These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
  The four fundamental concepts forming the buildup, the superstructure of the Science of Security, are discussed – „interest“, „conflict“, „power“ and „security“; they, together with the other four fundamental concepts – „system“, „process“, „logic“ and „abstraction“, forming the basis, the infrastructure of this Science, create the unified categorical complex on which the modern Science of Security is built.
  The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of these four paradigmal, axiomatic concepts:
  Николай Слатински. Сигурността – същност, смисъл и съдържание. София: Военно издателство, 2011.
   [Nikolay Slatinski. Sigurnostta – sushtnost, smisal i sadarzhanie. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2011].
  Nikolay Slatinski. Security – essence, meaning and content. Sofia: Military publishing house, 2011 (in Bulgarian)
  Modern Science of Security is built on eight paradigmal, axiomatic concepts: System, Process, Logic and Abstraction; Interest, Conflict, Power and Security [1].

  Figure 1. Categorical architecture of the Science of Security
  ⁕ The first group of concepts – System, Process, Logic and Abstraction – represent the basis, the infrastructure of the Science of Security.
  Infrastructure – this is a group (a complex) of interrelated elements that serves as the basis for the functioning of a system.
  Note. Clarifications for which no source is explicitly indicated are based on texts and definitions for them in Wikipedia.
  ⁕ The second group of concepts – Interest, Conflict, Power and Security – represent the buildup, the superstructure of the Science of Security.
  Superstructure – this is a group (a complex) of interrelated elements, that builds on the infrastructure and ensures the functioning of the system.
  These four paradigmal, axiomatic concepts, which we will focus on in the present Study, are the most important concepts with which the Science of Security specifically operates. They are paradigmal, axiomatic, precisely because without them it is not possible to build the entire semantic architecture and philosophical essence of this Science.
  In the use of the second, fundamental for the Science of Security, group of concepts, two extremes are visible.
  ‣ On the one hand, taken as if from very life itself, these concepts seem intuitively obvious and are often used without explanation, as if they were taken for granted.
  ‣ On the other hand, for years new and new authors give their own definitions for them, the number of which in some cases is immeasurably large. It is enough to write „security definitions“ in the Google search engine, and everyone can be convinced that a kind of auction is starting – there were over 100, over 200, over 300 different definitions, which is pure absurdity, a light cavalry attack on the positions of the serious science!
  However, both extremes have a significant weakness – they „conserve“ and simplify the idea of each of the four basic concepts. Thus these concepts turn out to be only or mainly what each of us does not doubt that they are – who does not know intuitively or at the everyday level what this is „interest“, or „conflict“, or „power“, or „security“!? But in this way the debate completely disappears – how far the concepts in question are really what they are thought to be; the analysis of their essence is lost; the possibility of the four concepts being looked at and understood from more sides is reduced; entire content layers remain untouched; the sense of interdependence between them is lost; their connection with important spheres of social relations, experience, memory and activity thins. Therefore, other approaches are far more effective, which look for the „golden“ section between the two extremes, which discuss the concepts, especially the key ones, from different, sometimes paradoxical points of view, and thus achieve unexpected nuances, deepening the understanding of these concepts.
  In the working definitions that we will give next:
  • INTEREST is the GOAL;
  • POWER is the MEANS;
  • INTEREST is the impulse pushing through the „holy selfishness of nations“ the participants in international relations to a perpetual motion that only at first glance appears to be Brownian. Everything in these relations is centered around and focused in the interests of the various actors in the global, continental, regional and national processes. The protection of vital (and not only vital) interests is the main goal of these actors on the international stage.
  Brownian motion – disordered, chaotic, random movement of microscopic solid particles, dust particles, grains (Brownian particles) dispersed in a liquid or gas, discovered in 1827 by the Scottish botanist Robert Brown (1773 – 1858).
  • CONFLICT is another name for international relations. It is the mechanism for the most effective defense of the interests of their actors – in, with and through it, the various actors impose their interests. A conflict is a relationship between two or more actors on the international stage, reproducing in an acute form the contradictions underlying this relationship between them [2].
  • POWER is the key, the main argument, the main tool in international relations. It determines the relative weight and, accordingly, the „price“ of the various actors on the international stage. The investment that each actor makes in his power has a very high return, and underestimating the importance of power even today leads to the marginalization and negligible role of the one who has allowed himself such a strategic illusion.
  • SECURITY is the criterion, the measure, the indicator for the successful or unsuccessful participation of the various actors in international relations. It is the main motive, the meaning of the actions (and inactions) of these actors on the international stage. Security is the main commodity traded in the market of international relations. That is why the American political science professor John Herz (1908 – 2005) considers these relations as a „security game“ [3].
  In a number of fields of science (psychology, political science, sociology, anthropology, etc.), the definition of „interest“ is usually in the following vein:
  Interest is a conscious necessity.
  Necessities can be seen as needs for something necessary to maintain the vital activity of the organism, the individual, the social group and the society as a whole. They are the internal instigator, trigger factor for biological and social activity. Necessities reflect the interrelationship of the subject and the conditions for his activity and are manifested in unconscious drives and conscious motives for behavior [4].
  This is what the Russian scientist in the field of international relations Elgiz Pozdnyakov (1929 – 2016) wrote: „The process of realizing social necessities is precisely the process of forming people's interests. If the necessity exists objectively ... then the interest is the subjective expression of the objectively existing necessities. Not just the necessity, but the conscious necessity serves as a stimulus for the activity, i.e. the necessity formed as interest... Interest is not just an objective necessity, but a subjective expression of objective necessities“ [5].
  In the Science of Security, however, at the end of this definition of interest as a conscious necessity, a comma is put, not a period, and it continues as follows:
  This is because Science of Security does not study (is not interested in) all possible necessities, but only those that are of high importance and priority to the system.
  While the necessities must be satisfied and in relation to them this is the maximum that the relevant object strives for, the interests are directed not simply to their fullest possible satisfaction, but to social institutes, organizations, norms of relationships in society, from which depend on the conditions for normal life and normal activity of people (distribution of values and goods) [6]. In this sense, necessities have primarily a biological dominant, and interests – mainly a social dominant.
  We will continue to use the term „system“ in order not to explicitly list „individual“, „community“, „society“, „organization“, etc.
  As the German philosopher and social psychologist Erich Fromm (1900 – 1980) explains, the essential meaning of the word „interest“ „is contained in its root: Latin, inter-esse, „to be in [or] among“ it [7]. The eminent French philosopher Claude Helvetius (1715 – 1771) wrote that „if the physical world is subject to the law of motion, the spiritual world is no less subject to the law of interest“ and therefore called interest „an all-powerful magician, changing in the eyes of all beings every object“. For the great German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 – 1831), interest is „a passion without which nothing has been accomplished“ [8, 9].
  Man, for example, has many conscious necessities, but most of them are rather hopes, desires, illusions, delusions, dreams, because he does nothing, or at least enough, to satisfy and fulfill them.
  Interest is an indication, a sign, a symbol that a system is alive. The existence of interests is the necessary condition for a system to be alive. A system that has no interests is not alive in a social sense, but only in a biological sense – it consumes, it excretes, but in fact no one notices it, is not interested in it, no one considers it and does not respect it, and most of all to try to absorb or destroy it.
  We would like to draw attention: we have just said that a system having interests is a necessary condition for it to be alive. The necessary but not the sufficient condition! The sufficient condition for a system to be alive is that it fights for the realization of its interests. Then it is not just alive – it is vital. Because a system that does not want to be alive or struggle to be alive is simply indistinguishable from a non-living system. The meaning of being alive and vital is to want to live and to struggle to live. And to be alive and vital, beyond the biological sense, means not only to consume and excrete, but to have interests. To fight to be alive means to fight for the protection and realization of your interests. Interest always goes with the struggle for its realization. So a system that has no interests or does not struggle to protect and realize them is indistinguishable from an inanimate one. This means that it has either isolated itself from other systems, or the fact of its existence can be ignored because it is unable to play any role in intra-system relations, nor to make anyone or anything else to reckon with it.
  The logical line of reasoning is as follows:
  Difference ↔ Different Interests
  Systems (people, communities, societies, states) are different and therefore have different interests. The opposite is also true – the systems have different interests, therefore they are different.
  At the root of the difference of the states lies their different interests, just as at the root of the difference of interests lies the difference of the states. And at the base of this base lies inequality between countries. Countries are therefore different and have different interests because they are unequal.
  Inequality is the rule, equality is the exception. A deep meaning is encoded in the inequality, which perhaps contains in a concentrated form the secret of the structure of our world. Perhaps this is precisely why the Italian theologian and philosopher St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 1274) wrote the following: „If all were the same, the whole would not be perfect: which is evident both in the natural and in the civil whole... And in the distribution, some good is assigned to each, as to the individual things are given differently according to their prior distinctness, because of which they are assigned a different share. Therefore, God originally created things different and unequal to one another, in accordance with what was required for the perfection of the universe, and not with any prior difference between things; with the latter He will consider the reward at the Last Judgment, giving to each according to his merit“ [10].
  The German and Anglo-American sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf (1929 – 2009) defined four primary causes of inequality in social systems, in accordance with which inequality arises [11]:
  ▪ from the natural (biological) diversity of the inclinations, characters, interests of people and social groups;
  ▪ from the natural (intellectual) difference of talents, abilities, gifts;
  ▪ from the social differentiation (horizontally) of fundamentally equal positions;
  ▪ from the social stratification (vertically, in accordance with prestige, wealth and socio-cultural background), manifested in hierarchies of social status.
  There are different classifications of the types of interest of the system, depending on the specifics of this system and the objectives of the study. Most often, among the various interests, the following three main types are distinguished:
  ▪ VITAL (existential) interests, which are of high, critical, extreme priority, because their defense is connected with the very existence and development of the system, and for their protection it is ready to pay the highest price;
  ▪ IMPORTANT (substantial) interests that are not directly related to Whether the system will exist and develop, but directly affect How it will exist and develop, i.e. of the quality of its existence and development (that is, if they are threatened, there will be risks for the vital interests) and for their defense it is ready for certain compromises.
  ▪ PERIPHERAL (secondary) interests that can only indirectly affect how the system will exist and develop, i.e. they indirectly affect the quality of existence and its development (i.e. if they are threatened, there will be risks for the important interests) and therefore, in order to guarantee them, the system can make compromises of different scale and scope.
  The concept of „conflict“ is built into the very foundation of Science of Security.
  We have already emphasized above that since the systems are different, they have different interests. But also because they have different interests, the systems are different. We could paraphrase a famous saying: „Tell me what your interests are and I'll tell you who you are“.
  Individual countries differ in geographical location, territory, relief, natural resources, population, military, history, economy, culture, etc. Based on these individual specifics, they form their interests. When they enter into relationships with each other, they actually meet their interests. On the international stage, countries do not relate to each other based on aesthetic considerations and emotional sensuality, but by assessing their interests and their compatibility or incompatibility. Countries do not say to each other: „Wow, what an exciting access to the sea you have!“ or „Wow, how this strategic raw material suits you!“ They value interests that are a function of access to the sea and possession of strategic raw materials.
  The logical line of reasoning is as follows:
  Difference ↔ Different Interests → Conflict
  Systems are different and the main evidence of their difference is their different interests. When the different interests of the systems meet, this interaction is called „conflict“. Conflict is the collision (meeting, interaction) of the different interests of the systems. And the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus (circa 544 BC – circa 483 BC) taught that every collision is an agreement – „an agreement in the opposing tensions between the bow and the lyre“ [12].
  In the Science of Security, the existence of a conflict between two systems, between two countries, between two people is an indication of the normality, naturalness, logic and liveliness of their relations.
  Conflict is another name for interpersonal, interstate, intersystem relations.
  The absence of conflict, on the contrary, let it not sound paradoxical, is a sign of illness, of exhaustion, of emptying of content in the relations between the two parties. The absence of any conflict between the two parties should trigger a red light, it requires the appearance of an „alarm“ signal, it means a rethinking of the relationship, an invitation to reflect, what is happening to this relationship, why it is not normal, because for what reason are they no longer wholesome, not healthy, not constructive.
  Indeed, when in a relationship between two parties, for example, between two people (let it be He and She), can there be no conflicts at all? Well, since these are two different people, they have different interests, in their relationship these different interests meet and their differences invariably lead to conflict?!
  In a relationship between two people, there would be no conflict in one of two extreme situations: when their interests do not intersect, and when the interests of one have completely dissolved into the interests of the other.
  ▪ First, if the interests of the two do not intersect, i.e. they do not interact.
  See Illustration 1a.
  The two meet, maybe they live together, have some kind of coexistence, but this is only superficial, and in practice their interests do not interact and have no point of contact. Each of them does as He or She pleases and neither cares about the other, nor communicates with Her or Him in substance, nor considers Her or Him. With complete estrangement, the disappearance of the need for communication, of the feeling of closeness with the other, no conflict would arise in the relationship between the two. But these are not conflict-free relationships, these are absent relationships...
  If He sits continuously in one room and watches football matches, and She sits in the other room and watches favorite serial films, there would be no conflict in any way, no elementary friction would arise. But if they are together, if they care about each other, then this means thinking about each other's preferences, accepting them as normal, making compromises, giving in, putting up with some adversity and even deprivations – and it will turn out that today the match is more important, and tomorrow – the serial film...

  Illustration 1a. The fields of interest of A and B do not intersect
  ▪ Second, if the interests of one have completely dissolved in the interests of the other.
  See Illustration 1b.
  When He always willingly agrees to be as She says, or She always agrees to have His preference fulfilled, then it is more than logical that conflict in their relationship would not arise in any way and on any occasion.
  How can there be a conflict if He never objects to watching another serial films every night? Or if She is not even once thinks to raise her voice that there is a match on TV again? As soon as one has submitted himself to the will and wishes of the other, there is naturally no room at all for conflict in their relationship.
  It is enough, however, for Him to grunt once that he is also human and has the right to switch the TV on the cup final; or for Her to stamp her foot that this time nothing prevents them from watching the first episode of the new series and then, figuratively speaking, different interests are put on the table, or rather „beat“ each other, and the collusion between different interests means conflict. Which, of course, can be settled quite peacefully and painlessly if the two feel a need for each other and are highly motivated to continue being together, to succeed together and, if it happens, to lose together and help each other overcome together the failures.

  Illustration 1b. Field of interests of B completely dissolves into field of interests of A
  When analyzing the interests between the hypothetical He and She, there is a third case!
  ▪ Third, if the interests of both completely match, i.e. their interests turn out to be identical.
  See Illustration 1c.
  Is there not a contradiction here with everything that has been said so far? How can two different people have a complete coincidence of interests? This is the third extreme case, known as synchronization, and can occur, for example, when these two people have been together for so many years that they have become practically one being with two heads, two bodies, four arms and four legs. We have seen married couples who have been husband and wife for 50 years and more, how they begin to resemble each other even physically – they think alike, suffer alike, rejoice alike, breathe alike, their facial expressions, gestures become simply indistinguishable.
  Synchronization occurs everywhere – „the tendency to synchronize is one of the most pervasive drives in the universe, extending from atoms to animals, from people to planets“ [13]. As english writer Malcolm Gladwell (1963) says: „Anyone who has ever been to the movies knows that the size of the crowd in the theater has a big effect on how good the movie seems: comedies are never funnier and thrillers never more thrilling than in a packed movie house“ [14]. Synchronization in most cases has two manifestations – the elements of the system not only perform the same actions (spatial synchronization), but also these actions are performed through one and the same intervals (time synchronization). When there is synchronization both in space and in time, this amazing phenomenon is synchronization squared. It is like imagining two people running and sometimes jumping at the same time, so that the intervals at which they jump while running are the same. It is such a square synchronization, when associated with aesthetic experiences (rather than destructive effects), that can be called harmony.

  Illustration 1c. The fields of interest of A and B coincide, i.e. are identical (A ≡ B)
  Although the conflict is nothing but a collusion of interests, we must realize that in the verbalization of scientific terms it is better to use, if possible, softer expressions such as „meeting“, „interaction“, in the last case „opposition“. This is because „collision“, „clash“ and indeed „conflict“ are loaded in the Balkan latitudes with a destructive meaning. Just as „compromise“ in the Balkan region sounds too bad.
  During socialism, if someone's description said „conflict personality“, it meant something necessarily bad. And if someone was said to uncompromisingly stand up for his principles, that is necessarily a good thing. But how to build a relationship with a person if he is not capable of compromises, if he only thinks about his own interests?
  However, conflict is not initially evil, it can be a driver of development, it can help to restructure relations and to optimize them. Let us not confuse the conflict with the method of its resolution, which can be non-violent (peaceful) or violent. As a joke, it can be said that the difference between Europe and the Balkans is quite insignificant – in Europe people say „Sit here and let's talk!“, and in the Balkans they say „Go outside and let's talk!“. These are the two options for a way out of the conflict – non-forceful (peaceful) and forceful.
  Strategic managers, including security managers know that there are good and bad conflict personalities (and good and bad conflicts). Capable strategic managers make conflict „work“ for the good of the team, the company, the country and the region. They try to „quench“ only conflicts that are counterproductive and destructive.
  These considerations are also important because Bulgaria is already a member of the EU. And this is a qualitatively different environment. In it, the ability to work in a team, to make compromises is valued no less than personal professional and business qualities. There they prioritize positive synergistic „and-and“ thinking („non-zero-sum conflicts“) over confrontational „either-or“ thinking („zero-sum conflicts“) (see Study 18).
  After the Cold War, on a global scale, the way of thinking and the attitude towards the conflict – between states and between ethnic groups in one country, between different cultures or so-called civilizations – changed radically. Until recently, the Conflict was an unwanted phenomenon tearing the fabric of the system of international relations. The experience of participating in conflicts turned out to be entirely negative, with humiliations of the great powers (in Vietnam, in Afghanistan), bloodshed and degradation of societies, people and the environment. But a vision of the instrumental nature of the Conflict is now required.
  Conflict is seen as a means of directing events in the right direction. If earlier the goal was to regulate, resolve, liquidate, overcome the conflict, now it must be managed, controlled, manipulated, utilized. In other words, the Conflict today is needed alive, under cover; i.e. deactivated, but if necessary also activated, in accordance with the strategic interest. Many of the new conflicts, and especially those in regions of heightened insecurity, for all their historical and embedded logic, contain obvious elements of activated conflicts that always erupt at the right time and place.
  The analysis and resolution (regulation) of conflicts can be carried out by adhering to the framework of two different fields of scientific research [15].
  ▪ The first area is related to law and legal means. To some extent, this is an approach characteristic of the Soviet system of organization of science and knowledge (we will not make a political assessment here, which may lead to ideological speculation). Not for nothing in the spirit of this system, the study of international relations in universities is within the law faculties. In this approach, the regulation of conflicts takes place according to the norms of law and according to strictly defined rules and procedures. It cares very little (or almost nothing) about whether one or both parties to the conflict are satisfied with how their interests are protected under this regulation.
  ▪ The second area is related to the political methods and means of conflict regulation. To some extent, this is an approach characteristic of the Western system of organization of science and knowledge, and therefore there the study of international relations in universities is within the faculties of social sciences. In this approach, first of all, one seeks to find a political solution that will satisfy the interests of both parties through a compromise to some (or even different) degree.
  These two approaches are indeed interrelated, intertwined, „helping each other“. Because if a dispute is settled politically and in violation of international law, then it is vulnerable (its settlement may have become conjunctural, through force). And if it is regulated legally, but not politically, it is also vulnerable because it does not prevent the real contradictions. So the two approaches go hand in hand. Very often, however, the political solution is found first, and then it takes on some legal form.
  Let us return to the theoretical characteristics of the conflict. As has been said, conflict is the interactionof different interests. But while systems have whole palettes, fans, spectrums of interests, not all of these interests fall into the conflict field. Therefore, for the resolution of each specific conflict, an analysis of the interests falling within its conflict field must be made.
  Countries are like people – when they are arguing about something, they are arguing about everything. And it shouldn't be like that. The „quarrel“ should be conducted only for what is the subject of the specific dispute (conflict), which enters the relevant conflict field. In fact, regardless of the complexity and variety of different interests, when we consider a given conflict, the interests of both parties can be systematized in it into three types: non-intersecting interests, coinciding interests and mutually exclusive interests [16, 17] (see Illustration 2 ).

  Illustration 2. Types of interests in the conflict
  ♦ First, these are the NON-INTERSECTING INTERESTS (they can be antagonistic or identical), i.e. the interests that do not fall into the conflict field.
  These interests must be set aside because they are not the subject of the particular conflict. Thus, the antagonistic among them will not bring in new confrontational elements, and the identical among them will not be subjected to negative influences that can turn them into a subject of dispute.
  ♦ Second, it is the COINCIDING INTERESTS, falling into the conflict field.
  In principle, in any conflict, both sides have at least minimal common interests. Even during the Cold War, despite the high degree of confrontation between the USA and the USSR, there were some unwritten rules (tacit rules [18]), above all that this confrontation should not lead to a nuclear catastrophe, and in particular, neither of the two great powers should it does not intervene openly and with military power in the sphere of influence of the other great power (secretly, covertly, with intelligence services and the help of the opposition forces, however, it can).
  Conflicting interests must be also set aside because so as not to be drawn into the spiral of confrontation. They can be used to „quench“ conflict potential, to build bridges of understanding and channels of communication.
  ♦ Third, it is the MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE INTERESTS, falling into the conflict field.
  These are the interests to work on. They are the real point of contention.
  The conflict field can be manipulated in any conflict.
  ‣ On the one hand, it can be extended. Then additional interests of both parties enter into it and become the subject of the dispute (in some cases this is called „packaging“ – one party can tie the specific subject of the dispute in which it is weaker with another disputed issue in which it is stronger and thus partially compensates for its weakness).
  ‣ On the other hand, the conflict field can be narrowed. Then part of the interests that are the subject of the dispute come out of it (in some cases this is called „minimization of goals“ – the parties partially refuse to make certain discrepancies between themselves the subject of their relations).
  Since interests are conscious necesseties, and conscious – this means refracted through consciousness, e.g. with reasonable arguments and logical arguments, with deception and misinformation, with threats and „bribes“, both parties can be convinced that some of their conflicting interests are not such, but on the contrary, coincide, or at least do not fall into the conflict field. In other words, both the conflict field and the conflicting interests can be manipulated until a workable resolution of the conflict is achieved.
  In addition to the three types of interests involved in the conflicts, we can also talk about three types of possible solutions to these conflicts: symmetric, asymmetric and fundamentally new [19].
  ♦ In the SYMMETRICAL DECISION, each of the two parties receives half of what they are arguing about. Especially often this type of solution is applied when it comes to some measurable quantities – money, quantities, territories. Although at first glance it is considered the fairest way out of the conflict, the symmetrical solution is usually the least sustainable and the least effective, because it does not „attack“ the essence of the conflict (the subject of the dispute remains valid, the conflict is not resolved). Moreover, it is very difficult to find such an ideal situation where the two parties involved in the conflict are equal in their material power, legal right or value motivation, so that they feel that the solution satisfies them equally. In general, one side always has some advantage and in symmetrical decisions it will feel that it has been harmed, so it will not be ready to abide by the reached decision for too long. And even if at the given moment there is exemplary equality between the two parties, in the dynamic situation an asymmetry will inevitably occur between the two parties and one of them will seek (overtly or covertly) to revise the agreement reached.
  Sometimes the symmetrical decision is called the „mother's type of decision“ in that the mother loves unconditionally and divides equally between her children – when she cuts the cake between her two sons, she will give them equal pieces.
  ♦ In the ASYMMETRIC DECISION, each of the two parties receives a share proportional to its relative material strength, legal right or value motivation. And this type of solution is most often applied when it comes to some measurable quantities – money, quantities, territories. This solution seems unfair, but in practice it is more sustainable or at least more effective than the symmetrical one, because although it does not „attack“ the essence of the conflict (the subject of the dispute remains in force and the conflict is not resolved), nevertheless it reflects to a much greater extent the real balance of power of the two parties, and therefore each of them has more reason to believe that it is not harmed, and therefore will be more inclined to adhere to the decision reached. Obviously, even in the case of an asymmetric decision, it is logical to expect that due to the dynamic situation, changes (quantitative and even qualitative) may occur in the existing asymmetry between the parties, and the one of them in whose favor this change has occurred will seek (overtly or covertly) to revise the agreement reached.
  The asymmetric decision is sometimes called „father's type of decision“, because while the mother loves unconditionally, the father loves conditionally and therefore shares not equally, but brotherly (this is said in jest), i.e. on real merits or specific needs. Erich Fromm is of the same opinion and therefore writes the following: „Fatherly love is conditional love. Its principle is „I love you because you fulfill my expectations, because you do your duty, because you are like me“... The negative aspect is the very fact that fatherly love has to be deserved, that it can be lost if one does not do what is expected. In the nature of fatherly love lies the fact that obedience becomes the main virtue, that disobedience is the main sin – and its punishment the withdrawal of fatherly love“ [20].
  We would say that the conditionality of the father's love is mainly expressed in the fact that he does not formally divide attention, ambitions, incentives and punishments equally between his children, but grades them – by importance, by priority, by prospects, in relation to the children to him and to life. If the father divides the cake between his sons, he will give the older son more and the younger son less, because if he divides it equally, the first son will not have enough and the second will have some left over.
  ♦ With the FUNDAMENTALLY NEW DECISION, no binding of the interests of the parties (symmetrical or asymmetrical) is sought, but the very subject of the dispute is „attacked“, the essential conflict is resolved.
  The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel reached at Camp David, USA (1978) [21] is an example of a fundamentally new solution. At the so-called Six Day War (1967) Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula belonging to Egypt and the Golan Heights belonging to Syria. Under the auspices and mediation of US President Jimmy Carter, negotiations were held that culminated in the signing of a peace treaty (the Camp David Accords) between Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. In these negotiations, President Carter does not go down the path of finding some partial settlement of the problem with the occupied Sinai Peninsula (for example, to divide it 50%:50% (a symmetrical solution), or for example 30%:70% or 60%: 40% (asymmetric solution), since it would not be accepted either by Israel (through the territory of the Sinai Peninsula, Egypt could strike it suddenly), or by Egypt, and under no conditions (the Sinai Peninsula is ancient Egyptian territory and the voluntary President Sadat's agreement to cede and 1% of it to the Jewish state would have cost him his head in the literal sense of the word on the day he returned to Egypt).
  The solution, namely the fundamentally new „territory vs. Security“ solution, is found by Israel withdrawing completely from the Sinai Peninsula, where such logistical transformations are being carried out and such measures are being taken that no surprise attack by Egypt through the territory is any longer possible on the peninsula that would endanger Israel's security to an unacceptable degree. Thus, the deep causes of the conflict were attacked (for Egypt it is the restoration of sovereignty over the entire territory, and for Israel it is the guarantee of security). Since then, the Sinai Peninsula problem has not existed between the two countries. We will remind that the „Golan Heights“ problem between Syria and Israel remains alive and painful, because these Heights remain even now, more than 55 years after the Six-Day War, occupied by Israel.
  Jimmy Carter (1924) – President of the USA in the period 1977 – 1981.
  Anwar Sadat (1918 – 1981) – President of Egypt in the period 1970 – 1981. Received the Nobel Peace Prize together with Menachem Begin for signing the Camp David Agreement (1978).
  Menachem Begin (1913 – 1992) – Prime Minister of Israel in the period 1977 – 1983.
  There is a significant number of classifications, subject to the understanding that conflict is not a state, but a process and passes through different phases (stages) of development. They are determined by specific parameters related to changes in the state, goals and means of the participants, the scale and intensity of the conflict itself, and the involvement of new participants [22]. These phases can alternate. The conflict can develop both incrementally and in the opposite direction. Not every phase overcomes the causes that can lead to the next one. Its termination through settlement does not remove the problems of the previous phase from the agenda.
  The following phases of a conflict can be distinguished: contradiction, dispute, crisis, real conflict and war.
  • CONTRADICTION is an objective reality and exists constantly in the relations between the parties. It is evidence of a difference in perceptions and goals, which is realized as a fact and becomes the subject of these relations. It is included in the scale of priorities, although still at a very low level, but it can create an intention for action and become the basis for future conflict.
  Contradiction is the lowest, first phase of conflict, which is characterized as RECOGNITION OF DIFFERENCES.
  • DISPUTE is a statement of intentions and principles on the issue. The subject of contradiction moves up the scale of priorities. Arguments can be based on rational or irrational motives. The range of possible compromises is shortened, the strategy of behavior is determined.
  During the dispute, the conflict begins to develop and moves to a more acute phase. This phase is characterized as DECLARATION OF POSITIONS.
  • CRISIS is a situation in which it is determined in which direction the conflict will continue – whether it will be controlled or will start to get out of control. Confrontational elements are accumulating, readiness for confrontation and pressure and coercion is being shown, changes in the security system are being planned. Evidence of relationship breakdown is becoming visible.
  In the crisis, the critical phase of the conflict is reached. This phase is characterized as DEMONSTRATION OF DETERMINATION.
  • REAL CONFLICT is a deepening negative development of the problem with accumulating elements of irreversibility. The security system is readjusting for more decisive action. The price each side is willing to pay for resolving the conflict in its favor is increasing. The opponent is perceived as an enemy, suspected of bad intentions and exposed as a perpetrator of various crimes. Both sides are moving towards localized use of force and limited armed conflict.
  Real conflict is the phase of engaging in confrontation and violence, which is characterized as TAKING ACTION.
  • WAR is a large-scale, comprehensive and total armed conflict. Each participant mobilizes, deploys and puts into action all available resources. Violence escalated on both sides and reached uncontrollable proportions. This leads to irreversible consequences, to destructive systemic deformations and transformations.
  War is the final, destructive phase of conflict, which is characterized as CLASH ESCALATION.
  Conflicts can be systematized according to various criteria [23], for example by subject, number of countries involved, third party intervention, scope, type of the weapons used, intensity, ways of development over time, consequences:
  • Criterion „OBJECT“ (main objectives) – conflicts for territories; for resources; for values (cultural, ideological, religious); economic; commercial; diplomatic etc.
  It is interesting to know, for example, that the Tlingit and Haida Indians in Alaska have value conflicts (wars) when some of them steal from others a song, name or dance [24]! The subject of conflicts can be various deficits: positional deficit (deficit of social positions, statuses, roles); resource deficit (deficit of certain material or spiritual resources); cognitive deficit (deficit of orientations, of information for making correct decisions, of explanations for what is happening and what is to come) [25]. According to Ralf Dahrendorf, „the modern social conflict is an antagonism between rights and their provision, politics and economics, civil rights and economic growth“ [26].
  • Criterion „NUMBER OF COUNTRIES INVOLVED“ – 1 country (i.e. intra-state); 2 countries; more than 2 countries.
  When more than 2 countries are involved, there are different options for confrontation between them:
  ▪▪ Countries are each against each.
  Such is the situation in a certain period of the Cold War, when the three great powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, are irreconcilably opposed to each other. This happens before the playing of the „China card“ by US President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger – i.e. a policy of US rapprochement with one communist state (China) at the expense of increased confrontation with the other communist state (the Soviet Union). In fact, the Chinese leader, Chairman Mao Zedong, believes that he played the American card of rapprochement with one imperialist country (the United States) at the expense of increased confrontation with the other imperialist country (the Soviet Union).
  Richard Nixon (1913 – 1994) – President of the United States, 1969 – 1974. He is the only one to be elected twice as vice president and twice as president, and the only president to resign from that position in connection with the Watergate affair due to the inevitable impeachment. Impeachment is a procedure by which the legislative body officially impeaches a person who is a high-ranking state official, incl. head of state, for treason, violation of the constitution, corruption or other serious criminal offence.
  The „Watergate“ affair (Watergate) is a loud political scandal in the United States, in the period 1972 – 1974, related to illegal actions – the installation of listening devices in the headquarters of the Democratic Party in the „Watergate“ hotel in Washington. On July 27, 1974, the United States Congress began impeachment proceedings against President-elect Richard Nixon, who failed to prove that he had nothing to do with the affair, and on August 9, 1974, resigned in order not to leading to his removal from office.
  Henry Kissinger (1923) – National Security Advisor to President Richard Nixon (1969 – 1975), US Secretary of State (1973 – 1977). Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize (1973).
  Mao Zedong (1893 – 1976) – Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in the period 1943 – 1976.
  ▪▪ A coalition of some countries against a coalition of other countries, and the coalitions are with the same countries – participants in them (permanent coalitions). During the Cold War, there were four nuclear powers in Europe – the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and ... the United States (the United States is often called the greatest Western European military power). Regardless of the various frictions, disagreements and antagonisms regarding the main West-East conflict, there was always one permanent polarization – the Soviet Union against the US, Great Britain and France, in other words, however French President General Charles de Gaulle followed in foreign and defense politics his own strategic line, under him, figuratively speaking, France never once crossed the other side of the Berlin Wall.
  Charles de Gaulle (1890 – 1970) – President of France in the period 1959 – 1969.
  ▪▪ A coalition of some countries against a coalition of other countries, with the composition of each of the coalitions changing over time (flexible coalitions). Part of the strategic genius of the great Prussian and German „Iron“ Chancellor Otto von Bismarck was his foreign policy formula in the system of 5 great powers (Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany) that Germany should always be where the three great powers are [27]. Therefore, if need be, today Germany will be with Great Britain and Austria-Hungary against France and Russia; tomorrow – with Austria-Hungary and Russia against France and Great Britain, and the day after – with Russia and Great Britain against France and Austria-Hungary.
  Otto von Bismarck (1815 – 1898) – Chancellor of the North German Union (1867 – 1871); Reich Chancellor of the German Empire (1871 – 1890).
  • Criterion „THIRD PARTY INTERVENTION“ – conflicts without external intervention, i.e. only countries that are directly affected by the conflict are involved, or conflicts with external intervention, when the conflict involves countries (1 or more) that are not directly affected by the conflict. External intervention can be constructive with the aim of helping to settle the conflict or destructive with the aim of deepening the conflict or taking advantage of the difficulties of some of the countries directly involved in the conflict.
  • Criterion „SCOPE“ – local; national; regional; continental; global conflicts.
  • Criterion „TYPE OF WEAPONS USED“ – conflicts with light (small) arms; conflicts with heavy weapons; conflicts with weapons of mass destruction – nuclear, chemical, biological.
  • Criterion „INTENSITY“ – latent conflicts (fading out, without any violence); conflicts of low intensity (smoldering, episodically reminiscent of itself acts of violence); conflicts of medium intensity (escalating, with increasingly frequent acts of violence); high-intensity conflicts (large-scale, with increasing violence); conflicts of enormous intensity (out of control, with total violence).
  • Criterion „WAYS OF DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME“ – conflicts of uniform intensity and conflicts of uneven intensity (change of phases; pulsations either along the horizontal axis, i.e. from one phase to another – back and forth in development, or on the vertical axis – outbreaks of violence and then declines in violence.
  • Criterion „CONSEQUENCES“ – conflicts with negligible consequences; conflicts with minor consequences; conflicts with medium consequences; conflicts with severe consequences; conflicts with destructive (devastating) consequences.
  Ralf Dahrendorf gives his typology of conflicts [28]:
  ▪ by sources of occurrence – conflicts of interests, conflicts of values, conflicts of identifications;
  ▪ by social consequences – successful, unsuccessful, creative (constructive), destructive (devastating);
  ▪ by scale – local, regional, interstate, global, micro-conflicts, macro-conflicts, mega-conflicts;
  ▪ by forms of struggle – peaceful, non-peaceful;
  ▪ by direction – vertical, horizontal;
  ▪ according to the characteristics of the conditions of origin – endogenous, exogenous;
  ▪ in relation to the subjects of the conflict – real, accidental (conditional), displaced, false, falsely attributed, latent;
  ▪ by the use of the relevant tactics by the parties – „fights“, „games“, „debates“.
  Endogenous – arising, developing in the organism, as a result of internal causes; caused by internal factors.
  Exogenous – caused by external causes and factors.
  We will dwell in more detail on the last type of conflict in Ralph Dahrendorf's typology. In fact, the classification of conflicts as „fights“, „games“ and „debates“ was made by an American specialist in mathematical psychology, general systems theory, mathematical biology and modeling of social interactions, Anatole Rapoport (1911 – 2007) [29].
  ‣ „FIGHTS“ are a type of conflict in which the contradictions between the parties are antagonistic and both sides strive for total victory because the other possible outcome for them is total loss. Such are the conflicts related to values, on which compromise is impossible – either you are for abortion or you are against abortion; you are either for or against the death penalty; either you accept my God or you remain a believer in your God. There is no way to agree on 10% abortion and 90% non-abortion – abortion cannot be performed on one-tenth; nor for 20% execution and 80% non-execution of the death penalty – man cannot be killed at one fifth; nor for 50% of my God and 50% of your God – there is no way to create a synthetic god that is one second of my God and one second of your God.
  ‣ „GAMES“ are a type of conflict in which there are strictly defined rules for the behavior of the parties, such as e.g. of chess. Participants in such conflicts are rational players. Each of them strives to „win“ by optimizing their benefits and minimizing damage, observing these rules.
  ‣ „DEBATES“ are a type of conflict in which „bargaining“ prevails, the ability to trade, to maneuver, to carry out successful diplomacy, to find compromises, to search for the deep cause of the conflict.
  The paradigmal, axiomatic concept of „power“ is undoubtedly key in Science of Security, and when it comes to international relations it is in fact the concept around which their entire theory „revolves“. Different schools in the theory of international relations position themselves depending on their commitment to it.
  The logical line of reasoning is as follows:
  Difference ↔ Different Interests → Conflict → Power
  Systems are different and have different interests. In their relationships, they meet their interests. The interaction of their interests is a conflict. In conflict, systems mobilize all their resources to defend their interests. Power is defined as these „all resources“.
  We pay attention to the explicit emphasis on the word „all“, i.e. that power is all resources that the system has at its disposal in the conflict to defend its interests. That is why between social systems (people, communities, societies, states) there can be inter-system (inter-human, inter-community, inter-society, inter-state) relations, because not everything rests on and not everything is solved by physical force. Between animals, for example, between the fox and the rabbit, there is no inter-animal relationship, because the fox always eats the rabbit. Between people, however, in addition to physical strength, there is law, intelligence, cunning, arguments, diplomacy, charisma, etc., which can affect the final outcome of the relationship between the physically stronger and the physically weaker. This is the only way to explain how a fragile and gentle beauty „puts on the shoulder“ a strong and rough man-beast and triumphantly steps on his chest with the heel of her shoe. Obviously, she defeated him with something other than physical strength – attractiveness, charm, the promise of a bright future.
  It is no coincidence that the remarkable philosopher and historian Niccolò Machiavelli (1469 – 1527) in his immortal masterpiece „The Prine“ (Il Principe, 1513) wrote: „A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves. Therefore, it is necessary to be a fox to discover the snares and a lion to terrify the wolves. Those who rely simply on the lion do not understand what they are about. Therefore a wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate reasons to excuse this nonobservance. Of this endless modern examples could be given, showing how many treaties and engagements have been made void and of no effect through the faithlessness of princes; and he who has known best how to employ the fox has succeeded best. But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find someone who will allow himself to be deceived“ [30].
  According to the prominent American geopolitician of Dutch origin, Nicholas Speakman (1893 – 1943), the power of the state „means survival, the ability to impose one's will on others, the capacity to dictate to those who are without power, and the possibility of forcing concessions from those with less power“ [31].
  The famous Harvard international relations scholar Joseph Nye (1937) believed that power is the ability of a state to achieve its purposes or goals, and another prominent American political scientist Robert Dahl (1915–2014) defined state power as the ability to get others to do what they otherwise would not do [32].
  For the American scholar of international relations, Hans Morgenthau (1904 – 1979), essential characteristics influencing the strength (power) of the state are geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, the quality of diplomacy, the quality of government [33].
  According to the already mentioned Nicholas Speakman, the measures of the power of the state are not only the military forces, but also other factors: size of territory, nature of frontiers, size of population, absence or presence of raw materials, economic and technological development, financial strength, ethnic homogeneity, effective social integration, political stability, and national spirit [34].
  The remarkable French philosopher Raymond Aron (1905 – 1983) believed that the elements of state power were three: the space occupied by the political units; the available materials and the techniques by which they can be transformed into weapons, the number of men and the art of transforming them into soldiers (or, again, the quantity and quality of implements and combatants); the collective capacity for action, which includes the organization of the army, the discipline of the combatants, the quality of the civil and military command, in war and in peace, and the solidarity of the citizens during the conflict in the face of good or bad luck. „These three terms, in their abstract expression, account for the total situation, since they are equivalent to the proposition: the power of a collectivity depends on the theater of its action and on its capacity to use available material and human resources. Milieu, resources, collective action, such are, from every evidence, whatever the century and whatever the forms of competition among political units, the determinants of power“ [35, 36].
  In doing so, Raymond Aron distinguishes the power of the state from its power. For him, power is the state's ability to impose its will on other states, and therefore power is a social relation. And the power of the state is only one of the elements of power. Therefore, the difference between power and strength is a difference between the potential of the state, its material and human resources, on the one hand, and human relations, i.e. the second of its three elements (the capacity for collective action), on the other [37].
  The power of the state on the world stage is directly related to its ability to influence international processes and make others comply with it. While it could be said that the power of a state is not the ultimate solution to all its problems, moreover, as we have seen and will return to this below, power has various constituents of both the military and economic power of the state by no means exhaust its full power. However, no state can escape the shadow of its power (rather, the possible lack of sufficient power), because even if it is not a sufficient condition, power is nevertheless a necessary condition for the voice of the state to be heard, if not globally or continentally, but at least regionally.
  Let us presenta possible systematization of states in the international security system in terms of their power (a concept that, for the purposes of the present analysis, can rightly be considered equivalent to the concept of „strength“):
  • In the first place are the so-called „GREAT POWERS“, which shape the world order and without which not a single problem of global security can be solved.
  The unique unipolar model established after the end of the Cold War has led quite a few scholars to divide the great powers into „merely“ great powers and superpowers in order to give due attention and recognition to the US. In the group of the so-called „great powers“ researchers of international relations and international security, the American Barry Buzan (1946) and the Dane Ole Wever (1960) distinguish two types of states: superpowers and great powers. Superpowers must have first-class military political capabilities and be able to exert military and political influence on a global scale, be active players in the processes of securitization and desecuritization in all or almost all regions of the international system, such as threats, factors, security guarantors, partners or interveners in the region. As a rule, superpowers define „universal“ values globally, and their legitimacy will depend on their ability to secure the legitimacy of these values (such superpowers were Great Britain and France in the 19th century, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union after the First World War; the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II; after the end of the Cold War, only the US is a superpower), while (merely) great power status is less binding in capability and behavior. With great powers, it is not so necessary that they have enormous capabilities in all sectors, and they do not need to have an active presence in all regions and spheres of the international system. The status, the rank of a great power is mainly based on a single key position. What distinguishes great powers from merely regional ones is that the latter are accountable to the former based on the balance of power at the systemic level in the present and the near future. A great power is usually viewed by the other major players as a country that has tangible economic, military and political potential to claim superpower status in the near or medium term. Great powers are either considered regional powers that are possible contenders for superpowers (e.g. China), or they are considered superpowers but with maximum regional power capabilities (e.g. Japan) [38].
  The concept of securitization was introduced in 1995 by Ole Wever – one of the leading participants in the Copenhagen School of Security [39, 40].
  Representatives of the Copenhagen School consider security as an activity, an action and a driving force that makes politics go beyond the established rules and outlines problems as a special type of politics and even above everyday politics. They describe securitization as a much stronger (including extreme/extremal) version of politicization and define it as a successful speech act „through which, within the framework of a political community, mutual understanding is built between subjects regarding how to treat something as an existential threat to a given valuable object and to give the right to call for urgent and extraordinary measures to deal with the threat“ [41].
  • In the second place are the so-called „REGIONAL POWERS“, which are conventionally speaking the great powers in the respective region.
  According to Barry Buzan and Ole Wever's definition, regional powers determine to a large extent the polarity of the respective regional security complex and have influence and capabilities to directly affect securitization processes in the region [42]. Therefore, these are the countries whose role in the given region is extremely important, even defining, but outside the region their influence is much weaker, regardless of what their ambitions are and whether they are used by the great powers to find a balance of power on a global scale. The great powers are fighting for the partnership of the regional powers with all possible means. The US has its own list of „pivot states“ – regional powers that are at the forefront of US strategic interests in the region (South Korea, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, etc.).
  • In the third place are the so-called „STATES WITH LIMITED RESOURCES FOR INFLUENCE“, sometimes not quite precisely (or quite imprecisely) called „small states“.
Most countries in the world are like that. Their role and importance is only (or primarily) within their region, and outside of it, hardly anyone pays much attention to them, regardless of their claims. Great powers and regional powers seek their partnership for their interests and positions in the region through various means and techniques of „hard“ and „soft“ power (see below), coercions and incentives, „sticks“ and „carrots“.
  • In the fourth place are the so-called „MINISTATES“, which are so small and insignificant that they cannot play any particular role.
  Examples of such countries are Andorra, San Marino, Liechtenstein. However, there are a number of examples that show that even small countries can do well in this confused world. An extreme example of this is Luxembourg, because within NATO it has the same weight as a vote as in theory the US, UK, France and Germany, because in NATO decisions are made by consensus.
  • In the fifth place are the so-called „FAILED STATES“, disintegrated states that have become territories where there is no central authority and/or where different factions wage „war of all against all“. These gray areas breed, sow and spread various diseases, contagions and miasmas to the world – terrorism, crime, violence, AIDS, etc. They, like swamps that spread mosquitoes and poisonous reptiles, must be drained, sanitized and cultivated so that they do not spill over their ailments to neighboring countries, regions and continents.
  • In the sixth place are the so-called „ROGUE STATES“, i.e. the criminal states, which the world community denied equal participation in international relations, punished them with isolation, branded them as criminal regimes and pariahs, suspended their membership in leading processes and organizations or excluded these „states“ from them. The USA has its own list of such countries, called the „Axis of Evil“ or in some other similar way, which most often includes the DPRK, Syria, Cuba, Iran (until recently, Iraq and Libya were also considered such).
  Before our eyes, Russia has turned into a rogue state, a bandit state, a criminal state. And this „promises“ dark and gloomy times for this country waging a bloody, terroristic, thuggish, criminal and totally unprovoked war against neighboring Ukraine.
  Of these six types of countries:
  ‣ the first three types of states (great powers, regional powers, states with limited resources for influence) reflect SUBJECTIVITY in the system of international relations, i.e. they are first and foremost the SUBJECTS in this system, who act in accordance with their national power (strength) on the processes taking place in it;
  ‣ the second three types of states (mini-states, failed states, rogue states) reflect the OBJECTIVITY in the system of international relations, because they are mostly the OBJECTS that are affected by the processes in this system.
  Bulgaria falls into the category of countries with limited resources for influence, i.e. the real, reasonable and pragmatic goals and priorities of the Bulgarian foreign policy must be concentrated and focused in our region (Southeastern Europe), in this amazing triangular space, the peaks of which rest and even get stuck in some of the most explosive zones of increased insecurity and instability – the Western Balkans, Transcaucasia and the Middle East.
  After Russia invaded Ukraine in an absolutely illegal and barbaric manner, the risks to Bulgaria's national security have escalated and may become difficult to manage, if at all, in the short to medium term.
  States with limited resources for influence must always remember that in big politics a state that tries to to jump over its shadow may itself become a shadow.
  According to Joseph Nye, two components of power can be considered – hard power and soft power [43].
  In this approach, everything depends on whether the system experiences a material IMPACT, i.e. impact from hard power, and then, accordingly, we have hard security, or else the system experiences immaterial INFLUENCE (soft power) and then, respectively, we have soft security.
  • Hard power is related to material impact; it deals with measurable quantities/potentials: force, pressure, army, power – these are sticks, sanctions, punishments, etc.
  • Soft power is related to intangible influence; it deals with immeasurable (or difficult, relatively measurable) quantities/potentials: manipulation, disinformation, ideas, ideologies – these are carrots, incentives, rewards.
  Self-respecting countries do not rely only on their military and economic power, i.e. of hard power. They pay more and more attention to soft power – to culture, ideology, education, technology, the ability to manipulate as a new, modern and extremely important dimension of a state's power.
  Through soft power, you can subtly and with velvet gloves make your norms acceptable and legitimate in the eyes of others and they follow your wishes with minimal resistance [44]. Soft power is „the ability to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion. It works by convincing others to follow, or getting them to agree to norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. Soft power can rest on the appeal of one’s ideas or the ability to set the agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others“ [45].
  Although both hard and soft power are the ability to achieve one's goals by controlling the behavior of others, hard power seeks to change what others do through coercion, while soft power seeks to shape what others desire through the attractiveness of own values [46]. In the first, the weak does what the strong wants; in the second, the weak wants what the strong does. In the first case, the threat is more direct, more open and cruder, and in the second – more indirect, more refined and more insidious.
  Recently, Joseph Nye also introduced the concept of „smart“ power:
  • Smart power is [actually not quite the correct name of what it represents] the optimal mix between hard power and soft power [47].
  It was said „not quite the correct name“, because in fact we are not talking about smart power as much as about effective power.
  We can define violence as the effect of the application of power by one state (a community of people, an individual) on another state (a community of people, an individual) for the purpose of coercion, i.e. to make it (to him/her) to do, to force, to oblige to do, to concede or to accept something, to have a certain behavior.
  The nature of the violence depends on the power applied.
  • When violence results from the application of hard power, the violence is also called hard. In fact, in our understanding, it is hard violence that is perceived as violence and bears this name – „violence“. By its nature, it is STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE, because it is related to the direct effects of the structural elements, i.e. derives from structural capabilities, roles, relationships, dependencies. As human beings, that is as parts of a complex, self-organizing system, we constantly experience on ourselves this structural violence, it tries to place us within frameworks of certain behavior, to limit our mobility along the social network (horizontally) and the social hierarchy (vertically), to minimize our social roles and limit our decision-making autonomy.
  • When violence is the result of the application of soft power, it is naturally called soft violence, but it is very rarely perceived precisely as violence. If in hard violence we are affected, for example, to go from point A to point B, in soft violence we are influenced to do the same – by being paid (buying), by being persuaded, by being promises some reward by being motivated – e.g. with the idea of a better (brighter) future or a better (higher) standard of living. By its nature, soft violence is SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE, because it is formed and exerts its influence exclusively in the sphere of symbols, signs, virtual artifacts; and also because it is not felt physically, but perceived mentally.
  And as the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1930 – 2002) wrote: „Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incoporated form of the structure of the relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural; or, in other words, when the schemes they implement in order to perceive and evaluate themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female, white/black, etc.) are the product of the incorporation of the (thus naturalized) classifications which their social being is the product“ [48]. The power achieved through symbolic violence is, on the one hand, really power – full-fledged and self-reproducing. But on the other hand it is like a negation of power because „it is exerted only with the collaboration of those who undergo it because they help to construct it as such… This submission is in no way a 'voluntary servitude' and this complicity is not granted by a conscious, deliberate act; it is itself the effect of a power, which is durably inscribed in the bodies of the dominated, in the form of schemes of perception and dispositions (to respect, admire, love, etc.), in other words, beliefs which make one sensitive to certain public manifestations, such as public representations of power“ [49].
  Just as the interest goes with the efforts for its implementation, so power plays a role in intersystem relations only when it is applied, when it is a tool for realizing a more significant position in relation to opponents, when it is active, affecting. For example, if two young men put in a lot of effort in the gym and are equal in physical strength, but one of them uses his strength to bring order to the neighborhood, and the other works on his figure and strength to look into the eyes of girls and impresses with his figure, of the two, only the first, from the point of view of security science, is „powerful“, he is, figuratively speaking, a pole in neighborhood „geopolitics“. Naturally, if the appearance of a physically strong person is classified not as hard, but as soft power (in this case – as attractiveness), then the second young man is also „powerful“ – in the struggle not for power over other young people in the neighborhood, but for power over the hearts of the girls in this neighborhood.
  In international relations, the imbalance of power does not condemn the weaker state to a foregone failure. The scientific literature points to various ways in which a weaker state can achieve a better outcome in a conflict than a formal consideration of the balance of power between it and its opponent would suggest.
  In the event of a conflict between two countries, the weaker of them can act, for example, in one of the following ways:
  • to appeal to the principles of international law – it is possible that its opponent wants not to be accused by the international community of violating the principles of law and behaving as an aggressor, therefore to back down from his intentions and thereby arrive at a fairer for the weaker state solution to the conflict;
  • to appeal to the „history“ of relations with the other party – this means reminding the other party that it can fully achieve what it is aiming for, but this will destroy the entire historical heritage of good relations between the two countries;
  • to appeal to the future of relations with the other party – so it can be made to think whether if it does not strive for unconditional victory now, it will not create conditions in the future to acquire a reliable and grateful partner;
  • to appeal for new negotiations – at the moment the weaker party will be brought to its knees, but it can buy time by asking for the differences between the two parties to be settled a little later;
  • to seek to link this conflict, in which the country is weaker, to some other dispute, where its positions are stronger – thus compensating for its current weakness and obtaining a better outcome from the conflict (mentioned early as „packaging“);
  • to appeal to the national interest – to convince the other party that reaching a fairer agreement is in its national interest;
  • to resort to obstructions – for example, by sabotaging the negotiation process, preventing the reaching of an agreement, creating formal obstacles to the conclusion of the conflict;
  • to use a third party as an intermediary – in this way, the authority of the intermediary can have a compensatory function in relation to the weaker state;
  • to look for internal disagreements among the other party – this way it unity can be weakened and it can be demobilized;
  • to create a coalition – to compensate for its weakness;
  • to join the enemy of his enemy – not for nothing in the Middle East they say: „The friend of my friend is my friend, but the enemy of my enemy is my brother“…;
  • to appeal to a higher authority – by turning to a leading international organization (UN, OSCE), the weaker state can seek a fairer regulation of the conflict;
  • to appeal to public opinion – not every state is indifferent to – how the international community treats it, and the need to comply with public opinion can force the stronger state to make concessions [50];
  • to strive to discuss only the most advantageous issues for it – so the disadvantageous problems in which the weaker state is in an difficult position will go into the background, as well as the building of bridges between the two states, the creation of a culture of interaction, can moderate the output of deferred discussion questions [51].
  Although it is natural to remember that „the weak often prove to be much stronger than they imagine, and the powerful may be much weaker than is generally believed“ [52], yet the chances of the weaker state in a conflict is limited precisely because it is weaker. Approaches such as those listed and similar to them are not a panacea. They can only alleviate it lot to some extent. In today's interconnected and interdependent world, the weaker state must not isolate itself from international relations, but actively participate in them, in order to be able to place conflicts with other states not in a bilateral, but in a multilateral, international context. Only in this way can its chances for a successful outcome increase. In addition, the dimensions of the power become more and more, and this expands the room for maneuver. For example, if a state is militarily weaker, it can compensate for this weakness with economic power, and if it is economically weak, it can compensate for its weakness by taking advantage of its geostrategic and geographical position, and so make others invest in its security, protect and respect it.
  And so, at last, we have come to the essence, to the eighth and most important paradigmatic, axiomatic concept in the science of security – the very concept of „security“!
  Security is a particularly complex and important scientific category, located at the foundation of the existence and development of every individual, community, society and country.
  Security has a dual role:
  ♦ on the one hand, security is the reason for which the individual, the community of individuals, the social system undertakes certain actions (i.e. security is the motive, the impetus, the occasion, the stimulus) and therefore it stands AT THE INPUT of the activity of social subjects, actors, players;
  ♦ on the other hand, security is the measure of the effectiveness of the actions taken (that is, security is the evaluation criterion, the measure, the result) and it therefore stands AT THE OUTPUT of the activity of these social subjects, actors, players.
  Security is what gives rise to the actions of social actors and what determines the effectiveness of their actions. This duality of security manifests itself along with a number of other dualities (including security is subjective and objective; security is quantitative and qualitative; security is a biological/physiological and society/community need, etc.).
  Security – for which peoples from the most ancient times fought with each other to the death, which poets sang in moving and breathtaking poems, for the sake of which heroes went to the gallows and to the shooting!
  Security – the essence of which has been repeatedly pondered by some of the greatest geniuses of mankind of all time, including Plato himself, who wrote that security is „the prevention of harm“ [53].
  Security – for which in the pantheon of the ancient Romans, the great creators of Statehood, Army, Law and Morality, there is a separate goddess Securitata (Securĭtas, Securitas), personifying the security of every Roman citizen and of Rome as a whole. From the time of the emperor Augustus, it is often mentioned in connection with the peace and quiet he introduced. Her attributes are a scepter, a laurel or olive branch, a cornucopia.
  Gaius Julius Caesar Augustus (63 BC – 14 AD) – the first Roman emperor; he ruled the Roman Empire from 27 BC until his death in AD 14.
  A scepter (or rod) – an ancient symbol of power, is a long metal rod that has some symbolic image on the top.
  Laurel – an evergreen shrub, considered sacred in ancient times, its leaves are used as a spice (bay leaf). In ancient times, the heads of winners, priests, poets were decorated with a laurel wreath.
  The olive branch is a sign of peace.
  The cornucopia is a symbol of fertility, wealth, grace.
  Security is the meaning and endeavour in the choice of behavior of a system and is the main driving motive that gives purposefulness and rationality in the existence, survival and prosperity of the system and in the realization of the mission and goals laid down in that system.
  The logical line of reasoning is as follows:
  Difference ↔ Different Interests → Conflict → Power → Security
  Systems have different interests. The interaction of their interests is a conflict. In conflict, each system uses its power to defend its interests. Security is the measure of how successfully the conflict has ended for the system, i.e. whether it effectively applied its power and how it protected its interests in the conflict.
  If, after the end of the conflict, the security of the system increased or at least did not decrease, then the conflict ended positively for the system, its interests were protected, if not optimally, at least satisfactorily, and the use of its power was justified. However, if the security of the system has decreased, then the conflict has ended negatively for the system, its interests have not been properly protected, and the use of its power has not been justified.
  That is why, with whatever principles a foreign policy is justified, in the end it is evaluated by whether, as a result, the security of the state, society and people increases or at least does not decrease. Otherwise, something is fundamentally wrong with the strategy itself. A country participates in the market of international relations, not to be patted on the back or a little bit down, but to „buy“ security. This is what the Bulgarian international relations scholar Georgi Stefanov claims: „Security is the most general indicator of the effectiveness of foreign policy“ [54]. And according to Article 24, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria, national security is the main goal of the country's foreign policy [55]. The English philosopher and economist John Stuart Mill (1806 – 1873) defines security as an interest of a higher order, obliging to protect what is necessary for the well-being of the citizens of the state [56]. For Bulgarian philosopher Vasil Prodanov (1946): „National security is a basic moral and political right of every state, a supreme good and goal, one of the most important categories in making political decisions“ [57].
  Yes, security remains the main commodity that is traded in the Market of international relations, but, figuratively speaking, new payment instruments appear with which this Market works, concepts such as futures, liquidity, interest, annuity are shockingly changing when it comes to on the payouts, savings and share price of this fast growing global Market of Security. Today, even the richest, with the fattest accounts and long positions of accumulated security, societies and people cannot hope that they are secured with it forever. In this market, on these exchanges, someone with just a few pennies of „security“ can cause a stock crash and plunge this entire market into anarchy and chaos. Because in the world of global terrorism practiced by states and terrorist networks, security is an over-inflated bubble that can be burst with the rustiest little needle by the most seemingly harmless kid.
  For a more practical use of a comparatively clear and relatively accessible definition for a wider range of readers, it can be said that:
  System security is a state in which the existence of the system is guaranteed and its vital interests are reliably protected.
  If there is a threat to these interests, the system experiences a lack of security, i.e. the system is in a state of uncertainty. To protect vital interests, enormous resources are sacrificed, always when only in this way the system can guarantee its existence and development.
  Such an understanding of security serves as a fairly well-worked and visual definition of security.
  This definition „captures“ important elements of the understanding of security, but it „misses“ some key features and properties of the paradigmal, axiomatic concept of „security“, of the basic scientific category „Security“.
  That is why in Study 2 we have given a definition that reflects our understanding of security. This definition covers everything principal, basic, significant and key that is directly and immediately related to security:
  Security for a social system (individual, community, society, state, community of states) exists when the basic ideals, goals, values and interests of the system are not subject to any impact (Absolute safety) or they are not threatened by existing impacts that the social system is not able to effectively neutralize (Protected safety), control (Relative security), or manage (Transformational security).
  Thus, in Studies 9 and 20, as well as in this Study, we presented the eight fundamental concepts, the unified categorical complex, on which the modern, contemporary and forward-looking, multidisciplinary Security Science is built and developed:
  ♦ System, Process, Logic and Abstraction;
  ♦ Interest, Conflict, Power and Security.
  So far, in our Etudes, a long and complicated, but extremely important and necessary path has been covered – the peculiar, metaphorical Temple of the Science of Security has been built. And this is done in such a way that, we are convinced, corresponds to a large extent to today's and tomorrow's, not yesterday's day of this science and gravitates to the knowledge taught, studied and deepened in the serious European and American universities, institutes, think tanks, analysis and forecasting centers. In the following Studies, we will continue to pay attention to the complex essence, fundamental meaning and deep content of security – this so complex and ambiguous, but also so remarkable and exciting scientific category – „Security“.
  1. Слатински, Николай. Сигурността – същност, смисъл и съдържание. София.: Военно издателство, 2011, с. 35 – 118.
  Slatinski, Nikolay. Sigurnostta – sushtnost, smisal i sadarzhanie. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2011. (in Bulgarian)
   (Slatinski, Nikolay. Security – essence, meaning and content)
  2. Афанасьев, С. Д. и др. Современные буржуазные теории международных отношений (критический анализ). Москва: Наука, 1976, с. 332.
  Afanasiev, S. D. i dr. Sovremennie burzhuaznie teorii mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenii (kriticheskii analiz). Moskva: Nauka, 1976, s. 332. (in Russian)
   (Afanasyev, S. D. and others. Modern bourgeois theories of international relations (critical analysis)
  3. Herz, John. International Politics in the Atomic Age. New York: Columbia University press, 1962, p. 3.
  4. Возжеников, А., А. Прохожев. Государственное управление и национальная безопасность России. Москва: РАГС, 1999, с. 28.
  Vozzhenikov, A., A. Prohozhev. Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie i nacionalma\\naia bezopasnost Rossii. Moskva: RAGS, 1999, s. 28. (in Russian)
   (Vozzhenikov, A., A. Prokhozhev. Public administration and national security of Russia)
  5. Поздняков, Эльгиз. Системный подход и международные отношения. Москва: Наука, 1976, с. 121.
  Pozdnyakov, Elgiz. Sistemniy podhod I mezhdunarodnie otnoshenia. Moskva: Nauka, 1976, s. 121. (in Russian)
   (Pozdnyakov, Elgiz. System approach and international relations)
  6. Возжеников, А., А. Прохожев. Государственное управление..., ibid., с. 30.
Vozzhenikov, A., A. Prohozhev. Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie..., ibid., р. 30.
  7. Fromm, Erich. To have or to be. Continuum, 2005, p. 17.
  8. Федякин, А.В. „Национальные интересы“ как категория политической науки. // Вестник МГУ, серия 12, Политические науки, 2000, № 4, с. 113.
  Fediakin, A. V. „Nacionalniy interesy“ kak kategoria politicheskoi nauki. // Vestnik MGU, seria 12, Politicheski nauki, 2000, № 4, s. 113. (in Russian)
   (Fedyakin, A.V. „National interests“ as a category of political science)
  9. Возжеников, А., А. Прохожев. Государственное управление..., ibidem.
  Vozzhenikov, A., A. Prohozhev. Gosudarstvennoe upravlenie..., ibidem.
  10. Аквино, Тома от. Философски трактати. София: Изток-Запад, 2011, 130 – 131.
  Akvino, Toma ot. Filosofski traktati. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2011, 130 – 131. (in Bulgarian)
   (Aquino, Thomas of. Philosophical treatises)
  11. Пронин, С. В., А. П. Давыдов, Л. Я. Машозерская. Социальные конфликты в современном обществе. Москва: Наука, 1993, с. 39.
  Pronin, S. V., A. P. Davydov, L. Ya. Mashozerskaya. Socialnie konflikty v sovremennom obshchestve. Moskva: Nauka, 1993, s. 39. (in Russian)
   (Pronin, S. V., A. P. Davydov, L. Ya. Mashozerskaya. Social conflicts in modern society)
  12. Велчев, Йордан. Градът или Между Изтока и Запада, XIV – XVII век. Пловдив: Жанет 45, 2005, с. 672.
  Velchev, Jordan. Gradut i.i Mezhdu Iztoka i Zapada, XIV – XVII vek. Plovdiv: Zhanet 45, 2005, s. 672. (in Bulgarian)
   (Velchev, Jordan. The City or Between East and West, XIV - XVII century)
  13. Strogatz, Steven Henry. Sync: how order emerges from chaos in the universe, nature, and daily life. New York: Hyperion Books, 2003, 13 – 14.
  14. Gladwell Malcolm. The tipping point: how little things can make a big difference, Oxford University Press, 1994, р. 171.
  15. Лебедева, Марина М. Политическое урегулирование конфликтов. Подходы, решения, технологии. Москва: Аспект Прес, 1997, с. 8.
  Lebedeva, Marina. Politicheskoe uregulirovanie konfliktov. Podhody, reshenia, tehnologii. Moskva: Aspekt Pres, 1997, s. 8. (in Russian)
   (Lebedeva, Marina M. Political settlement of conflicts. Approaches, solutions, technologies)
  16. See mainly: Лебедева, Марина М. Политическое урегулирование…, ibid., 184 – 185.
  Lebedeva, Marina. Politicheskoe uregulirovanie…, ibid., 184 – 185.
  17. Удалов, Вадим В. Баланс сил и баланс интересов. // Международная жизнь, 1990 № 5, с. 19.
  Udalov, Vadim V. Balans sil i balans interesov. // Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, 1990 № 5, s. 19. (in Russian)
   (Udalov, Vadim V. Balance of forces and balance of interests)
  18. Miller, Benjamin. When Opponents Cooperate. Great Power Conflict and Collaboration in World Politics. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1995, p. 82.
  19. Вж. основно: Лебедева, Марина. Вам предстоят переговоры. Москва: Экономика, 1993, 41 – 46.
  See mainly: Lebedeva, Marina. Vam predstoiat peregovory. Moskva: Ekonomika, 1993, 41 – 46. (in Russian)
  (Lebedeva, Marina. Negotiations are coming up)
  20. Fromm, Erich. The Art of Loving. Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2006, 64 – 65.
  21. Fisher, Roger, William L. Ury. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Penguin , 1991, pp. 24 et seq.
  22. Журкин, В. В., Е. М. Примаков (ред.). Международные конфликты. Москва: Международные отношения, 1972, с. 53.
  Zhurkin, V.V., E.M. Primakov (red.). Mezhdunarodnie konflikty. Moskva: Mezhdunarodnie otnoshenia, 1972, s. 53. (in Russian)
(Zhurkin, V.V., E.M. Primakov (eds.). International conflicts)
  23. Вж. частично също: Генов, Георги. Конфликтът като политическо явление и процес. – Във: Гочев, Атанас, Георги Генов, Николай Младенов, Петър Христов. Ранно сигнализиране и предотвратяване на конфликти. София: 1997, с. 23.
  See partly also: Genov, Georgi. Konflikt kato politichesko iavlenie i process. – Vuv: Gochev, Atanas, Georgi Genov, Nikolay Mladenov, Petar Hristov. Ranno signalizirane i predotvratiavane na konflikti. Sofia: 1997, s. 23. (in Bulgarian)
   (Genov, Georgi. The conflict as a political phenomenon and process)
  24. Във: Пирожкова, Людмила. Человек и война. // ОНС, 1997, № 4, с. 157.
  Vuv: Pirozhkova, Lyudmila. Chelovek i voina. // ONS, 1997, № 4, s. 157. (in Russian)
   (Pirozhkova, Lyudmila. Man and war)
  25. Глухова, Александра. Политические конфликты: основания, типология, динамика (теоретико-методологический анализ). Москва: Эдиториал УРСС, 2000, с. 8.
  Gluhova, Alexandra. Politicheski konflikty: osnovania, tipologia, dinamika (teoretiko-metodologicheskii and methodological analysis). Moskva: Editorial URSS, 2000, s. 8. (in Russian)
   (Glukhova, Alexandra. Political conflicts: foundations, typology, dynamics (theoretical and methodological analysis)
  26. Дарендорф, Ралф. Съвременният социален конфликт. София: Център за изследване на демокрацията, 1993, с. 7.
  Dahrendorf, Ralph. Savremenniat socialen konflict. Sofia: Centur za izsledvane na demokraciata, 1993, s. 7. (in Bulgarian)
  (Dahrendorf, Ralph. Modern social conflict)
  27. Kagan, Donald. On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace. New York: Doubleday, 1995, p. 153.
  28. Дмитриев, Анатолий. Конфликтология. Москва: Гардарики, 2001, с. 293.
  Dmitriev, Anatoly. Konfliktologia. Moskva: Gardariki, 2002, s. 293 (in Russian)
   (Dmitriev, Anatoly. Conflictology)
  29. Афанасьев, С. Д. и др., Современные буржуазные теории..., ibid.., с. 336.
  Afanasiev, S. D. i dr. Sovremennie burzhuaznie teorii..., ibid.., с. 336.
  30. Machiavelli, Nicolo. The Prince. Downloaded from, 83 – 84.
  31. Thompson, Kenneth W. Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy. Theory and Practice. Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1992, р. 104.
  32. Nye, Joseph S., David A. Welch. Understanding global conflict & cooperation. Pearson Education, 2014, p. 46.
  33. Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace (Fourth Edition). New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954, 106 – 187.
  34. Spykman, Nicholas John. America's Strategy in World Politics. The United States and the Balance of Power, Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., 1942, p. 19.
  35. Aron, Raymond. Peace and war : a theory o f international relations. New York: Routledge, 2003, р. 54.
  36. Цыганков, Павел. Теория международных отношений. Москва: Гардарики, 2005, с. 280.
  Tsygankov, Pavel. Teoria mezhdunarodnyh otnosheniy. Moskva: Gardariki, 2005, s. 280. (in Russian)
   (Tsygankov, Pavel. International relations theory)
  37. Ibidem.
  38. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver. Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 34 – 35.
  39. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 23 et seq.
  40. Слатински, Николай. Петте нива на сигурността. С.: Военно издателство, 2010, стр. 157 – 161, 128 – 131.
  Slatinski, Nikolay. Pette niva na sigurnostta. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2010. (in Bulgarian)
   (Slatinski, Nikolay. Five levels of security)
  41. Проданов, Васил. Секюритизацията и десекюритизацията като характеристики на съвременните общества. – В: Международни отношения, 2010, No. 3, стр. 61 – 72.
  Prodanov, Vasil. Sekiuritizaciata I desekiuritizaciata kato harakteristiki na savremennite obshtestva. V: Mezhdunarodni otnoshenia, 2010, No. 3, str. 61 – 72. (in Bulgarian)
   (Prodanov, Vasil. Securitization and desecuritization as characteristics of modern societies)
  42. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver. Regions and Powers…, ibid., p. 47.
  43. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public Affairs, 2004, 6 – 30.
  44. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: BasicBooks, 1990, p. 32.
  45. Nye. Joseph S. Jr., William A. Owens. America’s Information Edge, 115 – 136, p. 136, in: Alberts, David S., Daniel S. Papp. Information Age Anthology: National Security Implications of the Information Age, Volume II, CCRP publication series, 2000,
  46. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. Bound to Lead. The Changing Nature of American Power. New York: BasicBooks, 1990, p. 267.
  47. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. The Future of Power. PublicAffairs, 2011, XIII – XIV.
  48. Bourdieu, Pierre. Pascalian Meditations. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2000, р. 170.
  49. Ibid., p. 171.
  50. Рубин, Джефри, Джесвальд Салакюз. Фактор силы в международных переговорах. // Международная жизнь, 1995, № 5, 30 – 38.
  Rubin, Dzhefri, Dzeswald Salacuse. Faktor sily v mezhdunarodnyh peregovorah. // Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn, 1995, № 5, 30 – 38. (in Russian)
   (Rubin, Jeffrey, Jesvald Salakiuz. Factor of power in international negotiations)
  51. Лебедева, Марина М. Политическое урегулирование…, ibid., с. 251.
  Lebedeva, Marina. Politicheskoe uregulirovanie…, ibid., p. 251.
  52. Рубин, Джефри, Джесвальд Салакюз. Фактор силы…, ibid., с. 38.
Rubin, Dzhefri, Dzeswald Salacuse. Faktor sily…, ibid., p. 38.
  53. Трахимёнок, Сергей. Безопасность государства. Методолого-правовые аспекты. Минск: Хата, 1997, с. 22.
  Trahimionok, Sergey. Bezopasnost gosudarstva. Metodologo-pravovie aspekty. Minsk: Hata, 1997, s. 22. (in Russian)
   (Trachimenok, Sergey. State security)
  54. Стефанов, Георги. Международната сигурност. София: Сиела, 1997, с. 9.
  Stefanov, Georgi. Mezhdunarodnata sigurnost. Sofia: Siela, 1997, s. 9. (in Bulgarian)
   (Stefanov, Georgi. International security)
  55. Конституция на Република България. // Държавен вестник, № 56, 13.07.1991.
  Konstitucai na republika Bulgaria. // Durzhaven vestnik, № 56, 13.07.1991. (in Bulgarian)
   (Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria)
  56. Алексеева, Татьяна. Дилемма безопасности: американский вариант. // Полис, 1993, № 6, с.19.
  Alekseeva, Tatyana. Dilemma bezopasnosti: amerikanskii varian. // Polis, 1993, № 6, s.19. (in Russian)
   (Alekseeva, Tatyana. The Security Dilemma: The American Version)
  57. Проданов, Васил. Вътрешната сигурност и националната държава. // Военен журнал, 1995, № 2, с. 9.
  Prodanov, Vasil. Vutreshnata sigurnost nacionalnata durzhava. // Voenen zhurnal, 1995, № 2, s. 9. (in Bulgarian)
   (Prodanov, Vasil. Homeland Security and the Nation State)
  Brief explanation:
  The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.


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