are, let alone how to calculate them accurately in terms of probability tables. Manufactured risk is expanding in most dimensions of human life... Manufactured uncertainty intrudes directly into personal and social life – it isn't confined to more collective settings of risk“ [66].
Before we go any further, let's summarize what has been said so far.
According to Ulrich Beck, the risks during the pre-industrial society and the first modernity were mainly natural disasters and were spatially (geographically) and temporally (such as the duration of the action and impacts, i.e. the consequences) limited, and their manifestation was mainly local, maximally regional. Gradually, however, qualitatively different risks appear on the scene – no longer natural, but anthropogenic and technogenic, i.e. socially produced, generated to one degree or another by human decisions. Technological and economic risks are particularly significant; not in vain for Ulrich Beck, the most significant and shocking example in this regard is the accident in Chernobyl.
Such risks can be (and they are!) unlimited both spatially (they go beyond the respective region and cross state borders with ease and speed), and temporally (the consequences of them, such as radiation in a nuclear accident, can last for generations) [69]. In other words, „while in classical industrial society the „logic“ of wealth production dominates the „logic“ of risk production, in the risk society this relationship is reversed“ [70].
Anthony Giddens also believes that the concept of risk itself passes through two stages, which at least roughly correspond to analyzes of the changing nature of, and attitudes towards, risk in early and late modernity in Ulrich Beck:
„In the first stage, risk is seen as ‘an essential calculus’, a way of promoting certainty and order in the precision of risk calculations, of ‘bringing the future under control’, where the various components of risk are ‘given’ and thus able to be calculated. It is upon this notion of risk that the welfare state developed as a means of protecting populations from the risks of actuarially calculable threats such as illness and unemployment with the use of social insurance schemes. The second stage is where we are not able to precisely calculate risk, but rather develop ‘scenarios’ of risk with various degrees of plausibility. One example is global warming, subject to expert dispute over whether or not it is happening and how serious its ramifications are“ [71].
A focus on risk becomes a major characteristic of a society when it self-perceives (reflects itself) as a society and thus becomes highly self-critical and self-confident. This intensifying self-perception of society undermines its „community“, its essence of „society“, parcelises it into groups and atomises individuals. This is how common discourses and traditions, common attitudes and values fall apart, fall into crisis and deform those patterns and models that build individual and community identities. And with them, the emphasis changes – from what connects us to what separates us.
In the past, people sought to be together to provide joint responses to risks and thus increase their chances of survival. Now they seek to be separated to increase their chances of survival. People are rescued individually from risk zones and productions. But the consciousness that we are producers of risks increases the degree of our personal and social responsibility in the face of risks, and does not look at these risks as fate, i.e. something predetermined and therefore inevitable, located outside our responsibility, and therefore also outside our duty [72].
Society produces risks, and along with that, it constantly makes decisions both in producing risks and in managing them. People act, make decisions regarding the actions taken, and as a result of the decisions made, they produce additional risks. So there are risks posed by actions, and risks posed by decisions about actions taken, decisions made as a rule in the absence of information and knowledge.
As risks produced by society increasingly cross national borders and persist for a long time – themselves or their consequences – we say, and will say with increasing alarm in the future, that risks produced within a country do not are limited neither in space nor in time – (and) for this reason:
THE RISK SOCIETY IS ALSO A WORLD RISK SOCIETY [73].
That would mean that
THE „RISK SOCIETY“ APPROACH (MODEL)
as laid out in Ulrich Beck's research, has a direct exit to one of the FOUR DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION – to this one, which RELATED TO ENTERING THE RISK SOCIETY,
with the fact that society is becoming more risky.
We clarify this, because of the danger of conceptual confusion, insofar as the term RISK SOCIETY, introduced by Ulrich Beck, is used
→ both to indicate one of the four approaches (models) in the study of risks,
→ also to denote one of the four dimensions of the epochal transformation that our world is experiencing.
Thus, Ulrich Beck's RISK SOCIETY in its main content overlaps with the „RISK SOCIETY“ APPROACH (MODEL) TO THE STUDY OF RISKS.
That's why,
if we leave the term RISK SOCIETY
within the terminological apparatus and coordinate system of Ulrich Beck's analyses, i.e. AS ONE OF THE APPROACHES (MODELS) FOR STUDYING RISK,
then the term WORLD RISK SOCIETY,
also in the spirit of Ulrich Beck's analysis, can be addressed to the Risk Society, but AS ONE OF THE DIMENSIONS OF THE EPOCH TRANSFORMATION THAT OUR WORLD IS EXPERIENCING.
In other words,
Deborah Lupton defines as a second approach (model) for studying risk the „Risk Society“ perspective, i.e. the „Risk Society“ approach,
but because Risk Society in our terminology is used to denote one of the dimensions of the global transformation of the world,
then if we want to keep RISK SOCIETY for one of the four approaches (perspectives) to studying risks,
one of the four dimensions of the global transformation of the world can be called (can be fully implied as) WORLD RISK SOCIETY.
But in that case, the other three dimensions of the global transformation of the world should be called WORLD GLOBALIZED SOCIETY, WORLD POSTMODERN SOCIETY and WORLD NETWORK SOCIETY respectively.
These four names are definitely more adequate and more comprehensive, but they are far more voluminous and cumbersome. That's why we omit the characteristic „worldly“ in them.
This is an occasion to return to the beginning of this Study and to recall again that:
• The GENERAL and ABSTRACT concept is RISK SOCIETY, which is one of THE FOUR DIMENSIONS OF TRANSFORMATION experienced by our world.
• The PARTICULAR and CONCRETE concept is Ulrich Beck's RISK SOCIETY, which is one of the FOUR APPROACHES (MODELS) FOR STUDYING RISK.
In order to avoid conceptual confusion, one of the following options can be used to distinguish the general and abstract concept „Risk Society“ from the particular and concrete concept „Risk Society“:
⁕ Risk Society (with a capital „R“) vs. risk society (with a lowercase „r“);
⁕ Risk Society vs. „Risk Society“;
⁕ Risk Society vs. Risk Society „according to Ulrich Beck“;
⁕ World Risk Society vs. Risk Society.
⁕ Society of Risk vs. Risk Society;
Risks in the modern Risk Society do not only cross regional and national boundaries – they also cross social and class constraints. According to Ulrich Beck, if the driving force in the Class Society could be summed up in the phrase: „I'm hungry!“, in the Risk Society it can be summed up like this: „I'm afraid!“, i.e. „I am scared!“. „The commonality of anxiety takes the place of the commonality of need“, the cohesion driven by need (the sum of the needy) gives way to the crowding born of anxiety (the sum of the anxious), and scarcity is displaced and replaced of insecurity and so solidarity of fear becomes a political force, but it is not clear how strong the cohesive force of fear is and whether it can give rise to sustainable co-existences and what their motivations and energies would be if based on fear, is fear a good basis for reaching compromises, and won't at some point the commonality of behavior be displaced by individual benefit calculations, not to mention that fear itself has never been a good basis for rational action and is too a „good“ trigger for extreme and illogical behaviors, for extremism and fanaticism [74].
In the Risk Society, some old dividing lines are being strengthened and new dividing lines are being drawn. For all the „democraticness“ of some negative impacts – such as smog („poverty is hierarchic, smog is democratic“ [75]), the division between risk sufferers bears the imprint of previous class distinctions and „there are broad overlapping areas between class and risk society“. The poorer strata are exposed to greater risks and are more affected by them.
Therefore, although Ulrich Beck is categorical:
„Objectively, however, risks display an equalizing effect within their scope and among those affected by them. It is precisely therein that their novel political power resides. In this sense risk societies are not exactly class societies; their risk positions cannot be understood as class positions, or their conflicts as class conflicts“ [76];
he nevertheless admits that:
„Risks seem to strengthen, not to abolish, the class society. Poverty attracts an unrortunate abundance of risks. By contrast, the wealthy (in income, power or education) can purchase safety and freedom from risks. This „law“ of the class-specific distribution of risks and thus of the intensification of class antagonisms through the concentration of risks among the poor and the weak was valid for a long time and still applies today to some central dimensions of risk“ [77].
Table 4. Class Society vs. Risk Society [78]
Another important division in the Risk Society is between those who generate the risks through their decisions and lifestyles and those who are affected by the risks: „those who make decisions are not accountable from the perspective of those affected by risks, and those affected have no real way of participating in the decision-making process“ [79].
Risk Society produces – with increasing frequency, in increasing quantity and with increasing impact – risks in all spheres of activity: political, economic, technological, financial, social, environmental, etc.
Risk Society is at the same time a society of apprehensions and worries, of fears and bad premonitions. Constantly thinking about all kinds of risks gives rise to pessimism, a feeling of possible imminent disaster. This does not mean that man and humanity always go to bed and wake up thinking about catastrophes, but on a subconscious level, as a permanent worry, there is undoubtedly the premonition of a possible catastrophe.
The premonition of possible catastrophes is life not in the established order, but in change; a life not in the comfort of immutable normality, but in the anxiety of possible a-normality, extra-normality; a life not in the comforting routine of established, understandable rules, but in the acceptance of the impending exception. Beck's theory of global risks is focused on the exception: „The fact is that this exceptional case has become the norm in the world risk society“ [80].
Ulrich Beck speaks of a kind of inflation of talk and premonition of possible catastrophes and ruins, and therefore pleads for a clear distinction between catastrophe and the rhetoric of catastrophe. Rhetoric takes place today but is aimed at tomorrow; it can have positive effects, not only stress and destabilize society, if it helps to make the right decisions and develop adequate behaviors: „Risk implies the message that it is high time for us to act! … Risk is both the everyday insecurity that is no longer accepted and the catastrophe that has not yet occurred. Risk opens our eyes and also raises our hopes of a positive outcome. That is the paradox of the encouragement we derive from global risks. To that extent risk is always also a political category, since it liberates politics from existing rules and institutional shackles… The risk society is a (latent) revolutionary society in which the normal situation and the exceptional situation can no longer be clearly distinguished“ [81].
For the „Risk Society“ approach (model), the thesis applies:
AS THE SOCIETY IS, SO ARE THE RISKS.
Although in this approach it is not the cultural-anthropological specificities of society that are important, as in the „Cultural-symbolic“ approach, but the structural-sociological specificities of society, we cannot „escape“ the importance of the risk culture, the culture of risk. If Samuel Huntington spoke of a clash of civilizations, then for the World risk society Ulrich Beck spoke of a clash of risk cultures [82].
Risk culture cannot but be related to risk perceptions, risk propensity, risk attitudes and risk behavior. The World Risk Society is forward-looking, it lives with „one foot“ (as foreboding and apprehension) in the future, „it is a society increasingly preoccupied with the future (and also with safety) which generates the notion of risk“ [83].
This presupposes and necessitates the development of new ideas about risks and their construction in public and individual minds. Society and individuals become participants in an imaginary performance, in an almost magical production that recreates a possible risky reality, i.e. potentially realizable crisis situation. In the conditions of the World Risk Society, thinking about global risk is possible only if the individual or society stages (in the individual or in the public consciousness) one or another potential or real long-term and global risk, in contrast to the conditions of the Risk Society, in which and by which it also describes risks valid to one degree or another, but they are still much more limited in time and space, although gradually becoming cross-border and transnational – as a disturbing memory from the future.
According to Ulrich Beck, „if people experience risks as real, they are real as a consequence“ [84].
We will summarize the following main points of Ulrich Beck regarding risks:
„1. Risk is synonymous not with catastrophe but with the anticipation of the catastrophe...
2. The more manifestly global risks elude the scientific methods used to predict them, the more the influence of the perception of risk grows. The result is that the contradictory certainties of religious, secular and political cultures confront one another in evaluations of global risks: clash of risk cultures.
3. How can the conflictual and subversive potential of global risks be explained in political theory? My thesis is that the global political potential of global risks stems, in all of its ambivalence, from the overlapping of the state of normalcy and the state of exception.
4. Finally, I will examine the consequences for the legitimation of state authority [Herrschaft]. Here we must distinguish between the increase in authority and the increase in its inefficiency: global risks produce authoritarian ‘failed states’ – even in the West“ [85].
When analyzing the risks in modern society, Beck seems to hesitate and speaks sometimes of a Risk Society, then of a World Risk Society. Moreover, in the different uses of the phrase „World Risk Society“, he puts different emphases – sometimes on „World", sometimes on „Risk“, sometimes on „Society“. We already know that for him the Risk Society is (and) the World Risk Society. But the question is completely logical:
Is the WORLD RISK SOCIETY (also) RISK SOCIETY?
If this is indeed the case, then we could put a sign of equality between the Risk Society and the World Risk Society. But if there was a complete equivalence between these two concepts, Beck would use them interchangeably. This does not seem to be the case, and in our opinion, it is not the case – insofar as Beck is talking about a Risk Society, but he is also talking about a World Risk Society. It is true that Beck claims that the Risk Society is also the World Risk Society, and it is probably absolutely natural to him that the World Risk Society (even its name implies this) is Risk Society. And yet, even in the conclusions of Beck himself, there is a considerable gap between the concepts of Risk Society and World Risk Society, from which we above „happily“ took advantage of in order to avoid conceptual confusions and at least minimize their negative effects.
But let's clarify again:
We have assumed that the RISK SOCIETY (in the spirit of Ulrich Beck's research) is one of the most essential, the most comprehensive characteristics (but not the only characteristic!) of the WORLD RISK SOCIETY, and therefore it can be laid in the foundations of one of the approaches (models) for studying risks. Therefore, Deborah Lupton has every reason to define Ulrich-Beck's RISK SOCIETY as one of the theoretical perspectives and Gabe Mythen as one of the paradigms in the study of risks.
At the same time, the WORLD RISK SOCIETY has a number of other key characteristics and it can be studied through the lens of the other three approaches (models) that we focus on in this Study.
So once again, we'll summarize the benchmarks in the Risk Society analysis:
• „RISK SOCIETY“ [Risk Society according as well to Ulrich Beck] is one of the four approaches (models) for studying risks, together with the other three approaches (models) – „Cultural-symbolic“, „Governmentality“ and „Adaptive-absorptive“.
• RISK SOCIETY [World Risk Society according to Ulrich Beck] is one of the four leading dimensions of the transformation of our world, together with the other three dimensions - Globalized, Postmodern and Network.
It is worth noting that in his last, posthumous book, The Metamorphosis of the World, Ulrich Beck speaks not of change, revolution or transformation of the world, but of metamorphosis:
„We live in a world that is not just changing, it is metamorphosing. Change implies that some things change but other things remain the same – capitalism changes, but some aspects of capitalism remain as they have always been. Metamorphosis implies a much more radical transformation in which the old certainties of modern society are falling away and something quite new is emerging. To grasp this metamorphosis of the world it is necessary to explore the new beginnings, to focus on what is emerging from the old and seek to grasp future structures and norms in the turmoil of the present“ [86]
In this fundamentally changed world, as the caterpillar changes into a butterfly, according to Ulrich Beck, not only must „methodological nationalism“ be replaced by „methodological cosmopolitanism“, but also the „Declaration of Independence“ must be replaced by „Declaration on Interdependence“, because „in world risk society, cooperation between foes is not about self-sacrifice but about self-interest, self-survival“. [87]
Explanation:
Metamorphosis – transformation, conversion, complete, radical change into something else; changing from one form to another by adopting a new appearance and functions; complete change, alteration.
For a World at Risk it is truly logical and inevitable that each one of us, each community, each society, as well as the whole world should say to ourselves:
„I risk, therefore I am. I venture, therefore I am. I suffer, therefore I am“ [88].
◙ The study of the two independent approaches belonging to the second main direction, the objective, as we have already indicated above, is based on scientific research and the thought-logical apparatus of political institutionalism.
♦ The second two approaches (models) are within the framework of the objective direction and it can be said about them (see Table 1):
AS THE RISKS ARE, SO IS THE SOCIETY.
„GOVERNMENTALITY“ OR GM APPROACH
In this approach (model), the basis of risk management is the managerial-organizational capabilities of the society.
The emphasis in risk management here is on the role of government institutions and organizations, i.e. of the institutions and organizations possessing to one degree or another some power. It is about the multiplicity of the whole vertically hierarchical and horizontally networked complex architecture and integrative infrastructure of state or non-state, governmental or non-governmental, public or private – national, regional, local, local – systems of institutions and various, more or less independent organizations.
The theoretical and practical problem fields of the „Governmentality“ approach include the following main activities:
• Researching the models, scenarios, mechanisms and tools through which this complex architecture and integrative infrastructure of institutions and organizations controls the trends and processes leading to increased risk taking place both in society (considered as a synergistic, self-organizing organism of socially active individuals), as well as in the population (perceived as a synthetic community of biologically living beings).
• Studying, systematizing and classifying everything that in risk management is directly or indirectly related to early warning and planning, analyzing what is happening and reacting to what happened, eliminating the consequences and drawing lessons from practice, self-optimization of the activity and the assimilation of foreign experience.
• Elaboration of qualitatively new power mentality and mental power, adequate for the Society of risks and serially produced uncertainties and insecurities, which possess not only much higher professionalism and far more effective managerial (and political!) abilities, but also a radically different psychology, based on values and self-reflection, on a sense of mission and a sense of responsibility – insofar as the price for untimely and inconsistent with the radically changed environment risk management is extremely high.
• Building a modern risk culture in society and its various communities and layers, responding to the complex and highly dynamic, internally contradictory and accompanied by extreme unpredictability strategic environment in the Risk Society. It is no longer possible to have a clear dividing and demarcating line between power and socium as before. They are increasingly intertwined – both as responsibilities and as an attitude towards risks. At the same time, both power and socium today have not one, but actually two key essences:
→ Power is not only VERTICAL, pointing „upward“ – to a single center (even if it is not, as it used to be, one person clothed with enormous personal power, but is to one degree or another a collective body, most often called „government“); it is also HORIZONTAL, pointing in different directions in the plane of its intertwining with society, which means scattered, dispersed, multiplied and fragmented.
→ Socium takes place and functions as a SOCIETY (i.e. it appears and is seen as a synergistic, self-organizing organism of socially active individuals, therefore it is characterized by systemicity, by unity, which is why it is a „a whole [consisting] of many [individuals]“); as well as a POPULATION (i.e. it appears and is seen as a synthetic community of separate biologically living beings, therefore it is characterized by a collectivity, by a multiplicity, therefore it is a „a set [consisting] of individual beings“).
In the „Governmentality“ approach, the institutions of power are considered
‣ not only as arising from the aspirationof certain people to rule over other people – in the state, region, city, village or in their field of activity, transforming this aspirationinto an institutional hierarchy (which, when we talk about the state, has the legitimate right to and the monopoly on violence, and in all other spheres and at all other levels it has the legitimate right to make decisions that must be unconditionally fulfilled by the subordinates and can possibly be challenged only through court),
‣ but also as a necessity to manage risks and produce security for the relevant community of people subject to the power of the relevant institution.
In other words, in the „Governmentality“ approach, we assess institutions through the prism of their role in relation to risks and their management. Our approach is pro-institutional and that is why we are within the limits of institutionalism. Moreover, we are within the framework of the objective direction for the study of risks, which means that risks and the attitude towards them are externally existing for society; risks affect the society whose functioning results from them; in this case, the risks are objectively generated and it is valid that:
AS THE RISKS ARE, SO IS THE SOCIETY.
Scientifically, scientifically applied and methodologically based on institutionalism, this approach considers not institutions as derivatives of society, but society as a derivative of institutions. Institutions are a complex, a reservoir of knowledge, skills, practices, procedures for managing society. They form and impute responsibilities to society, create prescriptions for behavior. In the qualitatively new situation of the Risk Society, the institutions adapt to the qualitatively new tasks, they change their functioning and act – conditionally and metaphorically – as „reasonable beings“ (goal-oriented and goal-achieving). In this transformation, institutions define, mediate, assign and impose new models of behavior and new responsibilities of the state, society and individuals. Thus, and only thus, can we understand the teleology (purposeful existence) of institutions.
Explanation:
Teleology – seeing things as purposefully caused; everything is purposeful and functions on the basis of a rational will and correspondence between causes and ends; each thing serves as a means to another, has a purpose that conditions its existence.
Institutions of power are not immutable and eternal. They are in direct relation with the historically specific content of the concept of „power“, with the historically specific forms of power arrangements. Here is what Michel Foucault writes:
„We could even, albeit in a very global, rough, and inexact fashion, reconstitute the great forms, the great economies of power in the West in the following way. First came the state of justice, born in a territoriality of feudal type and corresponding in large part to a society of the law — customary laws and written laws— with a whole game of engagements and litigations. Second, the administrative state (l'État administratif), born in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a frontier and no longer feudal territoriality, an administrative state that corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines. Finally, the state of government (l'État de gouvernement), which is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface it occupies, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, with the territory that it covers, to be sure, but only in a sense as one of its components. And this state of government, which is grounded in its population and which refers and has resort to the instrumentality of economic knowledge, would correspond to a society controlled by apparatuses of security“ [89].
From today's perspective of the Risk Society, the following can be said.
In the past, institutions of power had a forceful, repressive, coercive and disciplining effect on societies, communities and individuals. In his book „Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison“ Foucault presents his view of disciplinary power not only as power that is exercised from the top over the bottom, but rather as power that permeates every level of an organization:
„The human body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A „political anatomy“, which was also a „mechanics of power“, was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over others' bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the efficiency that one determines. Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, „docile“ bodies. Discipline increases the forces of the body (in economic terms of utility) and diminishes these same forces (in political terms of obedience)“ [90].
And furthermore, here is what Michel Foucault says about disciplinary power:
„This power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not the „privilege“, acquired or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions – an effect that is manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated. Furthermore, this power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on those who „do not have it“; it invests them, is transmitted by them and through them; it exerts pressure upon them, just as they themselves, in their struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them… Disciplinary power is also organized as a multiple, automatic and anonymous power; for although surveillance rests on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also to a certain extent from bottom to top and laterally; this network „holds“ the whole together and traverses it in its entirety with effects of power that derive from one another: supervisors, perpetually supervised. The power in the hierarchized surveillance of the disciplines is not possessed as a thing, or transferred as a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And, although it is true that its pyramidal organization gives it a „head“, it is the apparatus as a whole that produces „power“ and distributes individuals in this permanent and continuous field. This enables the disciplinary power to be both absolutely indiscreet, since it is everywhere and always alert, since by its very principle it leaves no zone of shade and constantly supervises the very individuals who are entrusted with the task of supervising; and absolutely „discreet“, for it functions permanently and largely in silence. Discipline makes possible the operation of a relational power that sustains itself by its own mechanism... Hence the fact that the disciplines use procedures of partitioning and verticality, that they introduce, between the different elements at the same level, as solid separations as possible, that they define compact hierarchical networks, in short, that they oppose to the intrinsic, adverse force of multiplicity the technique of the continuous, individualizing pyramid“ [91].
Study 21 clarified the differences between the two types of force (the two constituents of force): „hard“ and „soft“), and the differences between the two types of violence (the effect of applying force): „hard“ (structural) ) and the „soft“ (symbolic).
Today, the power institutions (mostly) in the liberal-democratic countries strive to replace their repressive, i.e. coercive, „hard“ power with „soft“ power, i.e. rewarding, consent-oriented power, thus orienting individuals from the forceful and punitive discipline imposed from above, which is perceived primarily as coercive, to the self-discipline that comes (as it were) from within, which is consensual and perceived primarily as voluntary.
Here we refer to another key concept of Michel Foucault – bio-power (bio-pouvoir). It is a power technology that appeared in the second half of the 18th century. It functions as a constantly operating and striving for maximum efficiency mechanism for comprehensive control [92]; it is still in a symbiotic relationship with the disciplinary authority and at the same time increasingly appears as its alternative.
The following reasoning of Michel Foucault is important here:
„One of the fundamental phenomena of the 19th century was and continues to be what we might call the taking over of life by power: if you will, the acquisition of power over man as a living being, a sort of etatization of the biological... The sovereign right is therefore the right to cause death and to leave one's life. And this new right that is established is the right to cause life and leave someone to die“ [93].
Explanation:
We will remain within the framework of the concept of „biopower“ as it was developed by Foucault and will not touch on the further deep semantic deciphering of this concept by the Italian philosophers Giorgio Agamben (1942) and Antonio Negri (1933 – 2023) [94] .
Еtatism (from French état – state) – strengthening the role of the state, spreading its influence, intervention and control in all spheres of public life.
Symbiosis – coexistence of two or more organisms, from which they have a one-sided or mutual benefit.
Disciplinary power needed „obedient bodies“ and used various technologies for this purpose – distribution of individuals in demarcated spaces, total surveillance and disciplinary supervision, systematic training to increase the utility of the individual and the imputation of obedience. Towards the second half of the 19th century, it began to be combined and replaced by (displaced by) another power – the biopower, which addresses man not as a submissive subject, but as a living being.
Disciplinary power is addressed to the body, traced to the level of relation to individuals, and governs the multitude of individuals „individually“ in order to transform it into a collection of obedient bodies, to make them participate in social processes to obtain economic benefits and transform them into individual bodies to be supervised, trained, used and possibly punished, i.e. it individuates, works with the individual body, while biopower is addressed to the living person, to the person as a living being, and addresses the multiplicity of people as a totality, insofar as this multiplicity forms a global mass and takes part in the general processes inherent in life (birth, reproduction, diseases, death...), i.e. it massifies, works with the public body.
Disciplinary power produces useful and obedient individual bodies; biopower creates regulatory mechanisms to anticipate events, minimize risks and losses, insure and provide compensation, i.e. to create conditions for a safe and secure life of the population [95].
After the anatomo-politics of the human as body, organized in the 18th century, at the end of the same century appeared the bio-politics of the human species [96].
Biopower does not cancel disciplinary techniques, but is intricately combined with them. Such a combination becomes possible because the disciplinary and biopolitical mechanisms are deployed at different levels:
‣ the first reflects the order „body - organism - discipline – institutions“;
‣ the second reflects the order „population – biopolitical processes – regulatory mechanisms – state“.
As a result:
‣ on the one hand, we have institutional and organic integrity: disciplining is from the institution;
‣ on the other hand, biological and ethical integrity: bio-regulation is by the state [97].
From Foucault's analyzes (without going into details) we will „extract“ what was written about the three „big forms“, „big power structures“,
for:
• THE THREE TYPES OF GOVERNMENT REGIMES:
1. power of the sovereign;
2. power of the administration;
3. governmentality
(i.e. the three types of state – the legal state, the administrative state, the state of governmentality);
and for:
• THE TWO TYPES OF IMPLEMENTATION (production, „doing“) OF POWER:
1. disciplinary power;
2. biopower.
Some fundamental things below are reflected mainly on the basis of sociologist Todor Hristov's monograph „Freedom and Sovereignty in the April Uprising“ [98].
Foucault builds the concept of sovereignty on the basis of the right of the sovereign (the king) over the life and death of his subjects. In order to justify this power of the king, it is necessary to solve three „preliminary“ tasks:
1. to show how individuals can and must give up their natural rights in order to submit to some sovereign;
2. to justify the need for the various abilities, opportunities, forces of the community or individuals to be subordinated to one central authority;
3. to explain how this power can be legitimized by means of a principle that remains beyond or before the law, but at the same time makes all legality possible.
Among the main distinguishing features of the regime of sovereign power, according to Foucault, are the following:
▪> it is based on the body of the sovereign;
▪> it is exercised over a certain territory;
▪> the sovereign exercises his power,
‣‣ firstly, by making laws and punishing their violations;
‣‣ secondly, by taking away wealth, products, labor, blood from the conquered territory;
▪> the sovereign, although he is forced to respect the common good, seeks above all to preserve, strengthen and display his power;
▪> the sovereign has the right to force his subjects to die, including in defense of his own power, or to let them live.
Foucault clarifies that when he speaks of law, he does not mean „simply the law, but also the whole set of instruments, institutions, regulations implementing the law“ [99].
Under the power of the sovereign, the state is legal, there is law in it, it is strictly observed that it is observed. But the system of power is embodied in the person of the sovereign.
The power of the sovereign belongs to a single center, when it ends, then begins its distribution to multiple centers, such as the disciplinary institutions and their bureaucracy – all of them are special „hotbeds of power“ [100].
Let us once again hear Michel Foucault:
„In the 17th and 18th centuries, an important phenomenon took place: the emergence of a new power mechanism, which has very specific procedures, completely new tools, a very different toolkit and which ... is absolutely incompatible with the attitude of sovereignty. This new mechanics of power is more about bodies and what they do than about the land and its product. It is a power mechanism that makes it possible to extract bodies, time and labor rather than goods and wealth. It is a new type of power that is exercised continuously through supervision rather than discontinuously through systems of chronic obligations. It is a type of power presupposing a tight web of material coercions rather than the physical existence of a sovereign. This new type of power ... is one of the most important inventions of bourgeois society ... This non-sovereign power, therefore foreign to sovereignty, is „disciplinary power“ [101].
Formed in the late Middle Ages and taking on its finished form in the great administrative monarchies of early modernity, the power regime of sovereignty has been undermined by a new type of power that Foucault calls GOVERNMENTALITY (gouvernementalité). This power has no center, because not only the state is governed, but also the family, the church, the school, the factory. Governmentality is not exercised over the territory, but over people, things, their relations. It pursues specific goals – to increase well-being, strength, productivity, knowledge, health, to facilitate certain relationships. It uses more tactics than laws; instead of punishing, confiscating, and exercising power, it seeks to govern as if it were serving the governed themselves.
→ SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY governs society and the individual;
→ GOVERNMENTALITY manages the processes in which society and the individual are immersed.
That is why the sovereign power can use norms, i.e. legal norms, such as a set of laws and punishments (including the death penalty) for their violation, but governmentality, and especially when it comes to biopower, needs norms, i.e. values to regulate the behavior of the governed [102]. Power through laws is more coercive, external to individuals, it is vertical; while power through norms is more consensual and perceived too often by individuals as internal to them and as horizontal.
However, it is necessary to explicitly quote the words of Michel Foucault that:
„We need to see things not in terms of the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a disciplinary society and the subsequent replacement of a disciplinary society by a society of government; in reality one has a triangle, sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mehanism the security apparatuses [dispositifs]“ [103].
The following are noted among the main characteristics of governmentality:
▪ First, its emergence can be recognized by the special regime of government, which object is the population and which roughly coincides with the birth of the political economy (and its successor – economics). Henceforth, government must be government of „each separately and all collectively“, it must concern itself with each individual and with the population as a whole...
▪ Second, this concept implies a certain attitude towards other forms of power, sovereignty and discipline. The main mechanisms of sovereign power are constitutions, laws, parliaments, and this power is exercised through judicial and executive bodies. Disciplinary power is related to power over and through the individual, his body, powers and abilities; over and through the multitude of individuals with armies, manufactories, factories, hospitals, and schools. This power coincides with the development of the bureaucratic and administrative apparatus of the state. Governmentality uses the techniques, rationalities, institutions of both sovereignty and disciplinary power, but it differs from them because in it the goal is not to exercise state power over the subjects of the given territory (for example, through taxes and punishments), as is the case with sovereign power, nor is it the regulation and imposition of order over the multitude of people in that territory (for example, through schooling, military training, and the organization of production), as is the case with disciplinary power. Its purpose is already management of the forces and abilities of living people, of the population (the people), whose resources must be created, increased and used effectively and rationally.
▪ Third, governmentality aims to embed all individuals in what Foucault calls security apparatuses [dispositifs] (regular army, police, diplomacy, special services) – these are those institutions that guarantee the optimal course of economic, social and vital processes, characteristic for the population [104].
We indicated above that biopower is still in a symbiotic relationship with disciplining power and at the same time is increasingly appearing as its alternative. As Todor Hristov writes, „the modern art of management is born from the interweaving of two power regimes – disciplinary power and biopower“ [105].
Biopower, as we said, focuses not on the territory or the individual body, but on man as a living being, as a biological species; its main object is the population, it is realized through the management of a series of random events, observable only at the population level – birth rate, death rate, life expectancy, health, old age, ethnic and racial composition, migration, education, poverty, environment and quality of life. Biopower seeks not to order and supervise, but to regulate and that in a way that expands the productive forces of the population and improves their distribution; its principle is the improvement of the life of the population. Unlike the power of the sovereign, which seeks to demarcate and exclude enemies from its loyal subjects, biopower does not push boundaries, but introduces norms, measures deviations from them, the distribution of human groups relative to them, the possible intersection with other norms and distributions [106].
The social imprints of disciplinary power and biopower are visible in the two extreme manifestations of power over the subject's life from the 17th century onwards.
• On the one hand, it is the power over the body as a machine – its training, the use of its powers and abilities, the increase of its utility and controllability, the inclusion in the systems of control, developing a whole system of various disciplinary institutes – schools, colleges, barracks, workshops. In relation to this system of institutions, certain systems of knowledge about man are also formed, defined by Foucault as the political anatomy of the human body.
• On the other hand, there are the forms that appeared later, towards the middle of the 18th century, exerting power over the body as a representative of the biological species and the biological processes related to it – reproduction, birth, death, expressed through indicators of health, duration of life etc. In this sphere, power is exercised in the form of regulatory control. Foucault calls this the biopolitics of population. The right of the sovereign to deprive his subject of life is replaced by the administration of the body and the discernible management of life. In order to reconcile the strengthening of bodies and the growth of the population with the increase of their usefulness and controllability, the power needs new methods and approaches to manage the abilities, inclinations and forces of the subjects, and for this purpose various social institutions are expanded – family, school, boarding school, army, police, medical institutions [107].
Foucault points out three fundamental features of biopolitics:
1. it forms the new „character“ – the population, different from the object of the discipline (the individual with his body) and from the object of political and legal theories (society);
2. it deals with collective and serial phenomena;
3. it has as its main main task not the modification of individual phenomena, but the „optimization“ of life at the global level [108].
According to Michel Foucault:
„From the eighteenth century onwards, security tends increasingly to become the dominant component of modern governmental rationality: we live today not so much in a Rechtsstaat (legal state) or in a disciplinary society as in a society of security“ [109].
Biopower is characterized by the application of „soft“ measures for „social protection of the population from various kinds of non-military threats“, which is why it is associated with „soft“ (i.e. non-state-centric) forms of security [and is] based on the belief that „security lies at the core of our individual and collective existence“ [110].
Foucault's theoretical research continued its independent life; his works provoke controversy, and heated debates about them tend to develop them further and ... change their meaning, sometimes beyond recognition. This is not at all illogical: we are not convinced that there is one philosopher Michel Foucault, rather, and while he was alive, and even more so, in the decades after his death, there were several philosopher Michel Foucaults! Some scholars claim to analyze Foucault and „see“ Foucault in their analyses, but rather, they see themselves in those analyses, Foucault being not what Foucault is, but what they are. This is exactly the case with the „Governmentality“ approach we are now studying.
What has been written about this approach in the scientific literature and what we present is a projection of Foucault's theories on the study of risks. A projection is always less dimensional than the projected phenomenon. If we project a solid (say a sphere) onto a plane, we get a curve. And this curve will only slightly resemble the sphere as its imprint, but at the same time it will be very different from it. It may be difficult for the observer to determine from the projection – image of what body this projection is. It is the same here: only certain shades, elements, accents of Michel Foucault are used in the „Governmentality“ approach. Moreover, this approach and its theory have acquired the right to an independent existence and develop their own history, so that looking at them, we may not even find reliable „traces“ of the great philosopher. And it is not strange if only the name, and precisely the name of the approach, although placed in quotation marks, nevertheless keeps us in satisfactory proximity to Foucault and makes us feel responsible to him.
But let's continue a little further with some generalizations about the „Governmentality“ approach.
Risk society is not only an attractive construct. It is a reality! There have always been risks, but the new ones – especially the untraditional ones – are characterized by a much higher frequency and a much higher exceptionality – as anomalies, as peculiarities of the situation, as consequences if mismanaged, not to mention – slept on.
The exceptionality of new risks is a very effective means of „soft“ rather than „hard“ disciplining of societies. This does not remove from the agenda the more usual methods of „hard“ disciplining. We are talking about society, but let's not lose sight of the systemic nature of socium and its essence as a synthetic whole of many separate elements, i.e. the fact that socium is a population as well as a society.
We are not inclined to some extreme degree to oppose society to population, although society carries as its main content much more sociality, and population – as its main essence much more biological. The problem is that new risks tend to desocialize and rebiologize socium, to de-transform it from a society into a population. After all, to some extent every society is also a population, but not every population is a society, and this must be remembered at all costs.
The exceptionality of the new risks in part – let's say it again – rehabilitates, justifies force actions, but at the same time it expands the arsenal of non-force impacts and thus diversifies its strategies, and with it expands its powers.
The partial rehabilitation of hard measures against society and the individual citizen should not disturb us too much. Sometimes the price of not reacting adequately, of allowing panic and disorganization in the face of risks giving rise to emergency situations, is very high and more extreme actions are required. Nevertheless, soft measures, and above all those from the arsenal of biopower, can prove more effective and conducive to social cohesion than the repression of coercion. In fact, biopower does not deny hard measures and is not entirely related to soft measures, but being flexible and constantly calculating benefits and damages, it prefers soft measures only because they are more effective and more rational; they are for it, so to speak, much cheaper and do far less damage to the social fabric – because they are less likely to tear it apart or damage its elasticity and adaptability.
Today's seemingly self-generating risks and biopower, with its much different, all-encompassing and all-pervading essence, carry out a kind of integration with each other – they osmotically seep into each other and unite symbiotically with each other. This allows to forge an up-to-date and vitally significant connection between the two constituents of governmentality. We are witnessing the emergence of both a much more effective managerial mentality – the emphasis is on mentality, and a much more modern mentality management – the emphasis is on management.
Explanation:
Osmosis – spontaneous passage of molecules through a semi-permeable barrier from the side with a lower concentration to the side with a higher concentration of the solution. This leads to an equalization of concentration on both sides of the barrier.
Only in this way in the Risk Society can the essence, meaning and content of the concept of governmentality be fulfilled to the required extent comprehensively and sufficiently exhaustive, optimally adequate and maximally effectively, while at the same time:
→ the mentality acquires a qualitatively new managerial dimension;
→ management acquires a qualitatively new mental content.
This is the synergistic effect from combining management and mentality; from the osmosis and symbiosis of new risks and biopower – without completely erasing and denying entirely the role of disciplinary power, or at least of the power coerced or tempted – in situations of increased risk or (with undeniable elements) of emergency – to resort to disciplinary measures.
And one more thing – today the process of normalization in the Risk Society acquires a different meaning. If previously normalization meant running processes within the normal, non-crisis, non-risky, practically stable state, now normalization increasingly means adapting the behavior of individuals and communities in society to and bringing it into line with the norms, to which the functioning of the Risk Society corresponds. Behavioral patterns deviating from or contradicting the norms of the Risk Society place their perpetrators in a state of risk, i.e. „at risk“. In other words, „to be designated as „at risk“, therefore, is to be positioned within a network of factors drawn from the observation of others“ [111]. From here follows the DIRECT RELATIONSHIP OF THE RISK SOCIETY WITH BIOPOWER. If in the case of disciplinary power abnormality was what was distinguished from the established categories of the norm, then in biopower normativity, and therefore also normality, is fixed after a detailed analysis of the existing different forms of normality [112].
Each risk is potentially manageable (this is a criterion for suitability and successful transformation of power institutions). This manageability guarantees a certain minimum security for all (some level of insecurity for all). For a higher level of security (lower level of insecurity), the individual must insure himself – the individual's personal responsibility in managing risks increases. Such a phenomenon can be defined as the privatization of risk [113]. From other (structural-sociological) considerations, this can also be said about the „Risk Society“ approach.
With the death of Foucault, as we have said, his ideas do not die. Time takes its course. Some of Foucault's ideas evolve, some change to one degree or another, sometimes even radically. These ideas are therefore significant because they go into a mode of independent existence, even of independent development, no matter how far this may take them from the original intention of their creator. We can agree that „recent theoretical developments on the question of biopower increasingly move away from the model proposed by Foucault“ [114]. And not only on the issue of biopower! To paraphrase a joke about traditions, today Foucault's ideas are not what they used to be. We are sure that Foucault himself would be perplexed by some transformations of his ideas, and would even be genuinely outraged by others.
We pointed out above that, according to Michel Foucault, „we live today not so much in a Rechtsstaat (legal state) or in a disciplinary society as in a society of security“.
This means that, for Foucault, the evolutionary transition takes place:
LAW STATE --> DISCIPLINARY SOCIETY --> SECURITY SOCIETY
Strategy Synergy Security
Personal site of Prof. Dr. Nikolay Slatinski for studies and analyses in the field of national and international security
About
All content on this website is published under the conditions of Creative Commons.
You may copy and distribute the materials for non-commercial purposes freely, as long as you credit the author with a link to this page and allow other people to use them in the same way, but without changing their content.
For any other use outside of the stated conditions, you must pay a royalty to the author.