Strategy Synergy Security

  These Studies on Security contain only the results of my scientific views, research, analyses and models. In other words, they provide a SUMMARY of my MAJOR contributions to the Science of Security.
  
  STUDY 10. TRADITIONAL AND NON-TRADITIONAL CHALLENGES, RISKS, DANGERS AND THREATS
  
  Complexes of modern strategic, systemic and critical security problems – challenges, risks, dangers and threats – are divided into two alternative categories, into two basic kinds (types) – traditional and non-traditional. The main lines characterizing this division of them are classified, which is extremely relevant for today's time of ever-greater uncertainty and ever-increasing insecurity.
  
  The following monograph of mine is devoted to a detailed analysis of the fundamental divisions of traditional and non-traditional challenges, risks, dangers and threats:
  Николай Слатински. Рискът – новото име на Сигурността. София: Изток-Запад, 2019.
   [Nikolay Slatinski. Riskut – novoto ime na Sigurnostta. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019].
  Nikolay Slatinski. Risk – the Name of Security. Sofia: Iztok-Zapad, 2019 (in Bulgarian)
  
  In a number of analyzes of leading strategic research institutions and prominent experts in the field of international relations and geopolitics, security and defense, such significant processes and problems, phenomena and destructive factors as organized crime, terrorism, hybrid wars, cyber(in)security, climate changes, pandemics, various emergency situations (natural, anthropogenic and technogenic), the migration crisis (as studied by the Science of Security) or the refugee wave (as perceived by society and the media) are defined as non-traditional manifestations of an expanding spectrum of contemporary challenges, risks, dangers and threats that have a critical and potentially catastrophic potential. To them, when it comes to Bulgaria, we must add the demographic crisis, which in the last 2-3 decades has turned into a demographic catastrophe, as well as the large, ever-deepening social division.
  Inevitably, however, the question arises – since almost the entire list of challenges, risks, dangers and threats mentioned above existed before, then why is the characteristic „non-traditional“ „attached“ to them? This is indeed a very serious, key question. And it is not only related to the terminology, but affects the very meaning, essence and content of what the Science of Security should primarily deal with these days. Because no matter how familiar the mentioned threatening processes and problems, phenomena and destructive factors, giving rise to crises and situations with critically increased insecurity, sound, the logical doubt arises regarding their non-traditionality – does it exist and, if it does exist, in what way does it express itself.
  That is why we will devote space here to reflections on the traditional and non-traditional in these security-trelated processes and problems, phenomena and destructive factors – about the traditional and non-traditional in relation to the COMPLEX of four basic concepts in the Science of Security discussed in Study 4. These really fundamentally important four categories, as already shown, are integratively combined by the Relationship „Challenge-Risk-Hazard-Threat“ and are linked synthetically (i.e. represented) by the acronym „CreDiT“.
  Let us clarify that open contradictions and ongoing disputes about which challenges, risks, dangers and threats to international and national security are traditional and which are non-traditional are by no means only our, Bulgarian weakness, this is undoubtedly a general scientific weakness.
  
  Now we will systematize separate groups of authors and their dividing lines in terms of traditional and non-traditional challenges, risks, dangers and threats.
  
  • According to the FIRST GROUP of authors, there used to be one old type of challenges, risks, dangers and threats that now manifest themselves in a NEW, RADICALLY DIFFERENT WAY and only their name remains the same, while their content sometimes changes beyond recognition. Along with them, NEW, RADICALLY DIFFERENT challenges, risks, dangers and threats (for example, cyber(in)security) appear and manifest themselves.
  That is why the division „TRADITIONAL–NON-TRADITIONAL“ follows the line „OLD–NEW“.
  
  • According to the SECOND GROUP of authors, the main idea is that until the end of the Cold War and in the first years after it, symmetric challenges, risks, dangers and threats were in the foreground, while today and especially after September 11, 2001, the world is facing different – asymmetric challenges, risks, dangers and threats.
That is why the division „TRADITIONAL–NON-TRADITIONAL“ follows the line    „SYMMETRIC–ASYMMETRIC“.
  At the same time, the authors of this second group differ in the criteria for symmetry and asymmetry – whether these criteria refer to the means (forces, resources) or to the applications (strategies, tactics) of these means (forces, resources).
  In fact, it is fundamentally important to clarify where to look for and find asymmetry – whether when „there is [not] comparability in forces, weapons, resources“, i.e. when there is an asymmetry in the means, or when there is „a type of threat in which are used unconventional, unconventional, unfamiliar and unexpected tactics, approaches and actions for the enemy“ [1], i.e. when there is an asymmetry in actions.
  
  • According to the THIRD GROUP of authors, the main difference lies in the intensity of challenges, risks, dangers and threats – for example, there were both terrorism and climate change before, but now they are much more intense (both as manifestation and especially as consequences), with a new level of scale, scope, potential, impact and consequences.
  Therefore, the „TRADITIONAL–NON-TRADITIONAL“ follows the line „LOWER INTENSITY–HIGHER INTENSITY“.
  
  • According to the FOURTH GROUP of authors, the main thing in the previous challenges, risks, dangers and threats was their quantitative nature (mostly as impact and caused changes), while the main thing in the challenges, risks, dangers and threats today refers to their qualitative nature (also mostly as impact and caused changes), in other words, the non-traditionality of new challenges, risks, dangers and threats is expressed in their modern, qualitatively different and oriented towards qualitative rather than quantitative effects evolution.
  That is why the division „TRADITIONAL–NON-TRADITIONAL“ follows the line „QUANTITATIVE– QUALITATIVE“.
  
  These four groups of authors are undoubtedly an integral part of the contemporary expert debate on traditional and non-traditional challenges, risks, dangers and threats. But however important they were, and however imperatively necessary their account was (and continues to be), there is no doubt that their classifications and lines of division could and should have been supplemented. This supplementation is related to a very important aspect – to the aspect of securitization.
  
  The concept of „securitization“ was introduced in 1995, albeit in a different context, by Ole Weaver (1960), one of the leading participants in the Copenhagen School of Security [2, 3].
  Representatives of the Copenhagen School consider security as an activity, an action and a driving force that makes politics go beyond the established rules and outlines problems as a special type of politics and even above everyday politics. They describe securitization as a much stronger (including extreme/extremal) version of politicization and define it as a successful speech act „through which, within the framework of a political community, mutual understanding is built between subjects regarding how to treat something as an existential threat to a given valuable object and to give the right to call for urgent and extraordinary measures to deal with the threat” [4].
  According to the understanding of the Copenhagen School, any social problem can be considered:
  ‣ or in the non-political sphere (the state does not deal with it and it is not the subject of public debate and political decision);
  ‣ or in the political sphere (the problem is part of the public policy and requires a management decision and certain resources);
  ‣ or in the realm of the extraordinary, i.e. it has become securitized (it is an existential threat requiring extraordinary measures and actions that go beyond the normal framework of political procedure).
  What is particularly important is the threshold at which one issue is securitized. A problem can be said to be securitized, but in fact it becomes so only when society sees it in this way. This is precisely the condition for extraordinary measures to be accepted as legitimate.
  Successful securitization has three components (or steps):
  1) existential threats;
  2) extraordinary action;
  3) and effects on interunit relations by breaking free of rules [5].
  An important point that the Bulgarian scientist Vasil Prodanov (1946) draws attention to is that „if actions are taken to increase the security of a given object, this does not mean that [it] is in danger, but that something has been successfully constructed as essential problem“ [6], i.e. it is possible, through speculative speech acts, especially by statesmen and politicians, to replace some real problems with others that serve these statesmen and politicians to construct threats and problems that lead to their securitization, hence the need for extraordinary or special measures (including those involving the use of force) that go beyond normal policy. In fact, living the „normal politics“ is a failure in its implementation. Once one problem is securitized, it is very difficult (and not always) or at least too slow to be desecuritized.
  
  In this regard, special attention is paid to the exceptional importance of speech acts of individuals, which are key factors for security management. In pursuit of their political goals, they often succumb to the temptation to „play with fire“, to turn the security problem into a securitized problem. In this sense, the so-called facilitating conditions are formulated, through which speech acts can become successful and adequately reflect the real situation of the problem and the need for an effective response in relation to this problem: „a) the form of the speech act; b) the position of the one who pronounces it; c) the historical resonance of the statement associated with certain threats” [7].
  
  Security problems are almost always existential, and their solutions are most often political. These problems can be managed relatively successfully and up to a certain point only if they lead to quantitative changes, and very difficult when they lead to qualitative changes.
  
  A distinction must be made (and this distinction is essential!) between:
  ‣ SECURITY PROBLEMS – problems, that are related to security;
and
  ‣ SECURITIZED PROBLEMS – problems, that are essential to security.
  
  A problem, that is related to security (a security problem) becomes a problem that is essential to security (a securitized problem), i.e. it becomes securitized, when, as a result of it qualitative changes occur, and society cannot overcome them without mobilization and structural transformations.
  
  National security is based on a kind of law: the larger and more acute the crisis in which a country is, the more unstable it is, the more problems are securitized, i.e. from problems that are related to security, they become problems that are essential to security.
  Not every problem is necessarily an immediate, essential security problem, but it becomes so from the moment when, as has been said, it cannot be overcome without mobilization and structural transformations in the state and in the national security system, in the society and in the public relations.
  
  It was stated above that the securitized problem goes beyond the standard political procedure for making decisions, for implementing the necessary measures and allocating the necessary resources, i.e. it goes beyond the normal policy of security (related to normal situations and conditions) and moves into the realm of the extraordinary policy of securitization (related to extraordinary situations and a-normal conditions). In such an extreme situation, the one who has the authority and responsibility to act and control the situation is no longer bound by the existing standard rules and procedures.
  The mere fact that existing rules and procedures are abandoned does not mean that there is a securitized problem. Similarly, an emerging existential threat does not necessarily mean that the problem it creates has become securitized. It all depends on the scale to which this existential threat has reached, and its significance for society. But it would be logical to assume that the emergence of an existential threat presupposes and legitimizes the adoption of extraordinary measures and the violation of standard rules and procedures.
  That is why the securitized problem can only be adequately answered if the three specific conditions already mentioned are present:
   (1) occurrence of an existential threat;
   (2) taking extraordinary measures;
   (3) violation of existing rules and procedures in order to more effectively react and interact between all institutions [8].
  In this sense, one speaks of an Act of Securitization – this is the very act of breaking the generally accepted rules and procedures, that occurs when politics goes outside the bounds of these established rules and procedures and it is considered legitimate (i.e. institutionalized) to violate them, regardless of whether they are they are mandatory in normal situations, or precisely because they are mandatory in such situations [9].
  But in such a case the question invariably arises:
   „Who has the right to authorize the violation of established rules and procedures?“
  This means who makes the decisions in cases that are not legally regulated, but this cannot be done without the need to violate these rules and procedures.
  This is the most important question:
   „Who makes the decision to declare a state of emergency and determines the actions during the state of emergency?“
  This is the question for the securitization manager, i.e. for the manager of the securitized problem.
  
  The German philosopher and legal forerunner of the „total state“ Carl Schmitt (1888 – 1985) defines the securitizing manager as „all-powerful“ and calls him the „sovereign“ [10]. Absolutely accurate and relevant definitions, because they adequately characterize the very essence of such a person – a person who makes „exceptions that are allowed“ and „suspends the right in a state of emergency“ [11]; a person who „can directly, in all the fullness of his power, stand up for the protection of public security and the existence of the state” [12].
  
  Carlschmitt's „all-powerful“ person, „sovereign“ is a concept, a sign, even a metaphor for something incredibly important and with far-reaching consequences, because the one who makes the decision to declare a state of emergency is burdened with enormous, almost bordering on Divine power – not only to determine the situation as an emergency, but also to determine how long it will be such, according to what extraordinary rules and procedures will be lived and worked under this emergency situation, how long the society or community will be in it, what will be the punishments and sanctions for deviating from the necessary and proper conduct, etc. It is obvious that the state of emergency can be both a transition to normality (regularity) and a legitimization of abnormality (extraordinaryness) as a new normality (regularity).
  
  The following consideration is also important here. If an emergency situation is, among other things, a speech act, then it can be speculatively or propagandistically told, manipulatively or selfishly „sold“ by the authorities to society as an emergency, even if it is not one.
  But why would the authorities resort to such disinformation?
  They can resort to it:
  • If the authorities are incompetent to assess the true scale of the situation;
  • If the authorities are under stress and have fallen into a stupor because of their helplessness or because fear is said to have big eyes, the authorities may mistakenly assess that the situation is extraordinary;
  • If the authorities want to hide their unpreparedness, inability to take adequate measures, to coordinate adequate structures, to allocate adequate resources and to use adequate opportunities to effectively manage complex situations of different types and with different potentials;
  • If the authorities hope that when a situation is an emergency, society will more easily understand its situation, will be more understanding and more lenient towards their actions – Well, the situation is an emergency after all! Here is how much the authorities have done, what efforts they made, how it seems to them that they are overtired, how they have tried everything possible, etc.;
  • If the authorities decide that talking about the emergency is welcome, because in such an emergency the public can more easily agree to extraordinary powers – when, if not in an emergency situation, should such powers be given to the authorities?! And having received these extraordinary powers, the authorities can use them not to overcome the emergency situation, but for their own purposes: to raise their rating, to strengthen themselves as authorities, to drive the opposition into a corner and to declare it destructive and even dangerous, and also, as mentioned above, to distract attention from their own weaknesses, from their own slovenliness to an emergency situation, from their own unpreparedness and even from their own unsuitability and, in general, from their own inability to manage crises.
  
  Based on what has been said so far, it can be rightfully asserted that many traditional challenges, risks, dangers and threats to which countries, peoples and societies are accustomed, today, undoubtedly, begin to enter a new dimension and a new manifestation, i.e. to enter, in other words, into extraordinarity, to become securitized, and from related to security, to grow into essential to security.
  This understanding, substantiated by irrefutable logic, makes it possible to add a fifth group of authors to the already mentioned four groups of authors.
  We will explain the most essential in their views.
  
  
  • According to the FIFTH GROUP of authors, previously the leading ones were challenges, risks, dangers and threats related to security (security problems), and now the leading ones are challenges, risks, dangers and threats that are essential to security (securitized problems), i.e. those that cannot be overcome by society without mobilization and structural transformations.
  These securitized problems go beyond the standard political procedure for management decisions, for implementing the necessary measures and allocating the necessary resources, i.e. they go beyond the framework of normal security policy (related to normal situations and conditions) and move into the realm of extraordinary security policy, into the realm of securitization (related to emergency situations and conditions).
  That is why the division „TRADITIONAL–NON-TRADITIONAL“ follows the line „SECURITY–SECURITIZED“.
  
  Speaking specifically about our country, our analysis gives us arguments to conclude that Bulgaria is in a post-catastrophic situation and faces a number of very serious challenges, risks, dangers and threats, some of which have become securitized, i.e. they fall under the category of extraordinary and cannot be counteracted with palliative measures within the framework of normal planning and management. Along with the two securitized phenomena in the national security sphere mentioned above – the demographic crisis turning into a demographic catastrophe and the huge social division – we can point to corruption as a securitized problem in the political sphere.
  
  • The demographic crisis in Bulgaria is extremely complicated by the so-called. „Roma problem“ (Gypsies are called “Roma” in Bulgaria), related to the possibility that in 15–20 years we will face a critical (catastrophic) situation, when 1 million out of the 6 million then inhabiting Bulgaria will consist mainly of marginalized, often asocial, partially sociopathically deformed as a system of values people who contribute nothing to the country, expect only benefits from the state, do not have labor skills, share the conviction that criminal behavior is justified because of poverty, and therefore this behavior can become a tool for their existence.
  
  • Social division in Bulgaria is growing and may eventually tear the fabric of society. If this rapid growth of social division is not controlled by democratic, economic, financial and security-related means, it may even lead to the degeneration of society and its transformation into a jungle, i.e. to the natural condition described by the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679),• Social division in Bulgaria is growing and may eventually tear the fabric of society. If this rapid growth of social division is not controlled by democratic, economic, financial and security-related means, it may even lead to the degeneration of society and its transformation into a jungle, i.e. to the natural condition described by the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679), in which people live in anarchy, without a common authority over them to respect them, i.e. without a supreme arbiter to bring order and enacting laws. This natural condition is a „war of every man against every man“ („bellum omnium contra omnes“), „and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short“. That is why „when establishing a state, people are guided by the desire to get rid of the disastrous state of war“ [13].
  And what else can society expect and how will it continue to be necessary civilized and sufficiently just if its structure, which creates the danger of social upheavals, is not far from the proportion of 1%:5%:94%? This actually means the ultra-rich 1%, living in high-security neighborhoods and basking in luxury; 5% – over-satisfied and hypocritically calling themselves „middle class“; and 94% – the rest of society. What development, what integrity, what common goals, values and interests can we talk about in such a society, which is rather a non-society, an anti-society?
  
  • Corruption in Bulgaria has acquired such proportions and causes such damage to politics, economy, finance, society and citizens that it can undoubtedly be defined as a securitized problem. For more than 30 years, various governments have not been able to give a true and precise answer to the securitized problem of „corruption“. They come to power promising to „break the backbone“ of corruption, but at the end of their rule, both objective criteria and subjective feelings indicate that corruption has not only not decreased, but even increased. This undermines people's faith in democracy, tears apart the social fabric, increases the stratification in our society, „unblocks“ additional channels of direct and covert influence of oligarchic and criminal structures on the governance of our country.
  Complete eradication of corruption is an unrealistic goal. But the fact that corruption is a securitized problem requires that its containment and control must become a strategic priority of national security policy. This also applies to the national security system itself, which has become a „grey zone“ of corruption and an „experimental field“ where new corrupt approaches and methods of ineffective management are invented and tested. The institutions of the national security system – thanks to the significant resources allocated to them and because of the veil of secrecy and opacity of their decisions – are generators of abuse of taxpayer money and burden the public with expensive projects and expenses that do not produce the necessary security.
  
  So, the division of challenges, risks, dangers and threats into traditional and non-traditional should be based on a holistic and comprehensive analysis and assessment of all their essential characteristics, potentials and capabilities for escalation. As a result of such an analysis and assessment, the challenges, risks, dangers and threats are divided into two main categories, into two main kinds (types):
  ♦ Kind (Type 1) – „traditional“: old, symmetric, lower intensity, quantitative, related to security (security) challenges, risks, dangers and threats;
  ♦ Kind (Type 2) – „non-traditional“: new, asymmetric, higher intensity, qualitative, essential to security (securitized) challenges, risks, dangers and threats.
  
  In this sense, a threat (the same can be said for a danger, for a risk, for a challenge) is traditional if it is old (that existed before and manifests itself now in the old, familiar way); if it is symmetric; if it is of lower intensity; if it leads to quantitative changes; and if it creates problems that are related to security (security problems).
  Similarly, a threat (the same can be said for a danger, for a risk, for a challenge) is non-traditional if it is new (that has existed before, but now manifests itself in a new, radically different way, or did not exist before); if it is asymmetric; if it is of higher intensity; if it leads to qualitative changes; and if it creates problems that are essential to security (securitized problems).
  
  Let us return, for example, to the problem of the migration crisis (as it is studied by the Science of Security) or the refugee wave (as it is perceived by society and the media). It must be considered and referred to the contemporary political context. Only in this context and only through it will we be able to understand what in its manifestation as a non-traditional threatening critical factor is new, takes place as asymmetric, is of higher intensity, leads to qualitative changes and becomes a securitized problem.
  
  With the entry into the Risk Society, it is logical, and even inevitable, that a qualitatively new, non-traditional type of problems will be of increasing scientific and practical interest:
  ‣ On the one hand, such problems, which – from related to risks, or, to put it more clearly, from representing risks, that is to say, from problems that generate risks, RISK PROBLEMS, as they have been until now, are able (have the potential) to escalate extremely quickly and undergo a qualitative (and not just quantitative) transformation, thus becoming problems capable of generating very serious, complex, destructive and difficult to manage risks and, thus are riskized, that is to say, they become RISKIZED PROBLEMS;
  ‣ On the other hand, in parallel with them and even more often – independently of them in the Risk Society new, radically different, non-traditional problems with extremely high potential and also capable of generating very serious, complex, destructive and difficult to manage risks are emerging and thus also are riskized, that is to say, they also become RISKIZED PROBLEMS.
  
  We will dwell on the riskized problems below, but it is especially important to understand from now on that these problems need to be „attacked“ proactively, energetically, and, if possible, aggressively and at the general, at the SYSTEM LEVEL – so that control over them is maintained and the system is not plunged into a long wave of insecurity and instability that would threaten its very existence.
  
  Apart from us, other authors also write about riskized problems and riskization, although in a somewhat different context – something that is not strange at all, the strange thing would be if no one else had guessed about them [14 ].
  
  Let's summarize for clarity:
  ▪ RISK PROBLEMS, i.e. problems that are related to risks or, as it was more clearly stated, that are risks, that are generating risks – these are THE TRADITIONAL RISKS, the previous generation of risks.
  TRADITIONAL RISKS, risk problems – these are risks that existed before and what they were until recently, i.e. risks that still manifest themselves even today in the old, well-known (although always carrying certain, or rather uncertain; and known, or rather unknown surprises) way and for the management of which there is developed expertise, there is accumulated experience, there is a decision-supporting routine, there are models, approaches, procedures, standards, best practices and culture of of behavior.
  
  ▪ RISKIZED PROBLEMS, i.e. problems that are capable of giving rise to very serious, complex, destructive and difficult to manage risks, i.e. which are capable of being riskized, of becoming precisely riskized problems – these are THE NON-TRADITIONAL RISKS, the new generation of risks.
  NON-TRADITIONAL RISKS, the new generation of risks, riskized problems are such risks that either existed earlier, but now manifest in a new, radically different way, or did not exist earlier.
  
  When we talk about non-traditional risks, the new generation of risks, riskized problems, we should know that very often such a risk is actually a whole family of similar (related) risks – of its mutations. In other words, when a risk, i.e. a risk problem is transformed into a riskized problem, this is most often (but not always) associated with its successive – several or multiple – mutations, creating a whole family of similar and related risks. So then, when we talk about a riskized problem, as a rule, we mean precisely the general, generic name of the sum of the individual mutations of this new generation risk, of this non-traditional risk.
We will give an example with the Covid-19 virus pandemic – it is generally said that it is caused by one specific coronavirus, but in fact its causative agents are a whole family of individual mutations of a specific SARS-CoV-2 virus (coronavirus).
  
  Riskized problems, new generation risks, non-traditional risks are a very serious test for any complex, self-organizing, dynamic and non-equilibrium systems. When such a system is unable to effectively manage a riskized problem, it faces significant difficulties and stresses, and even the hypothetical possibility of the beginning of the collapse of its main systemic functions, and thus the system loses unrecoverable parts of its systemicity and falls into a state of unmanageable insecurity. The resulting rapidly developing process of destabilization threatens the very existence of the system. Moreover, a riskized problem is capable of extremely destructively exploiting not only the vulnerability that is directly related to it, but also ANY OTHER system vulnerability! This is why the system can no longer treat a riskized problem by itself, on its own, in isolation, or at least independently of other risk problems (traditional risks) or other riskized problems (non-traditional risks), but it must approach a given riskized problem and accordingly − the problems of its security – in a complex way - systemic, holistic, unified. A riskized problem has the potential to destroy and bring down the entire system. A riskized problem is like a cancer that can and does seek to destroy the entire organism, even though it strikes a specific organ.
  
  When, say, a certain environmental risk is riskized, it threatens not only the ecology of the system (country, region, world), but the entire existence of this system.
  
  In the case of a riskized problem, the SPECIFIC VULNERABILITY through which this new generation risk, this non-traditional risk, „slips through“, can become a vulnerability through which ANY OTHER RISK will already „slip through“. At the same time, the opposite is also true – a riskized problem, a new generation risk, a non-traditional risk can „slip through“ not only through the vulnerability directly related to it, but also through ANY OTHER vulnerability of the system.
  
  If a traditional risk, a risk problem can be attacked and managed by itself, on its own, individually, then the non-traditional risk, a risk of the new generation, a riskized problem must be „attacked“ in a complex manner, at the level of the entire system.
  
  Let's make it clear so there are no misunderstandings:
  There have always been risks. Risks are not something new that appeared in the Risk Society.
  What then is new, non-traditional about risks in the Risk Society?
  The new thing is that:
  ‣ either in the Risk Society the previous generation of risks, traditional risks manifest themselves in a new, radically different, non-traditional way, because they acquire an escalating and highly destructive potential;
  ‣ or in the Risk Society new, radically different generation of risks emerges and manifests themselves – the non-traditional risks, the riskized problems – also with escalating and highly destructive potential.
  
  In other words, as was said, along with
  ‣ TRADITIONAL RISKS, i.e. the old generation of risks; problems generating risks; problems related to risks, problems representing risks – RISK PROBLEMS;
  
  we will already increasingly face the urgent need to manage
  ‣ NON-TRADITIONAL RISKS, i.e. the new generation of risks, very serious, complex risks with escalating and highly destructive potential; problems that are riskized – RISKIZED PROBLEMS.
  
  Due to the extreme importance, we will explain it again!
  
  • Traditional risk, RISK PROBLEM is related to a SPECIFIC vulnerability of the system. It can „slip through“ into the system through this („its“, specific, related) vulnerability. At the same time, the presence of this SPECIFIC vulnerability is an „invitation“ for the risk associated with it to materialize.
  Risks are like sharks – just as a shark smells blood from afar and heads to the appropriate location where that blood has appeared, so a risk from afar „sniffs“ whether a system has an associated with it vulnerability and if it „senses“ that the system does have such vulnerability, this risk is rapidly moving towards the system.
  Counteraction to such a risk is carried out by minimizing (or eliminating) its inherent vulnerability.
  
  Unlike a traditional risk (a RISK PROBLEM)
  a non-traditional risk, a risk of the new generation of risks (a RISKIZED PROBLEM) can exploit ANY vulnerability of the system. And, accordingly, ANY vulnerability of the system can turn out to be a „hole“, through which a riskized problem can see an opportunity for its realization and, accordingly (and immediately) take advantage of this „hole“, of this vulnerability.
  Counteraction to a riskized problem is carried out only at the systemic, general, complex, whole (holistic) level!
  
  If we take the Covid-19 virus pandemic as an example again, we can consider the coronavirus that gave rise to it (with the terminological stipulation made above) as a non-traditional risk, as a risk from the new generation of risks, AS A RISKIZED PROBLEM.
  The coronavirus, the cause of this pandemic, „scans“ the system – be it the individual or the respective society (the respective country) and if it finds any vulnerability in it, it attacks this system – the individual or the society – through it.
  An individual may have a vulnerable respiratory system, or digestive system, or cardiovascular system, or excretory system, or reproductive system, or some other system or an individual organ. The coronavirus immediately attacks the relevant system of the body or the given organ.
  The same goes for society. A society may have various vulnerabilities – for example, an aging population, or weak political leadership, or an inefficient health system, or a concentration of many people in a narrow space (nursing homes, guest-worker neighborhoods, or minority ghettos). The coronavirus immediately attacks this vulnerability of society.
  Once it penetrates the SPECIFIC vulnerability of the individual or society, the coronavirus:
  ‣ on the one hand, makes this vulnerability available to ANY OTHER virus (or destructive factor, or causer of harm and damage, or destabilizer, or disorganizer, or disintegrator);
  ‣ on the other hand – at the same time it strikes the system (individual, society) AS A WHOLE and weakens it (inflicts harms and damages, or destructures, or disorganizes, or disintegrates it).
  Counteraction to this coronavirus cannot be effectively conducted by only „sanitizing“ and strengthening the SPECIFIC vulnerability of the system (individual, society) – this can and should be done by affecting the WHOLE SYSTEM (individual, society).
  
  
  References:
  1. Държавна комисия по сигурността на информацията. Рисковe за интересите на Република България в областта на защитата на класифицираната информация, слайд 4.
  Darzhavna komisia po sigurnostta na informaciata. Riskove za interesite na Republika Bulgaria v oblastta na zashtitata na klasificiranata informacia, slaid 4. (in Bulgarian)
   (State Commission on Information Security. Risks for the interests of the Republic of Bulgaria in the field of protection of classified information, slide 4)
  2. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998, pp. 23 et seq.
  3. Слатински, Николай. Петте нива на сигурността. С.: Военно издателство, 2010, стр. 157 – 161, 128 – 131.
  Slatinski, Nikolay. Pette niva na sigurnostta. Sofia: Voenno iztadelstvo, 2010. (in Bulgarian)
   (Slatinski, Nikolay. Five levels of security)
  4. Проданов, Васил. Секюритизацията и десекюритизацията като характеристики на съвременните общества. – В: Международни отношения, 2010, No. 3, стр. 61 – 72.
  Prodanov, Vasil. Sekiuritizaciata I desekiuritizaciata kato harakteristiki na savremennite obshtestva. V: Mezhdunarodni otnoshenia, 2010, No. 3, str. 61 – 72. (in Bulgarian)
   (Prodanov, Vasil. Securitization and desecuritization as characteristics of modern societies)
  5. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, ibid., рр. 25 – 26.
  6. Prodanov, Vasil, ibidem.
  7. Prodanov, Vasil, ibid. pp. 61 – 62.
  8. Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, ibidem.
  9. Макарычев, Андрей. Мишель Фуко как теоретик безопасности: критическое прочтение концептов. – В: Мировая экономика и международные отношения, No. 3, 2008, 81 – 90, cтр. 83.
  Makarychev, Andrey. Mishel Fuko kak teoretik bezopasnosti: kriticheskoe prochtenie konceptov. V: Mirovaya ekonomika I mezhdunarodnye otnoshenia, No. 3, 2008, 81 – 90, str. 83. (in Russian)
   (Makarychev, Andrey. Michel Foucault as a security theorist: a critical conceptual reading)
  10. Клайн, Нейоми. Шоковата доктрина. Възходът на капитализма на бедствията. С.: Изток-Запад, 2011, с. 169.
  Klain, Neyomi. Shokovata doktrina. Vazhodut na kapitalizma na bedstviata. S.: Iztok-Zapad, 2011, s. 169. (in Bulgarian)
   (Klein, Naomi. The shock doctrine. The Rise of Disaster Capitalism)
  11. Троянов, Илия, Юли Цее. Посегателство над свободата. Истерия за сигурност, полицейска държава и ограничаване на гражданските права. Русе: Елиас Канети, стр. 143 – 144.
  Troyanov, Ilia, Iuli Tsee. Posegatelstvo and svobodata. Isteriya za sigurnost, policeyska durzhava i ogranichavane na grazhdanskite orava. Ruse: Elias Kaneti, pp. 143 – 144. (in Bulgarian)
   (Troyanov, Ilia, Yuli Tse. Encroachment on freedom. Hysteria about security, the police state and the curtailment of civil rights)
  12. Quote by: Makarychev, Andrey, ibid., р. 84.
  13. Hobbes, Thomas, William Molesworth (ed.). THE LEVIATHAN. https://cloudflare-ipfs.com/ipfs/bafykbzaceaj6ngzccgfhm5gud3ggx5oowq3bgi..., p. 88.
  14. Corry, Olaf. Securitzation and 'Riskization': Two Grammars of Security. Working paper prepared for Standing Group on International Relations, 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference, Stockholm 9th - 11th September, 2010, https://docplayer.net/42865528-Securitzation-and-riskization-two-grammar....
  
  
  02/05/2023
  
  
  Brief explanation:
  The texts of my Studies have been translated into English by me. They have not been read and edited by a native English speaker, nor by a professional translator. Therefore, all errors and ambiguities caused by the quality of the translation are solely mine. But I have been guided by the thought that the purpose of these Studies is to give information about my contributions to the Science of Security by presenting them in a brief exposition, and not to demonstrate excellent English, which, unfortunately, I cannot boast of.